



Brussels, 14.7.2021  
COM(2021) 564 final

2021/0214 (COD)

Proposal for a

**REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL**

**establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism**

(Text with EEA relevance)

{SWD(2021) 643 final} - {SWD(2021) 644 final} - {SWD(2021) 647 final} -  
{SEC(2021) 564 final}

## **EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM**

### **1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL**

#### **• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal**

The world is facing a profound climate crisis and the challenges of climate change require a global response. Strong international cooperation will strengthen the joint climate action needed by all the Parties of the Paris Agreement to meet the goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels<sup>1</sup>.

The European Union's international leadership must go hand in hand with bold domestic action. To meet the objective of a climate-neutral EU by 2050 in line with the Paris Agreement, the Union needs to increase its ambition for the coming decade and update its climate and energy policy framework. This process is already projected to start under the existing EU legislation. Furthermore, as announced in the European Green Deal<sup>2</sup>, the Commission has proposed a new EU target for 2030 of reducing greenhouse gas ('GHG') emissions by at least 55 per cent compared to levels in 1990<sup>3</sup>, based on a comprehensive impact assessment<sup>4</sup>. This objective has been endorsed by the European Council<sup>5</sup> and communicated to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change making it internationally binding<sup>6</sup>. The European Climate Law, as agreed with the co-legislators, sets the new 2030 target while making the EU's climate neutrality objective legally binding<sup>7</sup>.

To deliver on these GHG emissions reductions in line with the European Climate Law, the Commission proposes to revise where necessary all relevant policy instruments by July 2021 in a 'Fit for 55 Package', which covers in particular the review of sectoral legislation in the fields of climate, energy, transport, and taxation<sup>8</sup>. A carbon border adjustment mechanism ('CBAM'), announced in the European Green Deal, is part of that package and will serve as an essential element of the EU toolbox to meet the objective of a climate-neutral EU by 2050 in line with the Paris Agreement by addressing risks of carbon leakage as a result of the increased Union climate ambition. The European Parliament adopted in March 2021 a resolution advocating for the introduction of a WTO-compatible carbon border adjustment mechanism<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Article 2(1)(a) of the Paris Agreement.

<sup>2</sup> Communication from the Commission of 11 December 2019 on The European Green Deal (COM(2019) 640 final, p. 4).

<sup>3</sup> The Commission put forward the proposal COM(2020) 563 final, amending the initial Commission proposal on the European climate law to include a revised EU emission reduction target of at least 55 % by 2030. On 10-11 December 2020, the European Council in its conclusions endorsed this increased EU target.

<sup>4</sup> Communication from the Commission of 17 September 2020 on Stepping up Europe's 2030 climate ambition. (COM(2020) 562 final: Part 1/2).

<sup>5</sup> Conclusions of the European Council of 11 December 2020. (EUCO 22/20 CO EUR 17 CONCL 8).

<sup>6</sup> German Presidency of the Council of the EU (2020). The update of the nationally determined contribution of the European Union and its Member States.

<sup>7</sup> Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 ('European Climate Law') (OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1).

<sup>8</sup> Commission Work Programme 2021. (COM(2020) 690 final). Annex I outlines all the instruments under the package.

<sup>9</sup> European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2021 'Towards a WTO-compatible EU carbon border adjustment mechanism'.

The Commission also announced in its EU Action Plan: Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil<sup>10</sup> the promotion of relevant instruments and incentives to better implement the polluter pays principle<sup>11</sup> and thus complete the phasing out of ‘pollution for free’ with a view to maximising synergies between decarbonisation and the zero pollution ambition.

The Commission announced its intention to propose a CBAM in the European Green Deal. As indicated in the Communication ‘Should differences in levels of ambition worldwide persist, as the EU increases its climate ambition, the Commission will propose a carbon border adjustment mechanism, for selected sectors, to reduce the risk of carbon leakage. This would ensure that the price of imports reflect more accurately their carbon content. This measure will be designed to comply with World Trade Organization rules and other international obligations of the EU<sup>12</sup>’.

This mechanism is an alternative to the measures that address the risk of carbon leakage in the EU’s Emissions Trading System<sup>13</sup> (‘EU ETS’) and is meant to avoid that the emissions reduction efforts of the Union are offset by increasing emissions outside the Union through relocation of production or increased imports of less carbon-intensive products. Without such a mechanism, carbon leakage could result in an overall increase in global emissions.

The Paris Agreement commits the international community to a continuous increase in the ambition of climate action to limit global average temperature rise in order to significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. Each Party must prepare its own nationally determined contribution (‘NDC’) towards this global goal, reflecting its ‘highest possible ambition’ as well as its ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances<sup>14</sup>’.

As long as significant numbers of the EU’s international partners have policy approaches that do not result in the same level of climate ambition as the Union, and differences in the price applied to GHG emissions remain, there is a risk of carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs if, for reasons of differing ambitions related to climate policies, businesses in certain industry sectors or subsectors were to transfer production to other countries with less stringent emission constraints or imports from these countries would replace equivalent but less GHG emissions intensive products due to the difference in climate policy. That would risk undermining the effectiveness of the EU’s emission mitigation policies, and could also lead to an increase in their total emissions globally, thus jeopardising the reduction of GHG emissions that is urgently needed if the world is to keep the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.

Currently, the risk of carbon leakage is being addressed in the Union under the EU ETS. This is the world's first international GHG emissions trading system and has been in place since 2005. For the sectors covered by this system and most at risk of carbon leakage, this risk is currently managed through the granting of free allowances and compensations for the increase in electricity costs under state aid rules. However, free allocation under the EU ETS weakens the price signal that the system provides for the installations receiving it compared to full

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<sup>10</sup> Communication from the Commission of 12 May 2021 on Pathway to a Healthy Planet for All (COM(2021) 400 final).

<sup>11</sup> Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

<sup>12</sup> Commission Communication. (2019). The European Green Deal (COM(2019) 640 final), p. 4.

<sup>13</sup> Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32).

<sup>14</sup> Article 4(3) of the Paris Agreement.

auctioning. It thus affects the incentives for investment into further abatement of GHG emissions.

At the same time, as the Union increases its climate ambitions, the divergence with third countries' level of climate action is expected to widen, with an increased risk of carbon leakage for the EU. This would stem from the EU's increasingly ambitious GHG emissions reduction targets that should reduce the overall number of ETS allowances. As a consequence, the carbon price signal from the EU ETS is strengthened, incentivising Union producers to reduce their emissions, but widening the difference with countries without carbon pricing mechanisms. Moreover, overall free allocation will also decline over time, in line with the reduction of the emission cap.

Considering the problems described above, this proposal addresses the problem of reducing GHG emissions in the Union, while at the same avoiding that these emissions reduction efforts are offset globally by emissions increase outside the Union. In this context, a CBAM is proposed with the overarching objective of addressing the risk of carbon leakage in order to fight climate change by reducing GHG emissions in the Union and globally.

- **Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area**

In the context of the 'Fit for 55 Package' the CBAM is not a self-standing measure. It is a climate policy measure aiming at preserving the integrity of the EU's climate ambition towards the ultimate goal of climate neutrality. The role of the CBAM is to address the risk of carbon leakage and reinforce the EU ETS. There is thus a strong relation between the EU ETS and the CBAM.

As part of the 'Fit for 55 Package' the EU ETS is also proposed for revision<sup>15</sup>. This involves the extension of the EU ETS to maritime transport, as well as the introduction of emissions trading to the buildings and road transport sectors. Most notably, the higher climate ambition of the proposed amendments of the EU ETS appears in a more stringent cap on emissions, meaning that the overall number of allowances available will decline. A more stringent cap implies a stronger carbon price signal. The EU objective of climate neutrality and the decision to raise the climate ambition for 2030 also lead to a broader reconsideration of existing measures against the risk of carbon leakage. In particular, while free allocation of allowances effectively prevents carbon leakage risks, it weakens the carbon price signal for the Union industry compared to full auctioning.

As indicated by the European Green Deal, the CBAM would ensure that the price of imports reflects more accurately their carbon content. This measure has been designed to comply with World Trade Organization ('WTO') rules and other international obligations of the Union. Furthermore, President von der Leyen has underlined that 'carbon must have its price – because nature cannot pay the price anymore. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism should also motivate foreign producers and EU importers to reduce their carbon emissions'<sup>16</sup>.

To this end active outreach to third countries would be important with regard to the understanding of and compliance with CBAM requirements. Moreover, the EU will engage with third countries whose trade to the EU is affected by this Regulation to explore possibilities for dialogue and cooperation with regard to the implementation of specific elements of the Mechanism. It should also explore possibilities for concluding agreements to take into account their carbon pricing mechanism. Agreements with third countries could be

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<sup>15</sup> [OP please insert the number of the proposed EU ETS revision when available]

<sup>16</sup> State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament Plenary on 16 September 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH\\_20\\_1655](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_1655)

considered as an alternative to the application of CBAM in case they ensure a higher degree of effectiveness and ambition to achieve decarbonisation of a sector.

The existing mechanisms to address the risk of carbon leakage are free allocation of EU ETS allowances and in some cases financial measures to compensate for indirect emission costs from increases in electricity prices due to the EU ETS (indirect emission costs). A CBAM is an alternative to those measures and would therefore have to replace them over time. However, to allow producers, importers and traders to adjust to the new regime, the reduction of free allocation should be implemented gradually while the CBAM is phased-in, in order to ensure that they are not cumulative.

- **Consistency with other Union policies**

The Union is extremely active in international fora to strengthen environmental global rules and to accompany trade partners and less developed countries on a path to decarbonise. CBAM will complement the international environmental action of the Union and favour decarbonisation in third countries.

Since 1992, the Union has worked to develop joint solutions and drive forward global action to tackle climate change. More specifically, action at EU level should aim to provide for cost effective delivery of long-term climate objectives, while ensuring fairness and environmental integrity. The establishment of a robust governance of the EU 2050 climate-neutrality objective will help to ensure that the Union remains on track to achieve this target.

The Commission also announced the promotion of relevant instruments and incentives to better implement the polluter pays principle<sup>17</sup> and thus complete the phasing out of ‘pollution for free’ in the EU Action Plan: Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil<sup>18</sup> with a view to maximising synergies between decarbonisation and the zero pollution ambition.

## **2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY**

- **Legal basis**

Articles 191 to 193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) confirm and specify EU competencies in the area of climate change. The legal basis for this proposal is Article 192(1) of TFEU. In accordance with Articles 191 and 192(1) of TFEU, the Union shall contribute to the pursuit, inter alia, of the following objectives: preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change.

- **Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)**

Climate change is by its very nature a trans-boundary challenge that cannot be solved by national or local action alone. Coordinated EU action can effectively supplement and reinforce national and local action and enhances climate action. Coordination of climate action is necessary at Union level and, where possible, at global level, and EU action is justified on grounds of subsidiarity.

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<sup>17</sup> Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

<sup>18</sup> Commission Communication. (2021). Pathway to a Healthy Planet for All. (COM(2021), 400 final).

The introduction of an EU-wide CBAM will create a common and uniform framework to ensure an equivalence between the carbon pricing policy applied in the EU's internal market and the carbon pricing policy applied on imports. Its aim is purely environmental and has a cross-border dimension, so it cannot be tackled independently by Member States. Due to its environmental nature and in order to avoid trade diversion, the CBAM should be more efficiently applied at Union level in a uniform way, mirroring EU ETS and designed in a compatible way with WTO rules.

Moreover, should the CBAM not be applied in a uniform way, it would incentivise behaviours resulting in trade diversion and forum shopping, as third country exporters would import goods through EU jurisdictions applying the CBAM in the most lenient way.

This is not in contrast with deferring implementation and enforcement to competent national authorities, however this should be limited to implementation and enforcement.

- **Proportionality**

The proposal seeks to address the challenge of reducing GHG emissions in the Union while at the same time avoiding that these emissions reduction efforts are offset by emissions increase outside the Union. The policy choices therefore are clearly dictated by the aim to achieve the objectives of the CBAM, namely to address the risk of carbon leakage in order to fight climate change by reducing GHG emissions in the Union and globally.

The proposed product coverage of the CBAM is framed by the sectors and emissions covered by the EU ETS, the sector coverage of which is in turn based on various quantitative and qualitative criteria linked to the environmental objectives of the EU ETS, and the CBAM scope should be laid down by a reference to certain goods by way of their classification in the Combined nomenclature<sup>19</sup>. This serves the motivation for the measure, namely to ensure that risks of carbon leakage for certain energy intensive sectors are mitigated. The CBAM, builds on the climate logic of the EU ETS starting with sectors where emissions are the highest in absolute numbers and therefore where it would matter most.

The carbon content of products is an essential element of the CBAM as it indicates the GHG emissions (in carbon dioxide equivalent, 'CO<sub>2</sub>e') released during their production abroad. This is used to ensure that imported products are treated no less favourably than domestic products produced in EU ETS installations. As installations covered by the EU ETS are subject to a carbon price assessed on their actual emissions, imported products in the scope of the CBAM should also be assessed based on their actual GHG emissions. However, in order to allow businesses to adjust to such an approach it is proposed to start with a transitional period without financial adjustment.

As regards the administration of the measure empowering national competent authorities would maximise the effectiveness of the implementation and enforcement by taking into account national experiences in managing the EU ETS. A set-up with national competent climate authorities playing a key role mirrors to a large extent the set-up successfully used for almost a decade in the EU ETS.

- **Choice of the instrument**

The objectives of the present proposal can best be pursued through a Regulation. This will ensure direct applicability of a number of provisions concerning goods imported in the Customs Union. Moreover, this Regulation requires uniform and consistent application and

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<sup>19</sup> Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p. 1).

enforcement throughout the Union in order to pursue the objectives of Articles 32 and 207 of TFEU.

Differing exposures to the risk of carbon leakage would provide limited justification for action at national level. Carbon emissions are not localised and like the EU ETS, the CBAM can achieve greater efficiency when uniformly applied on a broader scale.

For this reason, the objectives of the present proposal can best be pursued through a Regulation. This will ensure direct applicability of its provisions.

Besides, conferring certain tasks related to implementation and enforcement to authorities in charge of climate and customs in Member States would address technical and methodological constraints and increase effectiveness.

### **3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS**

#### **• Stakeholder consultations**

For the preparation of this proposal, the Commission designed and implemented a stakeholder's consultation strategy, which encompassed both public and targeted consultations.

An inception impact assessment was published for feedback on 4 March 2020. A consultation took place until 1 April 2020<sup>20</sup> with the aim to collect feedback on the initial considerations of the project. In total 219 responses were submitted during this consultation period broken down into approximately 150 responses by trade federations, business associations and individual businesses, 20 NGOs, 20 citizens and the remaining from think tanks, academic/research institutions, trade unions and public authorities. The majority of responses came from the EU, with 24 from third countries.

Overall, the majority of replies expressed support for the CBAM, with the remaining being roughly divided equally between limited and no support. The vast majority of responses expressed cautiousness in the design of the measure requesting to consider all options possible. Among others, key areas emphasized were the impact on value chains and reliance on imports of raw materials, avoidance of excessive effects on final consumers, links to EU ETS and free allowances, distributional impact in affected sectors and across countries, especially developing economies and interaction with existing trade defence measures on raw materials.

In line with the Commission's Better Regulations Guidelines an open public consultation<sup>21</sup> was also carried out between 22 July and 28 October 2020. The consultation aimed to gather opinions from citizens and organisations on the justifications, objectives, potential design and scope as well as impacts of the initiative. Respondents were also allowed to upload position papers. A total of 615 respondents participated in the public consultation. Of these, 6 responses were duplicates, leading to 609 valid contributions.

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<sup>20</sup> <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12228-EU-Green-Deal-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism- en>

<sup>21</sup> <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12228-EU-Green-Deal-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism- en>

With respect to the problem of carbon leakage, most respondents state that carbon leakage is a real issue and that the CBAM can address carbon leakage, foster consumption of low-carbon products in the EU, and stimulate the deployment of low-carbon technologies and ambitious climate policies in third countries. On the effectiveness of current measures in the context of the EU ETS and state aid rules to limit carbon leakage, and on the ability of other regulatory measures to reduce GHG emissions companies, business associations and public authorities have a positive belief whereas citizens and other stakeholders are more critical. Respondents suggest that the CBAM should focus on products from activities already included in the EU ETS (especially those with the highest risk of carbon leakage) and account for entire value chains.

In addition to the above, the Commission services engaged in extensive bilateral consultations with public authorities within the EU and third countries, business associations, individual companies and NGOs. At the same time targeted consultations were undertaken by an external contractor who conducted a total of 25 in-depth interviews with senior managers and associations from the basic materials sectors, manufacturers, NGOs and policymakers. There were two rounds of interviews. First, 17 informal interviews were conducted at an early stage and served to identify relevant points of concern and open questions for further research. In a second step, eight additional interviews were conducted in order to test whether the judgements and concerns from the informal interviews were shared among a wider group of stakeholders. 17 stakeholders came from industry, 5 from NGOs and 3 from Member State institutions.

The results of the public and targeted consultations allowed the Commission to collect a significant number of views and opinions on the initiative. Both public and targeted consultations showed agreement on the necessity of a CBAM to address the risk of carbon leakage and help the Union to achieve its increased climate ambitions. The feedback received throughout these consultations has been used to inform the choice of the design elements and the preferred policy options. Result of the stakeholder consultation is summarised in the relevant annex to the impact assessment.

- **Collection and use of expertise**

The preparatory steps for the proposal rest on an array of studies and expert advice, analysing the potential design and scope of the CBAM as well as its environmental, social and economic impacts.

In particular, a study on the optimal design of the mechanism and its sectoral coverage was conducted with the support of external expertise to the Commission. The study reviewed the logic of intervention, assessed a range of alternative options and their feasibility, provided technical advice on technical design elements and provided support on the selection of sectors to be covered by the mechanism. Elements of this study are presented in the impact assessment<sup>22</sup>, while the full study is also published by the Commission<sup>23</sup>.

In addition to the qualitative study of the CBAM, a dedicated quantitative assessment of impacts was also conducted with support from the Joint Research Centre of the Commission and from external expertise, the first focusing on the CBAM's impacts on material products and the later focusing on the CBAM's impacts on electricity. These quantitative assessments

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<sup>22</sup> [OP please insert the link to the impact assessment after publication]

<sup>23</sup> [OP please insert the link to the study after its publication]



provided insight into the environment, economic and social impacts of the initiative and are made publicly available as part of the impact assessment.

Finally, the analysis rests on additional literature review, studies and research papers submitted by academics in the open public consultation and other independent studies.

- **Impact assessment**

The Regulatory Scrutiny Board issued a positive opinion with reservations on the impact assessment, including suggestions for improvement<sup>24</sup>. The Impact Assessment report was further revised along these lines, in particular, an effort was made to ensure that it is self-standing with regards to the problem of carbon leakage, while strengthening its coherence with the proposal for the revision of the EU ETS, as well as providing better clarity on the key impacts and institutional choices and presenting in greater detail the views of different stakeholder groups.

The problem addressed by the CBAM is how to reduce GHG emissions in the EU, while at the same time avoiding that these emissions reduction efforts are offset by emissions increasing outside the Union (carbon leakage). To reflect this dynamic framework, the basis against which the impact assessment was built reflected the fact that the CBAM is put forward against the new agreed EU target of reducing net GHG emissions by at least 55 per cent (relative to 1990).

Six different options were assessed against this dynamic framework, all of which were designed to take account of WTO requirements and of the EU's international commitments such as free trade agreements concluded by the EU or the Energy Community Treaty.

The first option for a CBAM is an import carbon tax, paid by the importer when products enter the EU. The tax would be collected by customs at the border based on a tax reflecting the price of carbon in the Union combined with a default carbon intensity of the products. Importers would have the opportunity to claim a reduction of the CBAM based on their individual carbon footprint and any carbon price paid in the country of production.

The second option involves the application on imports of a system that replicates the EU ETS regime applicable to domestic production. This option entails – similar to the system of allowances under the EU ETS – the surrendering of certificates ('CBAM certificates') by importers based on embedded emission intensity of the products they import into the Union, and purchased at a price corresponding to that of the EU ETS allowances at any given point in time. These certificates will not be linked to the EU ETS system of allowances but will mirror the price of these allowances to ensure a coherent approach to the pricing under the EU ETS. National climate authorities will administer the sale of the CBAM certificates and importers will submit declarations of verified embedded emissions in the imported products to these authorities tasked with managing the CBAM and surrender a number of CBAM certificates corresponding to the declared emissions. Such declaration and surrendering will occur – similar to that under the EU ETS – at a yearly reconciliation exercise taking place in the year following the year of importation and based on yearly trade import volumes. The carbon emission intensity of products would be based on default values; however, importers would be given the opportunity, at the moment of the yearly reconciliation exercise, to claim a reduction of the CBAM on the basis of their individual emission performance. They would

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<sup>24</sup> [OP please insert the links to the summary sheet and the positive opinion of the RSB after their publication.]

also be entitled to claim a reduction of the CBAM for any carbon price paid in the country of production (which is not rebated or in other way compensated upon export).

Option 3 operates in the same way as option 2, however the carbon price of imports is based on actual emissions from third country producers rather than on a default value based on EU producers' averages. Under this option, the importer will have to report the actual emissions embedded in the product and surrender a corresponding number of CBAM certificates.

Option 4 would apply in the same way as option 3. It consists of surrendering CBAM certificates on imported products. However, this option considers also a 10 years phasing in period starting in 2026 during which the free allocations of allowances under the EU ETS would be gradually phased out by 10 percentage points each year and the CBAM would be phased in. During this phasing in period, the CBAM would be reduced proportionally to the amount of free allowances distributed in a given sector.

Option 5 is a variant of Option 3 with a scope extended further down in the value chain. Carbon-intensive materials that are part of semi-finished and finished products would be covered along the value chain. For imports, the CBAM would again be based on the actual emissions from third country producers.

Option 6 consists of an excise duty on carbon-intensive materials covering consumption in the Union of both domestic and imported products, besides the continuation of the EU ETS including the free allocation of allowances covering production in the EU.

With respect to the effectiveness of the CBAM against its overarching objective of addressing the risk of carbon leakage in order to fight climate change by reducing GHG emissions in the Union and globally, the impact assessment showed that all the policy options achieve positive impact. In that respect, all CBAM options were found to achieve a stronger reduction of emissions in the CBAM sectors in the Union, relative to the case of higher ambition and free allocation. With regards to incentivising third country producers to move towards cleaner production processes, all policy options bring about positive results. On that criteria, the options allowing for the possibility to demonstrate actual emissions are particularly effective, with options 3, 4 and 5 also showing strong positive results. All options were found to be coherent with the EU ETS.

On providing protection against carbon leakage, option 4 followed by 3 and 5 bring about a stronger positive impact, while options 1, 2 and 6 would be less effective. All policy options are designed in a way that respects the EU's international commitments.

The CBAM will apply on imports of goods at the price of carbon determined by the EU ETS system through the system of auctions. Importers would either be charged on the basis of a default value or based on the actual emissions embedded in the imports. The possibility to demonstrate that the carbon efficiency of their product is better than the default value, would increase the complexity of the system, but this also provides emission reduction incentives for the share of materials that is exported to the EU.

Overall the impact of the CBAM on employment is limited. Changes in employment are largely driven by the presence (or not) of free allocation. Retaining free allocation results in a slight increase in employment in the CBAM sectors. The complete removal of free allocation in the absence of a CBAM leads to the highest employment losses. The application of the CBAM on material industrial products is likely to have limited impact on consumer prices

because the measure is targeted at products upstream in the value chain and affects goods for final consumption only indirectly.

Compliance costs are assumed to arise for importers located in the Union that would be subject to the CBAM obligations. This could be done either based on a default value or by providing verified information about actual emissions. While the monitoring of these actual emissions would take place outside the Union, the responsibility – and thus costs – of providing the verification regarding this monitoring to authorities lies with the importers. For options 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, when emissions are declared at default value, monitoring of the emissions from the production process is not necessary and therefore also limited costs are incurred. However, if importers decide to claim to use the actual emissions from the production process, the monitoring creates additional costs for the business. Under option 6, default values have to be determined both for materials and manufactured goods. Administrative effort is relatively low for producers of materials in the EU, which means producers do not have to demonstrate the carbon intensity of their production.

Electricity generation is addressed separately to material products. Applying a CBAM to the electricity sector requires taking into account its uniqueness that distinguishes it from basic materials, including the methods for its transportation, through constrained, monopoly networks, and the broad set of technologies employed for its production.

In line with approaches applied to the material products, a reference value for emissions embedded in imported electricity needs to be established in the context of determining the corresponding CBAM obligation. Two alternative options are employed to determine the reference value for embedded emissions for electricity namely (a) average GHG emission intensity of the EU electricity mix and (b) average GHG emission factor of the EU electricity mix. As with other options, however, importers would still have the possibility to prove that their installation level emissions are lower than the above reference values.

On the basis of the above, the impact assessment concluded that option 4 provides clear benefits relative to all other options considered. It is therefore suggested to introduce a CBAM on selected products in the form of CBAM certificates based on actual emissions. It is also suggested to introduce CBAM progressively against a correspondent reduction of allowances allocated for free in the corresponding EU ETS installations. This policy option ensures a high level of effectiveness for the CBAM.

A system based on actual emissions on imported goods ensures a fair and equal treatment of all imports and a close correlation to the EU ETS. The CBAM system will, however, need to be complemented by a possibility to base calculations on a set of default values to be used in situations when sufficient emission data will not be available. Moreover, during an initial transitional phase, where importers may not be able to produce yet the data required by system on actual emissions, a default value could also apply. This option will need to be designed to fully respect the EU's international commitments, in particular WTO rules, and therefore it will be necessary to ensure that if a default value applies, importers are in all cases given the opportunity to demonstrate that they perform better than such value based on their actual emissions. Moreover, with regard to the phase in of the CBAM and the corresponding phase out of the free allowances, it will need to be ensured that at no point in time over this period, imports are afforded less favourable treatment than domestic EU production.

Further, the introduction of CBAM certificates based on actual emissions would protect against the risk of carbon leakage while incentivising third country producers to move

towards cleaner production processes, with the support of Official Development Assistance when applicable.

As regards electricity the preferred option is to apply the CBAM based on the carbon emission factor including the possibility for importers to demonstrate lower emissions. Both options contribute to mitigating the risks of carbon leakage by discouraging in the mid-term the build-up of carbon-intensive power generation sources in the vicinity of EU borders which might replace EU-based generators exposed to increasing carbon costs. However, the option based on the carbon emission factor displays superior effectiveness in preventing carbon leakage while keeping administrative costs low.

The choice of policy option 4 for material products and the carbon emission factor for electricity would introduce a proportionate mechanism to address climate change by reducing GHG emissions in the Union and avoiding that these emissions are replaced by emissions outside the Union. In addition, the gradual phase out of free allocation under the EU ETS in the sectors concerned, combined with the gradual phase in of CBAM, would ensure a prudent and predictable transition for businesses and authorities.

- **Regulatory fitness and simplification**

The impact assessment indicates that a CBAM would result in relatively higher compliance costs for SMEs compared to large enterprises. The exact degree of difference between the two groups could not be quantified based on the currently available data.

The fact that a CBAM is initially introduced on imports of a few basic materials and basic material products results in large businesses being the main impacted ones. Therefore, the practical impact of import related measures would have little practical impact on SMEs, even though that impact would be relatively higher than for large businesses if compared on the amount imported. For that reason the impact assessment did not carry out a SME test, neither did it perform a separate SME consultation, although the views of, and implications for, SMEs have been assessed as part of the Commission's Online Public Consultation,

For these reasons also, no special measures for SMEs are foreseen in this Regulation.

- **Fundamental rights**

The proposal respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union<sup>25</sup>. In particular, it contributes to the objective of a high level of environmental protection in accordance with the principle of sustainable development as laid down in Article 37 of the Charter.

#### **4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS**

Most revenues generated by CBAM will go to the EU budget<sup>26</sup>. In the special European Council of 17-21 July 2020<sup>27</sup>, EU leaders agreed on the recovery instrument NextGenerationEU. The instrument will provide the EU with necessary means to address the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and, therein, support investment in the green and digital transitions. In order to finance it, the Commission will be able to borrow up to

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<sup>25</sup> OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391.

<sup>26</sup> Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom (OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1).

<sup>27</sup> See [European Council conclusions, 17-21 July 2020](#).

EUR 750 billion on financial markets. In that context, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission agreed that ‘the Institutions will work towards introducing sufficient new own resources with a view to covering an amount corresponding to the expected expenditure related to the repayment’ of NextGenerationEU<sup>28</sup>. The Commission committed to put forward proposals on new own resources, which would include the CBAM in the first semester of 2021.

## 5. OTHER ELEMENTS

### • **Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements**

Within the framework of the overall package of environmental measures adopted and applied by the EU, which illustrate the EU's continued pursuit of a higher level of environmental ambition than many of our trading partners, it is considered appropriate to begin moving from a system in which carbon leakage is addressed by free allowances to a system in which carbon leakage with respect to imports is addressed by a carbon border adjustment mechanism as soon as this is reasonably possible, taking into account the technical and economic feasibility, including administrative constraints and the legitimate expectations of all economic operators, in an even-handed manner.

Concurrently balancing these multiple objectives pleads in favour of the gradual introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism, as soon as is reasonably possible, so that during an initial and relatively short pilot phase without any financial adjustment, operators can adjust themselves to the new system, including its additional administrative requirements, and the authorities can obtain experience with respect to the operation of the new system.

Once that pilot phase is complete, the process of transitioning from free allowances to a carbon border adjustment mechanism will accelerate in earnest and in a manner that ensures no discrimination between domestic and imported goods, or between imported goods from different countries, in full compliance with the EU's international obligations and rights.

The Commission will ensure that arrangements are in place to monitor and evaluate the functioning of the CBAM, including its enforcement against fraudulent practices, and evaluate it against the main policy objectives. Given that the CBAM is one of the policy proposals under the ‘Fit for 55 Package’, monitoring and evaluation could be carried out in alignment with the other policies of the package.

Before the end of the transitional period, the Commission will report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of the Regulation and, if appropriate, will make a legislative proposal to extend the CBAM to other goods than those listed in Annex I and possibly also to other emissions, and introduce other possible changes to improve its functioning. For that, it is necessary to firstly monitor the effect of the CBAM.

### • **Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal**

Chapter I sets out general provisions, including the subject matter, the scope of the proposal (Articles 1 and 2) and the definitions of the key terms (Article 3). Annex I defines in detail the

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<sup>28</sup> Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (OJ L 433I , 22.12.2020, p. 28).

scope of the proposal, listing the goods and the GHG emissions relating to each of those goods. Annex II indicates the countries and territories of origin excluded from the application of the measure.

Chapter II contains provisions on obligations and rights of declarants of goods. More specifically, it contains provisions on the conditions to apply for an authorisation to import CBAM goods (Articles 4 and 5), the obligation of an authorised declarant to submit an annual CBAM declaration by 31 May of each year and the content of that declaration (Article 6), the principles for the calculation of the emissions embedded in goods imported to the EU during the previous calendar year (Article 7, as further outlined in Annex III) and the process of verifying these emissions by accredited verifiers (Article 8, complemented by reporting requirements and verification principles in Annexes IV and V). It also sets out the principles for taking into account a carbon price paid in third countries (Article 9). Last, under Article 10, an operator of an installation in a third country has the possibility to request to the Commission to be included in a central database. Once registered, the operator may opt to disclose information about the embedded emissions verified to an authorised declarant. The authorised declarant can use that disclosed information to fulfil the obligation to declare verified information on embedded emissions when importing the goods produced in the installation registered in the central database to the Union.

Under Chapter III, there are the general provisions on the administrative set up of the competent national authorities, the role of the Commission – also as a central administrator – and the disclosure of information (Articles 11, 12, 13 and 15). The chapter also contains provisions on the main characteristics of the national registries and its accounts (Articles 14 and 16) and decisions of the authorities regarding the authorisation to import (Article 17), the accreditation of verifiers (Article 18) and the review of CBAM declarations (Article 19).

Chapter IV contains provisions regarding the CBAM certificates. Articles 20 to 24 establish detailed rules on the life cycle of the CBAM certificates, from their sale to the control of their surrender or, if any, re-purchase, and their final cancellation. Article 20 concerns in detail the sale of certificates by the competent authorities. Article 21 is about the calculation of the price of the certificates, done by the Commission, on a weekly basis. Article 22 lays down the procedures to ensure that each authorised declarant fulfils its obligation to surrender certificates in the national registry. Article 23 establishes the right of an authorised declarant to ask the competent authority to re-purchase a limited number of CBAM certificates remaining on its account after surrender. Finally, Article 24 specifies that, by 30 June of each year, the competent authority is required to cancel the certificates remaining in the account of each declarant after surrender and re-purchase, if any.

Chapter V deals with how customs authorities should deal with the procedures for the administration of goods at the border (Article 25). Under Chapter VI, penalties for non-compliance are set in Article 26 and a special provision on circumvention is provided in case there are changes in the pattern of trade (Article 27).

Chapter VII contains provisions regarding the exercise of the delegation to the Commission to adopt delegated acts (Article 28) and the examination procedure for implementing acts (Article 29). The power to adopt delegated acts is referred to in Articles 2, 18 and 27. Articles 2, 5 to 9, 21, 25, 31, 33 and 35 contain provisions on implementing powers.

Chapter VIII contains provisions in Article 30 on the evaluation of the Regulation and its review.

Chapter IX (Article 31) deals with the reduction of the CBAM obligation to reflect the transitional allocation of EU ETS allowances for free in installations producing, in the Union, the same kinds of goods which are covered by the proposal.

Chapter X contains specific provisions to be applied during an initial transitional period. In those provisions, a CBAM with no financial adjustment aiming at collecting data and raising awareness of declarants will apply in the first years. That transitional period will have a duration of three years, from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2025, as established in Article 32. Declarants will report on a quarterly basis the embedded emissions corresponding to their imports of the previous quarter, detailing direct and indirect emissions and reporting any carbon price paid abroad. Customs authorities will inform declarants of their CBAM obligations and exchange information with competent authorities.

Last, Chapter XI indicates the entry into force of the proposal, with some of the provisions applying only during the transitional period and others starting to be applied in 2026 (Article 36).

Proposal for a

**REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL**

**establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism**

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 192(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee<sup>1</sup>,

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions<sup>2</sup>,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

- (1) The Commission has, in its communication on the European Green Deal<sup>3</sup>, set out a new growth strategy that aims to transform the Union into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy, where there are no net emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) of greenhouse gases ('GHG emissions') in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use. The European Green Deal also aims to protect, conserve and enhance the EU's natural capital, and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts. At the same time, that transformation must be just and inclusive, leaving no one behind. The Commission also announced in its EU Action Plan: Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil<sup>4</sup> the promotion of relevant instruments and incentives to better implement the polluter pays principle as set out in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ('TFEU') and thus complete the phasing out of 'pollution for free' with a view to maximising synergies between decarbonisation and the zero pollution ambition.
- (2) The Paris Agreement<sup>5</sup>, adopted in December 2015 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ('UNFCCC') entered into force in November 2016. The Parties to the Paris Agreement, in its Article 2, have agreed to

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<sup>1</sup> OJ C, , p. . [OP please insert the number of the opinion]

<sup>2</sup> OJ C, , p. . [OP please insert the number of the opinion]

<sup>3</sup> Communication from the Commission of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019) 640 final).

<sup>4</sup> Communication from the Commission of 12 May 2021 on Pathway to a Healthy Planet for All (COM(2021) 400).

<sup>5</sup> OJ L 282, 19.10.2016, p.4.



hold the increase in the global average temperature well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

- (3) Tackling climate and other environmental-related challenges and reaching the objectives of the Paris Agreement are at the core of the European Green Deal. The value of the European Green Deal has only grown in light of the very severe effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health and economic well-being of the Union's citizens.
- (4) The Union is committed to reducing its economy-wide GHG emissions by at least 55 per cent by 2030 below 1990 levels, as set out in the submission to the UNFCCC on behalf of the European Union and its Member States on the update of the nationally determined contribution of the European Union and its Member States<sup>6</sup>.
- (5) Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>7</sup> has enshrined in legislation the target of economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050. That Regulation also establishes a binding Union reduction commitment of GHG emissions of at least 55 per cent below 1990 levels by 2030.
- (6) The Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on the impacts of global temperature increases of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global GHG emission pathways<sup>8</sup> provides a strong scientific basis for tackling climate change and illustrates the need to step up climate action. That report confirms that in order to reduce the likelihood of extreme weather events, GHG emissions need to be urgently reduced, and that climate change needs to be limited to a global temperature increase of 1.5°C.
- (7) The Union has been pursuing an ambitious policy on climate action and has put in place a regulatory framework to achieve its 2030 GHG emissions reduction target. The legislation implementing that target consists, inter alia, of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>9</sup>, which establishes a system for GHG emission allowance trading within the Union ('EU ETS') and delivers harmonised pricing of GHG emissions at Union level for energy-intensive sectors and subsectors, Regulation (EU) 2018/842 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>10</sup>, which introduces national targets for reduction of GHG emissions by 2030,

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<sup>6</sup> [Council](#) of the European Union ST/14222/1/20/REV1.

<sup>7</sup> Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 ('European Climate Law') (OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1).

<sup>8</sup> IPCC, 2018: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds.)].

<sup>9</sup> Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32).

<sup>10</sup> Regulation (EU) 2018/842 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 (OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 26).

and Regulation (EU) 2018/841 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>11</sup>, which requires Member States to compensate GHG emissions from land use with removals of emissions from the atmosphere.

- (8) As long as a significant number of the Union's international partners have policy approaches that do not result in the same level of climate ambition, there is a risk of carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs if, for reasons of costs related to climate policies, businesses in certain industry sectors or subsectors were to transfer production to other countries or imports from those countries would replace equivalent but less GHG emissions intensive products. That could lead to an increase in their total emissions globally, thus jeopardising the reduction of GHG emissions that is urgently needed if the world is to keep the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels.
- (9) The initiative for a carbon border adjustment mechanism ('CBAM') is a part of the 'Fit for 55 Package'. That mechanism is to serve as an essential element of the EU toolbox to meet the objective of a climate-neutral Union by 2050 in line with the Paris Agreement by addressing risks of carbon leakage resulting from the increased Union climate ambition.
- (10) Existing mechanisms to address the risk of carbon leakage in sectors or sub-sectors at risk of carbon leakage are the transitional free allocation of EU ETS allowances and financial measures to compensate for indirect emission costs incurred from GHG emission costs passed on in electricity prices respectively laid down in Articles 10a(6) and 10b of Directive 2003/87/EC. However, free allocation under the EU ETS weakens the price signal that the system provides for the installations receiving it compared to full auctioning and thus affects the incentives for investment into further abatement of emissions.
- (11) The CBAM seeks to replace these existing mechanisms by addressing the risk of carbon leakage in a different way, namely by ensuring equivalent carbon pricing for imports and domestic products. To ensure a gradual transition from the current system of free allowances to the CBAM, the CBAM should be progressively phased in while free allowances in sectors covered by the CBAM are phased out. The combined and transitional application of EU ETS allowances allocated free of charge and of the CBAM should in no case result in more favourable treatment for Union goods compared to goods imported into the customs territory of the Union.
- (12) While the objective of the CBAM is to prevent the risk of carbon leakage, this Regulation would also encourage the use of more GHG emissions-efficient technologies by producers from third countries, so that less emissions per unit of output are generated.
- (13) As an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce GHG emissions the CBAM should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the EU ETS. The CBAM is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the Union's increased ambition on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility.

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<sup>11</sup> Regulation (EU) 2018/841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry in the 2030 climate and energy framework, and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 and Decision No 529/2013/EU (OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 1).

- (14) This Regulation should apply to goods imported into the customs territory of the Union from third countries, except where their production has already been subject to the EU ETS, whereby it applies to third countries or territories, or to a carbon pricing system fully linked with the EU ETS.
- (15) In order to exclude from the CBAM third countries or territories fully integrated into, or linked, to the EU ETS in the event of future agreements, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amending the list of countries in Annex II. Conversely, those third countries or territories should be excluded from the list in Annex II and be subject to CBAM whereby they do not effectively charge the ETS price on goods exported to the Union.
- (16) This Regulation should apply to the continental shelf and to the exclusive economic zone declared by Member States pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea<sup>12</sup>, with a view to preventing the risk of carbon leakage in offshore installations.
- (17) The GHG emissions to be regulated by the CBAM should correspond to those GHG emissions covered by Annex I to the EU ETS in Directive 2003/87/EC, namely carbon dioxide ('CO<sub>2</sub>') as well as, where relevant, nitrous oxide ('N<sub>2</sub>O') and perfluorocarbons ('PFCs'). The CBAM should initially apply to direct emissions of those GHG from the production of goods up to the time of import into the customs territory of the Union, and after the end of a transition period and upon further assessment, as well to indirect emissions, mirroring the scope of the EU ETS.
- (18) The EU ETS and the CBAM have a common objective of pricing GHG emissions embedded in the same sectors and goods through the use of specific allowances or certificates. Both systems have a regulatory nature and are justified by the need to curb GHG emissions, in line with the environmental objective set out in Union.
- (19) However, while the EU ETS sets an absolute cap on the GHG emissions from the activities under its scope and allows tradability of allowances (so called 'cap and trade system'), the CBAM should not establish quantitative limits to import, so as to ensure that trade flows are not restricted. Moreover, while the EU ETS applies to installations based in the Union, the CBAM should be applied to certain goods imported into the customs territory of the Union.
- (20) The CBAM system has some specific features compared with the EU ETS, including on the calculation of the price of CBAM certificates, on the possibilities to trade certificates and on their validity over time. These are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the CBAM as a measure preventing carbon leakage over time and to ensure that the management of the system is not excessively burdensome in terms of obligations imposed on the operators and of resources for the administration, while at the same time preserving an equivalent level of flexibility available to operators under the EU ETS.
- (21) In order to preserve its effectiveness as a carbon leakage measure, the CBAM needs to reflect closely the EU ETS price. While on the EU ETS market the price of allowances is determined through auctions, the price of CBAM certificates should reasonably reflect the price of such auctions through averages calculated on a weekly basis. Such weekly average prices reflect closely the price fluctuations of the EU ETS and allow a reasonable margin for importers to take advantage of the price changes of the EU ETS

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<sup>12</sup> Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982.

while at the same ensuring that the system remains manageable for the administrative authorities.

- (22) Under the EU ETS, the total number of allowances issued (the ‘cap’) determines the supply of emission allowances and provides certainty about the maximum emissions of GHG. The carbon price is determined by the balance of this supply against the demand of the market. Scarcity is necessary for there to be a price incentive. As it is not possible to impose a cap on the number of CBAM certificates available to importers, if importers had the possibility to carry forward and trade CBAM certificates, this could result in situations where the price for CBAM certificates would no longer reflect the evolution of the price in the EU ETS. That would weaken the incentive for decarbonisation between domestic and imported goods, favouring carbon leakage and impairing the overarching climate objective of the CBAM. It could also result in different prices for operators of different countries. Therefore, the limits to the possibilities to trade CBAM certificates and to carry them forward is justified by the need to avoid undermining the effectiveness and climate objective of the CBAM and to ensure even handed treatment to operators from different countries. However, in order to preserve the possibility for importers to optimise their costs, this Regulation should foresee a system where authorities can re-purchase a certain amount of excess certificates from the importers. Such amount is set at a level which allows a reasonable margin for importers to leverage their costs over the period of validity of the certificates whilst preserving the overall price transmission effect, ensuring that the environmental objective of the measure is preserved.
- (23) Given that the CBAM applies to imports of goods into the customs territory of the Union rather than to installations, certain adaptations and simplifications would also need to apply in the CBAM regime. One of those simplifications should consist in a declarative system where importers should report the total verified GHG emissions embedded in goods imported in a given calendar year. A different timing compared to the compliance cycle of the EU ETS should also be applied to avoid any potential bottleneck resulting from obligations for accredited verifiers under this Regulation and the EU ETS.
- (24) In terms of sanctions, Member States should apply penalties to infringements of this Regulation and ensure that they are implemented. The amount of those penalties should be identical to penalties currently applied within the Union in case of infringement of EU ETS according to Article 16(3) and (4) of Directive 2003/87/EC.
- (25) While the EU ETS applies to certain production processes and activities, the CBAM should target the corresponding imports of goods. That requires clearly identifying imported goods by way of their classification in the Combined nomenclature<sup>13</sup> (‘CN’) and linking them to embedded GHG emissions.
- (26) The product coverage of the CBAM should reflect the activities covered by the EU ETS as that scheme is based on quantitative and qualitative criteria linked to the environmental objective of Directive 2003/87/EC and is the most comprehensive GHG emissions regulatory system in the Union.

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<sup>13</sup> Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p. 1).

- (27) Setting a product scope for the CBAM reflecting the activities covered by the EU ETS would also contribute to ensuring that imported products are granted a treatment that is not less favourable than that accorded to like products of domestic origin.
- (28) Whilst the ultimate objective of the CBAM is a broad product coverage, it would be prudent to start with a selected number of sectors with relatively homogeneous products where there is a risk of carbon leakage. Union sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage are listed in Commission Delegated Decision 2019/708<sup>14</sup>.
- (29) The goods under this Regulation should be selected after a careful analysis of their relevance in terms of cumulated GHG emissions and risk of carbon leakage in the corresponding EU ETS sectors while limiting complexity and administrative burden. In particular, the actual selection should take into account basic materials and basic products covered by the EU ETS with the objective of ensuring that imports of energy intensive products into the Union are on equal footing with EU products in terms of EU ETS carbon pricing, and to mitigate risks of carbon leakage. Other relevant criteria to narrow the selection should be: firstly, relevance of sectors in terms of emissions, namely whether the sector is one of the largest aggregate emitters of GHG emissions; secondly, sector's exposure to significant risk of carbon leakage, as defined pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC; thirdly, the need to balance broad coverage in terms of GHG emissions while limiting complexity and administrative effort.
- (30) The use of the first criterion allows listing the following industrial sector in terms of cumulated emissions: iron and steel, refineries, cement, organic basic chemicals, and fertilisers.
- (31) However, certain sectors listed in Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2019/708 should not at this stage be addressed in this Regulation, due to their particular characteristics.
- (32) In particular, organic chemicals are not included in the scope of this Regulation due to technical limitations that do not allow to clearly define the embedded emissions of imported goods. For these goods the applicable benchmark under the EU ETS is a basic parameter, which does not allow for an unambiguous allocation of emissions embedded in individual imported goods. A more targeted allocation to organic chemicals will require more data and analysis.
- (33) Similar technical constraints apply to refinery products, for which it is not possible to unambiguously assign GHG emissions to individual output products. At the same time, the relevant benchmark in the EU ETS does not directly relate to specific products, such as gasoline, diesel or kerosene, but to all refinery output.
- (34) However, aluminium products should be included in the CBAM as they are highly exposed to carbon leakage. Moreover, in several industrial applications they are in direct competition with steel products because of characteristics closely resembling those of steel products. Inclusion of aluminium is also relevant as the scope of the CBAM may be extended to cover also indirect emissions in the future.
- (35) Similarly, tubes and pipe fittings should be included in the scope of the CBAM despite their low level of embedded emissions, as their exclusion would increase the

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<sup>14</sup> Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2019/708 of 15 February 2019 supplementing Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the determination of sectors and subsectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage for the period 2021 to 2030 (OJ L 120, 8.5.2019, p. 2).

likelihood of circumventing the enclosure of steel products in the CBAM by modifying the pattern of trade towards downstream products.

- (36) Conversely, this Regulation should not apply to certain products whose production does not entail meaningful emissions like ferrous scrap (under CN code 7204), ferro-alloys (CN code 7202) and certain fertilisers (under CN code 3105 60 00).
- (37) Import of electricity should be included in the scope of this Regulation, as this sector is responsible for 30 per cent of the total GHG emissions in the Union. The enhanced Union climate ambition would increase the gap in carbon costs between electricity production in the Union and abroad. That increase combined with the progress in connecting the Union electricity grid to that of its neighbours would increase the risk of carbon leakage due to increased imports of electricity, a significant part of which is produced by coal-fired power plants.
- (38) As importers of goods covered by this Regulation should not have to fulfil their CBAM obligations under this Regulation at the time of importation, specific administrative measures should be applied to ensure that the obligations are fulfilled at a later stage. Therefore, importers should only be entitled to import CBAM goods after they have been granted an authorisation by competent authorities responsible for the application of this Regulation.
- (39) The CBAM should be based on a declarative system where an authorised declarant, who may represent more than one importer, submits annually a declaration of the embedded emissions in the goods imported to the customs territory of the Union and surrenders a number of CBAM certificates corresponding to those declared emissions.
- (40) An authorised declarant should be allowed to claim a reduction in the number of CBAM certificates to be surrendered corresponding to the carbon price already paid for those emissions in other jurisdictions.
- (41) The embedded declared emissions should be verified by a person accredited by a national accreditation body appointed in accordance with Article 4(1) of Regulation No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>15</sup> or pursuant to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2067<sup>16</sup>.
- (42) The system should allow operators of production installations in third countries to register in a central database and to make their verified embedded GHG emissions from production of goods available to authorised declarants. An operator should be able to choose not to have its name, address and contact details in the central database made accessible to the public.
- (43) CBAM certificates differ from EU ETS allowances for which daily auctioning is an essential feature. The need to set a clear price for CBAM certificates makes a daily publication excessively burdensome and confusing for operators, as daily prices risk becoming obsolete upon publication. Thus, the publication of CBAM prices on a weekly basis would accurately reflect the pricing trend of EU ETS allowances and pursue the same climate objective. The calculation of the price of CBAM certificates

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<sup>15</sup> Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30).

<sup>16</sup> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2067 of 19 December 2018 on the verification of data and on the accreditation of verifiers pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 334, 31.12.2018, p. 94).

should therefore be set on the basis of a longer timeframe (on a weekly basis) than in the timeframe established by the EU ETS (on a daily basis). The Commission should be tasked to calculate and publish that average price.

- (44) In order to give the authorised declarants flexibility in complying with their CBAM obligations and allow them to benefit from fluctuations in the price of EU ETS allowances, the CBAM certificates should be valid for a period of two years from the date of purchase. The authorised declarant should be allowed to re-sell to the national authority a portion of the certificates bought in excess. The authorised declarant should build up during the year the amount of certificates required at the time of surrendering, with thresholds set at the end of each quarter.
- (45) The physical characteristics of electricity as a product, in particular the impossibility to follow the actual flow of electrons, justifies a slightly different design for the CBAM. Default values should be used as a standard approach and it should be possible for authorised declarants to claim the calculation of their CBAM obligations based on actual emissions. Electricity trade is different from trade in other goods, notably because it is traded via interconnected electricity grids, using power exchanges and specific forms of trading. Market coupling is a densely regulated form of electricity trade which allows to aggregate bids and offers across the Union.
- (46) To avoid risks of circumvention and improve the traceability of actual CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from import of electricity and its use in goods, the calculation of actual emissions should only be permitted through a number of strict conditions. In particular, it should be necessary to demonstrate a firm nomination of the allocated interconnection capacity and that there is a direct contractual relation between the purchaser and the producer of the renewable electricity, or between the purchaser and the producer of electricity having lower than default value emissions. .
- (47) Contracting Parties to the Treaty establishing the Energy Community<sup>17</sup> or Parties to Association Agreements including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas are committed to decarbonisation processes that should eventually result in the adoption of carbon pricing mechanisms similar or equivalent to the EU ETS or in their participation in the EU ETS.
- (48) Integration of third countries into the Union electricity market is an important drive for those countries to accelerate their transition to energy systems with high shares of renewable energies. Market coupling for electricity, as set out in Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222<sup>18</sup>, enables third countries to better integrate electricity from renewable energies into the electricity market, to exchange such electricity in an efficient manner within a wider area, balancing supply and demand with the larger Union market, and reduce the carbon intensity of their electricity generation. Integration of third countries into the Union electricity market also contributes to the security of electricity supplies in those countries and in the neighbouring Member States.
- (49) Once third countries will be closely integrated into the Union electricity market via market coupling, technical solutions should be found to ensure the application of the CBAM to electricity exported from such countries into the customs territory of the

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<sup>17</sup> Council Decision 2006/500/EC of 29 May 2006 on the conclusion by the European Community of the Energy Community Treaty (OJ L 198, 20.7.2006, p. 15).

<sup>18</sup> Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and congestion management (OJ L 197, 25.7.2015, p. 24).

Union. If technical solutions cannot be found, third countries that are market coupled should benefit from a time limited exemption from the CBAM until at the latest 2030 with regard solely to the export of electricity, provided that certain conditions are satisfied. However, those third countries should develop a roadmap and commit to implement a carbon pricing mechanism providing for an equivalent price as the EU ETS, and should commit to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 [as well as?] to align with Union legislation in the areas of environment, climate, competition and energy. That exemption should be withdrawn at any time if there are reasons to believe that the country in question does not fulfil its commitments or it has not adopted by 2030 an ETS equivalent to the EU ETS.

- (50) A transitional period should apply during the period 2023 until 2025. A CBAM without financial adjustment should apply, with the objective to facilitate a smooth roll out of the mechanism hence reducing the risk of disruptive impacts on trade. Declarants should have to report on a quarterly basis the actual embedded emissions in goods imported during the transitional period, detailing direct and indirect emissions as well as any carbon price paid abroad.
- (51) To facilitate and ensure a proper functioning of the CBAM, the Commission should provide support to the competent authorities responsible for the application of this Regulation in carrying out their obligations.
- (52) The Commission should evaluate the application of this Regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the European Parliament and the Council. The report of the Commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral Union by 2050. The Commission should, as part of that evaluation, initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions, as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage, and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods<sup>19</sup>.
- (53) In light of the above, a dialogue with third countries should continue and there should be space for cooperation and solutions that could inform the specific choices that will be made on the details of the design of the measure during the implementation, in particular during the transitional period.
- (54) The Commission should strive to engage in an even handed manner and in line with the international obligations of the EU, with the third countries whose trade to the EU is affected by this Regulation, to explore possibilities for dialogue and cooperation with regard to the implementation of specific elements of the Mechanism set out this Regulation and related implementing acts. It should also explore possibilities for concluding agreements to take into account their carbon pricing mechanism.
- (55) As the CBAM aims to encourage cleaner production processes, the EU stands ready to work with low and middle-income countries towards the de-carbonisation of their manufacturing industries. Moreover, the Union should support less developed countries with the necessary technical assistance in order to facilitate their adaptation to the new obligations established by this regulation.

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<sup>19</sup> Commission Recommendation 2013/179/EU of 9 April 2013 on the use of common methods to measure and communicate the life cycle environmental performance of products and organisations (OJ L 124, 4.5.2013, p. 1).



- (56) The provisions of this Regulation are without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>20</sup> and 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>21</sup>.
- (57) In the interest of efficiency, the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97<sup>22</sup> should apply.
- (58) In order to remedy circumvention of the provisions of this Regulation, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of supplementing the list of goods in Annex I.
- (59) It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016<sup>23</sup>. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.
- (60) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>24</sup>.
- (61) The financial interests of the Union should be protected through proportionate measures throughout the expenditure cycle, including the prevention, detection and investigation of irregularities, the recovery of funds lost, wrongly paid or incorrectly used and, where appropriate, administrative and financial penalties.

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<sup>20</sup> Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).

<sup>21</sup> Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).

<sup>22</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters (OJ L 82, 22.3.1997, p. 1).

<sup>23</sup> Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making (OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1).

<sup>24</sup> Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by the Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13).

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

## **Chapter I**

### **Subject matter, scope and definitions**

#### *Article 1* *Subject matter*

1. This Regulation establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (the ‘CBAM’) for addressing greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the goods referred to in Annex I, upon their importation into the customs territory of the Union, in order to prevent the risk of carbon leakage.
2. The CBAM complements the system established for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union by Directive 2003/87/EC by applying an equivalent set of rules to imports into the customs territory of the Union of goods referred to in Article 2.
3. The mechanism will progressively become an alternative to the mechanisms established under Directive 2003/87/EC to prevent the risk of carbon leakage, notably the allocation of allowances free of charge in accordance with Article 10a of that Directive.

#### *Article 2* *Scope*

1. This Regulation applies to goods as listed in Annex I, originating in a third country, when those goods, or processed products from those goods as resulting from the inward processing procedure referred to in Article 256 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>25</sup>, are imported into the customs territory of the Union.
2. This Regulation applies to the goods referred to in paragraph 1 where those goods are brought to the continental shelf or the exclusive economic zone of a Member State.
3. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, this Regulation does not apply to goods originating in countries and territories listed in Annex II, Section A.
4. Imported goods shall be considered as originating in third countries in accordance with non-preferential rules of origin as defined in Article 59 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013.
5. Countries and territories shall be listed in Annex II, Section A, subject to the cumulative fulfilment of the following conditions: :
  - (a) the EU ETS established pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC applies to that country or territory or an agreement has been concluded between that third country or territory and the Union fully linking the EU ETS and the third country or territory emission trading system;

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<sup>25</sup> Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1).

- (b) the price paid in the country where the goods are originating in is effectively charged on those goods without any rebate beyond those also applied in the EU ETS.
- 6. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts in order to determine the conditions for applying the CBAM to goods referred to in paragraph 2. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 29(2).
- 7. If a third country or territory has an electricity market which is integrated with the Union internal market for electricity through market coupling, and it has not been possible to find a technical solution for the application of the CBAM to the importation of electricity into the Union, from that third country or territory, such the importation of electricity from the country or territory shall be exempt from the application of the CBAM, provided all of the following conditions are satisfied:
  - (a) the third country or territory has concluded an agreement with the Union, setting out an obligation to apply the Union law in the field of electricity, including the legislation on the development of renewable energy sources, as well as other rules in the field of energy, environment and competition;
  - (b) the national law in that third country or territory implements the main provisions of the Union electricity market legislation, including on the development of renewable energy sources and the coupling of electricity markets;
  - (c) the third country or territory has submitted a roadmap to the Commission, containing a timetable for the adoption of measures to implement the conditions set out in points (d) and (e);
  - (d) the third country or territory has committed to climate neutrality by 2050 and has accordingly formally formulated and communicated, where applicable, to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change a mid-century, long-term low greenhouse gas emissions development strategy aligned with that objective, and has implemented that obligation in its domestic legislation;
  - (e) the third country or territory has, when implementing the roadmap pursuant to point (c), demonstrated substantial progress towards the alignment of domestic legislation with Union law in the field of climate action on the basis of that roadmap, including towards carbon pricing at an equivalent level as the Union at least insofar as the generation of electricity is concerned. The implementation of an emission trading system for electricity, with a price equivalent to the EU ETS, shall be finalised by 1 January 2030;
  - (f) the third country or territory has put in place an effective systems to prevent indirect import of electricity in the Union from other third countries not meeting the requirements set out in points (a) to (e).
- 8. A third country or territory satisfying the conditions set out in paragraph 7, points (a) to (f), shall be listed in Annex II, Section B, of this Regulation, and shall submit two reports on the fulfilment of the conditions pursuant to paragraph 7, points (a) to (f), one before 1 July 2025 and another before 1 July 2029. By 31 December 2025 and by 31 December 2029, the Commission shall assess, notably on the basis of the roadmap pursuant to paragraph 7, point (c), and the reports received from the third country or territory, whether that third country or territory continues to respect the conditions set out in paragraph 7.

9. A third country or territory listed in Annex II, Section B of this Regulation, shall be removed from that list:
  - (a) if the Commission has reasons to consider that the country or territory has not shown sufficient progress to comply with one of the requirements listed in paragraph 7, points (a) to (f), or if the country or territory has taken action incompatible with the objectives set out in the Union climate and environmental legislation;
  - (b) if the third country or territory has taken steps contrary to its decarbonisation objectives, such as providing public support for the establishment of new generation capacity that emits more than 550 g of CO<sub>2</sub> of fossil fuel origin per kWh of electricity.
10. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 28 to set out requirements and procedures for countries or territories that are deleted from the list in Annex II, Section B, to ensure the application of this Regulation to their territories with regard to electricity. If in such cases market coupling remains incompatible with the application of this Regulation, the Commission may decide to exclude the third countries or territories from Union market coupling and require explicit capacity allocation at the border between the Union and the third country, so that the CBAM can apply.
11. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 28 to amend the lists in Annex II, Sections A or B, depending on whether the conditions in paragraphs 5, 7 or 9 are satisfied.
12. The Union, may conclude agreements with third countries with a view to take account of carbon pricing mechanisms in these countries in the application of Article 9.

*Article 3*  
*Definitions*

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

- (1) ‘goods’ mean goods listed in Annex 1;
- (2) ‘greenhouse gases’ mean greenhouse gases as specified in Annex I in relation to each of the goods listed in that Annex;
- (3) ‘emissions’ mean the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere from the production of goods;
- (4) ‘importation’ means the release for free circulation provided for in Article 201 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013;
- (5) ‘EU ETS’ means the system for greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading within the Union in respect of activities listed in Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC other than aviation activities;
- (6) ‘third country’ means a country or territory outside the customs territory of the Union;
- (7) ‘continental shelf’ means the continental shelf as defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea;

- (8) 'exclusive economic zone' means the exclusive economic zone as defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and which has been declared as exclusive economic zone by a Member State pursuant to that convention;
- (9) 'market coupling' means allocation of transmission capacity via an Union system which simultaneously matches orders and allocates cross-zonal capacities as set out in Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222;
- (10) 'explicit capacity allocation' means the allocation of cross-border transmission capacity separate from the trade of electricity;
- (11) 'competent authority' means the authority, designated by each Member State in accordance with Article 11 of this Regulation;
- (12) 'customs authorities' mean the customs administrations of Member States as defined in Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013;
- (13) 'declarant' means a person lodging a customs declaration for release for free circulation in its own name or the person in whose name such a declaration is lodged in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 952/2013;
- (14) 'person' means a natural person, a legal person and any association of persons which is not a legal person but which is recognised under Union or national law as having the capacity to perform legal acts;
- (15) 'direct emissions' mean emissions from the production processes of goods over which the producer has direct control;
- (16) 'embedded emissions' mean direct emissions released during the production of goods, calculated pursuant to the methods set out in Annex III;
- (17) 'tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>e' means one tonne of carbon dioxide ('CO<sub>2</sub>') or CO<sub>2</sub>, nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons as referred for goods in Annex I;
- (18) 'CBAM certificate' means a certificate in electronic format corresponding to one tonne of embedded emissions in goods;
- (19) 'surrender' means offsetting of CBAM certificates against the declared embedded emissions in imported goods;
- (20) 'production processes' mean the chemical and physical processes carried out to produce goods in an installation;
- (21) 'default value' means a value that is calculated or drawn from secondary data representing embedded emissions in goods;
- (22) 'actual emissions' mean the emissions calculated based on primary data from the production processes of goods;
- (23) 'carbon price' means the monetary amount paid in a third country in the form of a tax or emission allowances under a greenhouse gas emissions trading system, calculated on greenhouse gases covered by such a measure and released during the production of goods;
- (24) 'installation' means a stationary technical unit where a production process is carried out;
- (25) 'operator' means any person who operates or controls an installation in a third country;

- (26) ‘national accreditation body’ means a national accreditation body as appointed by each Member State in accordance with Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008;
- (27) ‘EU ETS allowance’ means an allowance referred to in Article 3(a) of Directive 2003/87/EC in respect of activities listed in Annex I of that Directive other than aviation activities;
- (28) ‘indirect emissions’ mean emissions from the production of electricity, heating and cooling, which is consumed during the production processes of goods.

## **Chapter II**

### **Obligations and rights of authorised declarants of goods**

#### *Article 4*

##### *Importation of goods*

Goods shall only be imported into the customs territory of the Union by a declarant that is authorised by the competent authority in accordance with Article 17 (‘authorised declarant’).

#### *Article 5*

##### *Application for an authorisation*

1. Any declarant shall, prior to importing goods as referred to in Article 2, apply to the competent authority at the place where it is established, for an authorisation to import those goods into the customs territory of the Union.
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, where transmission capacity for the import of electricity is allocated via explicit capacity allocation, the person to which capacity has been allocated for import and which nominates this capacity for import shall, for the purposes of this Regulation, be regarded as an authorised declarant in the Member State where the person declares the import of electricity. Imports are to be measured per border for time periods not longer than one hour and no deduction of export or transit in the same hour is possible.
3. The application for an authorisation shall include the following information about the declarant which must be established in the Union:
  - (a) name, addresses and contact information;
  - (b) Economic Operators Registration and Identification number (‘EORI’) in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013;
  - (c) main economic activity carried out in the Union;
  - (d) certification by the tax authority in the Member State, where the declarant is established, that the declarant is not subject to an outstanding recovery order for national tax debts;
  - (e) declaration on honour that the declarant was not involved in any serious infringements or repeated infringements of customs legislation, taxation rules and market abuse rules during the five years preceding the year of the application, including that it has no record of serious criminal offences relating to its economic activity;

- (f) information necessary to demonstrate the declarant's financial and operational capacity to fulfil its obligations under this Regulation and, if decided by the competent authority on the basis of a risk assessment, supporting documents confirming that information, such as the profit and loss account and the balance sheet for up to the three last financial years for which the accounts were closed;
  - (g) estimated monetary value and volume of imports of goods to the customs territory of the Union by the type of goods, for the calendar year during which the application is submitted and for the following calendar year;
  - (h) names and contact information of the persons on behalf of whom the declarant is acting, if applicable.
4. The applicant may at any time withdraw its application.
  5. The authorised declarant shall inform the competent authority without delay of any changes of the information provided under paragraph 3, arising after the decision was taken, which may influence the decision taken pursuant to Article 17 or content of the authorisation in accordance with Article 17.
  6. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts, concerning the standard format of the application and the delays and procedure to be followed by the competent authority when processing applications for authorisation in accordance with paragraph 1 and the rules for identification by the competent authority of the declarants for the importation of electricity. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 29(2).

*Article 6*  
*CBAM declaration*

1. By 31 May of each year, each authorised declarant shall submit a declaration ('CBAM declaration'), for the calendar year preceding the declaration, to the competent authority.
2. The CBAM declaration shall contain the following:
  - (a) the total quantity of each type of goods imported during the calendar year preceding the declaration, expressed in megawatt hours for electricity and in tonnes for other goods;
  - (b) the total embedded emissions, expressed in tonnes of CO<sub>2e</sub> emissions per megawatt-hour of electricity or for other goods per tonne of CO<sub>2e</sub> emissions per tonne of each type of goods, calculated in accordance with Article 7;
  - (c) the total number of CBAM certificates corresponding to the total embedded emissions, to be surrendered, after the reduction due on the account of the carbon price paid in a country of origin in accordance with Article 9 and the adjustment necessary of the extent to which EU ETS allowances are allocated free of charge in accordance with Article 31.
3. Where the imported goods are processed products resulting from the inward processing procedure as referred to in Article 256 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, the authorised declarant shall report in the CBAM declaration the total emissions embedded in the goods placed under the inward processing procedure that are listed in Annex I to this Regulation, even if the processed product is not listed in that Annex.

4. Where the imported goods are processed products resulting from the outward processing procedure as referred to in Article 259 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, the authorised declarant shall report in the CBAM declaration only the emissions of the processing operation undertaken outside the customs territory of the Union, provided that the processed product is listed in Annex I to this Regulation.
5. Where the imported goods are returned goods as referred to in Article 203 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, the authorised declarant shall report separately, in the CBAM declaration, 'zero' for the total embedded emissions corresponding to those goods.
6. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts concerning the standard format and the procedure for submitting the CBAM declaration and the arrangements for surrendering CBAM certificates provided for in paragraph 2, point (c). Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 29(2).

*Article 7*  
*Calculation of embedded emissions*

1. Embedded emissions in goods shall be calculated pursuant to the methods set out in Annex III.
2. Embedded emissions in goods other than electricity shall be determined based on the actual emissions in accordance with the methods set out in Annex III, points 2 and 3. When actual emissions cannot be adequately determined, the embedded emissions shall be determined by reference to default values in accordance with the methods set out in Annex III, point 4.1.
3. Embedded emissions in imported electricity shall be determined by reference to default values in accordance with the method set out in Annex III, point 4.2, unless the authorised declarant chooses to determine the embedded emissions based on the actual emissions in accordance with that annex, point 5.
4. The authorised declarant shall keep records of the information required to calculate the embedded emissions in accordance with the requirements laid down in Annex IV. Those records shall be sufficiently detailed to enable verifiers accredited pursuant to Article 18 to verify the embedded emissions in accordance with Article 8 and Annex V and to enable the competent authority to review the CBAM declaration in accordance with Article 19(1).
5. The authorised declarant shall keep those records of information referred to in paragraph 4, including the report of the verifier, until the end of the fourth year after the year in which the CBAM declaration has been or should have been submitted.
6. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts concerning detailed rules regarding the elements of the calculation methods set out in Annex III, including determining system boundaries of production processes, emission factors, installation-specific values of actual emissions and default values and their respective application to individual goods as well as laying down methods to ensure the reliability of data on the basis of which the default values shall be determined, including the level of detail and the verification of the data. Where necessary, those acts shall provide that the default values can be adapted to particular areas, regions or countries to take into account specific objective factors such as geography, natural resources, market conditions, prevailing energy sources, or industrial processes. The



implementing acts shall build upon existing legislation for the verification of emissions and activity data for installations covered by Directive 2003/87/EC, in particular Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2018/2067.

7. The implementing acts referred to in paragraph 6 shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 29(2).

#### *Article 8*

##### *Verification of embedded emissions*

1. The authorised declarant shall ensure that the total embedded emissions declared in the CBAM declaration submitted pursuant to Article 6 are verified by a verifier accredited pursuant to Article 18, based on the verification principles set out in Annex V.
2. For embedded emissions in goods produced in registered installations in a third country in accordance with Article 10, the authorised declarant may choose to use verified information disclosed to it in accordance with Article 10(7) to fulfil the obligation referred to in paragraph 1.
3. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts concerning the principles of verification referred to in paragraph 1 as regards the possibility to waive the obligation for the verifier to visit the installation where relevant goods are produced and the obligation to set thresholds for deciding whether misstatements or non-conformities are material and concerning the supporting documentation needed for the verification report.

The implementing acts referred to in the first subparagraph shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 29(2).

#### *Article 9*

##### *Carbon price paid in a country of origin*

1. An authorised declarant may claim in its CBAM declaration a reduction in the number of CBAM certificates to be surrendered in order for the carbon price paid in the country of origin for the declared embedded emissions to be taken into account.
2. The authorised declarant shall keep records of the documentation, certified by an independent person, required to demonstrate that the declared embedded emissions were subject to a carbon price in the country of origin of the goods and keep evidence of the proof of the actual payment for that carbon price which should not have been subject to an export rebate or any other form of compensation on exportation.
3. The authorised declarant shall keep those records referred to in paragraph 2 until the end of the fourth year after the year during which the CBAM declaration has been or should have been submitted.
4. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts establishing the methodology for calculating the reduction in the number of CBAM certificates to be surrendered, regarding the conversion of the carbon price paid in foreign currency into euro at yearly average exchange rate in accordance with paragraph 1, and regarding the qualifications of the independent person certifying the information as well as elements of proof of the carbon price paid and the absence of export rebates or other forms of compensation on exportation being applied as referred to in

paragraph 2. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 29(2).

#### *Article 10*

##### *Registration of operators and installations in third countries*

1. The Commission shall, upon request by an operator of an installation located in a third country, register the information on that operator and on its installation in a central database referred to in Article 14(4).
2. The request for registration referred to in paragraph 1 shall include the following information to be included in the database upon registration:
  - (a) the name, address and contact details of the operator;
  - (b) the location of each installation including complete address and coordinates expressed in longitude and latitude including 6 decimals;
  - (c) the main economic activity of the installation in the third country;
3. The Commission shall notify the operator on the registration in the database. The registration shall be valid for a period of five years from the date of its notification to the operator of the installation.
4. The operator shall inform the Commission without delay of any changes in the information referred to in paragraph 2 arising after the registration and the Commission shall update the relevant information.
5. The operator referred to in paragraph 1 shall be obliged to:
  - (a) determine the embedded emissions calculated in accordance with the methods set out in Annex III, by type of goods produced at the installation referred to in paragraph 1;
  - (b) ensure that the embedded emissions referred to in point (a) are verified in accordance with the verification principles set out in Annex V by a verifier accredited pursuant to Article 18;
  - (c) keep a copy of the verifier's report as well as records of the information required to calculate the embedded emissions in goods as laid down in Annex IV for a period of four years after the verification has been performed.
6. The records referred to in paragraph 5, point (c), shall be sufficiently detailed to enable the verification in accordance with paragraph 5, point (b), and to enable any competent authority to review, in accordance with Article 19(1), the CBAM declaration made by an authorised declarant to whom the relevant information was disclosed in accordance with paragraph 8.
7. An operator may disclose the information on the verification of embedded emissions referred to in paragraph 5 to an authorised declarant. The authorised declarant shall be entitled to avail itself of that disclosed information to fulfil the obligation referred to in Article 8.
8. The operator may, at any time, ask to be deregistered from the database.

## **Chapter III**

### **Competent authorities**

#### *Article 11* *Competent authorities*

1. Each Member State shall designate the competent authority to carry out the obligations under this Regulation and inform the Commission thereof.

The Commission shall make available to the Member States a list of all competent authorities and publish this information in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

2. Member States shall require that competent authorities exchange any information that is essential or relevant to the exercise of their functions and duties.

#### *Article 12* *Commission*

The Commission shall assist the competent authorities in carrying out their obligations under this Regulation and coordinate their activities.

#### *Article 13* *Professional secrecy and disclosure of information*

All information acquired by the competent authority in the course of performing its duty which is by its nature confidential or which is provided on a confidential basis shall be covered by an obligation of professional secrecy. Such information shall not be disclosed by the competent authority without the express permission of the person or authority that provided it. It may be shared with customs authorities, the Commission and the European Public Prosecutors Office and shall be treated in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97.

#### *Article 14* *National registries and central database*

1. The competent authority of each Member State shall establish a national registry of declarants authorised in that Member State in the form of a standardised electronic database containing the data regarding the CBAM certificates of those declarants, and to provide for confidentiality in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 13.
2. The database referred to in paragraph 1 shall contain accounts with information about each authorised declarant, in particular:
  - (a) the name and contact details of the authorised declarant;
  - (b) the EORI number of the authorised declarant;
  - (c) the CBAM account number;
  - (d) the number, the price of sale, the date of purchase, the date of surrender, or the date of re-purchase, or that of the cancellation by the competent authority, of CBAM certificates for each authorised declarant.

3. The information in the database referred to in paragraph 2 shall be confidential.
4. The Commission shall establish a central database accessible to the public containing the names, addresses and contact details of the operators and the location of installations in third countries in accordance with Article 10(2). An operator may choose not to have its name, address and contact details accessible to the public.

*Article 15*  
*Central administrator*

1. The Commission shall act as central administrator to maintain an independent transaction log recording the purchase of CBAM certificates, their holding, surrender, re-purchase and cancellation and ensure coordination of national registries.
2. The central administrator shall carry out risk-based controls on transactions recorded in national registries through an independent transaction log to ensure that there are no irregularities in the purchase, holding, surrender, re-purchase and cancellation of CBAM certificates.
3. If irregularities are identified as a result of the controls carried out under paragraph 2, the Commission shall inform the Member State or Member States concerned for further investigation in order to correct the identified irregularities.

*Article 16*  
*Accounts in the national registries*

1. The competent authority shall assign to each authorised declarant a unique CBAM account number.
2. Each authorised declarant shall be granted access to its account in the registry.
3. The competent authority shall set up the account as soon as the authorisation referred to in Article 17(1) is granted and notify the authorised declarant thereof.
4. If the authorised declarant has ceased its economic activity or its authorisation was revoked, the competent authority shall close the account of that declarant.

*Article 17*  
*Authorisation of declarants*

1. The competent authority shall authorise a declarant who submits an application for authorisation in accordance with Article 5(1), if the following conditions are fulfilled:
  - (a) the declarant has not been involved in a serious infringement or repeated infringements of customs legislation, taxation rules and market abuse rules and has no record of serious criminal offences relating to its economic activity during the five years preceding the application;
  - (b) the declarant demonstrates its financial and operational capacity to fulfil its obligations under this Regulation.
2. Where the competent authority finds that the conditions listed in paragraph 1 are not fulfilled, or where the applicant has failed to provide the information listed in Article 5(3), the authorisation of the declarant shall be refused.

3. If the competent authority refuses to authorise a declarant, the declarant requesting the authorisation may, prior to an appeal, object to the relevant authority under national law, who shall either instruct the national administrator to open the account or uphold the refusal in a reasoned decision, subject to requirements of national law that pursue a legitimate objective compatible with this Regulation and are proportionate.
4. A decision of the competent authority authorising a declarant shall contain the following information
  - (a) the name and the address of the authorised declarant;
  - (b) the EORI number of the authorised declarant;
  - (c) the CBAM account number.
5. An authorised declarant may, at any time, ask for its authorisation to be revoked.
6. The competent authority shall require the provision of a guarantee in order to authorise a declarant in accordance with paragraph 1, if the declarant was not established throughout the two financial years that precede the year when the application in accordance with Article 5(1) was submitted.

The competent authority shall fix the amount of such guarantee at the maximum amount, as estimated by the competent authority, of the value of the CBAM certificates that the authorised declarant have to surrender, in accordance with Article 22.
7. The guarantee shall be provided as a bank guarantee, payable at first demand, by a financial institution operating in the Union or by another form of guarantee which provides equivalent assurance. Where the competent authority establishes that the guarantee provided does not ensure, or is no longer certain or sufficient to ensure the amount of CBAM obligations, it shall require the authorised declarant either to provide an additional guarantee or to replace the initial guarantee with a new guarantee, according to its choice.
8. The competent authority shall release the guarantee immediately after 31 May of the second year in which the authorised declarant has surrendered CBAM certificates in accordance with Article 22.
9. The competent authority shall revoke the authorisation for a declarant who no longer meets the conditions laid down in paragraph 1, or who fails to cooperate with that authority.

*Article 18*  
*Accreditation of verifiers*

1. Any person accredited pursuant to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2018/2067 shall be regarded as an accredited verifier under this Regulation.
2. In addition to paragraph 1, a national accreditation body may on request accredit a person as a verifier under this Regulation after checking the documentation attesting its capacity to apply the verification principles referred to Annex V to perform the obligations of control of the embedded emissions established in Articles 8, 10 and 38.
3. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 28 for the accreditation referred to in paragraph 2, specifying conditions for the control

and oversight of accredited verifiers, for the withdrawal of accreditation and for mutual recognition and peer evaluation of the accreditation bodies.

#### *Article 19*

##### *Review of CBAM declarations*

1. The competent authority may review the CBAM declaration within the period ending with the fourth year after the year in which the declaration should have been submitted. The review may consist in verifying the information provided in the CBAM declaration on the basis of the information communicated by the customs authorities in accordance with Article 25(2) and any other relevant evidence, and on the basis of any audit deemed necessary, including at the premises of the authorised declarant.
2. Where a CBAM declaration in accordance with Article 6 has not been submitted, the competent authority of the Member State of establishment of the authorised declarant shall assess the CBAM obligations of that declarant on the basis of the information at its disposal and calculate the total number of CBAM certificates due at the latest by the 31 December of the fourth year following that when the CBAM declaration should have been submitted.
3. Where the competent authority has established that the declared number of CBAM certificates to be surrendered is incorrect, or that no CBAM declaration has been submitted pursuant to paragraph 2, it shall adjust the number of CBAM certificates due by the authorised declarant. The competent authority shall notify the authorised declarant of the adjustment and request that the authorised declarant shall surrender the additional CBAM certificates within one month.
4. The recipient of the notification referred to in paragraph 3 may lodge an appeal of the notification. The recipient of the notification shall be provided with information regarding the procedure to be followed in the event of an appeal.
5. Where CBAM certificates have been surrendered in excess of the number due, the competent authority shall, without delay, reimburse the authorised declarant the value of CBAM certificates surrendered in excess, calculated at the average price paid for CBAM certificates by the authorised declarant during the year of import.

## **Chapter IV**

### **CBAM certificates**

#### *Article 20*

##### *Sale of CBAM certificates*

1. The competent authority of each Member State shall sell CBAM certificates to declarants authorised in that Member State at the price calculated in accordance with Article 21.
2. The competent authority shall ensure that each CBAM certificate is assigned a unique unit identification code upon its creation and shall register the unique unit identification number, the price and date of sale of the certificate in the national registry in the account of the authorised declarant purchasing it.

*Article 21*  
*Price of CBAM certificates*

1. The Commission shall calculate the price of CBAM certificates as the average price of the closing prices of EU ETS allowances on the common auction platform in accordance with the procedures laid down in Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010<sup>26</sup> for each calendar week.

For those calendar weeks in which there are no auctions scheduled on the common auction platform, the price of CBAM certificates shall be the average price of the closing prices of EU ETS allowances of the last week in which auctions on the common auction platform took place.

2. This average price shall be published by the Commission on its website on the first working day of the following calendar week and shall be applied from the following working day to the first working day of the following calendar week.
3. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts to further define the methodology to calculate the average price of CBAM certificates and practical arrangements for the publication of the price. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 29(2).

*Article 22*  
*Surrender of CBAM certificates*

1. By 31 May of each year, the authorised declarant shall surrender a number of CBAM certificates to the competent authority that corresponds to the embedded emissions declared in accordance with Article 6(2)(c) and verified in accordance with Article 8 for the calendar year preceding the surrender
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the authorised declarant shall ensure that the required number of CBAM certificates is available on its account in the national registry. In addition, the authorised declarant shall ensure that the number of CBAM certificates on its account in the national registry at the end of each quarter corresponds to at least 80 per cent of the embedded emissions, determined by reference to default values in accordance with the methods set out in Annex III, in all goods it has imported since the beginning of the calendar year.
3. Where the competent authority finds that the number of CBAM certificates in the account of an authorised declarant is not in compliance with the obligations pursuant to paragraph 2, second sentence, that authority shall notify the adjustment and request that the authorised declarant surrenders the additional CBAM certificates within one month.
4. The recipient of the notification referred to in paragraph 3 may lodge an appeal of the notification. The recipient of the notification shall be provided with information regarding the procedure to be followed in the event of an appeal.

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<sup>26</sup> Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 of 12 November 2010 on the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ L 302, 18.11.2010, p. 1).

*Article 23*  
*Re-purchase of CBAM certificates*

1. The competent authority of each Member State shall, on request by a declarant authorised in that Member State, re-purchase the excess of CBAM certificates remaining on the account of the declarant in the national registry after the certificates have been surrendered in accordance with Article 22. The request to re-purchase shall be submitted by 30 June of each year when CBAM certificates were surrendered.
2. The number of certificates subject to re-purchase as referred to in paragraph 1 shall be limited to one third of the total CBAM certificates purchased by the authorised declarant during the previous calendar year.
3. The re-purchase price for each CBAM certificate shall be the price paid by the authorised declarant for that certificate at the time of purchase.

*Article 24*  
*Cancellation of CBAM certificates*

By 30 June of each year, the competent authority of each Member State shall cancel any CBAM certificates that were purchased during the year before the previous calendar year and that remained in the accounts in the national registry of the declarants authorised in that Member State.

## **Chapter V** **Border administration of goods**

*Article 25*  
*Procedures at the border when goods are imported*

1. The customs authorities shall not allow the importation of goods unless the declarant is authorised by a competent authority at the latest at the release for free circulation of the goods.
2. The customs authorities shall periodically communicate information on the goods declared for importation, which shall include the EORI number and the CBAM account number of the declarant, the 8-digit CN code of the goods, the quantity, the country of origin, the date of declaration and the customs procedure, to the competent authority of the Member State where the declarant has been authorised.
3. The custom authorities shall carry out controls on the goods in accordance with Article 46 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, including the 8-digit CN code, the quantity and the country of origin of the imported goods. The Commission shall include the risks relating to CBAM in the design of the common risk criteria and standards pursuant to Article 50 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013.
4. The customs authorities may communicate in accordance with Article 12(1) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, confidential information acquired by the customs authorities in the course of performing their duty or provided on a confidential basis, to the competent authority of the Member State where the declarant has been authorised. The competent authorities of the Member States shall treat and exchange this information in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97.



5. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts defining the information, the timing and the means for communicating the information pursuant to paragraph 2. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 29(2).

## **Chapter VI**

### **Enforcement**

#### *Article 26* *Penalties*

1. An authorised declarant who fails to surrender, by 31 May of each year, a number of CBAM certificates corresponding to the emissions embedded in goods imported during the previous year shall be liable to a penalty identical to the excess emissions penalty set out in Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC, increased pursuant to Article 16(4) of that Directive, in the year of importation of the goods, for each CBAM certificate that the authorised declarant should have surrendered.
2. Any person other than an authorised declarant, introducing goods into the customs territory of the Union without surrendering CBAM certificates according to this Regulation shall be liable to the penalty referred to in paragraph 1 in the year of introduction of the goods, for each CBAM certificate that the person should have surrendered.
3. Payment of the penalty shall in no case release the authorised declarant from the obligation to surrender the outstanding number of CBAM certificates in a given year to the competent authority of the Member State where the declarant has been authorised.
4. If the competent authority determines that an authorised declarant has failed to comply with the obligation to surrender CBAM certificates as specified in paragraph 1, or that a person has introduced goods into the customs territory of the Union as specified in paragraph 2, the competent authority shall impose the penalty and notify the authorised declarant or, in the situation under paragraph 2, the person:
  - (a) that the competent authority has concluded that the authorised declarant or the person fails to comply with the obligation of surrendering CBAM certificates for a given year;
  - (b) of the reasons for its conclusion;
  - (c) of the amount of the penalty imposed on the authorised declarant or on the person;
  - (d) of the date from which the penalty is due;
  - (e) of the action the competent authority considers the authorised declarant or the person should take to comply with its obligation under point (a) depending on the facts and circumstances of the case; and
  - (f) of the right of the authorised declarant or of the person to appeal under national rules.
5. Member States may apply administrative or criminal sanctions for failure to comply with the CBAM legislation in accordance with their national rules in addition to

penalties referred to in paragraph 2. Such sanctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

*Article 27*  
*Circumvention*

1. The Commission shall take action, based on relevant and objective data, in accordance with this Article, to address practices of circumvention of this Regulation.
2. Practices of circumvention include situations where a change in the pattern of trade in relation to goods included in the scope of this Regulation has insufficient due cause or economic justification other than avoiding obligations as laid down in this Regulation and consist in replacing those goods with slightly modified products, which are not included in the list of goods in Annex I but belong to a sector included in the scope of this Regulation.
3. A Member State or any party affected or benefitted by the situations described in paragraph 2 may notify the Commission if it is confronted, over a two-month period compared with the same period in the preceding year with a significant decrease in the volume of imported goods included in the scope of this Regulation and an increase of volume of imports of slightly modified products, which are not included in the list of goods in Annex I. The Commission shall continually monitor any significant change of pattern of trade of goods and slightly modified products at Union level.
4. The notification referred to in paragraph 3 shall state the reasons on which it is based and shall include relevant data and statistics regarding the goods and products referred to in paragraph 2.
5. Where the Commission, taking into account the relevant data, reports and statistics, including when provided by the customs authorities of Member States, has sufficient reasons to believe that the circumstances referred to in paragraph 3 are occurring in one or more Member States, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 28 to supplement the scope of this Regulation in order to include slightly modified products for anti-circumvention purposes.

**Chapter VII**  
**Exercise of delegation and committee procedure**

*Article 28*  
*Exercise of the delegation*

1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article.
2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 2(10), 2(11), 18(3) and 27(5) shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time.
3. The delegation of power referred to in Articles 2(10), 2(11), 18(3) and 27(5) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council.

4. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the *Official Journal of the European Union* or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated act already in force.
5. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Inter-institutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016.
6. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council.
7. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 2(10), 2(11), 18(3) and 27(5) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and to the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council.

#### *Article 29*

##### *Exercise of implementing powers by the Commission*

1. The Commission shall be assisted by the CBAM Committee. The committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.
2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

## **Chapter VIII** **Reporting and review**

#### *Article 30*

##### *Review and reporting by the Commission*

1. The Commission shall collect the information necessary with a view to extending the scope of this Regulation to indirect emissions and goods other than those listed in Annex I, and develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on environmental footprint methods.
2. Before the end of the transitional period, the Commission shall present a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Regulation. The report shall contain, in particular, the assessment of the possibilities to further extend the scope of embedded emissions to indirect emissions and to other goods at risk of carbon leakage than those already covered by this Regulation, as well as an assessment of the governance system. It shall also contain the assessment of the possibility to further extend the scope to embedded emissions of transportation services as well as to goods further down the value chain and services that may be subject to the risk of carbon leakage in the future.
3. The report by the Commission shall, if appropriate, be accompanied by a legislative proposal.

## **Chapter IX**

### **Coordination with free allocation of allowances under the EU ETS**

#### *Article 31*

#### *Free allocation of allowances under the EU ETS and obligation to surrender CBAM certificates*

1. The CBAM certificates to be surrendered in accordance with Article 22 shall be adjusted to reflect the extent to which EU ETS allowances are allocated free of charge in accordance with Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC to installations producing, within the Union, the goods listed in Annex I.
2. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts laying down a calculation methodology for the reduction referred to in paragraph 1. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 29(2).

## **Chapter X**

### **Transitional provisions**

#### *Article 32*

#### *Scope*

During the transitional period of this Regulation, the CBAM mechanism shall apply as a reporting obligation as set out in Articles 33 to 35.

#### *Article 33*

#### *Importation of goods*

1. A declarant importing goods shall be obliged to fulfil a reporting obligation as set out in Article 35.
2. The customs authorities shall, at the moment of the release of those goods for free circulation at the latest, inform the declarant of the obligation referred to in paragraph 1.
3. The customs authorities shall, by means of the surveillance mechanism established pursuant to Article 56(5) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, communicate to the competent authority of the Member State of importation information on imported goods, including processed products resulting from the outward processing procedure. Such information shall include the EORI number of the declarant, the 8-digit CN code, the quantity, the country of origin and the declarant of the goods, the date of declaration and the customs procedure.

#### *Article 34*

#### *Reporting obligation for certain customs procedures*

1. For processed goods resulting from the inward processing procedure as referred to in Article 256 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, the reporting obligation referred to in Article 33(1) shall include the goods placed under the inward processing procedure

that are listed in Annex I to this Regulation, even if the processed product is not listed in that Annex.

2. The reporting obligation shall not apply to import of:
  - (a) processed products resulting from the outward processing procedure as referred to in Article 259 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013;
  - (b) imported goods qualifying as returned goods in accordance with Article 203 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013.

#### *Article 35*

#### *Reporting obligation*

1. Each declarant shall, for each quarter of a calendar year, submit a report ('CBAM report') containing information on the goods imported during that quarter, to the competent authority of the Member State of importation or, if goods have been imported to more than one Member State, to the competent authority of the Member State at the declarant's choice, no later than one month after the end of each quarter.
2. The CBAM report shall include the following information:
  - (a) the total quantity of each type of goods, expressed in megawatt hours for electricity and in tonnes for other goods, specified per installation producing the goods in the country of origin;
  - (b) the actual total embedded emissions, expressed in tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>e emissions per megawatt-hour of electricity or for other goods in tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>e emissions per tonne of each type of goods, calculated in accordance with the method set out in Annex III;
  - (c) the actual total embedded indirect emissions, expressed in tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>e emissions per tonne of each type of other goods than electricity, calculated in accordance with a method set out in an implementing act referred to in paragraph 6;
  - (d) the carbon price due in a country of origin for the embedded emissions in the imported goods, which is not subject to an export rebate or other form of compensation on exportation.
3. The competent authority shall communicate the information referred to in paragraph 2 to the Commission at the latest two months after the end of the quarter covered by a report.
4. The competent authority shall impose a proportionate and dissuasive penalty on declarants who fail to submit a CBAM report.
5. If the competent authority determines that a declarant has failed to comply with the obligation to submit a CBAM report as specified in paragraph 1, the competent authority shall impose the penalty and notify the declarant:
  - (a) that the competent authority has concluded that the declarant fails to comply with the obligation of submitting a report for a given quarter;
  - (b) of the reasons for its conclusion;
  - (c) of the amount of the penalty imposed on the declarant;
  - (d) of the date from which the penalty is due;

- (e) of the action the competent authority considers the declarant should take to comply with its obligation under point (a) depending on the facts and circumstances of the case; and
  - (f) of the right of the declarant or to appeal under national rules.
6. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts concerning the information to be reported, the procedures for communicating the information referred to in paragraph 3 and the conversion of the carbon price paid in foreign currency into euro at yearly average exchange rate. The Commission is also empowered to adopt implementing acts to further define the necessary elements of the calculation method set out in Annex III, including determining system boundaries of production processes, emission factors, installation-specific values of actual emissions and their respective application to individual goods as well as laying down methods to ensure the reliability of data, including the level of detail and the verification of this data. The Commission is further empowered to adopt implementing acts to develop a calculation method for indirect emissions embedded in imported goods.
7. The implementing acts referred to in the first subparagraph shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 29(2).

## **Chapter XI**

### **Final provisions**

#### *Article 36*

#### *Entry into force*

1. This Regulation shall enter into force on the [twentieth] day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.
2. It shall apply from 1 January 2023.
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2:
  - (a) Articles 32 to 34 shall apply until 31 December 2025.
  - (b) Article 35 shall apply until 28 February 2026.
  - (c) Articles 5 and 17 shall apply from 1 September 2025.
  - (d) Articles 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 31 shall apply from 1 January 2026.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels,

*For the European Parliament*  
*The President*

*For the Council*  
*The President*

## LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT

### **1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE**

- 1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative
- 1.2. Policy area(s) concerned in the ABM/ABB structure
- 1.3. Nature of the proposal/initiative
- 1.4. Objective(s)
- 1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative
- 1.6. Duration and financial impact
- 1.7. Management mode(s) planned

### **2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES**

- 2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules
- 2.2. Management and control system
- 2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities

### **3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE**

- 3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s) affected
- 3.2. Estimated impact on expenditure
  - 3.2.1. *Summary of estimated impact on expenditure*
  - 3.2.2. *Estimated impact on operational appropriations*
  - 3.2.3. *Estimated impact on appropriations of an administrative nature*
  - 3.2.4. *Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework*
  - 3.2.5. *Third-party contributions*
- 3.3. Estimated impact on revenue

## LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT

### 1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE

#### 1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative

Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.

#### 1.2. Policy area(s) concerned

Climate policy.

#### 1.3. The proposal/initiative relates to:

a new action

a new action following a pilot project/preparatory action<sup>27</sup>

the extension of an existing action

a merger or redirection of one or more actions towards another/a new action

#### 1.4. Objective(s)

##### 1.4.1. General objective(s)

In light of the EU's increased climate ambitions, the introduction of a CBAM has the overarching objective of addressing climate change by reducing GHG emissions in the EU and globally.

##### 1.4.2. Specific objective(s)

###### Specific objective

The overarching objective of addressing climate change is further articulated in a number of specific objectives, namely:

(i) Addressing the risk of carbon leakage under increased EU ambition.

(ii) Contributing to the provision of a stable and secure policy framework for investments in low or zero carbon technologies.

(iii) Ensuring that domestic production and imports are subject to similar level of carbon pricing.

(iv) Encouraging producers in third countries who export to the EU to adopt low carbon technologies.

(v) Ensuring that the measure is effective, minimising the risk of being circumvented, thus providing environmental integrity.

(vi) Ensuring a proportionate administrative burden for businesses and public authorities in the application of the measure.

##### 1.4.3. Expected result(s) and impact

*Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the beneficiaries/groups targeted.*

<sup>27</sup>

As referred to in Article 58(2)(a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation.



The introduction of a CBAM envisages a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions both in the EU-27 and in the rest of the world in the sectors covered by CBAM. The CBAM is also expected to reduce the risks of carbon leakage, therefore gradually replacing the free allocation of allowances under the EU ETS.

As regards economic impacts, the modelling indicates that the introduction of a CBAM and other measures needed to reach the EU's increased climate ambitions could lead to a GDP contraction for the EU 27 by 0.22 % to 0.23 % in 2030. Impact on the investment side is modest. On the consumption side CBAM appears to have a slightly stronger negative effect relative to the scenario of increased climate ambition and no CBAM.

By effectively reducing carbon leakage, the introduction of a CBAM leads to a reduction in imports in the EU 27. Overall, the social impacts of CBAM are limited.

Administrative impacts on national authorities and businesses are expected. Altogether, compliance costs for businesses and authorities, while significant, are expected to be proportionate, and manageable in light of the environmental benefits of the measure.

While revenue generation is not an objective of CBAM is expected to generate additional revenue, which for 2030 is estimated at above EUR 2.1 billion.

#### 1.4.4. Indicators of performance

*Specify the indicators for monitoring progress and achievements.*

Objectives	Indicators	Measurement tools/data sources
<b>Reduce GHG emissions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Level of emissions in the EU</li> <li>- Level of emissions globally</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emission statistics</li> <li>- Sector statistics</li> </ul>
<b>Incentivise cleaner production processes in third countries</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evolution of actual emissions for CBAM sectors in third countries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Level of emissions demonstrated by third country producers subject to CBAM</li> </ul>
<b>Prevent carbon leakage</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- As indicators of GHG emissions above</li> <li>- Level of emissions in the EU relative to level of emissions globally</li> <li>- Trade flows in CBAM sectors</li> <li>- Trade flows downstream</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emission statistics</li> <li>- Trade statistics</li> <li>- Sector statistics</li> </ul>
<b>Ensure consistency with EU policies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Import certificates price in line with the price in the EU ETS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Statistics from EU ETS and CBAM authorities</li> </ul>
<b>Limit administrative burden</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Timely treatment of CBAM enforcement (e.g. possible reconciliation procedure)</li> <li>- Frequency of updating EU ETS pricing</li> <li>- Checks of actual level of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Feedback from industry and public authorities responsible for CBAM implementation</li> </ul>

	emissions by exporter	- Number of staff necessary for CBAM administration
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## 1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative

### 1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for roll-out of the implementation of the initiative

The CBAM is expected to be introduced in 2023. A simplified system of the CBAM scheme will be in place for the first years after the entry into force. Specifically, a transitional period will apply to facilitate the smooth roll out of the CBAM and allow traders and importers to adjust. Simplifications include the procedures applied at the border when goods are imported and the use of default values to determination the CBAM obligation.

### 1.5.2. Added value of Union involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g. coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For the purposes of this point 'added value of Union involvement' is the value resulting from Union intervention which is additional to the value that would have been otherwise created by Member States alone.

**Reasons for action at European level (ex-ante)** Reducing GHG emissions is fundamentally a trans-boundary issue that requires effective action at the largest possible scale. The EU as a supranational organisation is well-placed to establish effective climate policy in the EU, like it has done with the EU ETS.

There exists already a harmonised carbon price at EU level. This consists of the price resulting from the EU ETS for the sectors covered by the system. These sectors are energy-intensive and subject to international competition. In order to ensure a well-functioning single market when the EU increases its climate ambition, it is essential that a level playing field is created for the relevant sectors in the internal market. The single effective way to do this is by taking action at the level of the EU. Any initiative needs to be implemented in a way that provides importers, regardless of country of origin and port of entry or destination within the EU, with uniform conditions and incentives for GHG emission reductions that are equivalent to those of domestic producers.

The only meaningful way to ensure equivalence between the carbon pricing policy applied in the EU's internal market and the carbon pricing policy applied on imports is to take action at the level of the Union.

**Expected generated Union added value (ex-post):** In parallel to the EU ETS, reduction of GHG emissions and protection against the risk of carbon leakage in the EU single market can be established most adequately at the EU level. Additionally, the need for minimal administrative costs is best achieved by establishing consistent rules for the entire single market, further underlining the added value of an intervention at the EU level.

The public consultation has confirmed the added value of taking action on the CBAM at the EU level. In particular, stakeholders agree that an EU CBAM is needed due to existing differences of ambition between the EU and the rest of the world and in order to support the global climate efforts. In addition, in view of the EU's position in international trade, if it introduces a CBAM the environmental effect on

international climate ambitions will be most effective as a potential example to follow.

Thus, the objective of reducing emissions and climate neutrality requires – without equally ambitious global policies – action by the European Union.

*1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past*

The CBAM is a new mechanism. The preferred option in the Impact Assessment draws from the EU Emissions Trading System and aims at replicating some of its features.

*1.5.4. Compatibility with the Multiannual Financial Framework and possible synergies with other appropriate instruments*

In the interinstitutional agreement of 16 December 2020, signed in the context of the negotiations, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission agreed that "the institutions will work towards introducing sufficient new own resources with a view to covering an amount corresponding to the expected expenditure related to the repayment" of NextGenerationEU<sup>28</sup>. As part of the mandate received, the Commission was invited to put forward a proposal for a CBAM in the first semester of 2021, with a view to its introduction at the latest by 1 January 2023.

*1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for redeployment*

Implementation costs for CBAM will be financed by the EU budget.

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<sup>28</sup> Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (OJ L 433I , 22.12.2020, p. 28).

## 1.6. Duration and financial impact of the proposal/initiative

### limited duration

- in effect from [DD/MM]YYYY to [DD/MM]YYYY
- Financial impact from YYYY to YYYY for commitment appropriations and from YYYY to YYYY for payment appropriations.

### × unlimited duration

- Implementation with a start-up period from 1 January 2023
- followed by full-scale operation.

## 1.7. Management mode(s) planned<sup>29</sup>

### ✓ Direct management by the Commission

- by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;
- by the executive agencies.

### Shared management with the Member States

### Indirect management by entrusting budget implementation tasks to:

- third countries or the bodies they have designated;
- international organisations and their agencies (to be specified);
- the EIB and the European Investment Fund;
- bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation;
- public law bodies;
- bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that they provide adequate financial guarantees;
- bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with the implementation of a public-private partnership and that provide adequate financial guarantees;
- persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in the CFSP pursuant to Title V of the TEU, and identified in the relevant basic act.
- *If more than one management mode is indicated, please provide details in the 'Comments' section.*

Comments

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<sup>29</sup> Details of management modes and references to the Financial Regulation may be found on the BudgWeb site:  
<https://myintracomm.ec.europa.eu/budgweb/EN/man/budgmanag/Pages/budgmanag.aspx>

## 2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES

### 2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules

*Specify frequency and conditions.*

The Commission will ensure that arrangements are in place to monitor and evaluate the functioning of the CBAM and evaluate it against the main policy objectives. Given that CBAM is one of the policy proposals under the 'Fit for 55 Package', monitoring and evaluation could be carried out in alignment with the other policies of the package.

The administration system should be evaluated after the first year of operation to identify any issues also in terms of governance and potential improvements. In addition, when more data is available, the Commission will also review the scope of the CBAM to examine the possibility of extending it to cover emissions of additional sectors and further down the value chain. For this, it is necessary to monitor the effect of CBAM on the shortlisted sectors.

### 2.2. Management and control system(s)

#### 2.2.1. *Justification of the management mode(s), the funding implementation mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed*

A set-up similar to the EU ETS building on national competent authorities allows a swift implementation of the CBAM. In addition, limited functions in particular as regards IT carried out at central level should ensure cooperation and collaboration in the implementation of CBAM.

#### 2.2.2. *Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up to mitigate them*

The proposed CBAM will be based on a declarative system, which entails the risk of non-declaration or misdeclaration.

In order to address the risk of non-declaration, the system requires an authorisation before importing goods in the scope of the Regulation. National customs authorities will be in charge of enforcing this rule by not releasing into free circulation these goods as long as the declarant is not authorised according to this Regulation.

In order to address the risk of misdeclaration a system of auditing on risk assessment criteria as well as random audits will be in place coupled with sanctions set up as a sufficiently high level to serve as deterrent. Auditing will take place both at the level of CBAM declaration by the national authorities and at the level of import declarations by customs authorities.

#### 2.2.3. *Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio of "control costs ÷ value of the related funds managed"), and assessment of the expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure)*

The role of the national authorities will be to control the correct application of CBAM, in particular the surrender of CBAM certificates and the collection of funds. A risk management system will be applied to ensure cost-effective controls.

### 2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities

*Specify existing or envisaged prevention and protection measures, e.g. from the Anti-Fraud Strategy.*

The financial interests of the Union should be protected through proportionate measures throughout the expenditure cycle, including the prevention, detection and investigation of irregularities, the recovery of funds lost, wrongly paid or incorrectly used and, where appropriate, administrative and financial penalties.

An authorised declarant who fails to surrender, by 31 May of each year, a number of CBAM certificates corresponding to the emissions embedded in goods imported during the previous year or submits to the national competent authority false information related to actual emissions with a view to obtain a favourable individual treatment, shall be held liable for the payment of a penalty.

The amount of the penalty will be based on penalties in the EU ETS. Payment of the penalty shall not release the authorised declarant from the obligation to surrender the outstanding number of CBAM certificates to the national competent authority.

In case of repeated offences, the national competent authority may decide to suspend the account of the declarant.

Implementing acts will provide more detail on the application of penalties.

### 3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE

#### 3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s) affected

- Existing budget lines

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.

Heading of multiannual financial framework	Budget line	Type of expenditure	Contribution			
	Number	Diff./Non-diff. <sup>1</sup>	from EFTA countries <sup>2</sup>	from candidate countries <sup>3</sup>	from third countries	within the meaning of Article 21(2)(b) of the Financial Regulation
7	20 01 02 01	Non-diff.	NO	NO	NO	NO

- New budget lines requested

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.

Heading of multiannual financial framework	Budget line	Type of expenditure	Contribution			
	Number	Diff./non-diff.	from EFTA countries	from candidate countries	from third countries	within the meaning of Article 21(2)(b) of the Financial Regulation
3	09.20.YY – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism	Diff.	NO	NO	NO	NO

<sup>1</sup> Diff. = Differentiated appropriations / Non-diff. = Non-differentiated appropriations.

<sup>2</sup> EFTA: European Free Trade Association.

<sup>3</sup> Candidate countries and, where applicable, potential candidates from the Western Balkans.

### 3.2. Estimated impact on expenditure

#### 3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on expenditure

EUR million (to three decimal places): Current Prices

<b>Heading of multiannual financial framework</b>	Number	3 Natural resources and environment
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DG: TAXUD						2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	TOTAL
• Operational appropriations												
Budget line <sup>1</sup>	Commitments	(1a)	1.3	2.25	2.45	1.8	1.65	1.55	11.1			
	Payments	(2a)	1.3	2.25	2.45	1.8	1.65	1.55	11.1			
<b>TOTAL appropriations for DG TAXUD</b>	Commitments	=1a	1.3	2.25	2.45	1.8	1.65	1.55	11.1			
	Payments	=2a	1.3	2.25	2.45	1.8	1.65	1.55	11.1			

<sup>1</sup> According to the official budget nomenclature.



<b>Heading of multiannual financial framework</b>	<b>7</b>	‘Administrative expenditure’
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EUR million (to three decimal places): Current Prices

		2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	<b>TOTAL 2021 -2027 MFF</b>
DG: TAXUD							
• Human resources		1.064	1.216	1.216	1.216	0.912	<b>5.624</b>
• Other administrative expenditure – Missions							
<b>TOTAL DG TAXUD</b>	Appropriations	1.064	1.216	1.216	1.216	0.912	<b>5.624</b>

<b>TOTAL appropriations under HEADING 7 of the multiannual financial framework</b>	(Total commitments = Total payments)	1.064	1.216	1.216	1.216	0.912	<b>5.624</b>
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EUR million (to three decimal places): Current Prices

		2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	<b>TOTAL 2021 – 2027 MFF</b>
<b>TOTAL appropriations under HEADINGS 1 to 7 of the multiannual financial framework</b>	Commitments	<b>3.114</b>	<b>2.566</b>	<b>2.416</b>	<b>2.316</b>	<b>1.712</b>	<b>12.124</b>
	Payments	<b>3.114</b>	<b>2.566</b>	<b>2.416</b>	<b>2.316</b>	<b>1.712</b>	<b>12.124</b>

### 3.2.2. Summary of estimated impact on Commission's administrative appropriations

- The proposal/initiative does not require the use of appropriations of an administrative nature
- The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative nature, as explained below:

EUR million (to three decimal places)

	Year 2021	Year 2022	Year 2023	Year 2024	Year 2025	Year 2026	Year 2027	TOTAL
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<b>HEADING 7 of the multiannual financial framework</b>								
Human resources			1.064	1.216	1.216	1.216	0.912	<b>5.624</b>
Other administrative expenditure								
<b>Subtotal HEADING 7 of the multiannual financial framework</b>			1.064	1.216	1.216	1.216	0.912	<b>5.624</b>

<b>Outside HEADING 7<sup>1</sup> of the multiannual financial framework</b>								
Human resources								
Other expenditure of an administrative nature								
<b>Subtotal outside HEADING 7 of the multiannual financial framework</b>								

<b>TOTAL</b>			1.064	1.216	1.216	1.216	0.912	<b>5.624</b>
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The appropriations required for human resources and other expenditure of an administrative nature will be met by appropriations from the DG that are already assigned to management of the action and/or have been redeployed within the DG, together if necessary with any additional allocation which may be granted to the managing DG under the annual allocation procedure and in the light of budgetary constraints.

<sup>1</sup> Technical and/or administrative assistance and expenditure in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions (former 'BA' lines), indirect research, direct research.

### 3.2.2.1. Estimated requirements of human resources

- The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources.
- The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained below:

*Estimate to be expressed in full time equivalent units*

	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	Total
<b>• Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary staff)</b>						
20 01 02 01 (Headquarters and Commission's Representation Offices)	7	8	8	8	6	6
20 01 02 03 (Delegations)						
01 01 01 01 (Indirect research)						
01 01 01 11 (Direct research)						
Other budget lines (specify)						
<b>• External staff (in Full Time Equivalent unit: FTE)<sup>1</sup></b>						
20 02 01 (AC, END, INT from the 'global envelope')						
20 02 03 (AC, AL, END, INT and JPD in the delegations)						
<b>XX 01 xx yy zz<sup>2</sup></b>	- at Headquarters					
	- in Delegations					
01 01 01 02 (AC, END, INT - Indirect research)						
01 01 01 12 (AC, END, INT - Direct research)						
Other budget lines (specify)						
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>

**XX** is the policy area or budget title concerned.

The human resources required will be met by staff from the DG who are already assigned to management of the action and/or have been redeployed within the DG, together if necessary with any additional allocation which may be granted to the managing DG under the annual allocation procedure and in the light of budgetary constraints.

Description of tasks to be carried out:

Officials and temporary staff	The CBAM regulation requires the Commission to follow up with several delegated and implementing acts once the CBAM regulation is adopted. Commission staff will also be needed to review and assess the functioning of the CBAM system and to implement the IT system.
External staff	

<sup>1</sup> AC= Contract Staff; AL = Local Staff; END= Seconded National Expert; INT = agency staff; JPD= Junior Professionals in Delegations.

<sup>2</sup> Sub-ceiling for external staff covered by operational appropriations (former 'BA' lines).

3.2.3. *Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework*

The proposal/initiative is compatible the current multiannual financial framework.

The proposal/initiative will entail reprogramming of the relevant heading in the multiannual financial framework.

The proposal/initiative requires application of the flexibility instrument or revision of the multiannual financial framework<sup>1</sup>.

**3.3. Estimated impact on revenue**

The proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue.

The proposal/initiative has the following financial impact:

on own resources

on other revenue

please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines

EUR million (to three decimal places)

Budget revenue line:	Appropriations available for the current financial year	Impact of the proposal/initiative							
		2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
Article ..... ....		0	0	0	1,510	1,660	1,810	1,960	2,100

Note: CBAM is not expected to generate revenue in the transitional period from 2023 to 2025.

During its definitive stage, namely from 2026, yearly CBAM revenues will depend on the degree of phase-out of free allocation and the respective phase-in of the border measure.

In 2030, total yearly revenues from the border measure alone are expected to amount to EUR 2.1 billion are expected to be raised by the border measure and EUR 7 billion from additional.

For miscellaneous ‘assigned’ revenue, specify the budget expenditure line(s) affected.

Specify the method for calculating the impact on revenue.

The JRC GEM-E3 model was used to estimate revenues generated by CBAM.

<sup>1</sup> See Articles 12 and 13 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2093/2020 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027.



Brussels, 14.7.2021  
COM(2021) 564 final

ANNEXES 1 to 5

## **ANNEXES**

**to the**

**REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL**

**establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism**

{SEC(2021) 564 final} - {SWD(2021) 643 final} - {SWD(2021) 644 final} -  
{SWD(2021) 647 final}

**ANNEX I**  
**List of goods and greenhouse gases**

1. For the purpose of the identification of goods, this Regulation shall apply to goods listed in the following sectors currently falling under the combined nomenclature ('CN') codes listed below, and shall be those of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 <sup>(1)</sup>.
2. For the purposes of this Regulation, the greenhouse gases relating to goods falling in the sectors listed below, shall be those listed below for each type of goods.

**Cement**

<b>CN code</b>	<b>Greenhouse gas</b>
2523 10 00 – Cement clinkers	Carbon dioxide
2523 21 00 – White Portland cement, whether or not artificially coloured	Carbon dioxide
2523 29 00 – Other Portland cement	Carbon dioxide
2523 90 00 – Other hydraulic cements	Carbon dioxide

**Electricity**

<b>CN code</b>	<b>Greenhouse gas</b>
2716 00 00 – Electrical energy	Carbon dioxide

**Fertilisers**

<b>CN code</b>	<b>Greenhouse gas</b>
2808 00 00 – Nitric acid; sulphonitric acids	Carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide
2814 – Ammonia, anhydrous or in aqueous solution	Carbon dioxide
2834 21 00 - Nitrates of potassium	Carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide
3102 – Mineral or chemical fertilisers, nitrogenous	Carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide
3105 – Mineral or chemical fertilisers containing two or three of the fertilising elements nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium; other fertilisers; goods of this chapter in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a gross weight not exceeding 10 kg - Except: 3105 60 00 – Mineral or chemical fertilisers containing the two fertilising elements phosphorus and potassium	Carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide

<sup>1</sup> Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p. 1).

## Iron and Steel

CN code	Greenhouse gas
72 – Iron and steel Except: 7202 – Ferro-alloys 7204 – Ferrous waste and scrap; remelting scrap ingots and steel	Carbon dioxide
7301- Sheet piling of iron or steel, whether or not drilled, punched or made from assembled elements; welded angles, shapes and sections, of iron or steel	Carbon dioxide
7302 – Railway or tramway track construction material of iron or steel, the following: rails, check-rails and rack rails, switch blades, crossing frogs, point rods and other crossing pieces, sleepers (cross-ties), fish- plates, chairs, chair wedges, sole plates (base plates), rail clips, bedplates, ties and other material specialised for jointing or fixing rails	Carbon dioxide
7303 00 – Tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, of cast iron	Carbon dioxide
7304 – Tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, seamless, of iron (other than cast iron) or steel	Carbon dioxide
7305 – Other tubes and pipes (for example, welded, riveted or similarly closed), having circular cross-sections, the external diameter of which exceeds 406,4 mm, of iron or steel	Carbon dioxide
7306 – Other tubes, pipes and hollow profiles (for example, open seam or welded, riveted or similarly closed), of iron or steel	Carbon dioxide
7307 – Tube or pipe fittings (for example, couplings, elbows, sleeves), of iron or steel	Carbon dioxide
7308 – Structures (excluding prefabricated buildings of heading 9406) and parts of structures (for example, bridges and bridge-sections, lock-gates, towers, lattice masts, roofs, roofing frameworks, doors and windows and their frames and thresholds for doors, shutters, balustrades, pillars and columns), of iron or steel; plates, rods, angles, shapes, sections, tubes and the like, prepared for use in structures, of iron or steel	Carbon dioxide
7309 – Reservoirs, tanks, vats and similar containers for any material (other than compressed or liquefied gas), of iron or steel, of a capacity exceeding 300 l, whether or not lined or heat-insulated, but not fitted with mechanical or thermal equipment	Carbon dioxide

7310 – Tanks, casks, drums, cans, boxes and similar containers, for any material (other than compressed or liquefied gas), of iron or steel, of a capacity not exceeding 300 l, whether or not lined or heat-insulated, but not fitted with mechanical or thermal equipment	Carbon dioxide
7311 – Containers for compressed or liquefied gas, of iron or steel	Carbon dioxide

### Aluminium

<b>CN code</b>	<b>Greenhouse gas</b>
7601 – Unwrought aluminium	Carbon dioxide and perfluorocarbons
7603 – Aluminium powders and flakes	Carbon dioxide and perfluorocarbons
7604 – Aluminium bars, rods and profiles	Carbon dioxide and perfluorocarbons
7605 – Aluminium wire	Carbon dioxide and perfluorocarbons
7606 – Aluminium plates, sheets and strip, of a thickness exceeding 0,2 mm	Carbon dioxide and perfluorocarbons
7607 – Aluminium foil (whether or not printed or backed with paper, paper-board, plastics or similar backing materials) of a thickness (excluding any backing) not exceeding 0,2 mm	Carbon dioxide and perfluorocarbons
7608 – Aluminium tubes and pipes	Carbon dioxide and perfluorocarbons
7609 00 00 – Aluminium tube or pipe fittings (for example, couplings, elbows, sleeves)	Carbon dioxide and perfluorocarbons



**ANNEX II**  
**Countries and territories outside the scope of this Regulation**

**1. SECTION A- COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THIS REGULATION**

This Regulation shall not apply to goods originating in the following countries:

- Iceland
- Liechtenstein
- Norway
- Switzerland

This Regulation shall not apply to goods originating in the following territories:

- Büsingen
- Heligoland
- Livigno
- Ceuta
- Melilla

**2. SECTION B - COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THIS REGULATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPORTATION OF ELECTRICITY INTO THE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF THE UNION**

[Currently empty]

**ANNEX III**  
**Methods for calculating embedded emissions**

**1. DEFINITIONS**

For the purposes of this Annex and Annex IV, the following definitions apply:

- (a) ‘simple goods’ means goods produced in a production process requiring exclusively input materials and fuels having zero embedded emissions;
- (b) ‘complex goods’ means goods requiring the input of other simple goods in its production process;
- (c) ‘specific embedded emissions’ means the embedded emissions of one tonne of goods, expressed as tonnes of CO<sub>2e</sub> emissions per tonne of goods;
- (d) ‘CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor’, means the weighted average of the CO<sub>2</sub> intensity of electricity produced from fossil fuels in a geographic area. The CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor is the result of the division of the CO<sub>2</sub> emission data of the energy sector divided by the gross electricity generation based on fossil fuels. It is expressed in tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> per megawatt-hour;
- (e) ‘power purchase agreement’ means a contract under which a person agrees to purchase electricity directly from an electricity producer;
- (f) ‘Transmission System Operator’ means an operator as defined in Article 2(35) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council <sup>(2)</sup>.

**2. DETERMINATION OF ACTUAL DIRECT EMBEDDED EMISSIONS FOR SIMPLE GOODS**

For determining the specific actual embedded emissions of simple goods produced in a given installation, only direct emissions shall be accounted for. For this purpose, the following equation is to be applied:

$$SEE_g = \frac{AttrEm_g}{AL_g}$$

Where SEE<sub>g</sub> are the specific embedded emissions of goods *g*, in terms of CO<sub>2e</sub> per tonne, AttrEm<sub>g</sub> are the attributed emissions of goods *g*, and AL<sub>g</sub> is the activity level of the goods. The activity level is the amount of the goods produced in the reporting period in that installation.

‘Attributed emissions’ mean the part of the installation’s direct emissions during the reporting period that are caused by the production process resulting in goods *g* when applying the system boundaries of the process defined by the implementing acts adopted pursuant to Article 7(6). The attributed emissions shall be calculated using the following equation:

$$AttrEm_g = DirEm$$

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<sup>2</sup> Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 125).

Where DirEm are the direct emissions, resulting from the production process, expressed in tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>e, within the system boundaries referred to in the implementing act pursuant to Article 7(6).

### 3. DETERMINATION OF ACTUAL DIRECT EMBEDDED EMISSIONS FOR COMPLEX GOODS

For determining the specific actual embedded emissions of complex goods produced in a given installation, only direct emissions will be accounted for. In this case, the following equation is to be applied:

$$SEE_g = \frac{AttrEm_g + EE_{ImpMat}}{AL_g}$$

Where AttrEm<sub>g</sub> are the attributed emissions of goods *g*, and AL<sub>g</sub> the activity level of the goods, the latter being the amount of goods produced in the reporting period in that installation, and EE<sub>ImpMat</sub> are the embedded emissions of the input materials (precursors) consumed in the production process. Only input materials listed as relevant to the system boundaries of the production process as specified in the implementing act adopted pursuant to Article 7(6) are to be considered. The relevant EE<sub>ImpMat</sub> are calculated as follows:

$$EE_{ImpMat} = \sum_{i=1}^n M_i \cdot SEE_i$$

Where M<sub>i</sub> is the mass of input material *i* used in the production process, and SEE<sub>i</sub> its specific embedded emissions for the input material. For SEE<sub>i</sub> the operator of the installation shall use the value of emissions resulting from the installation where the input material was produced, provided that that installation's data can be adequately measured.

### 4. DETERMINATION OF DEFAULT VALUES REFERRED IN ARTICLES 7(2) AND (3)

If actual monitoring data referring to direct emissions in accordance with points 2 and 3 cannot be adequately provided, a default value shall apply.

For the purpose of determining default values, only actual values shall be used for the determination of embedded emissions. In the absence of actual data, literature values may be used. The Commission shall publish guidance for the approach taken to correct for waste gases or greenhouse gases used as process input, before collecting the data required to determine the relevant default values for each type of goods listed in Annex I. Default values shall be determined based on the best available data. They shall be revised periodically through implementing acts based on the most up-to-date and reliable information, including on the basis of information provided by a third country or group of third countries.

#### 4.1. Default values referred in Article 7(2)

When actual emissions cannot be adequately determined by the authorised declarant, default values shall be used. These values shall be set at the average emission intensity of each exporting country and for each of the goods listed in Annex I other than electricity, increased by a mark-up, the latter to be determined in the implementing acts of this Regulation. When reliable data for the exporting country cannot be applied for a type of goods, the default values shall be based on the average emission intensity of the 10 per cent worst performing EU installations for that type of goods.

## **4.2. Default values for imported electricity in Article 7(3)**

Default values for imported electricity shall be determined based on either specific default values for a third country, group of third countries or region within a third country, or if those values are not available, on EU default values for similar electricity production in the EU, according to point 4.2.2.

### *4.2.1. Specific default values for a third country, group of third countries or region within a third country*

Specific default values shall be based on the best data available to the Commission determining the average CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor in tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> per megawatt-hour of price-setting sources in the third country, group of third countries or region within a third country.

Where specific default values are determined for a third country, a group of third countries or a region within a third country, and electricity is imported from another third country or another region into the third country, or another group of third countries or region within a third country with the purpose of being re-exported to the Union, the same specific default value shall not be used.

### *4.2.2. Alternative default values*

Where no specific default value has been determined for a third country, a group of third countries, or a region within a third country, the default value for electricity shall represent the CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor in the EU, in tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> per megawatt-hour. That means the weighted average of the CO<sub>2</sub> intensity of electricity produced from fossil fuels in the EU. The weight reflects the production mix of the fossil fuels in the EU. The CO<sub>2</sub> factor is the result of the division of the CO<sub>2</sub> emission data of the energy industry divided by the gross electricity generation based on fossil fuels in megawatt-hour.

Where authorised declarants of goods originating in a third country, or for a group of third countries having a significant exchange of electricity with the EU, it can be demonstrated, on the basis of reliable data, that the average CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor of price-setting sources in that third country or that group of third countries is lower than the one in the EU or lower than the specific default value, an alternative default value based on that average CO<sub>2</sub>e emission factor shall be established for that country or group of countries.

Where alternative default values are defined for a third country or region in a third country, or a group of third countries or regions within third countries, and electricity is imported from another third country or from another region within a third country, or another group of third countries or regions within third countries into the third country subject to the alternative default value, the same alternative default value may not be used.

## **5. CONDITIONS TO APPLYING ACTUAL EMBEDDED EMISSIONS IN ELECTRICITY**

An authorised declarant may require to apply actual embedded emissions instead of default values for the calculation referred to in Article 7(3) if the following cumulative criteria are met:

- (a) the authorised declarant has concluded a power purchase agreement with a producer of electricity located in a third country for an amount of electricity that is equivalent to the amount for which the use of a specific value is claimed;
- (b) the installation producing electricity is either directly connected to the EU transmission system or it can be demonstrated that at the time of export, there was no

physical network congestion at any point in the network between the installation and the EU transmission system;

- (c) an equivalent amount of electricity to the electricity for which the use of actual embedded emissions is claimed has been firmly nominated to the allocated interconnection capacity by all responsible transmission system operators in the country of origin, the country of destination and, if relevant, each third country of transit, and the nominated capacity and the production of electricity by the installation referred to in point (b) refer to the same period of time which shall not be longer than one hour;
- (d) meeting the above criteria is certified by an accredited verifier. The verifier shall receive at least monthly interim reports demonstrating how the above criteria are fulfilled.

## **6. ADAPTATION OF DEFAULT VALUES BASED ON REGION SPECIFIC FEATURES**

Default values can be adapted to particular areas, regions of countries where specific characteristics prevail in terms of objective factors such as geography, natural resources, market conditions, energy mix, or industrial production. When data adapted to those specific local characteristics are available and can define more targeted default values, the latter may be used instead of default values based on EU installations.

Where declarants for goods originating in a third country, or a group of third countries can demonstrate, on the basis of reliable data, that alternative region specific adaptation of default values are lower than the default values defined by the Commission the former can be used.

## **ANNEX IV**

### **Book-keeping requirements for data used for the calculation of embedded emissions**

#### **1. MINIMUM DATA TO BE KEPT BY AN AUTHORISED DECLARANT FOR IMPORTED GOODS:**

1. Data identifying the authorised declarant:
  - (a) name;
  - (b) the unique identifier assigned by the competent national authority;
2. Data on imported goods:
  - (a) type and quantity of each type of goods;
  - (b) country of origin;
  - (c) actual emissions or default values.

#### **2. MINIMUM DATA TO BE KEPT BY AN AUTHORISED DECLARANT FOR EMBEDDED EMISSIONS IN IMPORTED GOODS BASED ON ACTUAL EMISSIONS**

For each type of goods to which this Regulation applies, the following additional data has to be kept:

- (a) identification of the installation where the goods were produced;
- (b) contact information of the operator of the installation where the goods were produced;
- (c) the verified emissions report including the data regarding the embedded emissions of each type of declared goods as set out in Annex V;
- (d) the specific embedded emissions of the goods.

**ANNEX V**  
**Verification principles and content of a verification report**

**1. PRINCIPLES OF VERIFICATION**

The following principles shall apply for verifications requested according to Article 8:

- (a) verifiers shall carry out verifications with an attitude of professional scepticism;
- (b) an emissions report shall be considered as verified and fit for purpose only if the verifier finds with reasonable assurance that the report is free of material misstatements and of material non-conformities regarding the calculation rules of Annex III;
- (c) installation visits by the verifier shall be mandatory except where specific criteria for waiving the installation visit are met;
- (d) for deciding whether misstatements or non-conformities are material, the verifier shall use thresholds given by the implementing acts adopted in accordance with Article 8.

For parameters for which no such thresholds are defined, the verifier shall use expert judgement to whether misstatements, individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, justified by their size and nature, have to be considered material, i.e. and could affect the use of the report by the intended users, in particular the competent national authorities.

**2. CONTENT OF A VERIFICATION REPORT**

A verification report shall include, at least, the following information:

- (a) identification of the installation where the goods were produced;
- (b) contact information of the operator of the installation where the goods were produced;
- (c) the applicable reporting period;
- (d) name and contact information of the verifier;
- (e) ID of accreditation, name of the Accreditation Body;
- (f) the date of the installation visit, if applicable, or the reasons for not carrying out an installation visit;
- (g) quantities of each type of declared goods produced in the reporting period;
- (h) direct emissions of the installation during the reporting period;
- (i) a description on how the installation's emissions are attributed to different types of goods;
- (j) quantitative information on the goods, emissions and energy flows not associated with those goods;
- (k) in case of complex goods:
  - i. quantities of input materials (precursors) used;
  - ii. the specific embedded emissions;

- iii. in case actual emissions are used: the identification of the installation where the input material has been produced and the actual emissions from the production on that material.
- (l) the verification opinion statement;
- (m) information on material misstatements found and not corrected, where applicable;
- (n) information of non-conformities with calculation rules set out in Annex III, where applicable.





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**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT**

**Subsidiarity Grid**

*Accompanying the document*

**Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council  
establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism**

{COM(2021) 564 final} - {SWD(2021) 643 final} - {SWD(2021) 644 final} -  
{SEC(2021) 564 final}

## Subsidiarity Grid

<b>1. Can the Union act? What is the legal basis and competence of the Unions' intended action?</b>
<b>1.1 Which article(s) of the Treaty are used to support the legislative proposal or policy initiative?</b>
Articles 191 to 193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ('TFEU') confirm and specify EU competencies in the area of climate change. The legal basis for this proposal is Article 192(1) TFEU. In accordance with Articles 191 and 192(1) TFEU, the EU shall contribute to the pursuit, inter alia, of the following objectives: preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change.
<b>1.2 Is the Union competence represented by this Treaty article exclusive, shared or supporting in nature?</b>
In the case of environment, the Union's competence is shared.
<i>Subsidiarity does not apply for policy areas where the Union has <b>exclusive</b> competence as defined in Article 3 TFEU<sup>1</sup>. It is the specific legal basis which determines whether the proposal falls under the subsidiarity control mechanism. Article 4 TFEU<sup>2</sup> sets out the areas where competence is shared between the Union and the Member States. Article 6 TFEU<sup>3</sup> sets out the areas for which the Unions has competence only to support the actions of the Member States.</i>
<b>2. Subsidiarity Principle: Why should the EU act?</b>
<b>2.1 Does the proposal fulfil the procedural requirements of Protocol No. 2<sup>4</sup>:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Has there been a wide consultation before proposing the act?</li><li>- Is there a detailed statement with qualitative and, where possible, quantitative indicators allowing an appraisal of whether the action can best be achieved at Union level?</li></ul>
<p>The Commission engaged in an array of public and targeted consultations, for the preparation of this proposal. An inception impact assessment took place between 4 March and 1 April 2020 with the aim to collect initial feedback on the project. An open public consultation was also placed on the Commission website, from 22 July to 28 October 2020, aiming to gather opinions from citizens and organisations on the justifications, objectives, potential design and scope as well as impacts of the initiative. In addition to these, the Commission services engaged in extensive bilateral consultations with public authorities within the EU and third countries, as well as with business associations, individual companies and NGOs.</p> <p>The impact assessment is explicit in stating that the only meaningful way to ensure equivalence between the carbon pricing policy applied in the EU's internal market -by the EU ETS- and the carbon pricing policy applied on imports is to take action at the level of the Union. CBAM is inherently a border measure and therefore, there is clear added value of placing the intervention at the EU level, although its implementation and enforcement will be better performed at Member States level. These arguments are substantiated qualitatively in the impact assessment.</p>

<sup>1</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E003&from=EN>

<sup>2</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E004&from=EN>

<sup>3</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E006:EN:HTML>

<sup>4</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016E/PRO/02&from=EN>

The explanatory memorandum of the proposal and the impact assessment, under chapters 3.2 and 3.3, contain sections on the principle of subsidiarity.

**2.2 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying the Commission's proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the conformity with the principle of subsidiarity?**

Climate change is, by its very nature, a trans-boundary challenge that cannot be solved by national or local action alone. Coordinated EU action can effectively supplement and reinforce national and local action and enhances climate action. Coordination of climate action is necessary at EU level and, where possible, at global level, and EU action is justified on grounds of subsidiarity.

Since 1992, the EU has worked to develop joint solutions and to drive forward global action to tackle climate change. More specifically, action at EU level should aim to provide for cost effective delivery of long-term climate objectives, while ensuring fairness and environmental integrity. The establishment of a robust governance of the EU 2050 climate-neutrality objective will help to ensure that the EU remains on track to achieve the objective. Action on climate change adaptation at EU level enables the integration of adaptation policies and measures in key sectors, governance levels and EU policies.

There exists already a harmonised carbon pricing system at EU level: the EU ETS. The EU ETS applies to sectors that are energy-intensive and may be subject to international competition. In order to ensure a well-functioning single market when the EU increases its climate ambition, it is essential that a level playing field is created for the relevant sectors in the internal market. The single effective way to do this is by taking action at the level of the EU. Any initiative needs to be designed in a way that provides importers, regardless of country of origin and port of entry or destination within the EU, with uniform conditions and incentives for carbon emission reductions that are equivalent to those of domestic producers.

Additionally, the need for minimal administrative costs is best achieved by establishing consistent rules for the entire single market, further underlining the added value of an intervention at the EU level. Nevertheless, for the sake of minimising costs and ensuring effective action, national authorities should implement and enforce of the regulation, while a body at EU level could coordinate their actions and provide assistance. This architecture would draw the lessons of the successful experience of the EU ETS.

Moreover, as CBAM is inherently a border measure there is clear added value of placing the intervention at the EU level in view of the fact that external trade is an exclusive competence of the EU. At the same time, the CBAM also needs to be implemented consistently by Member States in the EU market and in view of its close links to the EU ETS, there is further justification of intervention at EU level. The public consultation has confirmed the added value of taking action on the CBAM at the EU level. In particular, stakeholders agree that a CBAM is needed due to existing differences of ambition between the EU and the rest of the world and in order to support the global climate efforts. In addition, in view of the EU's position in international trade, if it introduces a CBAM the environmental effect on international climate ambitions will be most effective as a potential example to follow.

**2.3 Based on the answers to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed action be achieved sufficiently by the Member States acting alone (necessity for EU action)?**

This proposal aims to reduce GHG emissions in the EU and avoiding that these emissions reduction efforts are offset by emissions increase outside the EU, as a result of carbon leakage, as well as ensure that the price of imports into the EU reflect more accurately their carbon content. This problem has a cross-border dimension, so it cannot be tackled independently by Member States. Due to its environmental nature and in order to avoid trade diversion, CBAM should be more efficient if designed at EU-level in a uniform way, mirroring EU ETS and designed in a compatible way with WTO rules.

(a) Are there significant/appreciable transnational/cross-border aspects to the problems being tackled? Have these been quantified?

The problem addressed by this proposal is how to succeed in reducing GHG emissions in the EU and avoiding that these emissions reduction efforts are offset by emissions increase outside the EU, as a result of carbon leakage. This risk increases as the EU raises the ambition of its climate policies above that of its trading partners. Therefore, the scale of the problem is commensurate to the raising of the EU climate ambition relative to that of others.

Based on the above, CBAM as a measure –like the problem it addresses - is cross-border one aiming to ensure that the price of imports into the EU reflect more accurately their carbon content. The impact assessment studied in detail the transnational aspects to the problem including impacts on imports and exports of goods subject to CBAM, as well as those indirectly related through upstream or downstream processes. Efficiency and administrative impacts on cross-border flows of goods were also studied in the impact assessment.

(b) Would national action or the absence of the EU level action conflict with core objectives of the Treaty<sup>5</sup> or significantly damage the interests of other Member States?

National action would conflict with core objectives of the Treaty, including the ones in Article 32, which establishes in letter (c) ‘the objective of avoiding distorting conditions of competitions within the custom union’ and in letter (d) ‘the need to avoid serious disturbances in the economies of Member States’. These objectives would be impaired if Member States were left free to adopt individual decisions beyond implementation and enforcement in a matter that involves a number of provisions concerning goods imported in the Customs Union and a number of references to the custom union code.

Moreover, should Carbon Border Adjustment not be applied in a uniform way, it would incentivise behaviours resulting in trade diversion and forum shopping, as third country exporters would import goods through EU jurisdictions applying CBAM in the most lenient way.

Conversely, the absence of EU level action would significantly damage the interests of Member States as established in Article 191 TFEU as the objectives of ‘preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment’ and of avoiding carbon leakage can only be pursued at EU level.

(c) To what extent do Member States have the ability or possibility to enact appropriate measures?

<sup>5</sup> [https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en)

<p>Member States do not have the possibility to enact appropriate measures. If they applied on their own a form of CBAM, they would very seriously risk diverting trade towards Member States not doing so. Moreover, CBAM is designed with a view to mirror the EU emission trading system, an EU wide and harmonised instrument, in terms of price of certificates, phasing out of existing carbon leakage measures and exclusion of third countries.</p>
<p>(d) How does the problem and its causes (e.g. negative externalities, spill-over effects) vary across the national, regional and local levels of the EU?</p>
<p>Member States are exposed to the risk of carbon leakage to different extent. This exposure would depend on whether their economies include industries covered by the EU ETS and more importantly on whether they host particular industrial installations in sectors that are at risk of carbon leakage. Whether a Member State is at EU's external border it may also impact its exposure to carbon leakage.</p> <p>Moreover, differing exposures to the risk of carbon leakage would provide limited justification for action at national level. Carbon emissions are not localised and like the EU ETS, the CBAM can achieve greater efficiency when uniformly applied on a broader scale.</p>
<p>(e) Is the problem widespread across the EU or limited to a few Member States?</p>
<p>Climate change and the need to address it is widespread across the EU.</p>
<p>(f) Are Member States overstretched in achieving the objectives of the planned measure?</p>
<p>No, the measure is proposed to support climate policy in the EU and in Member States.</p>
<p>(g) How do the views/preferred courses of action of national, regional and local authorities differ across the EU?</p>
<p>The European Council invited the Commission to propose a CBAM to ensure the environmental integrity of EU policies and avoid carbon leakage in a WTO-compatible way<sup>6</sup>. As agreed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, the CBAM will also form part of new own resources feeding into the EU's budget<sup>7</sup>. The European Parliament adopted a report on a WTO-compatible EU carbon border adjustment mechanism<sup>8</sup>. National authorities of several Member States also have called for the implementation of CBAM. Regional or local authorities have expressed very few views on CBAM.</p>
<p><b>2.4 Based on the answer to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed action be better achieved at Union level by reason of scale or effects of that action (EU added value)?</b></p>
<p>Reducing GHG emissions is a trans-boundary issue that requires effective action at the largest</p>

<sup>6</sup> European Council. (2020). Conclusions of the European Council of 11 December 2020. (EUCO 22/20 CO EUR 17 CONCL 8).

<sup>7</sup> Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (OJ L 433I , 22.12.2020, p. 28).

<sup>8</sup> European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2021 towards a WTO-compatible EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (2020/2043(INI))

<p>possible scale. The EU is well-placed to establish effective climate policy. The introduction of an EU-wide CBAM will create a common and uniform framework to ensure an equivalence between the carbon pricing policy applied in the EU's internal market and the carbon pricing policy applied on imports and it will be beneficial for all.</p>
<p>(a) Are there clear benefits from EU level action?</p>
<p>Yes.</p>
<p>(b) Are there economies of scale? Can the objectives be met more efficiently at EU level (larger benefits per unit cost)? Will the functioning of the internal market be improved?</p>
<p>Yes.</p>
<p>(c) What are the benefits in replacing different national policies and rules with a more homogenous policy approach?</p>
<p>The introduction of a CBAM will not replace national policies, but will create a common framework at EU-level to ensure an equivalence between the carbon pricing policy applied in the EU's internal market and the carbon pricing policy applied on imports.</p>
<p>(d) Do the benefits of EU-level action outweigh the loss of competence of the Member States and the local and regional authorities (beyond the costs and benefits of acting at national, regional and local levels)?</p>
<p>Reducing GHG emissions is fundamentally a trans-boundary issue that requires effective action at the largest possible scale. The EU, as a supranational organisation is well-placed to establish effective climate policy in the EU, like it has done with the EU ETS. An EU-wide CBAM is therefore beneficial for all EU Member States and local and regional authorities. This domestic policy also has transnational aspects, strictly connected with the global dimension of climate change and the objective of curbing global emissions. In particular, the proposed regulation involves several custom aspects that falls in the EU exclusive competence, e.g. custom regimes, import regulations, uniform application of obligations by custom authorities, and agreements with third countries.</p>
<p>(e) Will there be improved legal clarity for those having to implement the legislation?</p>
<p>Yes, since it is a new measure applying to the whole internal market, a single set of rules will ensure uniform application, which will be conferred to Member States authorities.</p>
<p><b>3. Proportionality: How the EU should act</b></p>
<p><b>3.1 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying the Commission's proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the proportionality of the proposal and a statement allowing appraisal of the compliance of the proposal with the principle of proportionality?</b></p>
<p>The proposal seeks to address the challenge of reducing GHG emissions in the EU while at the same time avoiding that these emissions reduction efforts are offset by emissions increase outside the EU. The policy choices therefore are clearly dictated by the aim to achieve the objectives of the CBAM, namely to address the risk of carbon leakage in order to fight climate change by reducing GHG emissions in the EU and globally.</p>
<p>The proposed product coverage of CBAM is framed by the sectors and emissions covered by the EU</p>

ETS and the CBAM scope should be laid down by a reference to certain goods by way of their classification in the Combined Nomenclature. This serves the motivation for the measure, namely to ensure that imports of energy intensive products into the EU are on equal footing with EU products in terms of EU ETS carbon pricing and to mitigate risks of carbon leakage. CBAM, as an alternative to free allocation of EU ETS allowances, builds on the logic of the EU ETS starting with sectors where emissions are the highest and therefore where it would matter most.

The carbon content of products is an essential element of the CBAM as it indicates the carbon dioxide equivalent emissions released during their production abroad. This is used to ensure that imported products are treated no less favourably than domestic products produced in EU ETS installations. As installations covered by the EU ETS are subject to a carbon price assessed on their actual emissions, imported products in the scope of CBAM should also be assessed based on their actual GHG emissions. However, such an approach may involve high administrative costs in the beginning and therefore for an initial transitory period it is proposed to use default values with the possibility for the importers to demonstrate that their products were produced with actual emissions lower than the default value, and therefore be subject to a lower CBAM obligation.

As regards the administration of the measure, the choice of empowering national climate CBAM Authorities is meant to minimise administrative costs associated with this task and increase effectiveness. This will require, however, in ensuring proper collaboration and coordination of the assessment of declarations of embedded emissions in imported goods at EU level.

**3.2 Based on the answers to the questions below and information available from any impact assessment, the explanatory memorandum or other sources, is the proposed action an appropriate way to achieve the intended objectives?**

The legal instrument of a Regulation was chosen to ensure direct applicability, uniform application and uniform enforcement throughout the EU, in order to avoid trade diversion and forum shopping. With a view to ensure a well-functioning measure meeting its climate objectives, a decentralised approach with some coordination and support functions at central level is envisaged in the proposal. Setting up a central CBAM body together with the national climate bodies will minimize the relevant administrative costs associated and will ensure a coherent application of CBAM to all imports. The revenues will finance the implementation costs of CBAM as well as generate new own resources for the EU.

(a) Is the initiative limited to those aspects that Member States cannot achieve satisfactorily on their own, and where the Union can do better?

Yes.

(b) Is the form of Union action (choice of instrument) justified, as simple as possible, and coherent with the satisfactory achievement of, and ensuring compliance with the objectives pursued (e.g. choice between regulation, (framework) directive, recommendation, or alternative regulatory methods such as co-legislation, etc.)?

The objectives of the present proposal can best be pursued through a Regulation. This will ensure direct applicability of a number of provisions concerning goods imported in the Customs Union, included on custom regimes, territorial application, anti-circumvention provisions, or sanctions. Moreover, this Regulation requires uniform and consistent application and enforcement throughout the EU by national authorities in order to pursue the objectives of Articles 32 and 207 TFUE. Any different legal instrument would impair the

<p>needed uniform application throughout the European Union by disrupting competition among Member States and creating unwanted effect of trade diversion and forum shopping. As an example, by choosing the legal instrument of a directive, foreign companies could try to take advantage of different implementation rules of carbon border adjustment in different member states by choosing to import and release products into free practice in Member States applying a more lenient attitude in terms of verification of embedded emissions, sanctions, or guarantees.</p>
<p>(c) Does the Union action leave as much scope for national decision as possible while achieving satisfactorily the objectives set? (e.g. is it possible to limit the European action to minimum standards or use a less stringent policy instrument or approach?)</p>
<p>In order to ensure a well-functioning measure meeting its set climate objectives, a decentralised approach is envisaged. On the one hand, certain tasks where a single approach is key such as the publication of the price of certificates and the establishment default values will be carried out by the Commission, which will also play a role in coordination and advice. On the other hand, national climate authorities will take care of implementation and enforcement tasks, such as the sale of CBAM certificates, the reimbursement requests, the application of penalties. Such system will ensure a coherent application of the CBAM obligations to all imports of the relevant goods in a transparent way, safeguarding the EU's trade obligations and at the same time ensuring an effective application as regards the climate effectiveness of the measure.</p>
<p>(d) Does the initiative create financial or administrative cost for the Union, national governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators or citizens? Are these costs commensurate with the objective to be achieved?</p>
<p>The implementation of CBAM will create limited administrative costs for the Union. The EU will benefit from the increased revenues stemming from the CBAM, which will finance the implementation costs related to the measure and borne by Member States' authorities. It will also generate new own resources for the EU.</p> <p>In terms of impacts to economic operators and citizens, CBAM would entail very limited negative impacts on GDP, investments and consumption in the EU as compared to the case of raising the EU climate ambition in its absence. At the same time, by capturing carbon leakage CBAM would limit output losses in the sectors to which it would apply in view of raising the level of climate ambition. It would also contribute to reduction in emissions in both the EU and in the rest of the world in CBAM sectors by 2030.</p>
<p>(e) While respecting the Union law, have special circumstances applying in individual Member States been taken into account?</p>
<p>Yes as part of the impact assessment the Commission analysis reflected, to the extent possible, the economic and industrial structures of individual Member States as well as their trade flows with third countries. In this context, individual specificities and differences between Member States were accounted for in the assessment of impacts by the Commission.</p>





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**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT**

*Accompanying the document*

**Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council**

**establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism**

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<b>Executive Summary Sheet</b>
Impact assessment on the introduction of a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
<b>A. Need for action</b>
<b>What is the problem and why is it a problem at EU level?</b>
<p>Should differences in levels of climate ambition persist worldwide, the EU's increased ambitions will reinforce the risk of carbon leakage from the EU. Such leakage is caused by the relocation of production of energy-intensive products from the EU to other countries with lower environmental compliance costs, and of these same EU products being replaced by more carbon-intensive imports from these countries. In that case, the result is an overall increase in global emissions hence undermining the effectiveness of EU climate policies.</p> <p>In 2005, the EU introduced the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) to reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions and fight against climate change. The EU objective of climate neutrality by 2050 and the decision to raise climate ambition for 2030 lead to a broader reconsideration of existing measures against carbon leakage. In particular, free allocation of allowances prevents carbon leakage risks but also weakens the carbon price signal for EU industry compared to full auctioning. As an alternative to free allocation the CBAM would ensure that the price of imports reflects more accurately their carbon content.</p>
<b>What should be achieved?</b>
<p>The introduction of a CBAM aims at addressing the overarching objective of addressing climate change by reducing GHG emissions in the EU and globally.</p> <p>More specifically, the measure intends: i) to address the risk of carbon leakage, ii) to contribute to the decarbonisation objectives in the EU, iii) to encourage producers in third countries who export to the EU to adopt low carbon technologies and iv) to ensure that the price of imports reflects more accurately their carbon content.</p>
<b>What is the value added of action at the EU level (subsidiarity)?</b>
<p>Reducing GHG emissions is fundamentally a trans-boundary issue requiring effective action at the largest possible scale. The EU as a supranational organisation is well placed to establish effective climate policy on its territory, as it has done with the EU ETS. The only meaningful way to ensure equivalence between the carbon pricing policy applied in the EU's internal market and the carbon pricing policy applied on imports is to take action at the level of the Union. Additionally, the need for minimal administrative costs is best achieved by consistent rules for the entire single market.</p>
<b>B. Solutions</b>
<b>What are the various options to achieve the objectives? Is there a preferred option or not? If not, why?</b>
<p>Six options were considered including two different taxes (options 1 and 6) and regulation mirroring the EU ETS for imports (the rest of the options) on a selection of basic materials (aluminium, fertilisers, cement and iron and steel) and electricity. All the measures are designed to ensure compliance with the international commitments of the EU:</p> <p><b>Option 1</b> is an import carbon tax based on a default value reflecting EU emissions average while allowing importers to demonstrate their actual carbon intensity of their imported products. On the other hand,</p>

**Option 6** consists of an excise duty on carbon-intensive materials covering consumption of both domestic and imported products, along with the continuation of the free allocation of allowances in the EU ETS.

**The rest of the options** involve the purchase and surrender of import certificates (CBAM certificates) on the importation of a selection of basic materials mirroring the EU ETS. In **option 2**, the price of the certificates would be based on a default value reflecting EU emissions average, with the option for importers to demonstrate the actual carbon intensity of imported products. **Option 3** assumes that the carbon price of imports will be based on actual emissions from third country producers rather than on a default value based on EU producers' averages. Both these options assume that the CBAM sectors do not receive free allowances under the ETS.

**Option 4** is a variant of option 3. It considers a phase in of the CBAM with a phase out of free allowances starting after 2025. **Option 5** is another variant with an extension of the scope further down in the value chain to cover also the basic materials as part of components and finished goods.

This impact assessment supports option 4 as the preferred option for its positive impacts and coherence with the rest of the Fit for 55 Package.

### **What are different stakeholders' views? Who supports which option?**

The public consultation suggested that carbon leakage is already perceived as a reality and that the risk is likely to increase in view of the raising of the EU climate ambition. The respondents believe that the following policy options are all at least somewhat relevant for the design of a CBAM (in order of best scored): i) a tax applied on imports on sectors at risk of carbon leakage (e.g. a border tax or customs duty); ii) a carbon tax (e.g. excise or VAT type) at consumption level applied to EU production as well as to imports; iii) the obligation to purchase CBAM certificates from a specific pool outside the EU ETS dedicated to imports, which would mirror the EU ETS price or iv) the extension of the EU ETS to imports.

### **C. Impacts of the preferred option**

#### **What are the benefits of the preferred option (if any, otherwise of main ones)?**

Option 4 provides clear benefits in terms of emission reductions in the EU and reduction of the risk of carbon leakage for the sectors considered. Relative to a scenario, which assumes the continuation of free allocation in the EU ETS and the new climate level of ambition, Option 4 would lead to a 1.0% emissions reduction in the EU and a 0.4% in the rest of the world in CBAM sectors by 2030. In addition, under option 4, carbon leakage is brought down to -29% in 2030.

#### **What are the costs of the preferred option (if any, otherwise of main ones)?**

In terms of economic impacts, option 4 would entail limited negative impacts on GDP (-0.223%) and consumption (-0.558%) and slightly positive effects on investments (0.388%), as compared to the baseline in 2030. Regarding social impacts, option 4 foresees small increase in employment by 0,3% in the sectors covered by CBAM (as compared to baseline, in 2030). Limited negative impact on employment is envisaged for downstream sectors.

Finally, administrative and compliance costs are expected for businesses and authorities. While it is difficult to assess these costs with precision, estimates show that under option 4, aggregate costs for businesses could amount to EUR 9.8 to 14.3 million yearly. Estimated enforcement costs for authorities could amount to an aggregate of EUR 15 million per year.

#### **What are the impacts on SMEs and competitiveness?**

The assumptions and data available do not allow for a quantitative assessment of impacts on SMEs. However, we can expect higher relative compliance costs for small companies than larger companies. Competitiveness would be reinforced as the risk of carbon leakage is reduced.

**Will there be significant impacts on national budgets and administrations?**

No other significant impacts

**Will there be other significant impacts?**

No other significant impacts

**Proportionality?**

Option 4 meets the objectives of the initiative in a proportionate manner.

**D. Follow up**

**When will the policy be reviewed?**

The measure will apply first to a reduced number of sectors. It will be reviewed after three years from its entry into application in particular to consider the extension of its scope to more basic products and to semi-finished and finished goods.



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PART 1/2

**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT**

**IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT**

*Accompanying the document*

**Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council  
establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism**

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## Glossary

<i>Term or acronym</i>	<i>Meaning or definition</i>
CAT	Carbon Added Tax
CBAM	Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
CN	Combined Nomenclature
CO <sub>2</sub>	Carbon Dioxide
ETS	Emissions Trading System
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
PEF	Product Environmental Footprint
SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
VAT	Value Added Tax
WTO	World Trade Organisation

## 1 INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT

The world is facing a profound climate crisis and the challenges of climate change require a global response. Strong international cooperation will strengthen the joint climate action needed by all the Parties of the Paris Agreement to meet the goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels<sup>1</sup>.

The European Union's international leadership must go hand in hand with bold domestic action. To meet the objective of a climate-neutral EU by 2050 in line with the Paris Agreement, the EU needs to increase its ambition for the coming decade and update its climate and energy policy framework. As announced in the European Green Deal<sup>2</sup>, the Commission has proposed a new EU target for 2030 of reducing greenhouse gas ('GHG') emissions by at least 55 % compared to levels in 1990<sup>3</sup>, based on a comprehensive impact assessment<sup>4</sup>. This objective has been endorsed by the European Council<sup>5</sup>. To deliver on these GHG emissions reductions, the Commission proposes to revise where necessary all relevant policy instruments by June 2021 in a 'Fit for 55 Package', which covers in particular the review of sectorial legislation in the fields of climate, energy, transport, and taxation<sup>6</sup>. The initiative for a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism ('CBAM'), which is subject to examination in this impact assessment, is part of that package and will serve as an essential element of the EU toolbox to meet the objective of a climate-neutral EU by 2050 in line with the Paris Agreement by addressing risks of carbon leakage following the increased EU climate ambition.

The European Green Deal underlined that 'should differences in levels of ambition worldwide persist<sup>7</sup>, as the EU increases its climate ambition, the Commission will propose a CBAM, for selected sectors, to reduce the risk of carbon leakage<sup>8</sup>'. Indeed, carbon leakage could result in an overall increase in non EU emissions hence undermining the effectiveness of EU climate policies.

The 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, as well as strong international diplomacy and leadership, are part of the EU's toolbox to achieve higher climate ambition globally. The Paris Agreement commits the international community to a continuous increase in the ambition of climate action to limit global average temperature rise in order to significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. Each Party must prepare its own nationally determined contribution ('NDC') towards this global goal, reflecting its

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<sup>1</sup> Article 2(1)(a) of The Paris Agreement.

<sup>2</sup> European Commission. (2019). The European Green Deal. (COM(2019) 640 final), p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> The Commission put forward the proposal COM(2020) 563 final, amending the initial Commission proposal on the European climate law to include a revised EU emission reduction target of at least 55 % by 2030. On 10-11 December 2020, the European Council in its conclusions endorsed this increased EU target.

<sup>4</sup> European Commission. (2020). Stepping up Europe's 2030 climate ambition. (COM(2020) 562 final: Part 1/2).

<sup>5</sup> European Council. (2020). Conclusions of the European Council of 11 December 2020. (EUCO 22/20 CO EUR 17 CONCL 8).

<sup>6</sup> European Commission. (2020). Commission Work Programme 2021. (COM(2020) 690 final). Annex I outlines all the instruments to be proposed which includes among others the review of energy taxation.

<sup>7</sup> The level of ambition refers to the commitment towards climate neutrality and the implementation of transformative agenda to that end.

<sup>8</sup> European Commission. (2019). The European Green Deal. (COM(2019) 640 final), p. 5.




‘highest possible ambition’ as well as its ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances’<sup>9</sup>. Heterogeneity in climate action among countries is therefore inevitable. However, a number of independent evaluations suggest that the aggregate impact of Parties’ current NDCs, if fully implemented, will not put the world on a pathway to achieve the Paris Agreement goals. Therefore, as long as the EU’s international partners do not share the same level of climate ambition, and differences in the price put on GHG emissions remain, there is a risk of what is generally referred to as carbon leakage. Carbon leakage refers to the situation that occurs if, for reasons of differing ambitions related to climate policies, businesses in certain industry sectors or subsectors were to transfer production to other countries with less stringent emission constraints or imports from these countries would replace equivalent but less GHG intensive products due to the difference in climate policy stringency. This could lead to an increase in their total non-EU emissions, thus jeopardising the reduction of GHG emissions that is urgently needed if the world is to keep the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.

Currently, the risk of carbon leakage is being addressed in the EU under the EU Emissions Trading System (‘EU ETS’). This is the world's first international emissions trading system and it has been in place since 2005. For the sectors covered by this system in the EU and most at risk of carbon leakage, this risk is currently managed through the granting of free allowances and compensations for the increase in electricity costs under state aid rules. It should be noted that carbon pricing mechanisms can also include carbon taxation, which outside the EU may cover the same sectors that are covered in the EU by the ETS.

Figure 1 shows the different carbon pricing mechanisms that exist or that are under consideration<sup>10</sup> around the globe.

### Figure 1: Carbon pricing around the world

Summary map of regional, national and subnational carbon pricing initiatives



<sup>9</sup> The Paris Agreement 2015, Article 4(3).

<sup>10</sup> Some of the mechanisms under consideration are likely to be implemented by the time CBAM enters into force.

Source: World Bank, *summary map of regional, national and subnational carbon pricing initiatives* (Last update: 1 April 2021), the World Bank Group, Washington. <https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/>

The EU ETS revision is assessed by the European Commission in a separate impact assessment. Among others, this involves the possible extension of the EU ETS to maritime transport, as well as emissions from buildings and road transport<sup>11</sup>. Most notably, a higher environmental contribution of the EU ETS translates into a more stringent cap on emissions, meaning that the volume of allowances available will decline. A more stringent cap will likely imply an increase of the EU ETS carbon price at which allowances' supply and demand match. The EU objective of climate neutrality and the decision to raise climate ambition for 2030 also lead to a broader reconsideration of existing measures against carbon leakage. In particular, free allocation of allowances prevents carbon leakage risks but also weakens the carbon price signal for EU industry compared to full auctioning.

As an alternative to free allocation, as indicated by the Green Deal Communication, the CBAM 'would ensure that the price of imports reflects more accurately their carbon content. This measure will be designed to comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, including as regards the principle of non-discrimination, and other international obligations of the EU<sup>12</sup>'. Further, President von der Leyen has underlined that 'Carbon must have its price – because nature cannot pay the price anymore. This Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism should motivate foreign producers and EU importers to reduce their carbon emissions<sup>13</sup>'. To this end, active outreach to third countries and businesses would be important with regard to the understanding of and compliance with CBAM requirements.

In the special European Council of 17-21 July 2020<sup>14</sup>, EU leaders agreed on the recovery instrument NextGenerationEU. The instrument will provide the EU with the necessary means to address the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and, therein, support investment in the green and digital transitions. In order to finance it, the Commission will be able to borrow up to EUR 750 billion on financial markets. In that context, EU leaders agreed to provide the EU with new own resources, notably to facilitate the repayment of NextGenerationEU funds.

As part of the mandate received, the Commission was invited to put forward a proposal for a CBAM in the first semester of 2021, with a view to its introduction at the latest by 1 January 2023. The envisaged timetable was confirmed in the roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources agreed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 16 December 2020<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> European Commission 2020. Inception Impact Assessment: Amendment of the EU Emissions Trading System (Directive 2003/87/EC). (Ares(2020)6081850).

<sup>12</sup> European Commission. (2019). The European Green Deal. (COM(2019) 640 final), p. 5.

<sup>13</sup> State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament Plenary on 16 September 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH\\_20\\_1655](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_1655)

<sup>14</sup> See [European Council conclusions, 17-21 July 2020](#).


<sup>15</sup> See [Interinstitutional agreement](#) between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources, adopted on 16 December 2020.

## 2 PROBLEM DEFINITION

This section will define and analyse the problems and the problem drivers as well as assess the evolution of the problems in the absence of EU policy intervention. The ‘Intervention Logic’ (

Figure 2 below) presents visually the problems, their drivers, as well as the objectives of the proposed mechanism.

**Figure 2: Intervention Logic**



### 2.1 What is the problem?

#### 2.1.1 Overall positioning of the problem

The problem addressed by this impact assessment is how to succeed in reducing GHG in the EU and avoiding that these emissions reduction efforts are offset by emissions increases outside the EU. As indicated in Section 1, if differences in levels of climate ambition are to persist worldwide, the EU’s increased ambitions will reinforce the risk of carbon leakage from the EU. Such leakage is caused by the relocation of production of energy-intensive products from the EU to other countries with lower environmental compliance costs, and of these same EU products being replaced by more carbon-intensive imports from these countries<sup>16</sup>. These manifestations of carbon leakage are sometimes referred to as the increase or reallocation of GHG emissions embedded in imported goods<sup>17</sup>. GHG emissions embedded in imports are a great concern as they are expected to increase both as a result of the relocation of production outside of the EU but also as there might be increased demand of such products due to price differences. The resulting overall increase in global emissions undermines the effectiveness of EU climate policies. The risk of carbon leakage increases as the EU raises the ambition of its climate policies above that of its trading partners.

The public consultation on the CBAM, for which the Commission received over 600 contributions from companies and business associations, EU and non-EU citizens, civil society and public authorities suggested that carbon leakage is already perceived as a reality and that the risk is likely to increase in view of the raising of the EU climate

<sup>16</sup> The relocation of production is one of the channels leading to carbon leakage.

<sup>17</sup> Embedded emissions refers to the production of goods but not physically incorporated in the goods.

ambition. Overall, respondents agreed that a CBAM can be justified by differences of ambition between EU and third countries to fight against climate change and can contribute to both EU and global climate efforts. The results of the consultation are highlighted throughout this report and discussed in more detail under Annex 2.

Firstly, rising GHG emissions across the world are a global problem as they lead to climate change, which has a devastating effect on the planet and its people. In particular, carbon dioxide emissions from human activities contribute about 80 % to the anthropogenic warming of the atmosphere together with other GHGs such as methane or nitrous oxide. Recognising the need to address climate change, the EU and 189 countries have become Parties to the Paris Agreement in order to keep global temperature rise well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 °C. To contribute to this objective, the EU has increased its targets and efforts to reduce its GHG emissions, and to achieve climate neutrality (net zero emissions) by 2050<sup>18</sup>.

Secondly, the risk of EU effort being offset by relocating production and increase of carbon-intensive imports could increase due to a variety of factors<sup>19</sup>. The evidence of the existence of carbon leakage is not always conclusive or suggests that it is difficult to isolate carbon leakage as a single factor in relocation decisions. One reason for this is because different studies use different methodologies. In particular, as explained in Annex 11, *ex-post* studies do not find substantial evidence of carbon leakage as a result of free allocation under the EU ETS and of the low carbon price until phase 3 of the EU ETS. By contrast *ex-ante* analyses using simulation models, often find a substantial risk of carbon leakage in the absence of protection mechanisms such as free allocation of carbon allowances. This is especially so, in studies focusing on specific industries (e.g. partial equilibrium) which tend to focus on emission-intensive and trade-exposed sectors and find higher leakage rates for these sectors in particular. The differences in results between the types of studies indicate that carbon leakage protection measures have been effective to date, while higher carbon prices and declining free allocation can result in an increased leakage risk and thus alter the results. These considerations align the results of *ex-ante* and *ex-post* studies by explaining the differences. *Ex-ante* studies often assume the absence of carbon-leakage protection mechanisms. However, in practice carbon pricing mechanisms have always been accompanied by special provisions, such as free allowance allocation or carbon tax exemptions, to avoid the risk of carbon leakage. In *ex-post* studies of existing carbon pricing mechanisms, these leakage protection measures are therefore included. Additionally, analytic and empirical evidence shows that as a result of the existing leakage protection mechanisms, the carbon price signal has been significantly reduced. Notwithstanding the above considerations, as the EU increases its climate ambitions, existing mechanisms in place to address carbon leakage are being reconsidered, allowances available for free allocation will become scarce, the carbon price signal will become stronger and industries will therefore have to reduce their emissions. This view is also supported by the OECD which argues that ‘this literature, however, has been, by definition, based on past climate policies, which have not embodied the same level of ambition that is now being put forward by some countries. Thus, while carbon leakage and competitiveness effects of climate policies have been

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<sup>18</sup> European Commission. (2020). Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition. (COM(2020) 562 final: Part 1/2) p.8. European Council Conclusions of December 2020. (EUCO 22/20 CO EUR 17 CONCL 8).

<sup>19</sup> See section 2.2 below.

very modest so far, increased policy stringency divergence in the future may amplify these issues. The small effects identified may partly reflect the low stringency of climate policies to date. Yet threats posed by climate change require policies that lie outside the bounds of past experience. Another explanation for the small effects observed so far is that the climate policies are designed so as to prevent potential competitiveness effects<sup>20</sup>.

### *2.1.2 The CBAM in the context of the Paris Agreement*

While each Party to the Paris Agreement sets its own level of ambition, at the same time we need to make sure that Parties are not undermining the effectiveness of each other's policies. By introducing a CBAM, the EU will ensure that goods imported into the EU follow the same rules as the goods produced in the EU without interfering with policy choices in third countries.

In order to respect the Paris Agreement and the principle of nationally determined contributions (NDC) therein as well as the principle of Common but Differentiated responsibility, the CBAM would be designed in such a manner that it does not directly depend on the overall level of ambitions of a country nor on the policy choices made by a country.

The CBAM would be designed to reduce the risk of carbon leakage resulting from the climate ambition of the EU while taking into account the effects of the policies carried out by our partners across the globe. As most of the CBAM options, considered in the sections below, would apply to the actual emissions of imported goods or offer the possibility to be applied to actual emissions of imported goods, this would imply that when a country decides to reduce emissions through a regulatory approach, its goods would be subject to a lesser CBAM obligation when exported to the EU. In addition, in practice the possibility to account for any carbon price effectively paid outside the Union will be taken into account when determining the CBAM obligation. Therefore, policies based on carbon pricing approaches will be taken into account.

## **2.2 How is the problem currently being addressed?**

The risk of carbon leakage is inherent to any carbon pricing policy carried out in an open economy, unless all countries have the same level of ambition to fight against climate change. This risk has been identified from the beginning of the EU ETS and addressed through two mechanisms, namely the free allocation of ETS allowances to sectors at highest risk of carbon leakage and the possibility for Member States to give state aid to electro-intensive undertakings active in a sector exposed to international trade, compensating the higher electricity costs resulting from the ETS. Both of these mechanisms are described in the impact assessment of the ETS revision<sup>21</sup>. The ETS Directive, however, clearly states that both mechanisms are to be transitional and the Commission is obliged to assess the effects of these measures by revision clauses in the ETS Directive.

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<sup>20</sup> OECD (2020) Climate Policy Leadership in an interconnected world: What Role of Border Carbon Adjustments? Paragraph 30.

<sup>21</sup> See section 5.2.1.4 and Annex 9 in European Commission 2020. Inception Impact Assessment: Amendment of the EU Emissions Trading System (Directive 2003/87/EC). (Ares(2020)6081850).

### 2.2.1 *Free allocation of allowances*

Free allowances are an effective way to deal with carbon leakage. However, the combination of competition in global supply chains and the provision of free allowances results in a reduced and uncertain carbon price incentive for climate-neutral production processes and for the efficient use and choice of materials in manufacturing and recycling. Furthermore, they result in a situation where carbon emissions embedded in goods placed on the EU market are not priced consistently, but depending on the material and its origin, thus limiting the incentives to reduce emissions.

The European Court of Auditors report 18/2020, ‘the EU’s ETS: free allocation of allowances need better targeting’, found that the share of free allowances still represented a very significant part of the total amount of ETS allowances, while the stated objective of the ETS is that auctioning should be the default method for attribution of allowances. In addition, the same report found that free allocation could have a negative effect on the incentive to decarbonise. The ETS revision impact assessment compares the results of the ETS in the power sector, where allocation is mostly auctioned, with the industry sector, where the vast majority of allowances are allocated for free, to note that decarbonisation has progressed faster in the former than in the latter.

It should be noted that carbon leakage risks through relocation of production are also addressed in existing carbon pricing mechanisms outside the EU. The instrument of free allowance allocation is used in all major jurisdictions with emission trading systems in place. Besides the EU ETS, the emission trading schemes in California, Quebec, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea allocate parts of their allowances for free at varying methods and shares (between 21 % and 97 %<sup>22</sup>). The same applies to the ETS pilots in China, which also allocate allowances to the covered power plants for free<sup>23</sup>.

All economic literature confirms that free allocation is an effective instrument to address the risk of carbon leakage, however handing allowances for free has a cost both financially and in terms of effectiveness of the ETS. As the EU is raising its climate ambition, both these costs will increase, which will risk to make it more difficult for the EU to reach the set climate targets.

### 2.2.2 *Compensation of indirect carbon costs*

The guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post 2021 identify the sectors found at risk of carbon leakage due to their indirect emissions, and the Member States which are allowed to provide compensation for indirect carbon costs<sup>24</sup>.

Like free allowances, state aids by nature are a regime of exception. This is outlined in the excerpt of the Communication: ‘The primary objective of State aid control in the context of implementation of the EU ETS is to ensure that the positive effects of the aid

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<sup>22</sup> Acworth et al., Achieving Zero Emissions Under a Cap-And-Trade System, EUI Policy Brief, Issue 2020/26 June 2020, [https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/?option=com\\_attach&task=download&id=695](https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/?option=com_attach&task=download&id=695)

<sup>23</sup> IEA, The Role of China’s ETS in Power Sector Decarbonisation, 2020, April <https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-chinas-ets-in-power-sector-decarbonisation>

<sup>24</sup> European Commission. (2020). Communication from the Commission Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post-2021 (2020 C/2020/6400).

outweigh its negative effects in terms of distortions of competition in the internal market. State aid must be necessary to achieve the environmental objective of the EU ETS (necessity of the aid) and must be limited to the minimum needed to achieve the environmental protection sought (proportionality of the aid) without creating undue distortions of competition and trade in the internal market.’

It should be noted that only 13 Member States and Norway avail this possibility to grant indirect cost compensation<sup>25</sup>.

### **2.3 What are the problem drivers?**

There are three interconnected drivers that may induce an increased risk of carbon leakage, namely: the different levels of climate ambitions in the world and the actions in place to achieve them, the increased EU ambitions and the reconsideration of existing carbon leakage protection mechanisms, in particular the gradual decrease of allowances available for free allocation under the EU ETS. When looking at those drivers in the context of the globalised value chain, the risk of carbon leakage becomes even more acute.

#### *2.3.1 Different levels of climate achievements in the world*

At present, international climate action is characterised by different stages of achievements. The Paris Agreement, however, aims to create a coherent dynamic by strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change. Each Party to the Paris Agreement defines its own NDCs to reduce GHG emissions. While NDCs reflect Parties’ ‘highest possible ambition’, they also reflect their ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances’. This means that the global response to the climate challenge will inevitably differ between the Parties in the short and medium term perspectives. However, this does not mean that these differentiated approaches should be an obstacle to each Party’s achievement of its own objectives. As pricing carbon emissions is a key instrument to reach emission reductions in a cost-effective way, global cooperation aiming at agreements on such mechanisms could serve as a powerful tool in the fight against climate change. Such agreements would also level the global playing field and reduce potential negative effects following from differences in compliance costs across the economies of different Parties.

#### *2.3.2 Increased EU climate ambition*

The EU is increasing its climate ambition consistently with the goal of reaching climate neutrality by 2050, in accordance with its commitment to the Paris Agreement. This is the key climate target set by the European Green Deal. In the process of achieving this target, intermediate goals for 2030 have been proposed to reflect the increased ambition<sup>26</sup>. On 11 December 2020, the European Council raised the EU target for 2030

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<sup>25</sup> SWD/2020/0194 final - Evaluation accompanying the document Impact assessment on Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post 2021.

<sup>26</sup> European Commission. (2020). Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law). (COM(2020) 563 final), p. 1.



from 40 % to 55 %<sup>27</sup> compared to 1990 and this new target was communicated to the UNFCCC as the EU's NDCs under the Paris Agreement. This new target will put the EU on a path to climate neutrality. Higher emissions reduction targets require revisions of existing climate policy instruments to achieve the new objectives.

### 2.3.3 *Review of existing carbon leakage protection mechanisms*

In order to achieve these targets, the EU considers the pricing of GHG emissions as an important instrument of a cost-effective policy package to support the transformation of industries towards climate neutrality. Since 2005, direct GHG emissions of industrial installations and the power sectors are priced in the EU ETS. The risk of carbon leakage has been effectively addressed for those sectors regulated under the EU ETS that are exposed to the risk of carbon leakage. This was done by granting free emissions allowances up to 100 % of determined benchmarks representing the average emissions per unit of the relevant product of the best 10 % producers in the EU. The EU ETS Directive provides for this system to continue at least until 2030<sup>28</sup>. Free allocation of allowances is an effective tool to address the risk of carbon leakage; however, it has two principal drawbacks: first it is a costly measure<sup>29</sup>, second it limits the carbon price signal for industry and hence the incentive to decarbonise. In addition, in the context of the EU's higher 2030 target and objective to become carbon neutral by 2050, the level of free allowances available will decline further as a function of the overall declining EU ETS cap. Moreover, since the carbon price is passed on in electricity prices and as such on to consumers, possibly becoming an indirect driver of carbon leakage for some energy-intensive sectors, Member States have the possibility to compensate some electro-intensive industries for the increase in electricity prices resulting from the EU ETS, provided they comply with EU state aid rules.

## 2.4 **How will the problem evolve?**

### 2.4.1 *Carbon leakage in view of the evolution of leakage protection in the EU*

The EU's leadership in reducing its GHG emissions may result in higher carbon cost differences with its trading partners. This increases the risk of carbon leakage.

As discussed in the previous section, the current approach to addressing the risk of carbon leakage relies on free allocation of allowances, and in some cases financial measures to compensate for the carbon cost of indirect emissions to operators of installations from sectors and sub-sectors at a significant risk of carbon leakage. For that purpose, the EU has established a list of such sectors and sub-sectors<sup>30</sup>. This means that there are currently mechanisms in place to address the risk of carbon leakage in these sectors.

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<sup>27</sup> European Council. (2020). European Council Conclusions of December 2020. (EUCO 22/20 CO EUR 17 CONCL 8).

<sup>28</sup> Directive (EU) 2018/410 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018 amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments, and Decision (EU) 2015/1814, OJ L 76, 19.3.2018, pp. 3-37.

<sup>29</sup> In 2020, 724 million allowances were allocated for free.- Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the functioning of the European carbon market ([COM 2020\(740\) Final](#))

<sup>30</sup> Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2019/708 of 15 February 2019 supplementing Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the determination of sectors and subsectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage for the period 2021 to 2030, OJ L 120/20, 8.5.2019, pp. 20-26.



However, two already ongoing developments may reduce leakage protection. First, as laid out in the intervention logic, the increasingly ambitious GHG emissions reduction targets should reduce the overall number of allowances. This may lead to a higher carbon price in the EU ETS, which in turn creates an even larger difference to countries without carbon pricing mechanisms. Second, the cap on emissions and therefore the total amount of allowances will be reduced to meet new targets under the increased ambition. This means that free allocation will also decline over time and therefore carbon costs should increase for industrial installations, which may lead to an increase in the risk of carbon leakage.

Therefore, domestic industries may face higher production costs compared to international producers. In the absence of action, businesses could transfer their production to countries with laxer emission constraints, thus increasing GHG emissions in third countries, or import more as carbon-intensive products of EU firms are being replaced by carbon-intensive imported products from non-EU firms. The effectiveness of the EU's climate policies could thus be undermined and the ultimate outcome could then be no effect or even an increase in global emissions.

The above is also reflected in the views of stakeholders, as recorded in the CBAM public consultation. On the whole, stakeholders participating in the consultation believe that carbon leakage is already a reality and, to some extent, that the CBAM can address carbon leakage, foster consumption of the less-carbon intensive product in the EU and stimulate the deployment of low-carbon technologies and ambitious climate policies in third countries. They have a mixed opinion on the effectiveness of current measures in the context of the EU ETS and state aid rules to limit carbon leakage and on the ability of other regulatory measures (e.g. performance standards for products placed on the EU market) to effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The analysis of the CBAM public consultation results by geographic area indicates that respondents from bordering countries are relatively more convinced that current mitigation measures for carbon leakage in the context of the EU ETS are effective and will also stay effective in the future. By contrast, stakeholders based in other non-EU countries are relatively more sceptical about the current measures to address the risk of carbon leakage and more convinced about the effectiveness of an EU CBAM.

#### *2.4.2 Interdependence of the CBAM and the EU ETS revision in the context of problem evolution*

In the context of the 'Fit for 55 Package' the CBAM is not a self-standing measure. It is a support measure aiming at enabling the climate ambition of the EU. Under the assumptions of this impact assessment, the CBAM would be complementary to the EU ETS, with a view to addressing the risk of carbon leakage and reinforcing the EU ETS itself. There is a strong interdependence between the revision of the EU ETS and the possible introduction of a CBAM. Indeed, in case a CBAM is introduced it will have an effect on the share between auctioning and free allocation in the ETS.

Since phase 3 of the EU ETS, auctioning is the default approach to allocating allowances and free allocation remains as a transitional derogation aiming at addressing the risk of carbon leakage. Under phase 4, 43 % of allowances are still allocated for free. This illustrates the size of the derogation, which is reflected in the ETS impact assessment

quoting the European Court of Auditors report on the ETS<sup>31</sup>, whereby 94 % of the emissions from industry come from sectors considered at risk of carbon leakage. The ETS impact assessment presents approaches to better target free allocation, either to sectors where the risk of carbon leakage is the highest or by reinforcing benchmarks. The CBAM, as an alternative to free allocation, builds on the ETS logic that auctioning is the default ETS approach, starting with sectors where emissions are the highest and therefore where it would matter most. The criteria used in the CBAM impact assessment to select sectors to which the CBAM should apply are aligned to the criteria used to better target free allowances. Notwithstanding the above, the EU has set itself the very ambitious goal of becoming climate neutral by 2050 and of reducing its emissions by 55 % by 2030. This will necessarily have an impact on the availability of free allowances and will require increasing the effectiveness of all instruments aiming at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

It is in this context of a phase-out of the current measures to avoid carbon leakage that the CBAM becomes a necessary tool to mitigate the risk of carbon leakage as long as third countries do not share the same level of ambition, or in other words that they do not have a similar carbon price in place. The question is not whether one measure or the other is more effective to deal with the risk of carbon leakage but whether the CBAM will be an effective tool in a new scenario without the current measures. However, as also stated in the ETS revision impact assessment, the CBAM and options presented in the ETS revision impact assessment are complementary.

### **3 WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT?**

#### **3.1 Legal basis**

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ('TFEU') confers to the European institutions the competence to lay down appropriate provisions intended, inter alia, to preserve and protect the environment (Article 192(1) TFEU), including, in particular, measures combating climate change at global level.

Appropriate provisions of fiscal nature intended for environmental purposes can be adopted by the EU according to Article 192(2), first paragraph, of the TFEU.

Article 113 of the TFEU permits the EU to lay down harmonised rules in order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market.

Depending on the nature of the instrument proposed the legal basis may be Article 192 or Article 113 of the TFEU.

#### **3.2 Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action**

Reducing GHG emissions is fundamentally a trans-boundary issue that requires effective action at the largest possible scale. The EU as a supranational organisation is well-placed to establish effective climate policy in the EU, like it has done with the EU ETS.

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<sup>31</sup> European Court of Auditors, the EU's Emission Trading System: free allocation of allowances need better targeting, 2020.

There exists already a harmonised carbon price at EU level. This consists of the price resulting from the EU ETS for the sectors covered by the system<sup>32</sup>. These sectors are energy-intensive and subject to international competition. In order to ensure a well-functioning single market when the EU increases its climate ambition, it is essential that a level playing field is created for the relevant sectors in the internal market. The single effective way to do this is by taking action at the level of the EU. Any initiative needs to be implemented in a way that provides importers, regardless of country of origin and port of entry or destination within the EU, with uniform conditions and incentives for carbon emission reductions that are equivalent to those of domestic producers.

The only meaningful way to ensure equivalence between the carbon pricing policy applied in the EU's internal market and the carbon pricing policy applied on imports is to take action at the level of the Union.

### **3.3 Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action**

In parallel to the EU ETS, reduction of GHG emissions and protection against the risk of carbon leakage in the EU single market can be established most adequately at the EU level. Additionally, the need for minimal administrative costs is best achieved by establishing consistent rules for the entire single market, further underlining the added value of an intervention at the EU level.

Moreover, as the CBAM is inherently a border measure there is a clear added value in placing the intervention at EU level in view of the fact that external trade is an exclusive competence of the EU. At the same time, as the CBAM also needs to be implemented consistently in the EU market and in view of its close links to the EU ETS there is further justification of intervention at EU level. The public consultation has confirmed the added value of taking action on the CBAM at EU level. In particular, stakeholders agree that a CBAM is needed due to existing differences of ambition between the EU and the rest of the world and in order to support the global climate efforts. In addition, in view of the EU's position in international trade, if it introduces a CBAM the environmental effect on international climate ambitions will be most effective as a potential example to follow.

Thus, the objective of reducing emissions and climate neutrality requires – without equally ambitious global policies by third countries – action by the European Union.

## **4 OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED?**

### **4.1 General objectives**

Considering the problems described above, a CBAM has the overarching objective of addressing the risk of carbon leakage in order to fight climate change by reducing GHG emissions in the EU and globally.

### **4.2 Specific objectives**

The overarching objective of addressing climate change is further articulated in a number of specific objectives, namely:

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<sup>32</sup> Directive (EU) 2018/410 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018 amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments, and Decision (EU) 2015/1814, OJ L 76, 19.3.2018, pp. 3-37.

- Addressing the risk of carbon leakage under increased EU ambition, which would ensure that EU climate policies, as translated in the carbon price of the EU ETS, can be fully effective without resulting in increasing emissions abroad, which would undermine climate mitigation efforts. The applied carbon price reflects the polluter-pays-principle<sup>33</sup> and supports the reduction of GHG emissions from industry through the internalisation of external costs from GHG emissions that is achieved by the carbon price;
- Contributing to the provision of a stable and secure policy framework for investments in low or zero carbon technologies;
- Ensuring that domestic production and imports are subject to similar level of carbon pricing;
- Encouraging producers in third countries who export to the EU to adopt low carbon technologies.
- Minimising the risk of the measure being circumvented, thus providing environmental integrity;

### **4.3 Ancillary effects**

The CBAM, as envisaged by the above-mentioned objectives, may also give rise to a number of secondary and ancillary positive effects. These refer to the relevance of the CBAM as a climate tool to push third countries to adopt more stringent climate measures, as well as to the possibility to obtain revenues from the introduction of the measure. Specifically the ancillary positive effects of the CBAM include:

- Strengthening the joint climate action needed by all the Parties of the Paris Agreement to meet the goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels;
- While not introduced with revenue raising as its purpose and it not playing a role in the design of the measure, the CBAM will raise revenue on GHG emissions at the border. This is acknowledged in the Interinstitutional agreement including the CBAM in the list of future own resources in the context of NextGenerationEU<sup>34</sup>. The introduction of a CBAM would also incentivise key trading partners to consider the revenue generation dimension of carbon pricing policies.

## **5 WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS?**

### **5.1 What is the baseline from which options are assessed?**

The basis against which the different CBAM options are analysed in this impact assessment reflects the dynamic framework against which the CBAM is proposed. In particular, it aims at capturing the fact that the measure is put forward in the context of existing climate legislation that implements the ‘at least 40 % GHG emission reduction

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<sup>33</sup> Article 191(2) TFEU – e.g. a principle of EU legislation.

<sup>34</sup> See Interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources, adopted on 16 December 2020; European Council. (2020). Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 and NextGenerationEU. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/17/multiannual-financial-framework-for-2021-2027-adopted/>

target' by 2030, but also against the new agreed upon EU target of reducing GHG emissions by at least 55 %, and an evolving policy framework to implement the latter, which at the time of preparing this impact assessment is under consideration within the 'Fit for 55 Package'.

Calibrating the analysis and modelling of the CBAM, to account for the above considerations necessitates a stepwise approach. This first involves setting the foundations based on the current policy framework, and second an additional counterfactual based on the new agreed climate targets for 2030 - the latter balanced to account for policies that are under an ongoing assessment and which will, in turn, have an impact on the specific objective of the CBAM, namely to address the risk of carbon leakage.

The first step therefore involves setting the baseline of this assessment consistently with all other exercises under the 'Fit for 55 Package'. This consists of the EU Reference Scenario 2020 ('REF'), the main elements of which are depicted in Annex of the impact assessment for the revision of EU ETS Directive.

The baseline as reflected in the REF assumes the continuation of free allocation of allowances to operators of installations from sectors and sub-sectors at a significant risk of carbon leakage. At the same time, the baseline includes current climate and energy legislation that implements the 'at least 40 % GHG emission reduction target', notably the revised EU ETS Directive which regulates GHG emissions mainly from the power and industry sectors plus aviation, the Effort Sharing Regulation that sets national targets for emissions outside of the EU ETS and the Regulation on the inclusion of GHG emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry ('LULUCF'). With regard energy, the baseline includes the Energy Efficiency Directive and the Renewable Energy Directive, as well as other key policies covered in the Energy Union and the 'Clean Energy for All Europeans' package, including the internal electricity market policy.

The second step involves a counterfactual to account for the raising of EU ambition and thereby the motivation for the CBAM itself. Under this counterfactual, emission allowances under the EU ETS will be reduced in the coming years, to achieve an overall reduction of at least 55 % by 2030 and beyond, so as to ensure a balanced pathway to reaching climate neutrality by 2050. In the modelling, this result is achieved, until 2030, through a mix of measures consisting of both an expansion in carbon pricing, be it via EU ETS or other instruments, to the transport and buildings sectors and a moderate ambition in regulatory-based measures including energy efficiency, renewables and transport policies. For the purposes of modelling the impacts of alternative CBAM options, this counterfactual is based on the MIX scenario as depicted in the impact assessment for the revision of EU ETS Directive.

Under the MIX scenario the free allowances to industry at risk of carbon leakage continues as the main instrument to address this risk. As such, free allowances are assumed to cover 100 % of emissions at benchmark level of the industries in question. In modelling terms, this results in the MIX scenario keeping carbon leakage at a relatively low level<sup>35</sup>. In view of this, the third step of the analysis involves a variant to the counterfactual, which allows for the disentangling of impacts. Specifically a variant of

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<sup>35</sup> Except energy leakage as discussed below.

the MIX is also modelled depicting the case of complete removal of free allowances in the CBAM sectors<sup>36</sup>, in the absence of a CBAM.

This full auctioning variant of the MIX serves as an additional reference point to compare different leakage protection options under the CBAM. The motivation of this derives from the fact that under the European Green Deal free allocation in the CBAM sectors and a CBAM at the border are clear alternatives. The impact assessment of the EU ETS extension does not include any scenario in which free allocation is phased-out by 2030. Therefore, it would not be possible to assess with fairness any of the CBAM options if the case of full auctioning in the absence of a CBAM was not also presented for comparative purposes.

## 5.2 Description of the policy options

### 5.2.1 Design elements common to all options

This sub-section outlines certain design elements which are common to all of the policy options and are applied in a similar manner across the options. In identifying the options, account has been taken of WTO requirements and of the EU's international commitments such as free trade agreements concluded by the EU or the Energy Community Treaty. It should also be noted that a number of notions are used in the analysis below which call for specified definitions which can be found in Annex 5.

#### 5.2.1.1 Scope of emissions

The emissions to be covered by the CBAM should correspond to those covered by the EU ETS Directive<sup>37</sup>, namely carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) as well as, where relevant, nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). Regarding the scope of those emissions, different possibilities can be envisaged:

- **Direct emissions** are emissions taking place as part of a production process on which the producer has direct control. These include emissions from heating and cooling.
- **Indirect emissions** refer to emissions from the production of electricity which is consumed in a certain production process.
- **Full carbon footprint** (often termed a 'cradle to grave' approach) includes all GHG emissions relating to the mining of raw materials, all emissions from the production of materials and components needed for manufacture of the product, the emissions caused by the production process, including emissions from providing the necessary energy, emissions from the transport of raw materials and interim products to the site of the production process and of the product to the consumer, emissions caused during the use phase and emissions related to the disposal / end-of-life phase of the product.

As an instrument to prevent carbon leakage, the CBAM seeks to ensure that imported products are subject to a carbon price equivalent to the one they would have paid under the EU ETS, had they been produced in the EU. In the EU, the EU ETS applies to the

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<sup>36</sup> By CBAM sectors the analysis considers the sectors where CBAM is considered possible alternative to free allocation of allowances under the EU ETS.

<sup>37</sup> Annex 2 of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32).

direct emissions of installations where carbon intensive products are produced. The EU ETS also applies to the production of electricity that may be used in the production process. Conversely, the EU ETS does not apply to mining activities in the EU<sup>38</sup>, neither does it, for now, directly apply to transport<sup>39</sup> in the EU other than air transport. While the EU ETS may apply to certain activities related to the disposal and recycling of products, this is not related to whether these products are produced in the EU or imported. Therefore, the most appropriate scope when the CBAM is applied in the EU is to include direct emissions from the production of basic materials and basic material products up to the time of import, as well as related indirect emissions when they are significant. A threshold will have to be defined to determine when indirect emissions constitute an important part of an imported product's embedded emissions in order to limit the administrative burden. This is the approach that will be followed in most CBAM options.

In the longer term, when the material scope of the CBAM would be extended, as more information will be easily available on the carbon content of products and as carbon pricing policies of different countries may become more easily comparable, an extension of the carbon emission scope to cover the full carbon footprint of imported products may be considered.

Such a possible future extension would also be of relevance to transport emissions as the EU ETS may be extended to transport. Indeed, emissions resulting from transport may be significant for imported goods and are certainly a relevant issue in the fight against climate change. However, as long as emissions from transport are not included in the scope of the EU ETS, it would be complicated to include them in the scope of the CBAM. As the ETS revision impact assessment foresees such extension<sup>40</sup>, there is a case for including transport emissions in the CBAM. This could be done when the CBAM will be revised. Respondents to the Open Public Consultation somewhat agree that the CBAM should cover direct emissions and indirect emissions from electricity used in the production process, emissions recorded in all links of the value chains and emissions from international transport of goods. Conversely, they somewhat disagree that the CBAM should differentiate the treatment of imports of finished products, intermediate products and primary inputs.

#### 5.2.1.2 Measuring the carbon content

The carbon content of products is an essential element of the CBAM as it indicates the GHG emissions released during the production of the materials produced abroad. This is used to ensure that imported products are treated no less favourably than domestic products produced in EU ETS installations. The carbon content of products will be multiplied by the reference carbon price for determining the obligation to be paid under the CBAM.

Carbon content does not refer to carbon physically contained in a product in any chemical state, but rather to the GHG emissions released during the production of the material or product subject to the CBAM, or indirectly during the production of electricity used in the process. A carbon content is usually expressed with respect to the corresponding scope of emissions, products and sectors.

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<sup>38</sup> Unless the mining includes combustion units with a total rated thermal input of more than 20 MW.

<sup>39</sup> The impact assessment on the revision of the EU ETS Directive considers the possible extension of the EU ETS to transport and buildings.

<sup>40</sup> Specifically under policy options EXT1 and EXT2

As installations covered by the EU ETS are subject to a carbon price assessed on their actual emissions, imported products in the scope of CBAM may also be assessed based on their actual GHG emissions. Such an approach offers advantages relating to a fair and equal treatment and would also serve well to give incentives to foreign producers to develop low-carbon production. Furthermore, requesting to document the carbon content of all imports could serve well to fulfil the aim to closely mimic the functioning of the EU ETS. It may, however, also entail a significant administrative burden for importers. To limit this, a default value representing the emissions of imported products may be established with the possibility for the importer to demonstrate that its products were produced with actual emissions lower than the default value, and therefore be subject to a lower adjustment. Both approaches will be explored in this impact assessment.

For options where imported products in the scope of the CBAM are to be assessed based on actual GHG emissions, there would still be a need to set objectively determined default values to be used in situations when sufficient data to determine the actual GHG emissions are not available. This could be the case when importers cannot provide actual emission data or when the CBAM monitoring and verification of those given are not considered to fulfil laid down criteria.

For options where the default value is predominantly used, the level of this default value for each covered sector/product will have to be set taking into account the level of emissions attributable to a given sector in the EU, comparing it to the emissions of this sector outside of the EU. In addition, the higher the default value will be set, the more claims for individual treatment there may be, generating an additional administrative burden. This latter element also needs to be taken into account in setting the level of the default values.

The level of the default values may be defined as dynamic values, for example taking the EU average or median per sector as a reference. Alternatively, it could be a fixed value subject to revision after a defined number of years<sup>41</sup>.

Both default values and actual emissions must be calculated on the basis of robust Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) procedures. These can be based on major elements of existing EU ETS mechanisms such as the Monitoring and Reporting Regulation<sup>42</sup>, Free Allocation Rules Regulation<sup>43</sup> and Allocation Level Change Regulation<sup>44</sup> of the EU ETS, and complemented by further data requirements.

The reference flow/declared unit for the calculation of the carbon content should be the unit of weight (e.g., tonne CO<sub>2eq</sub>/tonne material<sup>45</sup>), specific per production site. Once the

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<sup>41</sup> Under the EU ETS values are recalculated every 5 years.

<sup>42</sup> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2066 of 19 December 2018 on the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and amending Commission Regulation (EU) No 601/2012 (OJ L 334, 31.12.2018, pp. 1–93).

<sup>43</sup> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2067 of 19 December 2018 on the verification of data and on the accreditation of verifiers pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 334, 31.12.2018, pp. 94–134).

<sup>44</sup> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1842 of 31 October 2019 laying down rules for the application of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards further arrangements for the adjustments to free allocation of emission allowances due to activity level changes (OJ L 282, 4.11.2019, p. 20–24).

<sup>45</sup> Except in the case of electricity where different specifications apply.



digital product passport announced in the Circular economy action plan will have become operational<sup>46</sup>, the information could be specific to the produced consignment. In the meantime, it could be acceptable to declare the yearly average carbon content.

It may be necessary to develop sectoral rules (for the sectors in the scope of the CBAM) detailing how to calculate both direct and indirect emissions. These rules could be developed following the approach already used for PEF Category Rules and international standards on carbon footprint<sup>47</sup>, focusing on the production steps in scope. For direct emissions, the calculation should follow the principles of the EU ETS calculation rules. For indirect emissions (related to electricity use), the approach may build on PEF rules. The existing rules cover both the use of electricity from the grid and from specific producers, as well as the production of own electricity (including through Guarantees of Origin certificates). The sectoral rules would also include the verification procedure to be followed.

The above considerations highlight the underlying compromises inherent in the design of the CBAM. Determining the CBAM obligation based on actual GHG emissions could more closely reflect the functioning of the EU ETS, but would involve higher administrative costs. Methods need to be developed and communicated to traders, while the costs associated with the management of the system are higher. In addition, verifiers in third countries may be limited in number in the short term and this could create bottlenecks for the verification of emission in these countries, which would have consequences on the functioning of the system. Default values would allow for determining the CBAM debt based on the volume of product imported according to an average of emissions in the EU. Considering that the average carbon intensity outside the EU is higher, most importers would accept these estimations, which would reduce costs upon them but also upon the EU. In any case, importers would still have the possibility to claim that the emissions embedded in their products are below the default value, however the burden to prove it could be placed on them.

### 5.2.1.3 Sectors

The specification of the CBAM's sectoral scope will be central to its effective implementation. The methodological approach to the specification of this sectoral coverage should not differ between the different options considered. In this respect, the measure may be understood as sector-neutral in its design – allowing for its potential extension to further sectors and products in the future. However, as discussed later, it is also recognised that some of the design options would allow the measure to move further down the value chain. Reaching further downstream of the supply chain may help mitigating certain weaknesses of some CBAM options, such as the risk of substitution of domestic products by imports downstream of the supply chain. In the modelling exercise, variants of the main options considered allow for exploring this effect.

The focus of the measure is on basic materials and basic material products<sup>48</sup>. The choice of the CBAM's coverage is framed by the sectors and emissions covered by the EU ETS.

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<sup>46</sup> See: [https://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/pdf/new\\_circular\\_economy\\_action\\_plan.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/pdf/new_circular_economy_action_plan.pdf)

<sup>47</sup> ISO 14067:2018, Greenhouse gases – Carbon footprint of products – Requirements and guidelines for quantification.

<sup>48</sup> Basic materials refer to materials that are either a (technically pure) substance or a mixture of substances in a physical form that can be sold, which has been derived from raw materials in an industrial process, during which their chemical composition is modified. By contrast basic material products are formed

This is dictated by the motivation behind the measure, namely to ensure that imports of energy intensive products into the EU are on equal footing with EU products in terms of EU ETS carbon pricing, and to mitigate risks of carbon leakage. In this regard, it makes sense to ensure a coherent administrative approach with EU ETS sectors, as the EU ETS price is fully harmonised at EU level and also covers emission-intensive activities competing globally.

Furthermore, narrowing the scope to a first shortlist of aggregated sectors relies on three additional criteria. The first is relevance in terms of emissions, namely whether the sector is one of the largest aggregate emitters of GHG emissions; the second is the sector’s exposure to a significant risk of carbon leakage<sup>49</sup>, as defined pursuant to the EU ETS Directive<sup>50</sup>; and the third is balancing broad coverage in terms of GHG emissions while limiting complexity and administrative effort. This results in the 12 aggregated sectors illustrated in Figure 3. As can be seen, a few sectors are responsible for the majority of the emissions.

**Figure 3: Initial shortlist of aggregated sectors sorted by emissions**

Short sector name	Number of installations	Emissions [kt CO2/yr]	Cumulated emissions
Iron & Steel	485	159 861	22.8%
Refineries	130	132 164	41.7%
Cement	214	118 164	58.6%
Organic basic chemicals	331	64 877	67.8%
Fertilizers	99	36 995	73.1%
Pulp & Paper	672	27 233	77.0%
Lime & Plaster	193	26 151	80.7%
Inorganic chemicals	149	22 483	84.0%
Glass	326	18 226	86.6%
Aluminium	89	13 755	88.5%
Ceramics	350	7 810	89.6%
Polymers	121	5 655	90.4%
Other sectors	1 200	66 902	100.0%

Source: Commission Analysis  
Sectoral emissions as share of the EU ETS industry sectors emissions.

Comprehensiveness in the CBAM’s scope has to be further balanced with the technical feasibility and the actual enforceability of the system. As discussed in more detail in Annex 7, when an imported material or product becomes subject to the CBAM, it will be necessary that the authority in charge can identify the product imported, check whether it is to be covered by the measure, and then determine the relevant amount of embedded emissions which are to be covered by CBAM certificates or an excise duty. Two key dimensions are critical in this respect. The first dimension relates to the need to unambiguously identify and distinguish materials or products, and not sectors per se, that will be covered by the measure. By way of example, we could note pig iron or ‘iron and steel primary forms’ as opposed to the iron and steel sector, or for the case of cement, clinker as opposed to the cement sector. This needs to be defined to a sufficient degree in order to allow for easily determining the amount of emissions that should be subject to

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products which consist overwhelmingly of one single basic material, and which are usually produced in a process closely coupled and performed in the same installation as the basic material (Annex 5 provides a full list of relevant definitions).

<sup>49</sup> As shown in the Annex 7 this list of sectors is based both on trade intensity and carbon intensity.

<sup>50</sup> Directive (EU) 2018/410 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018 amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments, and Decision (EU) 2015/1814, OJ L 76, 19.3.2018, pp. 3–37.

the CBAM when goods enter in the EU. The second dimension relates to whether materials or products can be sufficiently identified in practice to make the CBAM enforceable. This means that for the effective application of the CBAM, it will be critical that a product or material is unambiguously linkable to its definition and that sufficient information is available to determine its reference values of embedded emissions. For example, ‘clinker’ under the cement could be linked to the EU ETS benchmark of grey cement clinker and, based on good availability of data, allow for the calculation of embedded emissions based on clinker. These benchmarks could then be linked to specific imported products determined at Combined Nomenclature (CN) codes level such as cement clinkers (2523 10 00) and Portland cement (2523 29 00), cement, whether or not coloured (2523 90 00).

Once products or materials are defined and it is ensured that they can be identified, the next critical step involves the ability to define reference levels for the embedded emissions of materials and products. The feasibility to define reference values for the embedded emissions is indeed the decisive argument for a product or material’s inclusion in the CBAM. Without such reference values it is impossible to calculate the CBAM obligation to be paid upon import. Some high-emission industrial processes such as those of refineries produce several products simultaneously. For such processes, in order to define reference values that may be used for output products, a decision would first have to be made on how to attribute the emissions of the industrial process to the different output products. For this reason these products are not considered for the first stage of the CBAM.

These considerations and key steps in assessing the feasibility of different sectors are discussed in greater detail in Annex 7. On the basis of this, a possible initial shortlist of materials and material products scope of the CBAM is presented below. Based on the criteria set out above, in particular their carbon intensity, their trade intensity and the availability of necessary reference data to apply a CBAM, the list includes specified basic materials of the sectors of cement, iron & steel, aluminium and fertilisers. As noted earlier, in the future and conditional on whether data requirements for determining embedded emissions can be satisfied, further products in these sectors as well as other sectors at risk of carbon leakage could be covered by the measure.

In addition, electricity generation may also be a relevant sector to include in our analysis, although for different reasons. Electricity generation is the most important sector included in the EU ETS in terms of direct carbon emissions, and is also the largest sector responsible for carbon emissions in the wider economy. Additionally, electricity generators in principle do not receive free allowances, but have to buy them via auctions or on the secondary market. This distinguishes them from other EU ETS participants whose exposure to the risks of carbon leakage are currently mitigated with the allocation of free allowances. Finally, the infrastructure to exchange electricity with partner countries outside of the EU has been expanding over the past years, and this trend is expected to continue. Due to these physical characteristics and organisational aspects of the electricity market, the approach to electricity generation and trade differs from the approach proposed for material products. More details on this approach are given in Annex 8.


**Table 1: Initial shortlist of products for CBAM**


Sector	Materials or material products
Cement	Clinker Portland cement
Iron & Steel	Iron & steel primary forms Hot rolled & further steps Coated hot rolled & further steps Forged, extruded and wire
Aluminium	Aluminium unwrought Aluminium unwrought alloyed Aluminium products Alloyed aluminium products
Fertilisers	Ammonia Urea Nitric acid AN (Ammonium Nitrate)
Electricity generation	Electricity

Source: Commission Analysis

Figure 4 indicates the volume of imports and exports into and from the EU in the sectors identified as potentially falling under the initial shortlist (Table 1 above). It can be seen that in terms of the volume of imports iron & steel is the leading sector, followed by fertilisers, cement and aluminium.

**Figure 4: Volume and value of total imports and exports of EU-27 in 2019**





Source: Commission analysis based on data from Eurostat COMEXT

Regarding the scope of the CBAM, respondents to the Open Public Consultation somewhat agreed that the mechanism should focus on products from activities already included in the EU ETS (especially those with the highest risk of carbon leakage), and account for the entire value chain. In terms of sectoral coverage, five sectors are selected more than 50 times by the 609 consultation respondents (each respondent was allowed to select up to 10 sectors), i.e. i) electric power generation, transmission and distribution; ii) manufacture of cement, lime and plaster; iii) manufacture of iron and steel and of ferro-alloys; iv) manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds, plastics and synthetic rubber; and v) extraction of crude petroleum.

#### 5.2.1.4 Future-proofing design of the CBAM

The CBAM will need to be fit for the future and its design should be flexible in order to meet any new targets beyond 2030 and address the rapidly changing reality of global climate politics.

As indicated earlier, among measures deployed by the EU to achieve its ambition of carbon neutrality, there needs to be a consistent carbon price to incentivise low-carbon production processes, material efficiency and substitution, as well as enhanced recycling. To that end, and while different reform options are considered for the EU ETS, a CBAM should provide protection against carbon leakage risks. It is expected that the EU ETS price will rise until 2030 and beyond, and the need for carbon leakage protection will therefore continue. CBAM and possibly other measure will be necessary, their scope may need to be extended and the mechanism reinforced. As highlighted in section 5.2.1.3, in a first phase, the mechanism could apply to a limited number of sectors. A second phase could apply the CBAM to materials further down the carbon leakage list based on the

intensity of their carbon leakage indicator<sup>51</sup>. This gradual approach could then cover the entire list of sectors subject to carbon leakage.

Additionally, downstream products in the EU may also be or become at risk of carbon leakage. For example, if the mechanism covers basic materials and basic material products, then downstream domestic producers whose products are not included in the scope (e.g. manufacturers of components and final products) would face higher input costs irrespective of whether they source their (covered) material inputs domestically or from abroad. If climate ambitions diverge, carbon leakage may move down the supply chain, as final consumers may decide to source their purchase from abroad. To avoid this risk of carbon leakage further down the value chain, a broad product coverage is being considered in the design of the mechanism, which could foresee an extension to downstream sectors. Some of the options considered envisage including downstream sectors in the scope of the CBAM from the beginning. In the options where it is not the case, extension to downstream sectors should be considered at a later stage as the use of international standards on defining carbon footprint will pick up and data will become more easily available for all sorts of products.

Extending the CBAM to downstream products faces the challenge of the complexity of value chains and the varying possibilities on the transformation of the product in later stages. Certain CBAM imports such as fertilisers and electricity may reach directly the final consumer with limited transformation or added value. However, for other CBAM materials such as steel and aluminium, as more manufacturing steps included downstream and the final product becomes more complex, the content of the basic material in it becomes diluted. It thus becomes difficult to monitor and verify, as well as easier to circumvent through minor transformation. At the same time, the value added of the basic material in the value of the imported product is also critical, as it would determine the importance of transferring of carbon pricing downstream.

Addressing these challenge would raise two key considerations in practice. The first relates to the number of production steps involved in the manufacturing of each product that uses the CBAM basic material downstream. This would involve intermediate products, which use more than one material or product but require more complex manufacturing steps, and final products, which are made of components and further materials and is ready for sales to end consumers. Tracing the CBAM basic material downstream of these products would involve an analysis of the value chains to determine a reasonable limit for the reach of the measure. The second consideration relates to the value of carbon relative to value generation downstream. At lower CO<sub>2</sub> prices during initial phases, this may be negligible. However, at higher carbon prices in the future, more complex products down the value chain may become relevant for the CBAM.

#### 5.2.1.5 Reference carbon price

All options refer to a carbon price so as to align, to the extent possible, the price paid under the CBAM with the price paid under the EU ETS. Under different policy options, the actual reference carbon price may differ depending on the administrative feasibility

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<sup>51</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/default/files/events/docs/0127/6\\_cil-ei-ti\\_results\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/default/files/events/docs/0127/6_cil-ei-ti_results_en.pdf) see also EU ETS revision impact assessment *Table 58. Carbon leakage list 2021-2030 – Carbon leakage indicators of selected sectors at risk of carbon leakage.*

and specific design of each option. However, it should be noted that the starting point would be the price of allowances in the EU ETS.

This reference carbon price may be:

- The average EU ETS allowance auctioning price over a given period (previous year, quarter, month or week).
- The daily allowance price based on the previous day auctioning price of the EU ETS.

#### 5.2.1.6 Taking into account carbon pricing in third countries

In an ideal world, all countries would put in place the measures necessary to phase out fossil fuels in a fair and effective manner. While the Paris Agreement sets a shared goal of limiting global emissions in order to avoid a dangerous rise in global average temperature, each Party sets its own nationally determined contribution to limit its greenhouse gas emissions, reflecting its highest possible ambition.

The EU has set ambitious targets in line with preventing dangerous climate change, and among other measures has put in place a carbon pricing system, through the EU ETS, to achieve its targets in as cost effective manner as possible. However, in order to achieve its targets, the EU must also ensure that its efforts at home do not lead to emissions increases elsewhere through the risk of carbon leakage. A CBAM that ensures that covered imported products bear a comparable carbon price to domestically produced products will help manage that risk.

The CBAM as proposed would use the EU ETS price as the default value for comparing and adjusting prices at the border. Importers would have the opportunity to claim that the prevailing explicit carbon price in the country of production have addressed the risk of carbon leakage, and hence that their CBAM obligation should be reduced by this amount.

The CBAM should favour global cooperation in fighting climate change, and it should avoid situations of double carbon pricing by subjecting goods which have already paid a carbon price outside the EU based on GHG emissions in third countries to the CBAM. Therefore, the CBAM should be designed in such way that it takes into account climate policies in the form of explicit carbon pricing policies in our trading partner countries. While we recognise that reduction of GHG emissions by countries all over the globe is pursued through regulations other than carbon pricing, due to the conceptual difficulties in determining the equivalence between carbon pricing and non-price regulatory measures, and the fact that, like the EU, most countries will have both pricing and non-pricing approaches to reducing carbon emissions, the CBAM only focuses on carbon pricing. In practice, this means through a cost under an emission trading scheme or by a carbon tax, in both cases covering emissions having occurred during the production of imported materials. A carbon tax can be designed to tax the carbon content of fuels used or be more targeted at actual emissions occurring from the combustion of such fuels. In either case, the tax amount paid does not relate to the produced material being exported to the EU, and the tax would normally not be reimbursed upon export to the EU of the produced material (being for example steel).

Taking into account the carbon price paid abroad can be done either at country level or at transaction level for each individual consignment of imported materials. At country level, exemptions from having the CBAM applying to imports from such countries could be granted to countries who have in place a carbon pricing system that imposes a carbon

price at least equivalent to the price resulting from the EU ETS on products subject to the CBAM. In practice, and in view of current carbon pricing policies around the world, such an approach may be considered for countries with an ETS linked to the EU ETS (e.g. Switzerland).

At transaction level, the CBAM should allow importers to claim that they have paid a carbon price abroad on the GHG emissions embedded in the production of the goods they import. This carbon price effectively paid abroad should be deducted from the amount they would have to pay under CBAM<sup>52</sup>.

It should be noted that the different CBAM options – outlined in section 6 below – will entail different obligations with regards to third countries pricing measures. Regulation-based options (‘Import certificates’) will require taking into account such measures, while indirect taxation options (‘Excise Duty’) will not.

#### 5.2.1.7 The CBAM applied to imports and free allowances in the EU ETS

The CBAM and free allowances are two mechanisms that serve a similar purpose, preventing the risk of carbon leakage. The two mechanisms cannot offer ‘double protection’ and should not coexist in the long run as this would diminish the environmental objectives of both EU ETS and the CBAM. In the options considered, either the CBAM replaces free allowances at once or the CBAM is phased in as free allowances are phased out during a limited transition period. For sectors not covered by the CBAM, protection against carbon leakage would remain under the EU ETS framework. For sectors covered by the CBAM, protection against carbon leakage would come from the CBAM.

#### 5.2.1.8 Reconciliation procedure

As indicated under section 5.2.1.2 ‘Measuring the carbon content’, imported products in the scope of the CBAM could either be assessed based on their actual GHG emissions or by using a default value representing the emissions of the imported products. In the case of setting default values, importers will be given the option to claim that the emissions resulting from the production of their imports are below the default value by providing verifiable data as to their actual emissions. Furthermore, even in an option where imported products are assessed based on actual GHG emissions, there would still be a need to set objective default values to be used in situations where sufficient data to determine the actual GHG emissions is not available.

Claims that actual GHG emissions are below the default value may, depending on the actual administrative design chosen for the CBAM, be treated either when goods are imported for each individual shipment or through an annual reconciliation procedure inspired by the procedure in place in the context of the EU ETS.

#### 5.2.1.9 Elements related to administrative design

There are essentially two main options in the institutional design necessary to support the implementation and management of the CBAM. The first rests on a centralised system

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<sup>52</sup> Taking into account possible rebates or free allowances in third countries; In case the carbon price paid abroad is higher than under the CBAM, such imports would be exempt from the obligation to surrender CBAM certificates.



and consists of a CBAM authority at EU level. This could rely on an existing agency or a Commission service. The second is a decentralised system resting on Member States' national authorities, which could be the national climate authorities or any authority specifically appointed for this task.

Overall, both approaches have their respective merits and drawbacks. A decentralised approach could facilitate faster implementation, as it would not require the establishment of new institutional structures. It would rest and build upon the competencies and tasks of the Member States' existing national climate authorities. However, it may entail a long lead time to a fully harmonised implementation of the rules. Depending on the functions foreseen for the registration of traders and foreign industrial installations, the assessment and verification of declarations of actual emissions and the collection of the CBAM obligation, coordination across 27 different national authorities could be difficult to manage. Moreover, a decentralised approach could face difficulties in view of the rigidity of the national systems and respective IT infrastructure needs. Potential changes and fine-tuning would require changes across Member States which could increase costs both at national and central levels.

A centralised approach would be based on a Central Administrative CBAM Body. Such an approach may reduce coordination burdens and have the merits of one unique approach, which could facilitate the operation of the mechanism. It may also downsize the necessary information flows, thus potentially simplifying system requirements. However, such an authority does not exist at this moment and would need to be hosted by an existing agency or a Commission service. A central authority at EU level would also need to meet a number of specifications, which would affect the pace for this establishment.

In view of the above, the envisaged institutional architecture for the CBAM would have important implications as regards the costs of its operation. Commission research estimates that the CBAM would in its first phase concern 1 000 traders realising 239 000 import transactions on an annual basis from 510 production sites outside the EU. While this represents a large number of transactions, the estimate also indicates that they are undertaken by a fairly a limited number of traders and concern a limited number of sites.

To obtain a rough estimate of the potential staffing needs to operate the CBAM at EU level, we consider three core functional areas that will need to be supported. Depending on the level of centralisation these could be carried out either by a Central CBAM Authority or shared with the Member States' national authorities. In the latter case, estimates of staffing needs would depend on the capacities of the national authorities, and thereby their ability to cover the necessary administrative requirements arising from the CBAM with current staff - or if additional positions would be needed.

The first functional area relates to the core function of reviewing, assessing and approving declarations presented by traders, including issuing requests for supplementary information and clarification. Assuming a maximum of 10 working days for the handling of each, this would require 50 full time equivalent positions. The second functional area relates to the handling of complains submitted by traders. Assuming that around one third of declarations could be subject to litigation and a maximum of 5 working days would be needed for the handling of each, this would require an additional 7.5 full time equivalent positions.

For these two functional areas, the impact of a centralised versus a decentralised approach can vary. In the case of a decentralised approach, the estimated 57.5 full time

equivalent positions may not be equally distributed across Member States. Given the location of traders, certain Member States may face higher administrative costs relative to this function. In addition, a decentralised approach may possibly require a slightly higher aggregated number of full time equivalent positions, due to forgone possibilities of economies of scale.

The third functional area relates to the maintenance of the IT system, including the keeping and updating of registries and handling of CBAM obligations (selling and buy back of certificates). It is estimated that this would require an additional 18 full time equivalent positions if the management system was fully centralised. In case of a decentralised approach, the selling and buying of certificates would need to be carried out by national authorities, which would imply a higher number of full time equivalent positions in aggregate for this functional area, with only a portion retained centrally to support the management of the central IT system.

The above considerations would imply a requirement of 75 staff on a full time basis to implement the CBAM according to the centralised approach. This number would be higher in aggregate under a decentralised approach, yet this would depend on the current human resource capacities within the national authorities that would be tasked with handling the CBAM.

#### 5.2.1.10 Resource shuffling

Resource shuffling refers to the allocation or attribution of less emissions-intensive materials production (including materials embedded in manufactured goods) towards markets with higher carbon costs, while the overall carbon intensity of production in the home market remains constant. There exist three main mechanisms through which resource shuffling can take place:

- Attribution of low-carbon input factors (low-carbon electricity, low-carbon heat, biomass) to imported materials.
- Attribution of GHG emissions of a production process to co-products (e.g. slag, heat, flue-gases) to improve the reported carbon intensity of basic material production (unless strict MRV rules would limit such approaches).
- Attribution of shares of recycled material to imported or exported goods.

Incentives for resource shuffling exist for any emissions-related policy that includes traded goods (e.g. CBAM or product standards) where the carbon intensity of imported or exported products does not rely on default values only, but on actual emissions. For a CBAM, non-EU producers have an incentive to re-route carbon-intensive products to other markets in the world economy to avoid the levy imposed by the border measure. On the other hand, exporting low-carbon products to the EU would imply lowering the carbon costs these importers face and therefore undermine the carbon leakage protection which the CBAM provides, without leading to a decrease of global emissions.

Resource shuffling has emerged as an important problem in the Californian CBAM<sup>53</sup> on electricity. In addition, recent academic literature focusing on the EU approximates the scale of potential risk from resource shuffling from a CBAM at around 50 % for steel and

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<sup>53</sup> California is the only jurisdiction that currently has implemented a CBAM as part of its climate policy framework and is based on a transaction-based approach.

80 % for aluminium - the latter driven by the higher opportunities to source or attribute the production of aluminium to clean electricity<sup>54</sup>.

Notwithstanding the above, it should be noted that importers are perfectly entitled to direct lower-carbon products to the EU. That being said, and while resource shuffling of this scale would improve the EU's carbon footprint, it could result in higher carbon leakage, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the CBAM. At the same time, the negative implications of resource shuffling should also be balanced with the fact that third countries have to make an effort to produce low carbon-intensive products for the EU market and this will be positive from a climate perspective. As a matter of fact, beyond mere resource shuffling, third countries will have to invest in clean technologies if they want to export less polluting goods to the EU, which could result in less overall emissions and in internal synergies that will make it less expensive to shift to less polluting production for all markets. This positive effect will be larger and trigger changes more quickly the more relevant the EU market is for the total exports from that particular country.

#### 5.2.1.11 The CBAM for Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

LDCs currently account for a minimal share of EU-external trade in the commodities that could be covered by a CBAM. Yet, it should be recognised that exports to the EU from LDCs can provide important foreign exchange earnings for these countries and represent a significant share of their GNI. Many countries in the Global South, and on the African continent in particular, are exposed to possible risks (see more detailed data in Annex 3).

While preferential treatment for LDCs is an established procedure in other areas of trade policy, it raises questions in the case of a CBAM. For example, blanket exemptions from a CBAM should be avoided, as setting up a mechanism that will encourage LDCs to increase their level of emission and run counter to the overarching objective of the CBAM. In addition, these exemptions would be temporary in nature, and would therefore prove counterproductive for LDCs in the long run: the carbon intensive industry would have to be dismantled, and if exempted now, adaptation costs for LDCs would be higher. To sum up, neither the EU nor the trading partners would have an interest in fostering the growth of carbon-intensive, industries in these countries.

To avoid new global dividing lines between countries with a low and high-carbon export structure, recent analyses<sup>55</sup> have highlighted the need for targeted ways to support LDCs. These could take the form of technical assistance, technology transfer, extensive capacity building and financial support, with the objective to develop industrial production structures that are compatible with long-term climate objectives. This assistance could be carried out through existing support channels (e.g. bilaterally and multilaterally, including through the mechanisms established under the UNFCCC). In the absence of such compensating mechanisms, LDCs could argue that the introduction of a CBAM will be a disproportionate burden for them and that they conflict with the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national circumstances. Finally, to ease the transition, a gradual phasing in of the CBAM could be considered for existing production capacities in LDCs.

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<sup>54</sup> Stede, J., Pauliuk, S., Hardadi, G. Neuhoﬀ, K., Carbon pricing of basic materials: Incentives and risks for the value chain and consumers, 2021, DIW Discussion Papers, No 1935.

<sup>55</sup> See for example L. Lehne, O. Sartor: Navigating the politics of Borden Carbon Adjustments, E3G Briefing Paper, September 2020.

**Box 1: Option 1 in Brief**

**Depth of value chain:** Basic materials and basic material products  
**Coverage of CBAM:** Imports only  
**Free allocation in the EU ETS:** No (full auctioning of allowances for the CBAM sectors)  
**Type of payment:** Domestic producers buy EU ETS allowances; importers pay a tax  
**Reflection of actual emissions in carbon pricing:** Yes for domestic production; importers pay based on a default value reflecting EU average but may opt to demonstrate actual carbon intensity of imported products

The first option for a CBAM is an import carbon tax, paid by the importer when products enter the EU. Practically, the tax would be collected by customs at the border and based on a tax reflecting the price of carbon in the EU combined with a default carbon intensity of the products. An annual average price could be favoured over e.g. daily adjusted prices, as this would provide for a simpler implementation and higher predictability for importers. For simplicity considerations, the reference value for carbon intensity would be a default value based on EU producers' averages. However, importers will have the opportunity to claim for individual treatment<sup>56</sup>, which would be administered by a reconciliation exercise and could result in a deduction or refund of a proportion of the amount of tax to be paid. This involves the importer providing proof for any carbon price paid abroad and/or actual performance from carbon efficient technologies. Information will be subject to monitoring and verification procedures to assess whether a partial or full reimbursement of the tax should be granted.

Under option 1, a credible enforcement mechanism must be established. This would involve an existing entity with its seat in the EU, for instance an existing Agency or the Commission, to be vested with additional powers for compliance with the CBAM. In practice, the enforcement mechanism would require that for every import that falls within the scope of the CBAM, the importer nominates in the customs declaration a 'CBAM importer' (being in a similar situation as the installation operator in the EU ETS) with a business address in the EU, who would be responsible for paying the CBAM tax obligation and engaging in the reconciliation procedure.

This option assumes that the CBAM would be limited to specific imported carbon-intensive materials and basic material products. In an initial phase, in order to keep the measure simple and manageable, semi-finished and finished products would not be covered, with regard to neither the emissions from their production, nor the fact that they contain carbon-intensive materials. Option 1 reflects a scenario with full auctioning of emission allowances for the concerned sectors under the ETS. The free allocation of allowances contained in the current EU ETS would thus not be retained for the selected sectors. Under Option 1, the leakage protection currently resulting from free allocation of EU ETS allowances would therefore have to come from the CBAM.

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<sup>56</sup> This would allow producers to demonstrate their actual carbon intensity compared to the default value.

**Box 2: Option 2 in Brief**

**Depth of value chain:** Basic materials and basic material products

**Coverage of CBAM:** Imports only

**Free allocation in the EU ETS:** No (full auctioning of allowances for the CBAM sectors)

**Type of payment:** Domestic producers buy EU ETS allowances; importers buy import certificates (CBAM certificates)

**Reflection of actual emissions in carbon pricing:** Yes for domestic production; importers pay based on a default value reflecting EU average emissions or may opt to demonstrate actual carbon intensity of imported products

The second option involves the application on imports of a system that replicates the EU ETS regime applicable to domestic production. This option entails – similarly to the system of allowances under the EU ETS – the surrendering of certificates (‘CBAM certificates’) by importers, based on the embedded emission intensity of the products they import in the EU and purchased at a price corresponding to that of the EU ETS allowances at any given point in time. These certificates will not be linked to the EU ETS system of allowances but will mirror the price of these allowances to ensure a coherent approach to the pricing under the EU ETS.

There are a number of reasons not to use EU ETS allowances in the CBAM, all relating to the possible impact on the ETS, in terms of the functioning but also of the underlying logic. The ETS is a cap and trade system where the cap represents a total amount of greenhouse gas emissions for a given year. In line with the principle of the Kyoto protocol on accounting emissions of its parties, the cap is linked to the emissions taking place as a result of releasing greenhouse gases on the territory of the EU exclusively. Using ETS allowances to account for emissions taking place outside of the EU’s territory would bring a significant number of new actors on the ETS market at the same time, as it would require revising the logic used to set the ETS cap.

In general, it is preferable to carry out extensions of the ETS scope in a prudent manner involving specific pools of allowances, as it was the case for aviation and as it may be the case for buildings and transport. Finally, as the ETS sets a maximum to the emissions taking place in the EU, using its allowance for imports could result in quantitative restrictions on imports that would raise WTO concerns. In other words, the CBAM cannot introduce a cap on emissions outside the EU, in order to avoid restricting international trade.

Importers will submit declarations of verified embedded emissions in the imported products and surrender a number of CBAM certificates corresponding to the declared emissions to a CBAM authority. Depending on the level of centralisation, this authority could be either the central CBAM authority or the national authorities tasked with managing the CBAM. Such declaration and surrendering will occur – similar to that under the EU ETS – at a yearly reconciliation exercise taking place in the year following the year of importation and based on yearly trade import volumes. The carbon emission intensity of products would be based on a default value; however, importers would be

given the opportunity, at the moment of the yearly reconciliation exercise, to claim a reduction of the CBAM on the basis of their individual emission performance. They would also be entitled to claim a reduction of the CBAM for any carbon price paid in the country of production (which is not rebated nor compensated in other ways upon export).

The data necessary to calculate the amount of CBAM certificates to be surrendered should be provided by the ‘CBAM importer’ to the CBAM authority<sup>57</sup>. If the importer intends to provide its own emission figures for the CBAM, the relevant information is also to be provided. Depending on MRV requirements defined, the relevant information here would be either:

- the confirmation from the CBAM authority that the imported good falls under the CBAM;
- the specific embedded emissions determined in line with the CBAM requirements on MRV, as well as information on the carbon price paid abroad – in this case, some form of verification report would have to be attached by the importer.

At regular intervals (e.g. annually like in the EU ETS), the CBAM importer would perform a calculation (or ‘reconciliation’) of its CBAM obligation by adding up all its reported embedded emissions for the previous period (e.g. the calendar year) and for all imported products covered by the CBAM, and report them.

#### 5.2.4 *Option 3: Import certificates for basic materials based on actual emissions*

### **Box 3: Option 3 in Brief**

**Depth of value chain:** Basic materials and basic material products

**Coverage of CBAM:** Imports only

**Free allocation in the EU ETS:** No (full auctioning of allowances for the CBAM sectors)

**Type of payment:** Domestic producers buy EU ETS allowances; importers buy import certificates (CBAM certificates)

**Reflection of actual emissions in carbon pricing:** For both domestic production and imports, importers declare the actual carbon intensity of imported products

Option 3 operates in the same way as option 2, however the carbon price of imports is based on actual emissions from third country producers rather than on a default value based on EU producers’ averages. Under this option, the importer will have to report the actual emissions embedded in the product and surrender a corresponding number of CBAM certificates. In the event that a carbon price was paid abroad, the importer would be entitled to claim a reduction of his CBAM obligation corresponding to the carbon price paid abroad. Information will be subject to monitoring and verification procedures to assess the number of CBAM certificates to be purchased, as explained in option 2 above. Under this option, free allocation in the EU ETS would be discontinued.

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<sup>57</sup> See Annex 5: Definitions.

Even if the general principle in this option is that imported products in the scope of the CBAM are to be assessed based on actual GHG emissions, there would still be a need to set default values to be used in situations when sufficient data to determine the actual GHG emissions is not available.

*5.2.5 Option 4: Import certificates for basic materials based on actual emissions with parallel continuation of free allowances for a transitional period*

**Box 4: Option 4 in Brief**

**Depth of value chain:** Basic materials and basic material products

**Coverage of CBAM:** Imports only

**Free allocation in the EU ETS:** Phased out for the CBAM sectors - gradual phased-out after 2025 over 10 years

**Mode of payment:** Domestic producers buy EU ETS allowances needed beyond free allocation; importers buy import certificates (CBAM certificates)

**Reflection of actual emissions in carbon pricing:** Only partially for domestic production and imports during the transition period; importers declare the actual carbon intensity of imported products

Option 4 would apply in the same way as option 3. It consists of surrendering CBAM certificates on imported goods. However, this option considers a more gradual phasing out of free allowances, which shall start after 2025, so that they decline up to 50 % in 2030 and eventually to 0 % by 2035 at the earliest. On the basis of this, the CBAM would be phased in after 2025 and reduced proportionally to the amount of free allowances distributed in a given sector.

The CBAM after 2025 would apply to the difference between actual emissions and the proportion of emissions under the EU benchmark which remain covered by free allowances. This way, at any point in time, imports benefit from the same level of free allowances as domestic productions. Such a transitional period is designed to allow businesses with installations subject to the EU ETS to have more time to adjust to a situation where the carbon price will apply fully to their production.

*5.2.6 Option 5: Import certificates for basic materials also as part of components and finished products based on actual emissions*

**Box 5: Option 5 in Brief**

**Depth of value chain:** Basic materials also as part of components and finished products

**Coverage of CBAM:** Imports only

**Free allocation in the EU ETS:** No (full auctioning of allowances for the CBAM sectors)

**Mode of payment:** Domestic producers buy EU ETS allowances; importers buy import certificates (CBAM certificates)

**Reflection of actual emissions in carbon pricing:** Yes for domestic production; importers will declare the actual carbon intensity of imported products

Option 5 is a variant of Option 3 with a scope extended further down in the value chain. Adjustments would not be limited to specific imported carbon-intensive materials and basic material products. Instead, carbon-intensive materials that are part of semi-finished as well as finished products would also be covered along the value chain. For imports, the CBAM would again be based on the actual emissions from third country producers.

Under this option, no free allocation would be given to EU ETS operators.

#### 5.2.7 Option 6: Excise duty

#### Box 6: Option 6 in Brief

**Depth of value chain:** Basic materials also as part of components and final products

**Coverage of CBAM:** Domestic products, imports and waiving of liability for exports of EU producers (symmetric)

**Free allocation in the EU ETS:** Yes (continued)

**Mode of payment:** EU ETS coverage for domestic producers plus liability created upon production and import, paid when product is released for consumption<sup>58</sup>

**Reflection of actual emissions in carbon pricing:** Yes for domestic production; not for imports

Option 6 goes beyond the introduction of a CBAM reflecting the effects of the EU ETS at the border. It consists of an excise duty on carbon-intensive materials covering consumption of both domestic and imported products, besides the continuation of the EU ETS including the free allocation of allowances covering production in the EU.

An excise duty would be levied on the consumption in the EU of carbon-intensive materials, regardless of whether they are produced in the EU or imported. The excise duty would be calculated by applying the relevant carbon price to the base of the assessment, i.e. the quantity of the carbon intensive material produced or imported multiplied by a carbon intensity factor. The latter would represent an irrefutable value, so that only default values are used for embedded emissions of domestic and imported goods. The carbon intensity factor should reflect the carbon content of each covered material. In order to ensure administrative feasibility across the value chain, the carbon content should not reflect the specific production processes of the specific material at hand, but be determined according to material specific reference values. Initially, such reference values could, where available, correspond to or be derived from the EU ETS product benchmarks already used for free allocation of allowances<sup>59</sup>. The relevant carbon price should be determined in relation with the EU ETS allowance price.

For imports, the destination principle would be achieved by making the importation of basic materials, as well as goods containing a significant share of such materials, a taxable event. The importation would thus create the same liability as if the materials had

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<sup>58</sup> Release for consumption is a technical term defined in Article 7 of the EU Horizontal Excise Duty Directive (Council Directive 2008/118/EC). It can be roughly described as the time when the product leaves a tax warehouse and is transferred to the consumption sphere.

<sup>59</sup> For example, for steel and aluminium, several product benchmarks would have to be combined to get the carbon intensity factor.



been produced in the EU, i.e. dependent on the weight of the material and independent of the actual production process.

Exports of materials and manufactured products, on the other hand, would not be subject to the excise duty. Hence, as with the excise duties on alcoholic beverages, manufactured tobacco products and energy products, firms could be allowed a duty suspension for the liability created upon production or import. Thus, the excise duty could be waived where materials, including as part of products, are exported.

Duty suspension arrangements allow authorised entities to produce, process, hold, transport and trade excise duty goods between producers of different production stages without triggering excise duty. The duty is transferred along the supply chain until excise duty goods are finally released for consumption. As duty suspension arrangements allow for the transfer of liabilities along the value chain, efficient control mechanisms need to be in place.

As with other excise duties, this duty would become due when materials are released for consumption, as part of more processed products. A system for monitoring and verification of the carbon intensity of the products will have to be established, taking into account the material composition of the products and the carbon intensity of the materials contained therein.

Free allocation of allowances would continue, and operators of installations would receive free allowances based on the benchmark levels and the production volume of tonnes of the basic material. This approach would be compatible with the present system whereby EU operators would need to buy allowances to cover emissions exceeding the benchmark levels.

### *5.2.8 Options for the electricity sector*

Electricity generation is analysed separately due to several factors which make it unique among the sectors considered for inclusion in the CBAM. Not only is it the most important sector included in the EU ETS in terms of direct carbon emissions, it is also the largest sector responsible for carbon emissions in the wider economy<sup>60</sup>. Additionally, electricity generators in principle do not receive free allowances, but have to buy them via auctions or on the secondary market. This distinguishes them from other EU ETS participants, whose exposure to the risks of carbon leakage can be mitigated with the allocation of free allowances. At the same time, as electricity generated in third countries can only be delivered into the EU through interconnectors which are subject to capacity constraints, the exported volumes are subject to the limitations of physical infrastructure. Electricity imports in the EU make up 1–2 % of total EU consumption on average, which means that exposure to international trade in this case is lower than in other EU ETS sectors. The interconnection infrastructure has, however, been expanding over the past years and the trend is expected to continue<sup>61</sup>. The net physical inflows of electricity into

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<sup>60</sup> Electricity and heat generation accounted for 33 % of total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the EU28 and for 42% of total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the world in 2018, according to IEA data. This was a larger share than any other sector including transport.

[https://www.iea.org/data-and-](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/?country=WORLD&fuel=CO2%20emissions&indicator=CO2BySector)

[statistics/?country=WORLD&fuel=CO2%20emissions&indicator=CO2BySector](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/?country=WORLD&fuel=CO2%20emissions&indicator=CO2BySector)

<sup>61</sup> A 2018 report by the Commission Expert Group on electricity interconnection targets identified 82 interconnectors between the EU and 10 third countries without a carbon pricing mechanism or its

the EU from third countries without an equivalent carbon pricing mechanism increased from 3 TWh in 2017 to 20 TWh in 2019<sup>62</sup>. In fact, a growing body of evidence points to carbon leakage already occurring in certain regions and intensifying with rising carbon prices<sup>63</sup>. The above-mentioned factors speak in favour of selecting electricity imports for inclusion in the CBAM.

Applying the CBAM on electricity requires taking into account its uniqueness that distinguishes it from basic materials, such as the way it is transported, a relatively broad set of technologies used to produce it with various electricity generators working within a network and the fact that only direct emissions associated with electricity generation are factored in. In line with the methodology applied to other sectors and products, a reference value for emissions embedded in imported electricity needs to be established in the context of determining the corresponding CBAM obligation. In the absence of EU ETS benchmarks for electricity generation (stemming from the absence of free allocation in the sector), two main alternative options can be used to determine the reference value for embedded emissions.

### **Option A: Average carbon emission intensity**

The average carbon emission intensity of the EU electricity mix can be calculated as the ratio between the total amount of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions stemming from electricity production and the total gross electricity production in the EU over a defined period of time. Annual averages are the most widely used for measuring and comparison purposes. This metric provides information about the average carbon content of all the electricity generated within the EU in grams of CO<sub>2</sub> per kWh. As a default value, it can be used for calculating the corresponding CBAM obligation, after being multiplied by a concrete volume of imports and a specific carbon price.

The average carbon emission intensity calculated on the basis of the EU electricity mix would in practice very likely result in a default value that is significantly lower than the real embedded emissions of electricity generated in neighbouring third countries. This is due to the fact that the decarbonisation of the EU electricity sector (thanks to the EU ETS) has progressed much more rapidly than in neighbouring countries where efforts to fight climate change receive less attention<sup>64</sup>. Additionally, this would not create

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equivalents. With the completion of an interconnector between Italy and Montenegro in 2019, the list has grown to 11 countries. See Electricity interconnections with neighbouring countries: Second report of the Commission Expert Group on electricity interconnection targets, DG ENER, p. 10-18. Quarterly report on European electricity markets, Volume 13, Issue 2, second quarter of 2020, DG ENER, p. 20.

<sup>62</sup> Quarterly report on European electricity markets, Volume 13, Issue 2, second quarter of 2020, DG ENER, pp. 20-21.

<sup>63</sup> For an analysis of the situation in Romania, see Quarterly report on European electricity markets, Volume 13, Issue 3, third quarter of 2020, DG ENER, p. 22. For the case of the Baltic countries, see Quarterly report on European electricity markets, Volume 12, Issue 1, first quarter of 2019, DG ENER, p. 24-25. For the case of Ireland, see Curtis, J, et al. 'Climate Policy, Interconnection and Carbon Leakage: The Effect of Unilateral UK Policy on Electricity and GHG Emissions in Ireland'. *Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy*, vol. 3, no. 2, 2014, pp. 145–158. For a discussion on carbon leakage in the Balkans, see Višković, V. et al. 'Implications of the EU emissions trading system for the South-East Europe regional electricity market', *Energy Economics*, 65, 2017, pp. 251-261.

<sup>64</sup> The average carbon emission intensity of the EU electricity generation decreased by 31% between 2000 and 2018. Meanwhile in Russia and Ukraine, which are the largest sources of extra-EU electricity imports not covered by EU ETS or equivalent obligations, the average emission intensity in the electricity sector fell only by 7 % and 8 % respectively. As the trend continued in 2019 and 2020, the EU's average emission intensity is currently one of the lowest worldwide. Data available at <https://www.iea.org/data-and->

incentives for the exporting countries to decrease the emissions of their electricity mix. Thus, a default value based on the average carbon intensity in the EU might not be entirely appropriate to meaningfully mitigate the risks of carbon leakage in the electricity sector.

### **Option B: Average CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor**

The option B takes into account the way electricity is dispatched from different types of generation sources in a centralised management system of today. In order to minimise the cost of generation, the sources are ranked according to their marginal costs of production (the so called merit order) so that those with the lowest marginal costs are the first ones to be brought online to meet demand, and the plants with the highest marginal costs are the last to be brought online. In practice, renewable and nuclear sources with zero or low marginal costs (and zero carbon emissions) are the first ones to be called upon, while coal and gas power plants fill in the rest of the demand requirements and set the price for the all generators online. Since export capacity is only available when internal demand is satisfied, the additional demand spurred by exports is, as a rule, met with coal and gas power plants on the far side of the merit order. Therefore, it can be assumed that extra-EU electricity imports from third countries are by default generated by price-setting coal and gas power plants with a measurable carbon footprint.

### **Variants of option B**

#### **Variant B.1: CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor of the EU electricity mix**

In order to establish a reference value of this footprint, an average CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor of corresponding price-setting fossil-based generators in the EU can be used. This CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor, calculated in the context of state aid granted to compensate industrial consumers for indirect costs contained in their electricity bills as a result of the EU ETS<sup>65</sup>, is defined as the division of the total carbon emissions of the electricity sector divided by the gross electricity generation based on fossil fuels. It expresses the average carbon content of electricity generated by price-setting sources (most typically coal and gas power plants) in the EU, and better corresponds to the typical amount of emissions embedded in electricity imports from third countries. As a default value, the CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor can be used for calculating the corresponding CBAM obligation, after being multiplied by a concrete volume of imports and a specific carbon price. The factor could be subject to revision after a defined number of years.

The use of an EU based value would however not address the issue that countries with a lower CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor (with a less emitting electricity mix) would be treated equally to countries with a higher CO<sub>2</sub> factor (with usually a more emitting electricity mix), with the latter benefiting from using an EU-level default value, which is lower and not reflecting the real emissions of exported electricity. This is what we consider in variants B.2 and B.3.

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[statistics?country=EU28&fuel=Electricity%20and%20heat&indicator=CO2IntensityPower](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/development-of-co2-emission-intensity-of-electricity-generation-in-selected-countries-2000-2020) and <https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/development-of-co2-emission-intensity-of-electricity-generation-in-selected-countries-2000-2020>

<sup>65</sup> See Commission Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post 2021, C(2020) 6400.

### **Variant B.2: Countries below the CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor of the EU electricity mix claim to use the country factor**

This variant of the Option B comprises the use of a reference value based on the CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor of the exporting country in the case where an emission factor of this country is below the default EU value. In other cases, the default EU value is used.

### **Variant B.3: The use of the exporting country electricity mix CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor**

In this variant, a CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor of the electricity mix of the respective exporting country is applied to all imports. The advantage of this variant is that it better reflects the actual emissions of the country's exported electricity and provides an incentive for exporter countries to invest in clean generation of their electricity mix.

As in other sectors, importers will be given the possibility to claim that the carbon content of their product is below the default value. In view of the technical challenges associated with tracing the exact sources of electricity generated in third countries, a robust and credible system of verification will need to be established to ensure that the individual assessment procedure is reliable and reasonably accurate, without imposing too great an administrative burden on importers. Additionally, importers will also have the possibility to claim that they have paid a carbon price abroad that should reduce their CBAM obligation.


#### *5.2.9 Feedback from the Open Public Consultation*

The Open Public Consultation considered four policy options for the introduction of a CBAM: a tax applied on imports at the EU border (option 1 in the Impact Assessment), an extension of the ETS to imports (not retained in the Impact Assessment), the obligation to purchase allowances from a specific pool outside the ETS which would mirror the ETS price (options 2, 3, 4, 5 in the Impact Assessment) and a carbon tax (option 6 in the Impact Assessment). Differences in design between options 2, 3, 4 and 5 were not detailed in the questionnaire submitted to the Open Public Consultation, as these precisions were introduced at a later stage, also following feedback from stakeholders.

Consulted stakeholders on average believe that all four policy options submitted in the questionnaire are at least somewhat relevant to the design of a CBAM. On average, a tax applied on imported products belonging to sectors at risk of carbon leakage appears to be the most relevant option for stakeholders, followed by a carbon tax at consumption level applied to all products (both imported or produced in the EU) in the sectors that are at risk of carbon leakage.

When looking at different stakeholder groups, citizens, civil society organisations and public authorities seem to prefer a carbon tax on imported products, followed by a carbon tax at the consumption level. Companies are relatively less enthusiastic about all the proposed solutions and they attach limited relevance for the design of a CBAM to an extension of the ETS or a carbon tax on consumption. Responses broken down by geographical area do not show substantial differences between different clusters, except for the carbon tax on imports, which has limited relevance for respondents based in bordering countries.

**Figure 5: Most appropriate options to design the CBAM (average score and number of respondents in brackets)**



**Legend: 0 = Not relevant 1 = Somewhat relevant 2 = Highly relevant**

*Source: CEPS analysis of public consultation results.*

**Figure 6: Most appropriate options to design the CBAM**

		Civil society (all other stakeholders)	Companies & business associations	EU & non- EU citizens	Public authorities	Total
a. A tax applied on imports at the EU border on a selection of products whose production is in sectors that are at risk of carbon leakage (e.g. a border tax or customs duty on selected carbon intensive products)	Top	53.03%	38.82%	71.88%	53.85%	50.43%
	Bottom	15.15%	30.20%	3.13%	23.08%	20.35%
b. An extension of the EU Emissions Trading System to imports, which could require the purchasing of emission allowances under the EU Emissions Trading System by either foreign producers or importers	Top	40.32%	18.04%	32.84%	7.69%	25.00%
	Bottom	12.90%	36.47%	16.42%	15.38%	26.94%
c. The obligation to purchase allowances from a specific pool outside the ETS dedicated to imports, which would mirror the ETS price	Top	25.40%	30.56%	21.80%	15.38%	26.90%
	Bottom	19.05%	24.21%	18.80%	15.38%	21.69%
d. Carbon tax (e.g. excise or VAT type) at consumption level on a selection of products whose production is in sectors that are at risk of carbon leakage and applied to EU production, as well as to imports	Top	39.06%	24.70%	63.36%	38.46%	38.13%
	Bottom	18.75%	36.25%	15.27%	30.77%	27.67%

*Note: Top = Highly relevant; Bottom = Not relevant.*

*Source: CEPS analysis of public consultation results.*

On average, respondents to the Open Public Consultation somewhat agree that a tax on imported products may be effective in addressing the risk of carbon leakage; to a lesser extent as well the option to extend the ETS to imports or the obligation for imports to purchase allowances from a pool outside the ETS may counter carbon leakage (the latter option would also have limited impacts on EU producers subject to the ETS). Additionally, stakeholders somewhat disagree that the two options linked to the purchases of allowances would impose limited administrative burdens on exporters from third countries and on EU importers (especially the option considering a separate pool, outside the ETS). Finally, there is also some level of agreement on the limited room for circumventing a carbon tax (e.g. excise or value added tax -VAT- type) at consumption level on carbon-intensive products; interestingly, this is the only option where more than 50 % of respondents either somewhat agree or strongly agree about its effectiveness in addressing both carbon leakage and all carbon emissions in the sectors to which it will apply.

### **5.3 Options discarded at an early stage**

Some options were considered not to be viable ways forward, either because they violated the EU's international obligations or because they would be very complex in application.

**Table 2: Options Discarded**

<b>Option discarded</b>	<b>Explanation</b>
Customs Duty	Trying to equalise the carbon cost of imported products by raising import duties on certain carbon intensive products would have required revising the EU schedules of commitments at the WTO and also a considerable number of free trade agreements. In addition, under this approach it would have been practically impossible to ensure that domestic production and imported product are at all times subject to a similar carbon cost.
Application of the EU ETS rules to all products imported in the EU	The extension of the effects of the EU ETS beyond the EU borders in the context of a joint international effort to fight climate change is a policy the EU is pursuing. However, this policy tool can be effective only in very close collaboration with our trade partners. Unilaterally applying the EU ETS rules to installations outside of the EU when their production is destined to the EU would require a level and detail of information from third countries that is not available and will not be available in the medium or long term. In addition, the EU ETS is a cap and trade system. Putting a cap on imports would create unacceptable restrictions to global trade.
Carbon Added Tax (CAT)	A CAT paid at each production step for every additional tonne of carbon dioxide (CO <sub>2</sub> ) equivalent emitted would cover products down the value chain, thus having a wider scope than the other policy options for CBAM. However, such a policy option would be, in view of the level of information available today on the carbon content of consumption goods, extremely complex to implement and would raise substantial administrative and compliance costs. For example, it would require a comprehensive system for the monitoring and verification of the carbon intensity of the products and all their intermediate products, taking into account the material composition of the products at all stages of their production and the carbon intensity of all production processes involved. In addition, the benefits of a CAT would overlap with option 6.
Import tax or import certificates with export reimbursement	A CBAM combining an import tax or import certificates with a refund for exports would not be in line with the overarching climate objective of the mechanism, which is to reduce GHG emissions in the EU and globally. The inclusion of refunds of a carbon price paid in the EU would undermine the global credibility of EU's raised climate ambitions and further risk to create frictions with major trade partners due to concerns regarding compatibility with WTO obligations.

## 6 WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS?

### 6.1 Introduction

#### 6.1.1 *Modelling approach and scope*

This section gives an overview of the main impacts of the options considered under the CBAM. As discussed in Section 5.1, options are compared to the baseline, which rests on the EU reference scenario, the MIX as depicted in the the EU ETS revision impact assessment and a variant of the MIX based on full auctioning of EU ETS emission allowances for the sectors that will be subject to the CBAM. The motivation of this approach, as emphasised earlier, derives from the European Green Deal, where the CBAM and free allocation are clear alternatives. The MIX as depicted in the EU ETS impact assessment does not foresee full auctioning for the sectors at risk of carbon leakage. In modelling terms, for this impact assessment it would be impossible to illustrate how the CBAM adjusts if it was not compared also to a situation where full auctioning is introduced but the border adjustment is absent. Without such a comparison the move to full auctioning, from the MIX, would blur the impact of the border measure thus making it impossible to fairly assess its contribution.


In terms of sectoral scope, the analysis focuses on the sectors of four basic material products identified earlier in the discussion (Section 5.2.1.3), namely aluminium, fertilisers, cement (and lime) and iron and steel. As discussed in Annex 4, the sectoral granularity of the JRC-GEM-E3 model was improved for the purposes of this impact assessment to explicitly account for these sectors in the model's baseline dataset. While this has greatly facilitated the analytical insight of the model, it is recognized that in modeling terms these sectors still represent more aggregate representations of the products to which the CBAM would apply. This would imply that the sectors analyzed bellow embed both the CBAM product and certain of its downstream processes.

For presentational purposes, these four material industrial sectors - namely aluminium, fertilisers, cement (and lime) and iron and steel - are collectively referred to in the analysis below as CBAM sectors. The CBAM's impacts on electricity imports is analysed separately under Annex 8, to reflect the sector's distinct characteristic pertinent to its technical character that distinguish it from material industrial sectors.

The CBAM sectors that form the scope of this analysis account for about 55 % of all industrial emissions in the EU-27 in 2020. Iron and steel is the highest emitter, accounting for nearly 30 % of industrial emissions, followed by cement and fertilisers. Aluminium is last in terms of direct emissions, albeit the sector is more heavily geared in generating indirect emissions due to its electro-intensive character. When looking at total CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent emissions, CBAM sectors together with electricity generated accounted for nearly 40 % of emissions in 2020.



**Figure 7: Direct CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent emissions in the CBAM sectors – EU 27 in 2020**



Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

The options considered include the main options discussed in section 5.2.1.3, as well as certain variations to provide greater insight on the sources and implication of impacts. All options are assumed to apply simultaneously to the CBAM sectors from the start. That is, no sequencing is introduced in the sectoral application of the measure in its initial phase.

As regards the treatment of trade partners, the modelling assumes unilateral application of the CBAM to all imports in the CBAM sectors. That is, no exemptions are granted to countries who have in place or are considering to adopt a carbon pricing system imposing a carbon price at least equivalent to the price resulting from the EU ETS on products subject to the CBAM. The CBAM is indeed proposed against an evolving landscape both internationally and in the EU. Adopting a static approach to policy developments in other countries was an intentional assumption in the approach of the impact assessment. While in practice accounting for other countries' pricing policies that are equivalent or linked to the EU ETS may be considered, this was not accounted for in the modelling. In the modelling, we approximate the actual emissions of CO<sub>2e</sub> for the individual exporters outlined in the detailed description of the options (Section 5.2), with the average emission intensities of exporting country in the sectors concerned<sup>66</sup>.

While the risk of resource shuffling from the use actual carbon intensities is recognised, this is not accounted for in the main modelling exercise. As emphasised earlier, the risk of resource shuffling exists for any emissions-related policy that affects traded goods, where the carbon intensity of imported products does not rely solely on default values, but either gives the option to demonstrate actual emissions or requires full demonstration of actual emissions from the outset. Therefore, the risk of resource shuffling is indeed present for all CBAM options considered, with the exception of the excise duty option.

<sup>66</sup> The average emissions of the sectors in the exporting countries are taken as a proxy to reflect actual emissions of imports. In the modelling these are drawn from the JRC-GEM-E3 model, which in turn is calibrated using the GTAP 10 database (Aguiar, A., Chepeliev, M., Corong, E., McDougall, R., & van der Mensbrugge, D. (2019). The GTAP Data Base: Version 10. *Journal of Global Economic Analysis*, 4(1), 1-27) as a starting point and projections from the Global Energy and Climate Outlook 2020 for non-EU regions (Keramidas et al., Keramidas, K., Fosse, F., Diaz-Vazquez, A., Schade, B., Tchung-Ming, S., Weitzel, M., Vandyck, T., Wojtowicz, K. *Global Energy and Climate Outlook 2020: A New Normal Beyond Covid-19*, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021, EUR 30558, ISBN 978-92-76-28417-8, doi:10.2760/608429, JRC123203).

Quantification of the risk for resource shuffling is however very difficult, and requires detailed sectoral data. For this reason, quantitative evidence on the potential scale of the problem remains scarce in the literature. However, drawing from different secondary estimates<sup>67</sup>, robustness checks were performed, the results of which are presented in Annex 10.

Finally, it should be noted that while elements of the potential impact of the CBAM on SMEs have been considered in terms of compliance and administrative costs (Annexes 3, 4, 6), and while the views of and implications for SMEs have been assessed as part of the Commission’s Open Public Consultation, this Impact Assessment did not carry out an SME test, neither did it perform a separate SME consultation. The main reasons for this are that producers and importers of CBAM products are more likely to be large businesses, while by contrast SMEs are more likely to be in the second order of impacts, as downstream consumers.

**Table 3: Simplified presentation of scenarios and options considered in the modelling exercises**

Scenario	Specifications
<b>MIX</b>	Increased climate ambition to meet 55 % emission reduction target. Free allocation continues in the CBAM sectors at 100 % - No CBAM applies
<b>MIX-full auctioning</b>	MIX with full auctioning assumed in the CBAM sectors from 2023 – No CBAM applies
<b>Options 1 and 2</b>	CBAM on imports along with full auctioning in CBAM sectors – the CBAM applies based on EU average emission intensities
<b>Option 3</b>	Options 1 and 2, but using emission intensities of exporting country
<b>Option 4</b>	Option 3 but free allocation in CBAM sectors is phase-out after 2025 to reach up to 50 % in 2030, with the CBAM being fully phased-in by 2035 at the earliest
<b>Option 5</b>	Option 3 with the CBAM extended to import of downstream sectors along with full auctioning in CBAM sectors
<b>Option 6</b>	Excise duty on use of products of CBAM sectors, excise duty/rebate in downstream sectors at the border

*Source: Commission analysis*

The analysis is based primarily on the JRC-GEM-E3 model, supplemented with input from the Euromod and PRIMES models, the technical specifications and details of which are discussed in Annex 4.

### 6.1.2 Introducing the MIX and the MIX-full auctioning variant

The MIX scenario models a number of policies and measures to ensure that the EU reaches the agreed emission reduction of 55 % by 2030, including a strengthening of the EU ETS cap. Under the MIX, most industrial sectors face higher costs and therefore decline in output terms, which, in turn, also drives the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) down in 2030 relative to the baseline. Nevertheless, the continuation of free allocation keeps leakage at relatively low levels and imports increase only modestly in the CBAM sectors relative to the baseline. Leakage is calculated as the emission increase in non-EU regions in a specific sector divided by the emission reduction in that sector in the EU. In the MIX, the estimated leakage of 8 % in 2030 includes what may be termed as energy leakage. This is driven by the rebound effect of demand for fossil fuels in non-EU

<sup>67</sup> See for example Stede, J., Pauliuk, S., Hardadi, G. Neuhoff, K., Carbon pricing of basic materials: Incentives and risks for the value chain and consumers, 2021, DIW Discussion Papers, No 1935.

countries, due to lower demand in the EU<sup>68</sup>. Put differently, what is observed as leakage in the MIX derives in part from constraints; other than a decrease in leakage protection, the latter remaining unaltered in the scenario relative to the baseline<sup>69</sup>

The MIX scenario allows limited scope for insight into the impacts of a CBAM in the presence of free allocation. The MIX with full auctioning in the sectors considered under the CBAM points to a different extreme. While GDP contraction is of similar magnitude to the MIX (-0.22 % in 2030), the MIX-full auctioning leads to nearly eight times higher output losses in the CBAM sectors. A similar picture is also found on the import side. Imports are estimated to increase by nearly 9.9 % relative to the baseline in 2030, along with a strong growth in leakage to 42 % in 2030. Therefore, while the switch to full auctioning reduces carbon dioxide emissions in EU industries more (by c. 4 percentage points in 2030<sup>70</sup>), this - in the absence of other measures - leads to an expansion of leakage and greater pressure on the import side in the CBAM sectors.

**Table 4: MIX and MIX-full auctioning scenarios - EU 27 in 2030 (% change from baseline – except for leakage rates)**

	GDP	Output in CBAM sectors	Imports in CBAM sectors	Leakage in CBAM sectors*	CO <sub>2</sub> eq. emissions in Mt in the CBAM sectors EU 27
<b>MIX</b>	-0.22	-0.47	1.63	8%	-12.80
<b>MIX-full auctioning</b>	-0.22	-4.01	9.88	42%	-17.13

\*Note: Reported leakage rates are the proportion of emission increase in non-EU regions relative to by the emission reduction in the EU (in CBAM sectors)

Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

## 6.2 Environmental Impacts


Supporting reduction of GHG Emissions in the EU and rest of the worldFigure 8 illustrates the CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent emissions in the CBAM sectors by 2030 in the EU and the rest of the world across the different options, in both levels and relative to the baseline. As shown, all CBAM options achieve a stronger reduction of emissions in the CBAM sectors in the EU, up to nearly 3.5 % in 2030, relative to the case of higher ambition and free allocation (MIX). The primary driver of this reduction is the decline of output in the CBAM sectors, largely a consequence of the elimination or partial phase-out of free allocation in 2030.

<sup>68</sup> Energy leakage is caused by changes in demand for fossil fuel as a result of reduced fossil energy consumption as in the EU.

<sup>69</sup> Considering that the constraints imposed on EU economic activity under the MIX-55 continue to govern in the MIX-full auctioning and all the scenarios of CBAM, the leakage reported in elsewhere can be related primarily to the changes in leakage protection. That is the combination of reduced free allocation in the CBAM sectors and the imposition of CBAM.

<sup>70</sup> It is noted that in the context of the achievement of a 55% target, over-achievement in CBAM sectors leads to under-achievement elsewhere, so that the 55% are still achieved but not more.

**Figure 8: Level of emissions in the EU-27 and the Rest of the World in CBAM sectors and relative to the baseline in 2030 (in million tonnes of CO2 equivalent and as % change from baseline)**



Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

In **options 1 and 2**, with the end of free allowances and the introduction of the CBAM on import, the carbon costs increases for both imports and domestic production. Producers of basic materials have to pay a carbon price on their emissions, therefore they have a significant incentive for efficiency improvements, material recycling, more efficient use of carbon-intensive materials and material substitution from the EU ETS price. Indeed, a less carbon intensive production requires purchase of fewer EU ETS allowances. Under **options 3, 4 and 5**, where foreign producers must show their actual emissions, this incentive is also present and this explains that under **options 3, 4 and 5** in the absence of resource shuffling, emissions reduce even in the rest of the world, with option 4 achieving the strongest reduction.

The incentives resulting from carbon pricing under **option 4** during the transitional phase is a combination of the increased effort achieved under the **MIX** and **option 3**. As the free allowances are phased out, the incentive to reduce emissions in the EU becomes stronger. In 2030, when free allowances are phased out by up to 50% (**option 4**), the incentive appears to be stronger than the **MIX**, but slightly lower than **under options 3 and 5**.

The EU ETS price under **option 5** incentivises both efficiency improvements of production of basic materials, recycling and efficient material use and substitution whenever materials or final goods containing basic materials are sold domestically. Due to the wider product coverage, producers can more easily pass-through carbon costs along the value chain. Domestic producers thus also face full incentives for implementing climate neutral production processes.

Similarly, manufacturers and the construction industry profit from an efficient material use and substitution when products are sold domestically, yet for exported goods there is no such incentive.

**Option 6** ensures a consistent carbon price signal along the value chain even in the presence of free allocation, as it relies on a separate tax applying to domestic and imported products regardless of the EU ETS. It introduces incentives similar to a CBAM based on EU average emissions for an efficient use of raw and basic materials, and substitution with low-carbon alternatives for construction and manufacturing along the value chain. It ensures that the reference carbon intensity for basic materials is reflected in product prices where products are sold domestically. Such incentives are not present in exported products unless such a system is in place in the importing country. In addition,

the incentives described in the baseline scenario in relation to the system of free allowances remain in place.


The charts in **Figure 8** illustrate that these results need to be read in conjunction with results of the different options in terms of prevention of carbon leakage. As already explained, if carbon leakage results in an increase of emissions abroad outweighing the decrease in the EU, the efficiency of our policy would be seriously undermined.

### 6.2.1 Preventing Carbon leakage

Under the **baseline and the MIX**, carbon leakage is addressed by free allocation. However, as already mentioned before, agreed upon climate targets will decrease the amount of free allowances available and should increase the price of carbon and could decrease the amount of free allowances available. These effects should lead to an increased risk of carbon leakage resulting in more emissions globally.

Leakage is calculated as the change in emissions in non-EU regions in a specific sector divided by the change in emissions in that sector in the EU. This leakage calculation includes indirect emissions in iron and steel, and aluminium.

**Figure 9: Impact on carbon leakage in the CBAM sectors on aggregate - EU 27 in 2030**



Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

Figure 9 shows that whereas, as previously shown, the **MIX-full auctioning** is the scenario that achieves the best results in reducing carbon emissions in the EU, it is also the scenario where carbon leakage is the most significant, reaching 42 % for all CBAM sectors in 2030. In part, this is driven by the decline of output in CBAM sectors as a consequence of full auctioning in this scenario.

Compared to the MIX-full auctioning, all **options for the design of the CBAM** are effective in mitigating the carbon leakage, some even outperforming the baseline which sees no step up of overall climate ambition. Options 1 and 2 would be less effective than the others. All options based on actual emissions appear to even surpass the MIX in the mitigation the carbon leakage – achieving negative leakage rates which would mean that emissions would be reduced not only in the EU but also in the rest of the world, assuming that actual emissions are indeed attributed to the import flows.

In **options 1 and 2**, imports of basic materials from abroad face carbon costs similar to the costs of EU producers. While this means that the relative costs of EU and non-EU producers of basic materials are similar, the primary materials may still be substituted with (potentially less carbon efficient) imports at the level of components or finished

products. In the modelling, options 1 and 2 bring carbon leakage in the CBAM sectors down to 27 % in 2030 when the default value is set at the level of the EU average emissions per sector, but to -13 % under options 3, 4 and 5 where all imports would have face a CBAM based on actual emissions. The main driver behind this difference is that actual emissions are much higher than the EU average, which in turn increases substantially the size of the CABM obligation for imports.

**Under option 4**, the risk of carbon leakage is addressed through a mixture of free allowance allocation and the CBAM. As free allocation are replaced by the CBAM the scenario gets closer and closer to option 3. In 2030, carbon leakage is addressed equally by free allowances and the CBAM, the combination of which appears to result in the strongest possible reduction of leakage.

**Under option 6**, the analysis should be split in two, EU ETS on one hand and excise duty on the other hand. For the EU ETS part, the risk of carbon leakage is addressed by the free allocation of allowances. Therefore, the scenario is much closer to the MIX scenario. The consumption tax, being a pure destination based tax, does not affect trade flows and does not lead to any carbon leakage.

**Table 5: Impact on carbon leakage in the CBAM sectors (EU 27 in 2030)**

	<b>Iron and Steel</b>	<b>Cement</b>	<b>Fertiliser</b>	<b>Aluminium</b>
<b>MIX</b>	8 %	4 %	24 %	24 %
<b>MIX-full auctioning</b>	37 %	31 %	98 %	36 %
<b>Option 1 and 2</b>	22 %	23 %	61 %	25 %
<b>Option 3</b>	-12 %	16 %	-100 %	-76 %
<b>Option 4</b>	-24 %	7 %	-208 %	-89 %
<b>Option 5</b>	-12 %	16 %	-100 %	-76 %
<b>Option 6</b>	7 %	3 %	18 %	25 %

*Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model*

In terms of sectoral effects, the highest risk of leakage when moving to the **MIX-full auctioning** is observed in fertilisers and iron and steel, followed by aluminium and cement. The proportional mitigation of this risk is similar across sectors when the CBAM is introduced in all other scenarios. Fertilisers exhibit the highest level of mitigation with leakage rates switching from 98 % in the MIX-full auctioning to -100 % in **options 3 and 5**, reaching -208 % in **option 4**<sup>71</sup>. Cement is the only sector that exhibits consistent but weaker impacts relative to other sectors. These differences between sectors are driven by the interplay of a range of factors – notably the relative levels of trade intensity, the sector’s carbon intensity (both on the EU and with respect to partners) and the substitutability of its composite product with others.

<sup>71</sup> This implies emission reductions of about 2 tonnes CO<sub>2e</sub> in non-EU regions in addition to each tonne of CO<sub>2eq</sub> avoided in the EU. The difference in emission intensities of EU and non-EU producers is particularly high for fertilisers, hence a CBAM based on actual emissions is best suited to reduce emissions abroad and discourage imports from the most emission intensive producers. Options 3-5 all achieve a similar reduction of leakage on the import side; in addition, option 4 leads to less leakage on the export side than options 3

**Table 6: Changes in the levels of emissions in the EU in CBAM and downstream sectors (difference from baseline - in million tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent in 2030)**

	CBAM sectors	Other Non-ferrous metals	Other Chemicals	Electrical Goods	Transport Equipment	Other Equipment	Consumption Goods	Construction	Crops
<b>MIX</b>	-44.0	-0.4	-13.9	-0.4	-0.2	-0.3	-3.0	-0.3	-2.1
<b>MIX-full auctioning</b>	-58.9	-0.3	-12.8	-0.4	-0.2	-0.3	-3.0	-0.3	-2.2
<b>Options 1 and 2</b>	-56.2	-0.4	-13.0	-0.4	-0.2	-0.3	-3.0	-0.3	-2.4
<b>Option 3</b>	-53.5	-0.4	-13.2	-0.4	-0.2	-0.3	-3.0	-0.3	-2.6
<b>Option 4</b>	-47.4	-0.4	-13.6	-0.4	-0.2	-0.3	-3.0	-0.3	-2.5
<b>Option 5</b>	-53.5	-0.4	-13.2	-0.4	-0.2	-0.3	-3.0	-0.3	-2.6
<b>Option 6</b>	-46.5	-0.4	-13.6	-0.4	-0.2	-0.3	-3.0	-0.3	-2.4

Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

Impacts on the value chain and risk of additional carbon leakage will depend on the complexity of the manufacturing process downstream and the corresponding value added in later stages. The higher the value share of the basic material subject to the CBAM in the value of a product downstream, the higher the risk of carbon leakage in that product. At the same time, the more complex the final product becomes, the more diluted the content of the basic material becomes in the downstream product and the more the risk of carbon leakage declines.

In the modelling exercise, the fairly aggregate sectors of the JRC-GEM-E3 model have allowed to provide insight on downstream impacts at a more aggregate level. This has indicated that the risk of carbon leakage downstream on aggregate is quite low. Changes in emissions in downstream sectors in the EU are found to be of much smaller magnitude and in most sectors even negligible. A similar result is observed for the output effects in the downstream sectors, discussed more detail in section 6.4.2. On the basis of this result, it could therefore be argued that the pressure from the CBAM through cost increases further down the supply chain in downstream sectors seems to be fairly low, and therefore the risk on carbon leakage down the value chain is also fairly small. This is also partly indicated by option 5, which corresponds to an extension of option 3, and further down the supply chain, where emission changes in the EU are identical to those of options 1, 2 and 3. This seems to indicate that extending the CBAM down the supply chain does not necessarily reduce carbon leakage.

Notwithstanding the above, it is recognized that the finding of low carbon leakage down the value chain is conditional on the data and modelling specifications of the JRC-GEM-E3 model. As discussed earlier, the sectors analysed in the modeling embed both the CBAM products and a number of its downstream processes. Depending on the complexity of the transformation and the manufacturing step downstream, there may be varying degrees of risk of carbon leakage downstream. This is also important in the context of the value of carbon embedded in the basic material relative to overall value generation downstream. At lower carbon prices during initial phases of the CBAM, this may be negligible. However, as the price of carbon builds up more steeply in the future, this may imply that more complex products down the value chain become more exposed to the risk of carbon leakage, thus making this more relevant to be also covered by the CBAM.

These considerations are confirmed by recent academic researches based on more detailed disaggregation at product level. This indicates that a significant share of exports, as well as downstream products sold domestically in the EU, may be at risk of carbon

leakage<sup>72</sup>.

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<sup>72</sup> Stede, J., Pauliuk, S., Hardadi, G. Neuhoff, K., Carbon pricing of basic materials: Incentives and risks for the value chain and consumers, 2021, DIW Discussion Papers, No 1935.



summarizes the main findings of this analysis - which was based on carbon intensities of over 4 000 commodity groups covering basic materials, material products and manufactured goods downstream (components and final products). It depicts the overall value of sales of EU manufacturing productions, as well as the value and respective shares of these sales for which carbon leakage risks exist at carbon prices of 30 EUR/tonne and 75 EUR/tonne. The analysis shows that the commodity groups downstream (components and final products) at risk of carbon leakage could in fact account for between 5 % and 15 % of all manufacturing value added.

**Table 7: Literature estimates of carbon leakage risks in downstream EU manufacturing**

	Number of PRODCOM categories	Value added (million EUR)	Value added at risk carbon leakage for CO <sub>2</sub> price of 75 EUR/tonne (in million EUR and respective share to total manufacturing value added)	Value added at risk carbon leakage based for CO <sub>2</sub> price of 30 EUR/tonne (in million EUR and respective share to total manufacturing value added)
Not relevant	1313	16 81 325	-	-
Basic material	90	148 105	110 691 (2 %)	100 269 (2 %)
Basic material products	768	882 421	472 879 (9 %)	317 721 (6 %)
Component of products	743	1 076 112	209 598 (4 %)	94 868 (2 %)
Final products	1480	1 364 615	550 256 (11 %)	147 647 (3 %)
Total manufacturing	4394	5 152 578	1 343 424 (26 %)	660 506 (13 %)

Note: Carbon leakage risks are defined as those commodity groups with cost increases relative to gross value added of more than five percent and a trade intensity of at least 10 percent. Calculations based on PRODCOM statistics from Eurostat, using EU-27 data for manufacturing (NACE codes 10-33) in 2019. Source: Adapted from Stede, J., Pauliuk, S., Hardadi, G. Neuhoff, K (2021)<sup>73</sup>

### 6.2.2 Incentivising third country importers

Under the **baseline scenario**, which rests on the current ETS, there are no incentives for non-EU basic material producers, for the non-EU manufacturing and construction industry, nor for non-EU recycling related to materials and manufactured products imported into the EU.

**Table 8: CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent emissions in third countries (% change from baseline in 2030)**

	Iron and Steel	Cement	Fertiliser	Aluminium	CBAM sectors	Downstream sectors
MIX	0.14	0.03	0.19	0.13	0.08	0.02
MIX-full auctioning	0.72	0.27	1.70	0.25	0.55	0.01
Option 1 and 2	0.39	0.20	0.95	0.18	0.33	0.02
Option 3	-0.27	0.14	-1.24	0.01	-0.13	0.04
Option 4	-0.44	0.05	-1.79	-0.03	-0.29	0.04
Option 5	-0.27	0.14	-1.24	0.01	-0.13	0.03
Option 6	0.12	0.02	0.14	0.15	0.07	0.03

Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

**Under options 1 and 2**, importers of basic materials would have the option to demonstrate that the carbon efficiency of their product is better than the default value. Consequently, this provides emission reduction incentives for the share of materials that is exported to the EU.

**Options 3 and 5** provide the most incentives for third country importers, as lower emissions means they will have to buy less CBAM certificates.

The incentives for international climate action under **option 4** are a mixture of the baseline and **option 3**. For non-EU material producers exporting to the EU, there are

<sup>73</sup> Adapted from Stede, J., Pauliuk, S., Hardadi, G. Neuhoff, K., Carbon pricing of basic materials: Incentives and risks for the value chain and consumers, 2021, DIW Discussion Papers, No 1935. See: [http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw\\_01.c.812870.de/dp1935.pdf](http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.812870.de/dp1935.pdf)

limited incentives to increase production efficiency or invest into climate neutral production as long as the CBAM covers only a small share of the EU reference carbon intensity. These incentives increase as the share of the CBAM increases. Recycling incentives outside of the EU also increase as free allocation is phased out (and replaced with the CBAM).

Regarding the incentives for international producers and recycling, **option 5** is similar to option 3. However, due to the inclusion of the manufacturing value chain which uses significant amounts of carbon-intensive materials, there are also incentives for efficient and climate neutral material production where it is embodied in products, or for material efficiency and substitution within manufacturing industries (for the share of products exported to the EU). These effects are however fairly small, and hence not reflected in the model results.

The default value for carbon intensity of basic materials under **option 6** means that there are no incentives for efficiency improvements, climate neutral production and recycling of basic materials produced abroad. However, there are incentives to reduce the content of carbon-intensive materials in semi-finished and final products exported to the EU.

### *6.2.3 Feedback from the Open Public Consultation*

Stakeholders responding to the consultation somewhat agree that the CBAM would have positive environmental impacts, improving the effectiveness of policies against climate change, reducing carbon emissions globally, and promoting the adoption of ambitious climate policies in third countries.

These results are confirmed across all stakeholder groups, although the highest level of agreement is achieved among citizens and among civil society organisations, with the lowest being in the group of stakeholders representing business organisations. Results broken down by geographical area are very similar to those registered in the overall sample, except for respondents based in bordering countries, who appear to disagree on the effectiveness of the CBAM to reduce carbon emissions on a global scale, and are also uncertain regarding other types of environmental impacts<sup>74</sup>.

When estimating the environmental impacts generated by each of the policy options under investigation, no policy option leads to significantly better environmental outcomes according to the respondents.

## **6.3 Impacts on the EU ETS**

As the CBAM is envisaged to complement the EU ETS, it is important to assess the interaction between these two instruments. The main impact in this respect is that putting in place a CBAM will allow the reduction of free allowances, which should reinforce the price signal delivered by the EU ETS.

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<sup>74</sup> Results from bordering countries are, to some extent, affected by the view of six Russian stakeholders that are part of campaign B (section **Error! Reference source not found.**), as they somewhat disagree with all impacts.

### 6.3.1 Coherence

An important issue is the risk of overlap between the CBAM and the EU ETS. The EU ETS will cover the emissions of installations inside the EU. The CBAM, on the other hand, is intended to put a price on GHG emissions taking place outside the EU, but where the emissions are of interest to the EU, because the goods produced are used inside the EU. The combination of the CBAM and the EU ETS should not lead to a double pricing of carbon, neither should it lead to a situation where carbon is not subject to any price.

In **options 1, 2, 3 and 5**, the respective scope of the CBAM and the EU ETS are clearly defined, and overlaps between free allocation and the CBAM are avoided. In all cases there is a risk of double charging when goods are initially produced in the EU subject to the ETS, exported, and reimported potentially subject to the CBAM.

In **option 4**, for the period during which a CBAM would coexist with free allocation, particular attention should be paid to the level of the CBAM to ensure that the combination of the CBAM and free allocation does not undermine the incentive to emit less carbon dioxide than the free allocation benchmark nor does it provide more protection that needed to prevent carbon leakage.

In **options 1 to 5**, the method to establish the embedded emissions of imported products will have to be designed to avoid double counting of carbon emissions.

In **option 6**, the excise duty is a complementary instrument to the EU ETS, and the main element which matters is coordinating both instruments in delivering a price signal. One possibility would be to set the level of the excise duty at the level of the free allocation benchmark, so that the carbon price for EU production would reflect the full EU ETS price. As an excise duty is not imposed on exports, the risks related to goods exported and subsequently reimported do not apply.

### 6.3.2 Monitoring and compliance

As regards applicable rules in the CBAM, however, there is some desirable overlap between the two instruments. The carbon price to be paid inside and outside the EU should be as comparable as possible. Thus, system boundaries and MRV rules in general should also be comparable for the determination of the emissions on which the carbon price is based. Therefore, MRV rules for the CBAM should follow the same principles as those in the EU ETS. To ensure synergies, there should be some coordination and learning between the respective competent authorities, and deadlines for the compliance cycle should be coordinated.

### 6.3.3 ETS price

The move from MIX to the MIX full auctioning reduces emissions in CBAM sectors as a result of declining output, which reduces the scarcity of emission permits and hence the carbon price. For **all design options** of a CBAM, the expectation would be that imports of goods with a high ‘carbon content’ take place less frequently compared to the MIX-full auctioning. As a result, emissions in the CBAM sectors are higher, and therefore carbon prices increase slightly relative to the MIX full auctioning. Nevertheless, the modeling confirms that the impact of a CBAM on the EU ETS price is relatively small by 2030.



**Table 9: Impact on EU ETS price (in EUR)**

	2025	2030
MIX	35.2	47.9
MIX-full auctioning	32.8	44.8
Options 1 and 2	33.2	45.4
Option 3	33.6	45.9
Option 4	35.2	47.2
Option 5	33.6	45.9
Option 6	34.7	47.3

Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

## 6.4 Economic Impacts

### 6.4.1 Macroeconomic impact

The macroeconomic impacts under the different CBAM options are found to be generally quite limited. A number of factors contribute to this. Firstly, and most importantly, CBAM sectors - despite their high shares in total emissions - represent a relatively small part of the EU economy (see Annex 10). This means that any measure applied to these sectors alone is likely to trigger minor effects at macro level. This is reinforced by the other constraints that already apply to the EU industry, equally in all options to achieve 55 % ambition. By design, all scenarios follow the same underlying constraints as the MIX to reach the same aggregate emission reduction. Whilst sectoral differences exist, at macro level these constraints will dominate.

Given the above considerations, results from the JRC-GEM-E3 model indicate that GDP for the EU 27 contracts by 0.22 % to 0.23 % in 2030 with negligible differences between options. Impact on the investment side is modest. Investment under a CBAM is slightly lower than the MIX-full auctioning, but effects are too small to derive meaningful conclusions. On the consumption side the CBAM appears to have very similar effect to the MIX scenario.

**Table 10: Impact on EU-27 main macro-economic aggregates (% change from baseline in 2030)**

	GDP	Investment	Consumption
MIX	-0,222	0,413	-0,555
MIX-full auctioning	-0,224	0,362	-0,501
Options 1 and 2	-0,223	0,360	-0,518
Option 3	-0,227	0,357	-0,542
Option 4	-0,223	0,388	-0,558
Option 5	-0,227	0,356	-0,548
Option 6	-0,225	0,360	-0,561


Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

### 6.4.2 Sectoral impact

The impact of a CBAM on sectoral output largely follows the effectiveness of different design options in providing leakage protection. By implication this means that the extent and speed of phasing out free allocation in the CBAM sectors will have an important effect on sectoral output.

Figure 10 illustrates changes in output of CBAM sectors by scenario both in levels - billion EUR - and as percent change from baseline. As discussed earlier, the **MIX-full auctioning** leads to highest levels of carbon leakage, which is also reflected in the most significant reduction of output in all CBAM sectors at approximately -4 % in aggregate by 2030. By effectively capturing some of this carbon leakage, all CBAM options lead to higher output levels relative to the MIX-full auctioning. As evidenced in Figure 10 most CBAM options fare roughly the same by leading to increases in output compared to the MIX-full auctioning, with **option 4** having the strongest effect keeping output at baseline levels.

**Figure 10: Impact on output in all CBAM sectors - EU 27 in 2030 (in levels -billion EUR- and as % change from baseline)**



Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

The effect is observed across CBAM sectors as indicated in


Figure 11, which also shows changes in levels -billion EUR- and as percentage change from baseline. Again the MIX-full auctioning by eliminating free allocation results in highest output losses, with all CBAM options resulting to a rebounding of output relative to that.

The CBAM options, notably **option 4**, stand well against output losses, as well as at higher carbon prices, as projected for 2030 in these scenarios. In contrast, the MIX-full auctioning would see increasing output losses with increasing carbon prices. This is of particular relevance for the period after 2030, which will see a continued increasing tightening of the ETS cap and probably a continued increase in carbon price.

The MIX results in the least amount of output losses relative to all CBAM options, which is largely due to the switch to full auctioning assumed under the CBAM. Higher levels of output therefore come at the cost of forgone revenues, due to the continuation of free allocation and higher CO<sub>2</sub> eq. emissions in partner countries relative to the CBAM. It is worth noting that, in the case of fertilisers, all options based on actual emissions result in the increase of output levels relative to the baseline (and possibly in a corresponding greater capture of carbon leakage).




**Figure 11: Output in all CBAM sectors in the MIX, MIX-full auctioning and under alternative CBAM options (in levels -billion EUR- and as % change from baseline) - EU 27 in 2030**



Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

Figure 12 illustrates the effects on output by year for options 1, 2, 3 and 4. The figure highlights how the gradual phase out of allowances (and respective phase in of CBAM) under option 4 after 2025 relative to option 3 results in higher levels in 2030. The impact of the phase in – phase out on output is more pronounced for iron and steel, cement, and fertilisers, while it appears weaker for aluminium. By comparison, options 1 and 2 - by adopting an immediate phase out as option 3 but applying a CBAM based on EU average emissions - result in lower output relative to the options based on actual emissions (options 3 and 4).

**Figure 12: Output effects in all CBAM sectors for options 1, 2, 3 and 4 (in billion EUR) - EU 27**




Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

Turning to downstream industries, the response of different sectors is again largely dependent on the assumptions related to the increased ambition as depicted in the MIX scenario. It is these assumptions that drive the increase in output in the construction and electrical goods sectors, reflecting the shift to energy efficiency in buildings and electrification of the economy that accompanies the higher ambition to 2030.

Depending on the share of inputs used, downstream users are typically slightly worse off under the CBAM as they face higher input prices. Extending the CBAM to downstream sectors (in **option 5** for embodied raw products) appears to have a relatively small impact on production further down the supply chain. For example, the negative output effects downstream are found to be lower, albeit slightly, under **option 5** than those observed under **options 3 and 4** in the case of other chemicals, other non-ferrous metals and other equipment. Compared to options 1 and 2, the move to actual emissions (options 3-5) has a noticeably stronger negative impact on output downstream. This is indeed observed for crops, which under the actual emissions options would source more expensive imported fertilisers, as well as transport and other equipment which would possibly source more expensive imported iron and steel.

**Figure 13: Output in downstream industries - 2030 (% change from baseline<sup>75</sup>) - EU 27**



Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model


<sup>75</sup> Crops includes Paddy rice, Wheat, Cereal grains, Vegetables, fruit, nuts, Oil seeds, Sugar cane, sugar beet, Plant-based fibres; Consumption goods include beverages and tobacco products, food products, meat and meat products, vegetable oils and fats, dairy products, processed rice, sugar, textiles, wearing apparel and leather products; Transport equipment includes motor vehicles and parts, and transport equipment nec Electrical goods includes electronic equipment and electrical equipment; Other chemicals includes chemicals other than fertilisers, pharmaceuticals and rubber.

### 6.4.3 Trade impacts

The impact of the CBAM on trade flows is analysed both from the view of the EU and with regards to our main trade partners. Figure 14 illustrates changes in EU imports in the CBAM sectors under the different scenarios both in levels -billion EUR- and as % change from baseline. Consistent with the previous discussion, EU imports for all CBAM sectors increase in the MIX-full auctioning, reflecting the import side of carbon leakage. By effectively reducing this leakage, all CBAM options (except option 6) lead to import levels lower than to those even of the baseline (which has less overall climate ambition).

Overall, the resulting reduction in imports is approximately 11.1 % in 2030 for **options 3 and 5**, and slightly stronger for **option 4** at 11.9 %. The exceptions are **options 1, 2 and 6**, which result in import levels closer to those in the baseline<sup>76</sup>. To complement these findings, our analysis has also estimated what the CBAM obligation would represent in proportion of the value of imports (for more details see Annex 10). With higher carbon prices, the MIX-full auctioning would see even larger increasing imports. In contrast, notably **option 4**, as well as **options 3 and 5** would see higher reductions of imports compared to baseline with higher carbon prices. The principal driver of this effect is the difference in actual emissions, which is much higher in partner countries than the EU average. These results, as emphasised earlier, do not account for the possibility of resource shuffling. As indicated in Annex 10, in the event that the risk of resource shuffling materialises, the reduction in imports induced by the CBAM could be substantially limited.

**Figure 14: EU 27 imports for all CBAM sectors in 2030 (in levels -billion EUR- and as % change from baseline)**



Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

Effects by specific CBAM sector are broadly similar. Cement and fertilisers appear to experience the highest impacts in the MIX-full auctioning, but impacts from different options are equivalent to other sectors. Impacts on downstream industries are quite limited, with changes in imports estimated at less than 2.06 % relative to the baseline.

<sup>76</sup> It should be noted that in the modelling the application of the CBAM reduces exports to the EU relative to the counterfactual but is not linked to potential changes in production processes in trade partners, which in turn could result in lower emissions and thereby a rebounding of exports, especially in options that would allow for individual treatment.

**Table 11: EU 27 imports by sector in 2030 (% change from baseline)**

		MIX	MIX-full auctioning	Options 1 and 2	Option 3	Option 4	Option 5	Option 6
<b>Sectors covered by CBAM</b>	Iron and Steel	1.45	11.01	-0.86	-11.05	-11.98	-11.05	0.21
	Cement	3.39	45.88	3.74	-10.71	-15.12	-10.69	0.89
	Fertiliser	1.20	14.33	0.19	-23.70	-26.41	-23.66	0.64
	Aluminium	2.07	3.64	-0.54	-5.12	-4.41	-5.06	1.81
<b>Downstream sectors</b>	Other non-ferrous metals	1.00	0.62	0.87	1.19	1.29	1.11	1.02
	Other chemicals	-0.03	-0.19	-0.11	0.02	0.07	-0.19	-0.14
	Electrical goods	0.89	0.78	0.86	0.95	0.97	0.90	0.97
	Transport Equipment	-0.09	-0.05	0.05	0.14	0.09	0.05	0.16
	Other Equipment	0.19	1.21	1.66	2.06	1.40	1.29	1.73
	Consumption goods	-0.19	-0.34	-0.26	-0.18	-0.13	-0.22	-0.20
	Construction	0.39	0.65	0.69	0.74	0.60	0.44	0.67
Crops	-0.79	-0.88	-0.82	-0.69	-0.65	-0.67	-0.78	


Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

The CBAM results in a reduction of EU exports as compared to the MIX scenario. This effect appears to be primarily driven by the loss of free allocation, as evident by the impacts under the MIX-full auctioning scenario.

**Figure 15** illustrates these changes both in levels -billion EUR- and as percentage change from baseline. A CBAM on imports only, under **options 1, 2, 3, 4** and **5**, appears to weaken the export performance of the CBAM sectors slightly more than the MIX-full auctioning in 2030. This can be explained by the fact that the introduction of the CBAM would raise domestic prices for CBAM sectors, thereby weakening slightly more export competitiveness. The magnitude of the effect varies, nevertheless, depending on the extent of free allocation it remains still by 2030. In particular, **option 4**, where free allowances are up to 50 % in 2030, results in a weaker reduction in export for the CBAM sectors. **Option 6**, which addresses the export side, results in very limited impacts on exports. In case of higher carbon prices, as projected for 2030 in these scenarios, both the MIX-full auctioning and CBAM options would see further negative impacts on exports, though they would remain mostly limited for option 6.

Respondents to the public consultation did emphasise that the introduction of the CBAM might have repercussions on the EU's competitiveness, especially with regard to EU's exports. The argument highlighted by a number of respondents was that the cost-competitiveness of EU businesses could drop on international markets due to higher European product prices.

**Figure 15: EU 27 exports for all CBAM sectors in 2030 (in levels -billion EUR- and as % change from baseline)**



Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

Impacts on main trade partners would differ depending on the importance of respective CBAM sectors in bilateral trade with the EU. Section 2 of Annex 10 lists the main exporting countries to the EU per CBAM sector.

Overall, based on a simple descriptive analysis of current trade flows, the countries that would potentially be most exposed to the CBAM include Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, followed by certain Eastern European partners (Belarus and Albania) and North African partners (Egypt, Algeria and Morocco). Exports from these countries feature among the top in most of the shortlisted sectors considered for analysis under a CBAM.


In the case of aluminium, the top 10 exporting countries which collectively account for about 85 % of the overall imports into the EU are Norway (19 %), Russia (17 %), United Arab Emirates (8 %), China (7 %), Iceland (7 %), Mozambique (7 %), the UK (6 %), Switzerland (5 %), Turkey (5 %) and Bahrain (3 %). With respect to fertilisers, about 85 % of imports are accounted for by 5 countries, namely Russia (32 %), Egypt (21 %), Algeria (20 %), Trinidad and Tobago (7 %) and Ukraine (5 %).

Lastly, for cement the primary exporter is Turkey, which accounts for 35 % of the sector's total imports. Along with Ukraine (13 %), Belarus (10 %), Colombia (7 %), Algeria (6 %), Morocco (5 %), Albania (4 %), Norway (3 %) and Tunisia (3 %), they account for about 80 % of the total imports.

Figure 16 illustrates the results of the modelling regarding the impacts of the CBAM on imports by trade partner or regional group in 2030. Similar to the aggregate picture presented above, the MIX-full auctioning leads to an increase in carbon leakage and a corresponding increase in imports in the CBAM sectors. Imports from Rest of Europe, Russia, UK and China see the strongest increase in the MIX-full auctioning.

The introduction of a CBAM brings imports back to baseline levels for options 1,2 and 6, whereas for options based on actual emissions, imports in the CBAM sectors decline relative to baseline levels. For these options (options 3, 4 and 5) the overall decline in imports relative to the baseline reaches -11 % by 2030, and is more pronounced for imports from Russia (-35 %), Africa (-28 %), India (-25 %), and China (-11 %). As indicated earlier, these import reductions could be substantially limited in the event of resource shuffling.

**Figure 16: Value of imports into the EU-27 in all CBAM sectors in 2030 (in billion EUR) <sup>77</sup>**




Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

Figure 17 illustrates the impact of a CBAM on EU export by trade partner or regional group in 2030. Overall, the CBAM has limited effects on exports relative to the MIX-full auctioning. Both the scale and regional structure of exports are broadly the same under **options 1 to 5** and the MIX-full auctioning, with **option 4** resulting in slightly higher export levels overall, as also indicated earlier. **Option 6**, which addresses the export side, also result in exports closer to baseline levels.

**Figure 17: Value of exports from the EU-27 in all CBAM sectors in 2030 (in billion EUR)**

<sup>77</sup> Rest of Europe includes EFTA countries, Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.





Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

#### 6.4.4 Impacts from a CBAM on electricity

The impacts from the application of the CBAM on imports of electricity are presented in detail in Annex 8.

Overall, the CBAM is found to have positive effects on total carbon emissions reductions (in the EU and its neighbours), although there are differences in the impacts of the two considered options. Both options contribute to mitigating the risks of carbon leakage by discouraging in the mid-term horizon the build-up of carbon-intensive power generation sources in the vicinity of EU borders, which might replace EU-based generators exposed to increasing carbon costs. The option based on the carbon emission factor displays superior effectiveness in preventing carbon leakage due to a greater amount of carbon-intensive imports, and hence generation, avoided. This option could however be subject to a greater risk of resource shuffling, which could limit its impacts. The energy mix within the EU will not change significantly due to the application of a CBAM on electricity.

#### 6.4.5 Feedback from the Open Public Consultation

Regarding the expected economic impacts from the introduction of a CBAM, consulted stakeholders somewhat agree that the CBAM would: i) encourage the consumption of less carbon intensive products; ii) have a positive impact on innovation in the EU and elsewhere, through the promotion of clean technologies; iii) have a positive impact on the competitiveness of EU industry in the sectors concerned; and iv) have a positive impact on investment in the EU. They also agree, however, that it would lead to increased costs for EU businesses in downstream sectors.

These findings are, to some extent, confirmed when looking at responses by groups of stakeholders, with a few exceptions. Companies and business associations do not agree nor disagree on potential positive impacts on the competitiveness of the sectors concerned; they do agree, however, that the CBAM would impinge on EU exporters in the relevant sectors. This concern is shared also by public authorities responding to the consultation. Only citizens and civil society organisations somewhat agree on expected positive impacts on investment in the EU. Interestingly, business organisations somewhat disagree that the CBAM would result in the relocation or replacement of activities from third countries into the EU; by contrast, citizens somewhat disagree that the mechanism would lead to a relocation of downstream sectors from the EU to third countries.

When estimating the economic impacts stemming from each of the policy options for a CBAM, it is apparent from the Open Public Consultation that no policy option leads to significantly better economic impacts. A slightly larger share of respondents tend to agree that: a tax at the consumption level may be costly for EU businesses in downstream sectors; and the obligation to purchase allowances from a specific pool outside the ETS dedicated to imports may generate a negative impact on EU exporters.

## 6.5 Social Impacts

### 6.5.1 Impacts on employment

Overall the impact of a CBAM on employment is limited. The JRC-GEM-E3 model assumed imperfect labour markets with unemployment allowed to adjust following the policy scenarios.

Both the overall and sectoral employment effects across all CBAM options mirror the impacts on output and investment. Changes in employment are largely driven by the presence (or not) of free allocation. The **MIX**, by retaining free allocation, results in a slight increase in employment in the CBAM sectors largely driven by cement. The complete removal of free allocation in the absence of a border measure (MIX-full auctioning) leads to the highest employment losses. In this case, the high levels of carbon leakage and the associated depression of sectoral output, in the CBAM sectors, reduces employment by -3.76 % relative to the baseline. Depending on the strength of different CBAM options in capturing the carbon leakage generated in the MIX-full auctioning, negative effects on employment are mitigated. **Option 4** results in a slight increase in employment in the CBAM sectors. As regards downstream sectors impact on employment appears to be minimal. Impacts are comparable to the MIX-full auctioning across all industries for all CBAM options. This would imply that the cost pressures generated by the CBAM on downstream industries (e.g. in vehicle manufacturing as reflected in transport equipment below) are not strong enough to generate significant output and employment losses down the value chain.

**Table 12: Employment - EU 27 in 2030 (% change relative to the baseline)**

	MIX	MIX full auctioning	Option 1/2	Option 3	Option 4	Option 5	Option 6
<b>Sectors covered by a CBAM</b>							
Iron and Steel	0.06	-3.92	-2.55	-1.30	0.22	-1.29	-0.50
Cement	1.40	-3.53	-2.75	-2.45	-0.48	-2.45	-0.87
Fertiliser	-0.10	-7.29	-4.92	-0.31	2.59	-0.32	-0.32
Aluminium	-0.46	-1.72	-0.63	0.62	0.89	0.61	-0.80
<i>CBAM sectors</i>	0.22	-3.76	-2.48	-1.20	0.32	-1.19	-0.60

<b>Downstream sectors</b>							
Other Non-ferrous metals	-0.34	-0.41	-0.46	-0.52	-0.43	-0.50	-0.58
Other Chemicals	-0.12	-0.09	-0.12	-0.15	-0.14	-0.11	-0.10
Electrical Goods	0.87	1.02	0.91	0.77	0.76	0.76	0.72
Transport Equipment	0.00	0.09	-0.01	-0.13	-0.11	-0.13	-0.17
Other Equipment	0.23	-0.03	-0.11	-0.20	-0.03	-0.14	-0.14
Consumption Goods	0.05	0.23	0.19	0.13	0.07	0.12	0.11
Construction	0.05	0.23	0.19	0.13	0.07	0.12	0.11
Crops	-0.20	-0.11	-0.17	-0.32	-0.07	-0.33	-0.44
<b>Economy wide</b>							
	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.05

Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

### 6.5.2 Distributional impacts

The application of the CBAM on material industrial products is likely to have limited impact on consumer prices because the measure is targeted at products upstream in the value chain, and affects goods for final consumption only indirectly. The results from the JRC-GEM-E3 model suggest that prices across most household consumption categories increase only slightly across all options when compared to the MIX-full auctioning. The highest increases are observed in fuels and power<sup>78</sup> and under **option 4**. When compared to the MIX with free allocation, price changes for certain energy-related consumption categories decline slightly under the CBAM, following the changes in the carbon price reported in

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<sup>78</sup> This is because CO<sub>2</sub> prices are higher than in the MIX-full auctioning, and transport and buildings are assumed to be included in the EU ETS in the MIX scenario.

Table 9. At the same time, more resource intensive products, such as household appliances, vehicles (due to steel and aluminium) and to a lesser extent food (due to fertilisers), experience small increases prices reflecting the increase in resource prices as a consequence of full auction and the border measure CBAM. Nevertheless, the estimated effects on final prices are particularly small to have a material impact on final consumers.

This is reported in the table below.

**Table 13: Impact on selected consumer prices - EU 27 in 2030 (% relative to the MIX and the MIX-full auctioning)**

	Food beverages & tobacco	Housing and water charges	Fuels and power	Household equipment and operation	Heating and cooking appliances	Purchase of vehicles	Operation of personal transport equipment	Transport services	Misc. goods and services
<b>Relative to MIX</b>									
MIX full auctioning	-0.01	-0.07	-0.36	-0.02	0.07	0.04	-0.24	-0.13	-0.08
Option 1/2	0.01	-0.07	-0.30	-0.01	0.10	0.06	-0.20	-0.11	-0.07
Option 3	0.03	-0.06	-0.25	0.01	0.12	0.09	-0.16	-0.09	-0.06
Option 4	0.03	-0.03	-0.09	0.01	0.07	0.06	-0.06	-0.04	-0.03
Option 5	0.04	-0.06	-0.24	0.02	0.13	0.10	-0.16	-0.09	-0.06
Option 6	0.03	-0.06	-0.11	0.01	0.12	0.10	-0.07	-0.05	-0.06
<b>Relative to the MIX full auctioning</b>									
Option 1/2	0.02	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01
Option 3	0.04	0.01	0.11	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.02
Option 4	0.04	0.05	0.27	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.17	0.09	0.05
Option 5	0.04	0.02	0.12	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.03	0.02
Option 6	0.04	0.02	0.25	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.16	0.07	0.02

Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

These limited price changes, in turn, would imply fairly low distributional impacts from the introduction of the measure.

Distributional impacts were analysed with the use of the Euromod micro simulation model, by effectively linking it with the JRC-GEM-E3 model (see Annex 4 for details). In this sense, the distributional analysis at micro level was able to account for the economy-wide impact of the carbon adjustment measure under consideration, capturing the effects of the policy option not only through its direct impact on the tax burden, but also through its broader implications on consumer prices and household incomes. The analysis of distributional impacts focused **on options 1, 2, 4 and 6**, relative to the MIX full auctioning scenario. Exploring other options was deemed not to provide significant value added to the analysis.

The results indicate that a CBAM is regressive, albeit the overall impact is very small. That is because the expected changes in prices and incomes (as estimated by the JRC-GEM-E3 model) are very small, and so is their impact on household adjusted disposable income. For example, for the lowest income group (1<sup>st</sup> decile) the impact on disposable income ranges from -0.11 % (Lithuania, scenario 6) to 0.07 % (Lithuania, scenario 1/2). Beyond the lowest income group, the largest negative impact across all countries and scenarios is observed in Greece and Romania, in their second decile, in scenario 6 (of about -0.06 %), while the largest positive impact is observed in Belgium (scenario 1/2, 9<sup>th</sup> decile: 0.24 %). Detailed results by option are provided in Annex 10.

**Options 1 and 2** have the lowest estimated impact on poorer household incomes, while **options 4 and 6** display a larger impact. In these latter scenarios, the worst affected households are those in the first decile who experience a decrease in adjusted disposable income between -0.15-0.21 % (option 4, in Lithuania, Slovakia and Romania) and of 0.1 % (option 6, in Lithuania, Romania, Germany and Greece). On the other hand, in option 1/2 the largest fall in adjusted disposable income for households in the first decile is about a fifth of it (i.e. about -0.015 % in Denmark, Finland, France and Slovenia).

Distributional impacts vary across countries. This is due to the different impact that the same reform produces on prices of each good category and on incomes in each country. Country disparities are also explained by the different consumption patterns across the income distribution and the income structure of households. A detailed discussion of distributional impacts by Member State is provided in Annex 10.

### *6.5.3 Feedback from the Open Public Consultation*

On average, stakeholders participating in the consultation somewhat agree that the CBAM would have both positive and negative social impacts. On the one hand, respondents tend to agree that the mechanism would avoid job losses in the EU, which would otherwise stem from the substitution of EU production with production from third countries with lower climate ambition. On the other hand, they tend to agree that the CBAM may: i) increase the price of consumer products, including those related to basic needs (depending on the sectors covered); ii) lead to job losses in downstream sectors (by increasing the cost of their inputs); and iii) generate potential negative effects on the living standards of the poorer segments of the population.

The overall results are confirmed across all groups of stakeholders and regions, with a few exceptions. Business organisations are more sceptical about the contribution of the CBAM to avoiding job losses in the EU. By contrast, civil society organisations and citizens neither agree nor disagree when it comes to negative impacts on jobs in downstream sectors. When looking at the breakdown by geographical area, respondents based in bordering countries show the highest level of agreement when it comes to negative social impacts of the CBAM. Respondents from EEA countries, Switzerland and the UK neither agree nor disagree on the expected negative impact on jobs in downstream sectors.

Finally, when assessing the social impacts stemming from each of the policy options under analysis, no policy option leads to significantly better social outcomes. A slightly larger share of respondents tends to agree, however, that the obligation to purchase allowances from a specific pool outside the ETS dedicated to imports (options 2, 3, 4, 5 in the Impact Assessment) may lead to job losses in downstream sectors and generate negative effects on the living standards of the poorer segments of the population.

## **6.6 Administrative Impacts**

In order to estimate the compliance costs for economic operators and determine the drivers behind enforcement costs for authorities, data from cost assessment of existing mechanisms is used. Cost elements are estimated based on similar elements in instruments such as the EU ETS, national emissions trading systems, existing excise duties or import taxes as well as the Clean Development Mechanism<sup>79</sup> (CDM) as an international instrument that monitors emissions from international installations and projects. However, the CBAM will target imports of products and their embedded emissions. Therefore, costs from existing mechanisms of monitoring installations' emissions are generally doubled to create an estimation for the production of multiple products in one installation.

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<sup>79</sup> See: <https://cdm.unfccc.int/index.html>

Generally speaking, compliance costs are assumed to arise for importers located in the EU that would have to pay the CBAM obligation. This could be done either based on a default value or by providing verified information about actual emissions. While the monitoring of these actual emissions would take place outside the EU, the responsibility – and thus costs – of providing the information regarding this monitoring to authorities lies with the importers. More detailed data and analysis for this section can be found in Annex 6.

#### *6.6.1 Administrative burden for businesses*

The **baseline** scenario would not change anything compared to the current situation as no new obligations are introduced.

Design **options 1 to 5** rely on an adjustment of carbon price at the border using the payment options of an import tax or CBAM certificates. For these border instruments, the cost elements are the following:

- First and most importantly, the quantification of the emissions value that forms the basis of the calculation of the carbon price for design options that allow claiming of actual emissions. This includes:
  - o monitoring the quantity of imported products;
  - o tracking the place of origin;
  - o monitoring the embedded GHG emissions of products stemming from the production process;
  - o verification of the monitored emissions.
- Cost related to the documentation of the process, including the submission of information to the CBAM registry.
- Costs related to making the payment.
- Costs related to the preparation for controls by the authorities.

The documentation and reporting of the quantities and emissions will also represent a cost for businesses.

On the other hand, **option 6** proposes to implement a CBAM with an excise duty system. For this option, the cost elements differ and comprise the following steps:

- Again, the first important cost element is the quantification of the emissions value and the related excise duty amount. As the excise duty option fully relies on default values, this involves:
  - o monitoring the weight of basic materials, including imported and domestically produced goods;
  - o accounting of the movement of the basic material along the value chain including manufacturing businesses.
- Costs related to the administration of the processes, such as trading licenses or requests for specific uses of the material.
- Costs related to the documentation of materials and goods.
- Costs related to the payment.
- Costs related to the verification of information by the authorities.

With respect to **option 1**, the first set of cost elements related to the quantification of emissions, monitoring the quantity of imported products and their origin does not cause substantial added burden to businesses. When emissions are declared at default value, monitoring the emissions from the production process is not necessary and therefore also

cause limited costs. However, if importers decide to claim the use the actual emissions from the production process, the monitoring creates additional costs for the business, estimated to be between EUR 9.8 million and EUR 13.2 million in aggregate<sup>80</sup>.

**For options 2, 3, 4 and 5**, as the cost assessment for an implementation using CBAM certificates follows very similar requirements and thus also cost elements, the considerations largely overlap with the one made above. For options 2 and 3, this cost would amount to between EUR 9.8 million and EUR 14.3 million.

Administrative effort for **option 4** is similar to **option 3**. However, there are additional administrative costs for continuing to determine the level of free allocation that producers should receive. Therefore, the combined administrative effort is higher than for options 3, and would result in a cost increase for businesses.

**For option 5**, and as this option also relies on actual emissions, the total costs are similar to option 3, although the broader coverage of the value chain adds more relevant installations, importers and import transactions. This increases the compliance costs for importers compared to similar designs only targeting basic materials (and basic material products).

Under **option 6**, default values have to be determined both for materials and manufactured goods. Administrative effort is relatively low for producers of materials in the EU, since the excise duty relies on default values for basic materials, which means producers do not have to demonstrate the carbon intensity of their production. However, they will have to report production volumes to the competent authorities. Manufacturers along the value chain would have some additional effort, since the use of duty suspension arrangements would require them to report the weight of basic materials upon the sale of their products, as well as submit periodic returns to the relevant national authorities<sup>81</sup>. However, where increased administrative costs outweigh the carbon costs of materials in products, manufacturers would also have the option to pay the excise duty rather than register under the duty suspension regime.

Administrative costs for international firms are relatively low, since importers would be charged according to the weight of the material imported, without having to demonstrate the carbon intensity of the production process. For the same reason, no verification efforts for the carbon intensity of imported goods are needed for EU authorities. Compliance risks are also low due to the absence of a need for extraterritorial verification. For option 6, the estimated yearly total is between EUR 14.7 million and EUR 28.7 million (detailed calculation in Annex 6).

In all options, a CBAM would result in relatively higher compliance costs for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises ('SMEs') compared to large enterprises. Indeed, while the available data does not allow for a quantitative assessment of impacts of a CBAM specifically on SMEs, the literature suggests that there is a significant difference between large and smaller companies when it comes to administrative burden of tax or customs measures, or for MRV of carbon emissions (see Annex 6).

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<sup>80</sup> Calculated based on the estimates and the number of cases.

<sup>81</sup> Ismer, R., Haussner, M., Neuhoff, K., & Acworth, W., 'Inclusion of Consumption into Emissions Trading Systems: Legal Design and Practical Administration', 2016. <http://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CS-Administration-of-IoC-02052016-formatted3.pdf>



### 6.6.2 Administrative impact for authorities

Authorities face comparable cost elements to the businesses, with the difference that costs arise from assessing information and controlling the reports from economic operators. Therefore, the options that have been found to be more costly for businesses above, in general also create higher costs for authorities.

An overarching cost element is to have the necessary IT technology in place. Collected data at the time of import by customs authorities needs to be shared with the authorities in charge of assessing declared actual emissions and connecting the imported products to CBAM certificates either already surrendered at that point or to be. A central CBAM Authority or national authorities tasked with the CBAM will, in the design options involving surrender of CBAM certificates, be assigned the task of selling these certificates and conducting monitoring and verification of importers surrendering sufficient CBAM certificates to cover for embedded emissions in imported materials. In the case of a centralised system, the establishment of a central CBAM Authority would not mean establishing a new agency, but the necessary tasks could be dealt with by an existing body. For a decentralised CBAM, a limited number of functions would still need to be carried out at central level, for example the supervision of national customs and climate authorities, or the publication of CBAM certificate prices. The interaction between the central CBAM Authority and national authorities, as well as how the collection of necessary data for the operation of a well-functioning CBAM could be shared between this body and other authorities, primarily national custom authorities, is a matter to be closely evaluated during the finalization of the CBAM proposal. This also relates to the way the CBAM revenue will be collected as an EU-own resource. The same also applies to the option of implementation as an excise duty as this would also require an interface between Member States and the Commission, including the customs organisations.

According to experience collected through the management of tax administration, this can represent a major share of the costs. Across the options assessed below, the need for additional IT systems varies slightly depending on their complexity and need for collaboration, but additional infrastructure would in all cases be necessary to process the data and share it between customs and CBAM authorities. Similarly to some existing requirements on imported goods, such as ozone-depleting substances or F-gases, the CBAM could also be part of the recently launched Single Window Environment for Customs which facilitates automatic assessment and sharing of import-related data. Including the CBAM obligation in this environment would reduce costs for IT systems and also for the processing of the documents. However, the process of setting this up would require time and result in some limitations in the implementation. For example, a centralised assessment of monitoring data would be necessary. A decentralised approach involving Member States' existing structures would not be supported by this environment, as discussions with Commission experts have shown.

Under **option 1**, efforts are necessary for processing documents, administering payments and controlling the correct declaration of goods. In the case of actual emissions reported, these reports and validations would need to be assessed as well. Additional controls by customs authorities would be necessary to ensure that the right product categories are declared. A high level of carbon price may increase the risk of fraud by not declaring products that should be subject to the CBAM. Therefore, the controls at entry points to the EU on a sample of imports are necessary, and result in additional enforcement costs. An import tax with the option to present actual emission values has a higher complexity

and creates higher costs for enforcement. The processing of customs declaration would require more time, as the existence of an emissions report supporting the declared carbon content would need to be checked. The CBAM obligation would need to be paid based on the declared emissions at the time of import. Together with the necessary controls, this would complete the task of the customs authority. However, the declared actual emissions would have to be assessed by a competent climate authority. The monitoring report provided by the importer and its verification need to be assessed. As the reporting needs to be performed at product level and in non-EU countries, the costs are again assumed to be twice the amount of assessing the EU ETS reports. Based on cost estimations for the EU ETS<sup>82</sup>, this results in costs of EUR 6 750 per installation from which products are imported. A reconciliation of payments needs to be made at the end of a compliance cycle. The administration of these additional payments by the importers or the refunding in case the actual emissions were lower creates costs that do not arise when using default values. Using the administration of EU ETS accounts as a proxy, this element is estimated at EUR 400 per importer per year. In addition to this, it is assumed that a small amount of site inspections at production sites would be carried out to verify compliance at the level of production process as well. As this is assumed to target only a sample every year, the costs are estimated at EUR 351 per installation per year.

Table 14 summarises the ongoing administration and enforcement costs for CBAM options based on an import tax. To these, the costs for setting up and maintaining the IT infrastructure need to be added.

**Table 14: Yearly administration and enforcement costs for an import tax-based CBAM in EUR.**

Costs Cost element	Unit costs <sup>83</sup>		Overall costs	
	default factors	actual emissions	default factors	actual emissions
Processing of customs declarations	3	6	690 000	1 380 000
Assessment of monitored actual emissions	0	6 750	0	3 442 500
Administration of accounts/payments	included above	400	0	400 000
Customs controls	75	75	8 625 000	8 625 000
Site inspections	0	351	0	179 010
<b>Total (yearly)</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>7 582</b>	<b>9 31 ,000</b>	<b>14 026 510</b>

Sources: Amec Foster Wheeler Environment, 2016; German Parliament<sup>84</sup>, 2020; own expertise.

<sup>82</sup> Amec Foster Wheeler Environment, 2016. Evaluation of EU ETS Monitoring, Reporting and Verification Administration Costs. [http://publications.europa.eu/resource/ellar/f6a49ec5-c35c-11e6-a6db-01aa75ed71a1.0001.01/DOC\\_1](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/ellar/f6a49ec5-c35c-11e6-a6db-01aa75ed71a1.0001.01/DOC_1)

<sup>83</sup> Units: Processing of documents: per import transaction; assessment of monitored emissions: per third-country installation; administration of accounts: per importer; customs controls: per import transaction; site inspections: per third-country installation.

For **options 2, 3, 4 and 5**, the administration and enforcement costs are structured similarly to option 1 described above. The main difference is the greater involvement of a CBAM authority responsible for issuing and administering the surrender of the CBAM certificates. Empowering a central CBAM authority for the entire Union would minimize the relevant administrative costs associated with this task. In contrast to this, a set-up similar to the EU ETS with national competent authorities could also be conceivable. This is expected to result in higher costs because of the stronger need for collaboration and coordination of the assessment of monitoring reports, but such a decentralised approach could be easier to implement, as it would rely on existing capabilities in EU Member States.

As the CBAM based on import certificates would also be charged in relation to import, customs authorities need to process the information related to the imported product on behalf of the Union. Sufficient data to calculate the amount of necessary CBAM certificates would have to be included in the customs declaration and either certificates would be directly surrendered or added up for a final balance covering a full calendar year. In all cases, customs will always have an important role and will face costs. The option of requiring a surrender or proof of surrender of the CBAM certificates at the time of import will have a significantly higher impact on customs costs. If customs authorities only collect this information on behalf of a CBAM authority that in turn performs the yearly balance, reconciliation and ensures submission, the costs for customs authorities are lower, as those costs would be shifted to the CBAM authority. The costs would arise in both cases, either for customs authorities or for the CBAM authority, and are for this assessment assumed to be similar to each other.

For the options based on import certificates, the administration of the importers' accounts would be the main cost difference to the costs of an import tax. The costs here are estimated based on the assessment of such costs for the national implementation of the ETS in Germany<sup>85</sup>. Because of the higher complexity resulting from international accounts that also need to be administered, the reported costs are again doubled. As a result, EUR 400 per year and importer account are assumed for the administration of accounts and payments such as the supervision of the surrender of allowances. Additional customs controls are estimated similarly to the costs for the import tax.

The possibility to provide actual emissions as basis for the calculation of the CBAM creates higher costs compared to the use of default values. The need for emission monitoring reports to support the claimed actual emissions on which the self-declared CBAM obligation is calculated creates further complexity for the processing of customs declaration in the customs authorities. Similar to the import tax, the monitoring reports and verifications need to be assessed by a responsible authority, for example the central EU CBAM authority. The costs for this are – just as for the import tax above – estimated at EUR 6 750 per report. This cost element could increase in the case of decentralised assessment of the MRV documents. In this case, authorities on multiple Member States would have to assess the documents of an installation, unless exchange and acceptance of

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<sup>84</sup> German Parliament, 2020a. Entwurf eines Jahressteuergesetzes 2020. <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/228/1922850.pdf>

See also: [https://ec.europa.eu/taxation\\_customs/business/vat/modernising-vat-cross-border-ecommerce\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/vat/modernising-vat-cross-border-ecommerce_en)

<sup>85</sup> See: German Parliament, 2020: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Anpassung der Rechtsgrundlagen für die Fortentwicklung des Europäischen Emissionshandels.

[https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten\\_BMU/Download\\_PDF/Glaeserne\\_Gesetze/19\\_Lp/tehg\\_novelle/entwurf/tehg-novelle\\_180801\\_rege\\_bf.pdf](https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/19_Lp/tehg_novelle/entwurf/tehg-novelle_180801_rege_bf.pdf)

the decisions in other Member States is the case. In addition, the same costs as for the import tax are assumed for site visits, adding on average EUR 351 per installation.

summarises the administration and enforcement costs for CBAM options based on national ETS allowances. To these, the costs for setting up and maintaining the IT infrastructure need to be added.

**Table 15: Yearly administration and enforcement costs for an import certificates-based CBAM in EUR.**

Costs Cost element	Unit costs <sup>86</sup>		Overall costs	
	default factors	actual emissions	default factors	actual emissions
Processing of customs declarations	6	9	1 380 000	2 070 000
Assessment of monitoring and reporting action	0	6 750	0	3 442 500
Administration of accounts/payments	400	800	400 000	800 000
Customs controls	75	75	8 500 000	8 500 000
Site inspections	0	351	0	179 010
<b>Total (yearly)</b>	<b>481</b>	<b>7 985</b>	<b>10 280 000</b>	<b>14 991 510</b>

Sources: Amec Foster Wheeler Environment, 2016; German Parliament, 2020; own expertise.

Furthermore, and in a similar manner than for businesses, the further depth of the value chain, as envisaged under **option 5**, adds more relevant installations, importers and import transactions. This increases the compliance costs compared to similar designs only targeting basic materials (and basic material products).

Under **option 6**, an excise duty requires different actions from authorities than the import tax and import certificates options, which complete the price adjustment at the import of the products. The administration and enforcement of an excise duty requires the issuing of authorizations and licenses, processing of reported inventories of the economic operators, as well as carrying out inspections and checks<sup>87</sup>. Data sources for existing excise duties are scarce and not comprehensive in their assessment of different cost

<sup>86</sup> Units: Processing of documents: per import transaction; assessment of monitored emissions: per third-country installation; administration of accounts: per importer; customs controls: per import transaction; site inspections: per third-country installation.

<sup>87</sup> Ramboll et al. 2014: Study on the measuring and reducing of administrative costs for economic operators and tax authorities and obtaining in parallel a higher level of compliance and security in imposing excise duties on tobacco products. <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/a5d22256-3d16-4c7f-bb9e-3209447e517e/language-en>

elements. The central element influencing the costs for enforcement of an excise duty is the requirement for movement control within a duty suspension arrangement, as well as obtaining data from the producers and traders participating in this system. This is the case for excise duties on highly taxed products like tobacco. The high costs – not only for authorities but also for economic operators – are mentioned by the experts. As the excise duty systems to implement a CBAM is assumed not to require such real-time tracking, the costs of enforcement can be limited in this respect.

Still, the excise duties require processing data reported by businesses, maintaining the data infrastructure and monitoring compliance through controls. Important factors influencing the administration and enforcement costs are the complexity of products and the number of producers obliged to pay the excise duty. A higher number of producers increases costs for the authorities. The number of producers will be high compared to other excisable goods, because of the nature of the covered products as basic materials for many value chains.

Because of the nature of product and the similarity in set-up, consumption charges for plastic provide a good reference point for the administration and enforcement of an excise duty on carbon intensive basic materials. Currently, a plastic levy is in preparation in the United Kingdom. This provides an estimation of the overall ongoing costs. The impact assessment performed by the UK government foresees EUR 12.9 million per year for ongoing costs. This includes implementing continuous changes in the collection systems, compliance monitoring and support to customers. An EU CBAM system could thus be expected to result in higher yearly costs than this. With the available evidence base, a more precise quantification is difficult to achieve.

### *6.6.3 Administrative impact electricity*

In view of the relatively limited number of undertakings engaged in the business of importing electricity, the total administrative costs associated with compliance are expected to be rather low.

### *6.6.4 Feedback from the Open Public Consultation*

About 95 % of the respondents agree that the CBAM could increase administrative burdens for exporters and importers. The lion's share of respondents (430/478) indicating an increase in administrative burdens believe that the CBAM could entail burdensome verification and reporting procedures (430/478), and require a complex approach to establish the carbon content of the product (376/478); more than half of them (265/478) also believe that administrative burdens will increase due to the needed alignment with measurement standards. Similar results are recorded across all stakeholder groups and geographical areas.

Almost 93 % of respondents envisage an increase in administrative burdens borne by public administrations in the EU. More specifically, a large share of respondents indicating such an increase in administrative burdens believe that public administrations will face monitoring needs (413/460) as well as the need to adjust customs systems (328/460). Similar results are registered across all stakeholder groups and geographical areas; public authorities and stakeholders based in other non-EU countries, however, give more relevance to adjustments of customs systems than to monitoring needs to explain such an increase in administrative burdens for public administrations.

Although the majority of respondents (336/480) confirm that the CBAM is expected to generate relatively higher administrative burdens for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), almost one third of respondents (144/480) do not agree with this conclusion. When looking at the breakdown by stakeholder cluster, the majority of companies (225/268) and public authorities (11/14) believe that SMEs will face higher administrative burdens; by contrast, slightly more than half of the respondents representing civil society organisations (33/57) and less than half of citizens (67/141) expect higher costs for SMEs. Results similar to those recorded in the entire sample are consistent in all geographical areas, except for bordering countries, where the vast majority of respondents indicate a stronger increase in administrative burdens for SMEs.

## **6.7 Revenue Generation Impacts**

All options where free allocation is fully removed (1, 2, 3, and 5) as well as option 6 generate additional revenues, above EUR 14 billion per year in 2030. Option 5 provides the highest revenue. Option 4, which is based on partial phase out of free allocation, results in lower revenues in 2030 by comparison, at EUR 9.1 billion per year. Beyond 2030 and as free allocation is phased out and the CBAM is phased in, revenue should continue to increase in the EU and at the border for this option, eventually reaching the same levels as option 3.

Three main elements impact the revenue.


The first is the switch from free allocation to full auctioning. This explains why option 4, where this effect is phased in after 2025 over 10 years, produces less revenue in 2030.

The second is the revenue collected at the border; this revenue in all options is significantly lower than the revenue collected from auctioning in the EU ETS (at most the CBAM revenue is less than one fifth of the EU ETS revenue in option 3). This reflects the proportion between production in the EU and imports in the CBAM sectors. Extending the CBAM down the supply chain, as envisaged under option 5, increases the revenue generated at the border, which remains however limited compared to the revenue generated by the termination of free allocations in all scenarios.

Overall, total revenues will depend on effective level of carbon prices. The CBAM can have a limited effect on the demand for ETS allowances from industrial sectors and hence on the carbon prices. This has an effect on ETS revenues not only in CBAM sectors but in the whole ETS. This effect, however is not very significant.

Revenue impacts are presented below for 2030. In the longer term, the potential evolution of revenues would depend on the future level of the carbon price and the embedded emissions in the imported CBAM products. Whilst the carbon price may continue to rise in the future, the emissions embedded in the CBAM products from the EU's trade partners may decline as a consequence of the application of the CBAM, the latter expected to encourage the adoption of zero or low emission technologies in other countries. This may result in lower revenue levels for all options in the longer term.


**Figure 18: Revenues from the CBAM in 2030- Auctioning in the CBAM sectors plus border measure (in billion EUR)**



Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

In terms of sectoral structure, revenues largely reflect the scale of emissions in respective sectors, as well as their trade intensity. Therefore iron and steel, which is the highest emitter among the CBAM sectors and is also characterized by high import penetration, results in highest revenues both from the border measure and from additional auctioning. By contrast, cement, which is the second strongest emitter, has a much lower import penetration than iron. Resulting revenues are therefore lower and mostly arising from additional auctioning. Fertilisers come third in emissions and their relative stronger import penetration result in higher revenues from the border measure. Finally, aluminium, which is the last in strength of emissions also comes last in revenue impacts.

**Figure 19: Revenues from the CBAM by sector in 2030 - Auctioning plus border measure (in billion EUR)**



Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

## 7 HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE?

The policy options are compared against the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and proportionality in Table 16 below. The cost/benefit part assesses the overall performance of each option against all criteria in the medium to long term.


With respect to the effectiveness of the CBAM in meeting its environmental objectives and supporting reduction of emissions, all the policy options show a positive impact. On providing protection against carbon leakage, while **option 4 followed by options 3 and 5** also bring about a strong positive impact, **options 1, 2 and 6** would be less effective. All policy options are designed in a way that respects the EU's international commitments. With regards to incentivising third country producers to move towards cleaner production processes, all policy options bring about positive results. On that criteria, the options allowing for the possibility to demonstrate actual emissions are particularly effective, with **option 4 followed by options 3 and 5** also showing strong positive results. All options are coherent with the EU ETS.


Assessing the efficiency of the options, all options have slightly better economic impacts than the MIX-full auctioning. As regards social impacts, the effects of the CBAM on employment as well as its distributional impacts are generally quite limited. In addition, effects on consumer prices are very small and distributed in a progressive manner. Furthermore, all options will increase administrative costs for both businesses as well as the EU and Member States administrations. Lastly, all options comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.





**Table 16: How do the options compare**

Effectiveness, efficiency and coherence	Option 0 (a): MIX	Option 0 (b): MIX full auctioning	Option 1: Import Carbon Tax	Option 2: Import certificates at average EU emissions	Option 3: Import certificates based on actual emissions	Option 4: Import certificates with parallel continuation of free allowances for a transitional period	Option 5: Import certificates on basic materials also as part of components and finished products	Option 6: Excise duty
<i>Effectiveness</i>								
Supporting reduction of GHG emissions (by supporting investments on low carbon technologies)	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Carbon leakage prevention	Green	Red	Light Green	Light Green	Green	Green	Green	Light Green
Respect international commitments	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Incentivising third country producers	Yellow	Red	Light Green	Light Green	Green	Green	Green	Light Green
<i>Coherence</i>								
Consistency with EU ETS	Yellow	Light Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Yellow
<i>Efficiency</i>								
Economic Impacts	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Social Impacts	Light Green	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Budgetary impacts	Red	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Green	Green	Green	Light Green
Administrative costs	Yellow	Green	Light Green	Light Green	Yellow	Yellow	Red	Yellow
<i>Subsidiarity/proportionality</i>								
	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
<i>Overall assessment</i>								
Cost/benefit	Light Green	Red	Light Green	Light Green	Green	Green	Green	Light Green

 Strong positive impact

 Limited positive impact

 Limited negative impact

 Negative impact

## 8 PREFERRED OPTION

When proposing its updated 2030 greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of at least 55 %<sup>88</sup>, the European Commission also described the actions across all sectors of the economy that would complement national efforts to achieve the increased ambition. A number of impact assessments have been prepared to support the envisaged revisions of key legislative instruments.

Against this background, this impact assessment has analysed the various options through which the introduction of a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism could effectively and efficiently contribute to the delivery of the updated target as part of a wider ‘Fit for 55’ policy package.

### *8.1. Methodological approach*

Drawing conclusions about preferred options from this analysis requires tackling two methodological issues.

First, as is often the case in impact assessment analysis, ranking options may not be straightforward as it may not be possible to compare options through a single metric and no option may clearly dominate the others across relevant criteria. Ranking then requires an implicit weighting of the different criteria that can only be justifiably established at the political level. In such cases, an impact assessment should wean out as many inferior options as possible while transparently provide the information required for political decision-making. This is what this report does for the introduction of the CBAM, based on the objectives of the measure and intervention logic.

Secondly, the ‘Fit for 55 Package’ involves a high number of interlinked initiatives underpinned by individual impact assessments. Therefore, there is a need to ensure coherence between the preferred options of various impact assessments.

### *8.2. Policy interactions*

Given the complex interdependence across policy tools and the interplay with the previous methodological issue outlined above, no simultaneous determination of a preferred policy package is thus possible. A sequential approach was therefore necessary.

First, the common economic assessment<sup>8990</sup> underpinning the ‘Communication on Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition’ looked at the feasibility of achieving a higher climate target and provided insights into the efforts that individual sectors would have to make. It could not, however, discuss precise sectoral ambitions or detailed policy tools. Rather, it looked at a range of possible pathways/scenarios to explore the delivery of the increased climate ambition. It noted particular benefits in deploying a broad mix of policy instruments, including strengthened carbon pricing, increased regulatory policy ambition and the identification of the investments to step up the climate action.

An update of the pathway/scenario focusing on a combination of extended use of carbon pricing and medium intensification of regulatory measures in all sectors of the economy,

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<sup>88</sup> Communication on Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition - Com(2020)562.

<sup>89</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020SC0176>

<sup>90</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020SC0331>

while also reflecting the COVID-19 pandemic and the National Energy and Climate Plans, confirmed these findings.

Taking this pathway and the Communication on Stepping up Europe's 2030 climate ambition as central reference, individual impact assessments for all 'Fit for 55' initiatives were then developed with a view to provide the required evidence base for the final step of detailing an effective, efficient and coherent 'Fit for 55 Package'.

At the aggregate level, these impact assessments provide considerable reassurances about the policy indications adopted by the Commission in the Communication on Stepping up Europe's 2030 climate ambition. This concerns notably a stronger and more comprehensive role of carbon pricing, energy efficiency and renewable energy policies, and the instruments supporting sustainable mobility and transport. These would be complemented by a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and phasing out of free allowances. This approach would allow reducing, in a responsible manner, the risk of carbon leakage. It would also preserve the full scope of the Effort Sharing Regulation for achieving the increased climate target.

Various elements of the analyses also suggest that parts of the revenues of a strengthened and extended EU ETS should be used to counter any undesirable distributional impacts such a package would entail (between and within Member States). While the best way to do this is still to be determined, this would seem a superior alternative to foregoing the relevant measures altogether or simply disregarding the uneven nature of their distributional impacts. Under both these alternatives, the eventual success of any package proposed would be at risk.

### *8.3. Preferred policy option*

Preliminarily assuming the analysis above as the framework for the aggregate 'Fit for 55 Package', the specific analysis carried out in this impact assessment comes to the main following conclusions and would suggest **policy option 4**: a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on selected sectors in the form of import certificates based on actual emissions with parallel continuation of free EU ETS allowances for a transitional period as the preferred option. A primary basis on actual emissions ensures a fair and equal treatment of all imports as well as ensures a close correlation to the main features of the EU ETS. The CBAM system will, however, need to be complemented by a possibility to base calculations on a set default values to be used in situations when sufficient emission data will not be available. This option will need to be designed to fully respect the EU's international commitments, in particular WTO rules, and therefore it will be necessary to ensure that the phase in of the CBAM and phase out of the free allowances do not, at any point in time over the transitional period, afford double protection to EU producers.

As regards electricity, the preferred option is to apply a CBAM based on the carbon emission factor (**option b**), and in particular the variant based on the carbon emission factor of the electricity mix of the respective exporting country. Overall, option b is efficient in reducing carbon leakage while keeping administrative costs low as discussed in Annex 8.

This choice of options would best meet the objectives of the intervention and would introduce a proportionate mechanism to address climate change by reducing GHG

emissions in the EU and avoiding that these emissions are replaced by emissions outside the EU. In addition, the gradual phase out of EU ETS allowances would allow for businesses and authorities to carry out a prudent and predictable transition.

Policy option 4 ensures a high level of effectiveness for the CBAM. The introduction of import certificates based on actual emissions would provide stronger incentives to third country producers to move towards cleaner production processes, and thereby provide a stronger protection than all other options against the risk of carbon leakage, while respecting the EU's international commitments, among which WTO rules.

In terms of coherence with other EU policy goals, option 4 would be consistent with the EU ETS, ensure a level-playing field on carbon pricing and participate to the achievement of the EU's increased climate ambitions.

The assessment in section 6 highlights that option 4 performs well from an economic and social standpoint, with limited negative effects foreseen, and a better performance compared to the MIX-full auctioning.

#### *8.4. Ensuring coherence in the finalisation of the package*

The final step of the sequential approach outlined above for the coherent design of the 'Fit for 55' proposals will be carried out on the basis of the analysis of this and the other impact assessment reports. The choices left open for policy-makers will be taken, measures fine-tuned and calibrated, and overall coherence ensured. Until that stage, all indications of preferred measures are to be considered preliminary as preserving overall effectiveness, efficiency and coherence may require adjustments as the final package takes shape.

In particular, the policy choices made with regards to the revision of the EU ETS and the Effort Sharing Regulation may affect the design of the CBAM. The compatibility of the mechanism with the EU ETS needs to be safeguarded. For instance, decisions on the strengthening of the existing EU ETS, through the increased stringency of the cap and the possible revision of the EU ETS benchmarks for free allocation may require adjusting the design of the CBAM, to guarantee the even-handedness between EU and third country producers. Similarly, the possible extension of the EU ETS to road transport and buildings or all fossil fuel combustion may have consequences on the approach retained for the CBAM, in particular on the scope of emissions covered. Finally, the different initiatives of the 'Fit for 55 Package' should ensure a coherent policy framework to address the risks of carbon leakage.

A comprehensive analysis will therefore be carried out to ensure consistency with all the relevant initiatives under the 'Fit for 55 Package'. To that end, a complementary document to the full set of individual impact assessments, looking at the effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of the final package, will accompany the 'Fit for 55' proposals.

#### *8.5. Timing considerations*

The objective to have the CBAM introduced at the latest by 2023, as agreed between the European Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on 17 December 2020, is indeed an ambitious one considering the length of the legislative procedure and the

time required to set up the necessary administrative functions for its effective implementation.

In view of the time necessary for the legislators to adopt the Regulation and the Implementing and Delegated Acts it may become necessary to consider a transitional period whereby the measure could be introduced on a simplified basis before implementing a full-fledged CBAM.

Such a stepwise approach would allow for swift implementation, but would involve simplifications involving implementation options that are not optimal from outset. Such simplifications could include the use of default values, which would allow determining the CBAM obligation based on the volume of product imported according to an average of emissions in the EU. Other simplifications could involve the administrative set-up, which for the transitional period may need to rely more to Member States authorities and less at central level.

## **9 HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?**

The Commission will ensure that arrangements are in place to monitor and evaluate the functioning of the CBAM and evaluate it against the main policy objectives. Given that the CBAM is one of the policy proposals under the 'Fit for 55 Package', monitoring and evaluation could be carried out in alignment with the other policies of the package.

The administration system should be evaluated after the first year of operation to identify any issues and potential improvements. In addition, when more data is available, the Commission will also review the scope of the CBAM to examine the possibility of extending it to cover emissions of additional sectors and further down the value chain. For this, it is necessary to monitor the effect of the CBAM on the shortlisted sectors.

Table 17 provides the objectives, progress indicators and data sources/measurement tools which would be used to inform against these indicators. The monitoring indicators are expected to be collected on a yearly basis. For evaluation purposes, annual statistics will be computed and compared between successive years.

**Table 17: Monitoring and evaluation indicators**

Objectives	Indicators	Measurement tools/data sources
<b>Reduce GHG emissions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Level of emissions in the EU</li> <li>- Level of emissions globally</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emission statistics</li> <li>- Sector statistics</li> </ul>
<b>Incentivise cleaner production processes in third countries</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evolution of actual emissions for CBAM sectors in third countries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Level of emissions demonstrated by third country producers subject to the CBAM</li> </ul>
<b>Prevent carbon leakage</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- As indicators of GHG emissions above</li> <li>- Level of emissions in the EU relative to level of emissions globally</li> <li>- Trade flows in CBAM sectors</li> <li>- Trade flows downstream</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emission statistics</li> <li>- Trade statistics</li> <li>- Sector statistics</li> </ul>
<b>Ensure consistency with EU policies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Import certificates price in line with the price in the EU ETS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Statistics from EU ETS and CBAM authorities</li> </ul>
<b>Limit administrative burden</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Timely treatment of CBAM enforcement (e.g. possible reconciliation procedure)</li> <li>- Frequency of updating EU ETS pricing</li> <li>- Checks of actual level of emissions by exporter</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Feedback from industry and public authorities responsible for CBAM implementation</li> <li>- Number of staff necessary for CBAM administration</li> </ul>



Brussels, 14.7.2021  
SWD(2021) 643 final

PART 2/2

**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT**

**IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT**

*Accompanying the document*

**Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council  
establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism**

{COM(2021) 564 final} - {SWD(2021) 644 final} - {SWD(2021) 647 final} -  
{SEC(2021) 564 final}

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## Glossary

<i>Term or acronym</i>	<i>Meaning or definition</i>
BM	Product Benchmark
BREF	EU Best Available Techniques Reference Documents
CAT	Carbon Added Tax
CBAM	Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CES	Constant Elasticity of Substitution
CHP	Combined Heat and Power
CIT	Corporate Income Tax
CL	Carbon Leakage
CLL	Carbon Leakage List
CN	Combined Nomenclature
CWT	Complexity Weighted Tonnes
CO <sub>2</sub>	Carbon Dioxide
CTP	Climate Target Plan
DRI	Direct Reduced Iron
DSGE	Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
EITE	Energy Intensive and Trade Exposed
ETS	Emissions Trading System
FAR	Free Allocation Rules
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GVA	Gross Value Added
HS	Harmonized System
JRC-GEM-E3	General Equilibrium Model for Economy-Energy-Environment
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

NACE	Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPK fertilisers	Nitrogen-Phosphorus-Potassium fertilisers
SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
VAT	Value Added Tax
VCM	Vinyl Chloride Monomer
WTO	World Trade Organisation

## **ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION**

### **1. Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references**

The lead DG is the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union. The Decide reference of this initiative is PLAN/2020/6513.

The Commission Work Programme for 2021 provides, under heading A European Green Deal, the policy objective of ‘Fit for 55 Package’, the initiative for a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and a proposal for CBAM as own resource (legislative, incl. impact assessment, planned for Q2 2021).

### **2. Organisation and timing**

The Inter-service Steering Group was set up by the Secretariat-General to assist in the preparation of the initiative. The representatives of the following Directorates General participated in the ISSG work: Legal Service, CLIMA, TRADE, JRC, COMP, GROW, ECFIN, ENER, EEAS, INTPA, NEAR, MOVE, BUDG, ENV, AGRI, JUST, RTD, REA, MARE.

A total of five Inter-Service Steering Group meeting took place, with the last being on 16 March 2021.

It should be noted that in addition to the Inter-Service Steering Group, DG TAXUD held seven meetings to discuss the design and legal issues of the mechanism with representatives from the following Directorates General: Legal Service, CLIMA, TRADE, ENER, BUDG, NEAR. The last meeting of the group took place on 11 January 2021.

### **3. Consultation of the RSB**

On 17 March 2021, DG TAXUD submitted the draft Impact Assessment to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and the Board meeting took place on 21 April 2021. The opinion of the Board, as issued on 23 April 2021, was positive with reservations.

The Board’s recommendations have been addressed as presented below.

*1) The report should be self-standing. It should describe the existing measures to prevent carbon leakage and better identify their weaknesses.*

The recommendation was addressed by expanding the discussion under the problem definition of the impact assessment (Section 2). An addition subsection was introduced (Section 2.2 ‘How is the problem currently being addressed?’) outlining how the risk of carbon leakage has been identified from the beginning of the EU ETS and what have been the two mechanisms, employed under the existing system to address it (i.e. free allocation of ETS allowances and the possibility for Member States to give state aid to electro-intensive undertakings active in a sector exposed to international trade). The discussion on the evidence on the risk of carbon leakage as identified in the literature was also improved and expanded drawing from the analysis previously detailed under Annex 11.

*2) The report should strengthen the discussion on the coherence with the new ETS proposal. It should explain to what extent the ETS revision depends on the CBAM*

*initiative. The report should justify why it deviates from the ETS on some aspects, such as sectoral coverage and the inclusion of transport emissions. It should better explain why it proposes a parallel system with CBAM certificates to match the carbon content of imports, instead of ETS allowances. The report should be more explicit on the envisaged timeframe for the gradual introduction of CBAM and its coherence with the revision of the ETS.*

The recommendation was addressed by expanding the analysis under Section 2.4 ‘How will the problem evolve?’. The discussion now provides a more detailed account of the fact that the CBAM would be complementary to the EU ETS, with a view to addressing the risk of carbon leakage and reinforcing the EU ETS itself. It proceeds by explaining the interdependence of CBAM proposal and the proposal of EU ETS revision in the context of problem evolution. In this context, the report further explains, under Section 5.2.1.1 ‘Scope of emissions’, the reasons for not including transport emissions at this stage. Specifically at this stage the details of the extension of the ETS to transport are not fully known and will in any case depend on the outcome of the legislative process. It would be more prudent to schedule the inclusion of transport emission to take place when the scope of CBAM is next revised. On sectoral coverage the report is clear in that the choice of CBAM’s coverage is framed by the sectors and emissions covered by the EU ETS. Moreover, the discussion in Section 5.2.3 ‘Option 2: Import certificates for basic materials based on EU average’ has been expanded to provide more insight on the methodological choices regarding the design of CBAM certificates. Finally, the discussion under Section 8 ‘Preferred option’ now discusses the main issues related to the envisaged timeframe of the measure.

*3) The report should better present and analyse the costs and benefits of different administrative options, in particular centralised versus decentralised implementation, to clearly inform the political choices. It should discuss the risks for a timely implementation, in particular linked to the development of IT systems and the potential set-up of a central administrative CBAM body.*

The recommendation was addressed by expanding the analysis under Section 5.2.1 ‘Design elements common to all options’ through the introduction of a new section on 5.2.1.9 ‘Elements related to administrative design’. The discussion now clarifies that there are essentially two main options in the institutional design of CBAM -a centralised system based on a Central CBAM authority at EU level and a decentralised system resting on national authorities of Member States. The main characteristics, as well as the benefits and costs of each are also discussed. Section 5.2.1.9 also provides a provisional estimate of the costs and staffing needs related to the administrative set up for the measure. Finally, the discussion under Section 8 ‘Preferred option’ discuss issues related to timely implementation and the potential simplifications that may be necessary to ensure CBAM is operational from 2023.

*4) As CBAM is an alternative to free allowances, the initiative should be mainly compared with the scenario with free allowances, and not with the counterfactual with full auctioning.*

The recommendation was addressed by comparing all the CBAM options to the MIX scenario with free allowances. As indicated in the Board’s detailed technical comments the full auctioning variant was maintained as an additional reference point to disentangle the effect of removing free allowances from the specific effects of introducing CBAM.

*5) The impact analysis should better highlight the effects of the introduction of CBAM on the competitiveness of EU exporters on third-country markets. It should better integrate the risks and consequences of resource shuffling and of carbon leakage down the value chain.*

The recommendation was addressed by expanding the analysis in different parts of the impact assessment report. Specifically, section 6.4.3 ‘Trade impacts’ provides a more detailed clarification on the effects of CBAM on EU export competitiveness, while the analysis in the said section has been expanded to include also the views of stakeholders on this matter as recorded in the Commission’s open public consultation. The report has also been expanded to integrate more clearly and concretely the risks and consequences of resource shuffling and carbon leakage down the value chain. Section 5.2.1.10 ‘Resource shuffling’ now provides a more detailed analysis of the drivers and implications of resource shuffling. References on the limitations posed by the problem are also included in the impacts section. Nevertheless, the report also recognises that resource shuffling is an unescapable fact, difficult to quantify ex ante. Equally, the report seeks to balance the fact that even in the presence of resource shuffling, the fact that those third countries have to make an effort to produce low carbon-intensive products for the EU market will be positive from a climate perspective. Finally, section 6.2.2 ‘Preventing Carbon leakage’ provides a more insight into the impacts on the value chain and the drivers of this impact (complexity of manufacturing process downstream and corresponding value added in later stages).

*6) While global emissions and engaging with third countries are part of the (specific) objectives, the relation with third countries should receive more attention. The report should explain how the CBAM initiative is consistent with the Paris Agreement, and its parties setting their own ambition levels.*

The recommendation was addressed by expanding the analysis under Section 2.1 ‘What is the problem?’ and the inclusion of a new section (2.1.1) on ‘CBAM in the context of the Paris Agreement’.

*7) The report should systematically take into account the comments made by the different stakeholder groups throughout the report. In particular, it should be transparent on their positions on the different options and confront any concerns with the findings of the analysis.*

The recommendation was addressed by including references and further insight from the feedback obtained from different stakeholder on the Open Public Consultation. Views of stakeholders on the different policy options, as well as on anticipated impacts on business and consumers have been integrated in differentiated assessments in the body of the report. The analysis now clarifies that by introducing a CBAM, the EU will ensure that goods imported into the EU follow the same rules as the goods produced in the EU without interfering with policy choices in third countries. In order to respect the Paris Agreement and the principle of nationally determined contributions (NDC) therein as well as the principle of Common but Differentiated responsibility, the CBAM would be designed in such manner that it does not directly depend on the overall level of ambitions of a country or on the policy choices made by a country.

*8) The methodological section (in the annex), including methods, key assumptions, and baseline, should be harmonised as much as possible across all ‘Fit for 55’ initiatives. Key methodological elements and assumptions should be included concisely in the main*

*report under the baseline section and the introduction to the options. The report should refer explicitly to uncertainties linked to the modelling. Where relevant, the methodological presentation should be adapted to this specific initiative.*

The recommendation was addressed by further clarifying the methods, key assumptions, and baseline ensuing harmonised approach and presentation to other ‘Fit for 55’ initiatives. Key methodological elements and assumptions presented in the main report under the baseline section and the introduction to the options have been further strengthened and clarified.

#### **4. Evidence, sources and quality**

The evidence for the impact assessment report was gathered through various activities and from different sources:

- Studies on Carbon Leakage:
  - 2030 Revised climate ambition impact assessment
  - Carbon Leakage in the Emissions Trading System (ETS) Phase 3 and 4
  - Alternatives to address carbon leakage – DG CLIMA
- Studies on Carbon Border Adjustment:
  - Design and effects
  - Modelling – JRC and DG ECFIN
  - World Trade Organisation (WTO) – DG TRADE
  - OPC results analysis
  - Effect of a CBAM on energy markets – DG ENER
- Feedback on the Inception Impact Assessment
- Desk research

## ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION

### 1. Introduction

For the preparation of this initiative, the Commission designed a stakeholder’s consultation strategy, which is summarized in this synopsis report. The aim of the synopsis report is to present the outcome of the consultation activities and to show how the input has been taken into account.

The consultation strategy encompasses both public and targeted consultations. Further details are given in Table 2-1.

**Table 2-1: Overview of consultation activities**

Methods of consultation		Stakeholder group	Consultation period	Objective/Scope of consultation
Inception Assessment mechanism)	Impact (feedback)	Academic/research institutions Business association Company EU citizen Non-EU citizen Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) Trade Union Public Authorities	4 March – 1 April 2020	Collect feedback on the inception impact assessment outlining the initial considerations of the project.
Targeted Consultation	By External Contractor	Business Association Company Public authorities NGOs	September – December 2020	Gather perspectives on the various options for CBAM. Identify relevant points of concern and open questions for further research.
	Bilateral Stakeholder’s meetings	Business Association Company Public authorities	2020 – 2021	Discuss issues and policy options with shareholders to ascertain views and possible impacts on specific sectors. Share knowledge and experience.
Public Consultation		Academic/research institutions Business association Company EU citizen Non-EU citizen NGOs Trade union Public Authorities	22 July – 28 October 2020	Ascertain the views of a broad range of stakeholders mainly on the justifications, objectives, potential design and scope as well as impacts of the initiative.

The main objectives of the different consultation streams are:

- Provide stakeholders and the wider public with the opportunity to express their views on all relevant elements.
- Gather specialised input to support the analysis of the impact of the initiative.

- Contribute to design the technical aspects of the future initiative.
- Satisfy transparency principles and help to define priorities for the future initiative.

As reflected above by the different methods of consultation used and stakeholders groups reached, the stakeholder consultation strategy has formed an integral part of the policy development process.

## **2. Consultation participation**

### *1. Feedback on the inception impact assessment*

The consultation period through this feedback mechanism took place between 4 March and 1 April 2020 via the Commission website. The period started when the inception impact assessment was published outlining the initial thinking and policy options of the project. 219 responses were submitted during this consultation period broken down into: approximately 150 responses by trade federations, business associations and individual businesses, 20 NGOs, 20 citizens and the remaining from think tanks, academic/research institutions, trade unions and public authorities. The majority of responses came from the EU, with 24 from third countries.

### *2. Targeted consultation*

The external contractor conducted a total of 25 in-depth interviews with senior managers and associations from the basic materials sectors, manufacturers, NGOs and policymakers. There were two rounds of interviews. First, 17 informal interviews were conducted at an early stage of the study. In addition to gathering stakeholders' opinions, these interviews served to identify relevant points of concern and open question for further research. In a second step, eight additional interviews were conducted in order to test whether the judgements and concerns from the informal interviews were shared among a wider group of stakeholders. 17 stakeholders came from industry, 5 from NGOs and 3 from Member State institutions.


### *3. Public Consultation*

The public consultation was placed on the Commission website, and remained open for fourteen weeks from 22 July 2020 to 28 October 2020 in line with the Better Regulations Guidelines. The consultation questionnaire consisted of 43 questions: 38 closed-ended questions and 5 open-ended questions and aimed to gather opinions from citizens and organisations on the justifications, objectives, potential design and scope as well as impacts of the initiative. Respondents were also allowed to upload position papers.

A total of 615 respondents participated in the public consultation. Of these, 6 responses were duplicates, leading to 609 valid contributions. Figure 2-1 presents the type and countries of the stakeholders. From the point of view of the size of the organisations involved, 120 are micro (1 to 9 employees), 108 small (10 to 49 employees), 53 medium (50 to 249 employees) and 156 large (more than 250 employees).



**Figure 2-1: Types and countries of respondents**



Source: Public consultation questionnaire responses

A total of 228 position papers were submitted by the respondents. Overall, 121 position papers were selected for the final analysis. These were selected based on 3 selection criteria, namely: sector, respondent type and country (with balanced representation between member States and non-EU countries). 115 of these papers were selected from the survey consultation. In addition, 6 papers were selected from the Inception Impact Assessment consultation to cover respondent categories that were not sufficiently covered in the survey consultation.

It is also worth remarking that two campaigns were identified. More specifically Campaign A includes 23 responses by stakeholders based either in Germany or Austria and belonging to EU citizens or NGOs stakeholders. They are in favour of a CBAM to address carbon leakage while fighting against climate change and they show preference for the excise duty and import tax options. Campaign B comprises 22 responses by stakeholders (companies, business associations but also 1 Public authority and 1 NGO) with some linkages with the Russian steel value chain. Their answers are identical and they argue that a CBAM would impose unnecessary burdens on the EU industry, they emphasise that current measures (e.g. EU ETS and EU state aid rules) are sufficient to address the risk of carbon leakage and they clearly prefer a carbon tax at consumption level over any other alternative for a CBAM, while deeming a tax on imports at the EU border entirely irrelevant. However, the number of responses included in each of the two campaigns is not large enough to have a significant impact on the consultation results.

### 3. Methodology and tools for processing the data

The consultation activities allowed for the collection of data of both qualitative and quantitative nature, which were processed and analysed systematically. Qualitative data was structured according to key themes. Quantitative data (including survey responses and figures provided by stakeholders) was processed using Excel spreadsheet, and analysed using statistical methods, ensuring the appropriate protection of personal data without publishing the information of the respondents that did not give their consent.

## **4. Consultation results**

### *1. Inception impact assessment feedback*

Overall, the majority of replies (approximately 140) expressed support for the CBAM, with the remaining being roughly divided equally between limited and no support. The vast majority of responses expressed cautiousness in the design of the measure requesting to consider all options possible. Among others, key areas emphasized were the impact on value chains and reliance on imports of raw materials, avoidance of excessive effects on final consumers, links to EU ETS and free allowances, distributional impact in affected sectors and across countries, especially developing economies and interaction with existing trade defence measures on raw materials.

In more specific terms, some of the main concerns highlighted by stakeholders included: the negative impact on free trade and global supply chains, reduction of imports, harm to cross-border electricity infrastructure investment, the questionable existence of carbon leakage, WTO compatibility, the possibility of retaliatory trade measures and the need to protect the competitiveness of the EU industry. There were suggestions as to the sectoral scope and scope of emissions to be covered as well as the continuation of free allowances. Lastly, concerns were also expressed on the methodology to be adopted in the design of the measure and the potential administrative burden of the measure.

### *2. Targeted consultation*

As the targeted consultation interviews focused on the perspective of stakeholders on the policy options the results will be discussed for each option. Responses broken down by stakeholder type and sector are presented in Table 2-2.

Regarding Option 1 there were major concerns regarding carbon leakage for European exporters (all materials producers), downstream manufacturers (e.g. steel), as well as resource shuffling (mostly steel and aluminium). While NGOs regarded abolishing free allowance allocation as an attractive feature of this option, some industry players saw it as an opportunity to mitigate leakage concerns in the short term if it was combined with free allocation (Option 4), albeit less of a long-term solution.

Option 6 (excise duty) was seen as providing an attractive investment framework into climate neutral production processes. It was named as the preferred option by several industry and manufacturing representatives, but these interviewees also pointed out that an adequate amount of free allocation was needed to guarantee an effective carbon leakage protection. The administrative complexity was seen as manageable.

The carbon added tax (CAT) was seen as an attractive instrument theoretically. However, stakeholders agreed that the administrative complexity of the tracing ruled out the instrument in practice.

**Table 2-2: Responses of targeted consultation by stakeholder type and sector**

	<i>No. of inter-views</i>	<i>Option 1: CBAM on imports with auctioning (basic materials only)</i>	<i>Option 6: Excise duty with free allocation (materials also in manufactured products)</i>	<i>CAT with CBAM (materials also in manufactured products)</i>	<i>Other comments</i>
<b>Cement</b>	4	Surplus capacity moves pricing towards marginal costs which are higher in EU: CBAM as short-term defence; Lack of export rebate will lead to a loss of exports from European producers	Systematic approach seen as opportunity to unlock climate neutral investment. Concern about speed of implementation and if free allocation remains sufficiently close to benchmark	In theory good carbon leakage protection, but extremely complex in construction sector. Not realistic in the short term but could be considered post-2030	Favour coexistence of CBAM and free allocation to ensure level playing field Broad sectoral scope important to avoid substitution effects
<b>Steel</b>	4	Primary focus on short-term survival. Surplus free allowance allocation caused by historic base line seen as rescue in current crisis, hope for additional protectionist element. Combination with full auctioning not expected. Danger of carbon leakage not solved (both for exports of basic materials, as well as imports and exports of manufactured goods if only basic materials covered), strong concerns about resource shuffling as an advantage for importers	Systematic approach seen as foundation for climate neutral investment strategy (seen as most favourable option). Concern about level of continued free allowance allocation (no leakage protection without continued free allowances). Free allocation needs to be at benchmark level also for low-carbon processes. Administrative complexity is manageable.	Extremely high administrative costs due to complexity of tracing requirements. Worry about reliability of reporting for non-European countries	CBAM on imports and exports only possible if free allocation is retained ('red line')
<b>Aluminium</b>	2	Not seen as a viable option due to concerns about resource shuffling; high indirect carbon costs require continued compensation in case of full auctioning	Welcome option, would require that also indirect emissions are covered. Simplicity of the system is attractive.	Complexity of tracing of actual emissions major disadvantage	-
<b>Chemicals and plastic</b>	4	Large concerns about leakage risks along value chain for most players because trade occurs mostly in later stages of the value chain	Seen as option to support sustainable business from life-cycle perspective (clean processes and circularity), which is requested by many high value customers in competition with other	Complexity of tracing actual emissions would require technology such as block chain. This option entails high fraud	Free allocation deemed necessary for transition; Resource shuffling under CBAM will

			materials; weakness that leakage protection depends on free allowance mechanism	risks	remain concern as long as no international acceptance of CBAM
<i>NGO</i>	5	Seen as attractive tool if primary objective is moving away from free allowance allocation.	Seen as element for advancing investments towards climate neutrality. Could help on emission reductions from material/fertiliser efficiency and recycling. Continued free allocation might require political deal (tighter target, use of revenue for international climate action)	Important in discussions in Netherlands	
<i>Manufacturing</i>	3	Fear of accumulation of burden in different countries; only basic materials seen as counteracting EU industrial strategies for manufacturing industries	Novel instrument; preferable to imports only CBAM; legally most secure variant; additional charge for EU sales seen as problematic depending on level of the charge	Not seen as viable in practice	-
<i>Member States' policymakers</i>	3	Differing opinions: One side: major concerns around resource shuffling and lacking coverage of exports and value chain in manufacturing industries Other side: questions future effectiveness of free allocation and sees CBAM that mirrors EU ETS as most effective leakage protection; little concern about resource shuffling	Differing opinions: Shift of paradigm; needs long term alignment with EU ETS; fiscal offset of reduced auctioning through charge; administratively easy Other side: reliance on free allocation not considered future proof and providing too little incentives for use of low-carbon materials	In theory good carbon leakage protection, but extremely complex in construction sector. Not realistic in the short term but could be considered post-2030	Need to consider trade impact of possible retaliation measures by other countries and social acceptability One side sees need to continue free allocation at least as transition


### 3. Public Consultation

A concerted effort was made to ensure that the views and concerns of all affected stakeholders were carefully considered throughout the impact assessment exercise. The public consultation gathered the views of the stakeholders on the problems presented, justification, design and impact of the proposed measure.

Respondents irrespective of group seem to indicate that a CBAM can be **justified** by differences of ambition between the EU and third countries when it comes to fighting climate change, and that it can contribute to both EU and global climate efforts. Citizens indicate most agreement, whereas responses from bordering countries show relative disagreement. Most do not believe that a CBAM would impose unnecessary burdens on the EU industry, however companies and business associations, as well as stakeholders in bordering countries are relatively more concerned on this point.

With respect to the problem of **carbon leakage**, most respondents (apart from those coming from bordering countries) appear to believe that carbon leakage is a real issue and that the CBAM can address carbon leakage, foster consumption of low-carbon products in the EU, and stimulate the deployment of low-carbon technologies and ambitious climate policies in third countries. On the effectiveness of current measures in the context of the EU ETS and state aid rules to limit carbon leakage, and on the ability of other regulatory measures to reduce greenhouse gas ('GHG') emissions companies, business associations and public authorities have a positive belief whereas citizens and other stakeholders are more critical. Finally, all stakeholder groups apart from public authorities which are neutral seem to disagree that the current measures under the EU ETS can address carbon leakage sufficiently in regards to enhanced climate ambitions in the EU.

**Figure 2-2: Options for designing CBAM based on stakeholder group**




Source: Public consultation questionnaire responses

Regarding the **design** of the mechanism, responses appear to indicate that all policy options listed in the questionnaire are at least somewhat relevant for the design of a CBAM as can be seen in Figure 2-2. Companies are relatively less enthusiastic about all the proposed solutions and they attach limited relevance for the design of a CBAM to an extension of the EU ETS or a carbon tax on consumption, but they show a greater preference for the import tax. In addition, a carbon tax on imports has limited relevance for respondents based on bordering countries

Responses on the **product coverage** of the measure are presented on Figure 2-3. Respondents appear to suggest that the CBAM should focus on products from activities already included in the EU ETS (especially those with the highest risk of carbon leakage) and account for entire value chains.

**Figure 2-3: Product Coverage**



Source: Public consultation questionnaire responses

On **sectoral coverage**, each respondent was allowed to select up to 10 sectors in the online questionnaire. The following five sectors are selected more than 50 times by the 609 respondents:

- i) Electric power generation, transmission and distribution.
- ii) Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster.
- iii) Manufacture of iron and steel and of ferro-alloys.
- iv) Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds, plastics and synthetic rubber.
- v) Extraction of crude petroleum.

In **implementation issues** there does not seem to be a consensus among respondents on the possible approach that can be applied to compute the carbon content of imported products. Respondents suggest that: i) both direct and indirect emission should be factored in; ii) emissions should account for the entire value chain of products in different countries; and iii) importers should have the possibility to demonstrate how the imported product was manufactured, in a verifiable manner. To a lesser extent, respondents appear to indicate that the approach should rely upon: i) the EU product benchmarks for free allocation under the EU ETS; and ii) the Commission product environmental footprint method.

Moreover, a number of respondents specified that the carbon content of imported products should be verified by an independent third party, with respondents from third countries showing less enthusiastic on that option. Furthermore most stakeholder groups disagreed with permitting self-certification, apart from public authorities. In addition, most participants and especially companies and business associations argued that the possibility to grant a rebate to EU exporters should be explored under the CBAM.

The majority of respondents in all stakeholder groups also expressed that the following avenues for circumvention would appear to pose significant risks to the correct functioning of the CBAM and should be prevented:

- i) substitution between primary inputs and semi-finished goods;
- ii) resource shuffling in the form of allocating low carbon production only to the EU;
- iii) transshipment strategies via exempted third countries;
- iv) avoidance based on minor modification of imported products.

The majority of the respondents seem to indicate that no exemption should be granted and that all imports should be subject to a CBAM on an equal footing with citizens being the greatest advocate of that and public authorities agreeing the least. Consulted stakeholders in all groups though, leave room for exempting partner countries with established climate policies that create incentives for emission reductions, similar to those in force in the EU. In contrast, there is no agreement in respect to granting credits for importing countries with climate policies generating carbon costs higher than in the EU.

On **expected impacts** the public consultation looked at economic, environmental and social impacts, as well as administrative burdens. On **economic impacts**, the respondents collectively recognise that the CBAM would: i) encourage the consumption of low-carbon products; ii) have a positive impact on innovation; iii) have a positive impact on the competitiveness of the EU industry; and iv) have a positive impact on investment in the EU. They also appear to agree, however, that it would lead to increased costs for EU businesses in downstream sectors. However, companies, business associations and public authorities believe that the CBAM would impinge on EU exporters in the relevant sectors. In addition, respondents based in bordering countries argue the above effects to be negative instead of positive.

**Environmental impacts** are positive across all respondents, as they suggest that the CBAM would have positive would improve the effectiveness of policies against climate change, reduce carbon emission globally, and promote the adoption of ambitious climate policies in third countries. Business stakeholders are less convinced than other stakeholders on the extent this will be achieved, whilst stakeholders from bordering countries disagree on the effectiveness of CBAM to reduce carbon emissions on a global scale.

**Social impacts** are perceived to be both positive and negative. On the positive side, respondents seem to agree that the mechanism would avoid job losses in the EU, with business stakeholders questioning that. However, all stakeholder groups also appear to indicate that the CBAM may: i) increase the price of consumer products; ii) lead to job losses in downstream sectors; and iii) generate potential negative effects on the living standards of the poorer segments of the population.

Relating to the **administrative burden**:

- About 95 % of respondents (478 out of 503) suggest that the CBAM could increase administrative burdens for exporters and importers.
- Almost 93 % of respondents (460 out of 495) envisage an increase in administrative burdens borne by public administrations in the EU.
- The majority of respondents (336 out of 480) appear to maintain that the CBAM is expected to generate relatively higher administrative burdens for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), however, almost one third of respondents appear to disagree with this conclusion.

It should be noted that the stakeholder group disagreeing with the above is citizens.

Lastly, the positions papers gathered by all stakeholder groups raised the following key challenges:

- Consideration of economic and environmental impacts.
- Technical design (e.g. Calculation of carbon content, default values).
- Balance the burden between EU and non-EU companies.
- Ensuring robust data collection and verification process.
- Retaliation measures.
- Implemented in a way to strengthen global climate ambition.
- Ensure competitiveness of EU industry on global market.
- Contributing to decarbonisation of sectors through innovation and investment.
- Definition of sectoral scope of CBAM and maintaining free allowances.
- Alignment with EU ETS.

## **5. Conclusions**

The results of the public and targeted consultations allowed the Commission to collect a significant number of views and opinions on the initiative. Both public and targeted consultations showed agreement on the necessity of a CBAM to address the risk of carbon leakage and help the EU to achieve its increased climate ambitions.

Regarding the design options an import tax and a tax at consumption level are the most favoured by the public consultation. The targeted consultation shows greater preference for the excise duty option largely because of its retention of free allocation and disproof of the CAT due to its complexity and increased administrative burden. In addition, all consultations largely point to the same initial sectors for CBAM coverage.

With respect to expected impacts, the public consultation provides for positive economic and environmental impacts but mixed social impacts. This is partly confirmed by the targeted consultation which shows that environmental and economic impacts vary depending on the option. As for administrative costs the majority of respondents in both consultations believe they will be increased, with the targeted consultation specifying that for certain options.

Finally, it is worth noting that the feedback received throughout the public and the targeted consultations has been used to inform the choice of the design elements and the preferred policy options.



## **ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW?**

### **1. Practical implications of the initiative**

The initiative would affect the following stakeholders:

- Private sector/industry.
- Public administration/Competent authorities.
- EU citizens.
- Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

#### ***(a) Private sector/industry***

The proposal for a CBAM will increase costs for both imports and domestic production. Producers of basic materials have to pay a carbon price on their emissions. Imports of basic materials from third countries face carbon costs similar to the costs of European producers. The possibility to demonstrate that the carbon efficiency of their product is better than the default value, would increase costs, but this also provides emission reduction incentives for the share of materials that is exported to the EU.

Producers will face the following costs:

- Increase in carbon costs.
- Monitoring the quantity of imported products.
- Tracking the place of origin.
- Monitoring the embedded GHG emissions of products stemming from the production process.
- Verification of the monitored emissions.
- Cost related to the documentation of the process, including the submission of information to the CBAM registry.
- Costs related to making the payment.
- Costs related to the preparation for controls by the authorities.
- Buying and surrendering of import certificates (CBAM certificates).

Compliance costs are likely to be higher for SMEs. These costs are detailed in Annex 6 for businesses and SMEs.

However, the investment in low carbon technologies will improve production efficiency and prepare businesses for more sustainable production processes.

#### ***(b) Administrative management of the CBAM***

The EU will benefit from the increased revenues stemming from the CBAM. A detailed assessment can be found in Annex 6.

Public administration will face similar costs than businesses from a CBAM, with the main differences arising from assessing information and controlling the reports from economic operators. Costs linked to the establishment of a central CBAM registry are also foreseen.

Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) rules for the CBAM should be based on those in the EU ETS. To ensure synergies, there should be some coordination and learning between the respective competent authorities, and deadlines for the compliance cycle should be coordinated.

*(c) EU citizens*

Due to the implementation of a CBAM and the shift towards cleaner technologies, a limited increase on consumer prices is expected. In fact, prices across household consumption fall slightly with the exception of minor increases in vehicles and household equipment. The distributional impact of CBAM, although small, is progressive.

There is a loss of employment in sectors covered by the CBAM, by -1.20 %. The effects on other downstream sectors are minimal.

Altogether, and in line with the objective of the CBAM, EU citizens will benefit from a reduction in GHG emissions.

*(d) Least Developed Countries (LDCs)*

CBAM may give rise to unintended economic risks due to additional costs for exporters and deteriorating terms of trade. Many countries in the Global South, and on the African continent in particular, are exposed to relatively high risks. In order to avoid new global dividing lines between countries with a low- and high-carbon export structure, the EU should carefully assess risk levels and support the transformative process that partner countries would need to undertake to adjust to the CBAM .

LDCs are not among the EU's main importers. Excluding intra EU-27 trade, LDCs comprise less than 0.1 % of imports to the EU in Iron and Steel, Fertilisers, and Cement. At the same time, the relative importance of these exports for LDCs' economies can conversely be quite large. Mozambique is an important exception to otherwise negligible shares of LDCs in EU imports, as the country accounts for 7.7 % of the EU's imports of aluminium. In fact, 54.1 % of Mozambican Aluminium CBAM sector exports were to the EU. While the Iron, Steel and Fertiliser sectors have 3-4 LDCs importing relatively evenly, the Aluminium and Fertiliser sectors are dominated by Mozambique and Senegalese imports respectively when it comes to LDCs.

**Table 3-1: Exports from LDCs to the EU in sectors likely impacted by CBAM<sup>1</sup>**

Sector	CBAM Product	EU-27 5-year Average Imports From All LDCs (€ ,000)	Countries (LDCs With Over 70 % LDC-EU market share)	% Share	Remarks
Cement	Other Cement	98.4	Cambodia	33.1 %	Almost threefold increase 2018-2020
			Chad	28.9 %	2016 imports only
			Senegal	13.4 %	Mainly 2016 imports
	Portland Cement	26.4	Haiti	92.4 %	2019 imports only
	Clinker	1	Uganda	40.0 %	Single-year import data for each country
Guinea, Mozambique, Senegal			20.0 % each		
Iron & Steel	Hot Rolled	575.4	Sierra Leone	78.8 %	96.0 % decrease 18/19 95.2 % increase 19/20
	Primary Forms	387.8	Niger	99.7 %	2020 imports only
	Coated Hot-Rolled	263.8	Myanmar	51.1 %	Mainly 2017 imports
			Niger	21.1 %	2017 & 2019 imports only
	Forged, Extruded & Wire	63.6	Ethiopia	77.0 %	2018 imports only
Aluminium	Aluminium Products	835,047.0	Mozambique	100.0 %	
	Unwrought Alloyed & Alloyed	15,201.8	Mozambique	87.1 %	Volatile. 99.6 % drop in 2020 from peak in 2018
Fertilisers	Mixed N Fertiliser	2,298.2	Senegal	94.3 %	2017 & 2018 imports only
	Other Fertilisers	474.6	Senegal	55.9 %	2018 & 2019 imports only
			Madagascar	16.0 %	
	Urea	1.8	Afghanistan	100.0 %	2019 imports only
	Nitric Acid	1.8	Ethiopia	100.0 %	2017 imports only

Source: DAI (2021). Supplementary Analysis to the Impact Assessment on the European Commission's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, commissioned by the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Partnerships (internal document)

Some key takeaways from the product level data include:

- Imports of other cement from Cambodia to the EU-27 have increased threefold between 2018-2020.
- Portland Cement only has one substantial import value from Haiti, all due to one-time imports in 2019.
- Imports of clinker from LDCs to the EU-27 are not substantial.
- CBAM Iron & Steel product imports from LDCs fluctuate annually, with several LDCs trading large quantities one year, to trading small (or zero) amounts the next year. This is also true for Mixed N and Other Fertilisers.
- Mozambique comprises nearly 100 percent of all CBAM Aluminium Product LDC imports to the EU-27.

<sup>1</sup> Products coverage is indicative. The final CBAM proposal may include additional subcategories of sectors

- No LDC imports in Ammonia were recorded to the EU-27 over the last 5 years. Urea and Nitric Acid imports from LDCs are relatively insignificant.

The carbon emissions resulting from LDCs' imports into the EU across the sectors tentatively reviewed for possible CBAM application are proportionately limited relative to those of other EU trading partners globally. It should be recognised nevertheless that those sectors do contribute to the economies of certain LDCs. The table below illustrates the proportional importance of these sectors in main LDC countries.

**Table 3-2: Relative importance of certain CBAM sectors in main LDC countries**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>GDP Contribution (%)</b>
Mozambique	<i>Aluminium</i>	Exports to EU accounted for nearly 7 % of GDP in 2020 – GDP contribution of sector around 13 %
Mauritania	<i>Iron Ore</i>	10-18 % per IMF projections – depends on iron prices
Sierra Leone	<i>Iron Ore</i>	Fluctuates per iron price – 2.48 % in 2017, 15.4 % in 2013
Senegal	<i>Phosphate mining &amp; Fertiliser Production</i>	~2 - 5 %

Finally, compliance costs are likely to be higher in LDCs relative to developed countries where governments, sectors and firms will have more capacity and access to expertise to facilitate verification and compliance. This includes institutions in charge of accreditation, availability of certification bodies and data on carbon intensity (needed for identifying carbon embedded in exports to the EU under CBAM). On the private sector side, LDC businesses are likely to on average have lower capacity than larger companies, in more advanced countries, to be able to comply with such procedures.

## 2. Summary of costs and benefits

**Table 3-3: Overview of Benefits for Preferred Option – Option 4**

<b>I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option</b>		
<b>Description</b>	<b>Amount</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>Benefits</b>		
Supporting reduction of GHG Emissions	Impact on carbon dioxide (CO <sub>2</sub> ) emissions in the CBAM sectors in EU27 and rest of the world (% change from MIX with free allocation in 2030): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>-1.0 %</b> in the EU in 2030</li> <li>- <b>-0,4 %</b> in the rest of the world in 2030</li> </ul>	By reducing GHG emissions in the EU, CBAM will enable the EU to achieve its increased targets for 2030 and become carbon neutral by 2050.
Preventing carbon leakage in CBAM sectors	Under option 4, carbon leakage in CBAM sectors is brought down to -29 % in 2030	Preventing carbon leakage is important to ensure that global emissions and imports of carbon embedded products do not rise as a result of the relocation of industry from EU.
Revenue generation	The yearly revenue stemming from CBAM is expected to be around: <b>EUR 9.1 billion in 2030</b> (7 billion EUR from auctioning and 2.1 billion EUR from CBAM)	- Revenue generated is made up of both the revenues from the CBAM itself, and from additional auctioning in the CBAM sectors

**Table 3-4: Overview of costs for Preferred Option – Option 4**

<b>II. Overview of costs – Preferred option</b>							
		Citizens/Consumers		Businesses		Administrations	
		One-off	Recurrent	One-off	Recurrent	One-off	Recurrent
<b>Economic and social costs in the EU</b>	Direct costs		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Overall small decrease in aggregate consumption of 0,56 %</li> <li>- expected limited increase in electricity prices</li> <li>- expected limited increase vehicle and household equipment products</li> </ul>	Cost of new technologies	Compliance costs (See below)	None	None
	Indirect costs	- minimal loss of employment in downstream sectors		None	None	None	None

<b>Enforcing CBAM<sup>2</sup></b>	Direct costs	None	None	None	- compliance costs for quantification of emissions, documentation, reporting - Higher compliance costs for SMEs - compliance costs for buying and surrendering CBAM certificates	- setting up systems (e.g. CBAM registry) - setting up system for certificates	- Enforcement costs on processing documents, payments and controlling goods. - Cost of administering registry accounts for transactions of CBAM certificates - Costs for monitoring, verification and reporting of carbon content
	Indirect costs	None	None	None	None	None	None

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<sup>2</sup> See Annex 6 for further details.

## ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS

### 1. Introduction

In order to assess the environmental, macro-economic, and distributional impacts of the CBAM, the analysis used three modelling tools: (1) JRC-GEM-E3, a computable general equilibrium model; (2) Euromod, a static microsimulation model; (3) PRIMES model (Price-Induced Market Equilibrium System), a large-scale applied energy system model that was employed specifically for the modelling of the electricity sector.

### 2. The JRC-GEM-E3

#### *Overview*

JRC-GEM-E3<sup>3</sup> (General Equilibrium Model for Economy-Energy-Environment) is a recursive dynamic Computable General Equilibrium model. It is a global model, covering the EU, alongside 12 other major countries or world regions. With a detailed sectoral disaggregation of energy activities (from extraction to production to distribution sectors) as well as endogenous mechanisms to meet carbon emission constraints, the JRC-GEM-E3 model has been extensively used for the economic analysis of climate and energy policy impacts.

Divided into 31 sectors of activity, firms are cost-minimizing with Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production functions. Sectors are interlinked by providing goods and services as intermediate production inputs to other sectors. Households are the owner of the factors of production (skilled and unskilled labour and capital) and thereby receive income, used to maximize utility through consumption. Government is considered exogenous, while bilateral trade-flows are allowed between countries and regions using the Armington trade formulation where goods from different goods are imperfect substitutes.

In 5-year steps, an equilibrium is achieved at goods and services markets, and for factors of production through adjustments in prices.

The model integrates (in particular for the baseline building) inputs from energy system models (generally PRIMES for EU Member States and POLES-JRC for the rest of the world) on a number of variables of interest, such as a detailed use of energy products by consumers, global fuel prices, etc. More information on the integration of energy system model inputs in macroeconomic modelling in JRC-GEM-E3, can be found in the Impact Assessment of the Climate Target Plan (CTP) - Annex 9.3<sup>4</sup>.

The JRC-GEM-E3 model is normally used to compare (various) policy options against a baseline scenario, representing the evolution of the global economy under current energy and climate policies.


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<sup>3</sup> <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/gem-e3/model>

<sup>4</sup> European Commission. (2020). Stepping up Europe's 2030 climate ambition. (COM(2020) 562 final). Part 2: <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2020/EN/SWD-2020-176-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-2.PDF>



**Figure 4-1: A schematic representation of the GEM-E3 model.**



Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

The model can be used to assess the impacts of the energy and climate policies on macroeconomic aggregates such as GDP and employment. The most important results provided by JRC-GEM-E3 are: Full Input-Output tables for each country/region identified in the model, dynamic projections of national accounts by country, employment by economic activity and unemployment rates, capital stock, interest rates and investment by country and sector, bilateral trade flows, private and public consumption, consumption matrices by product and consumption purpose, GHG emissions by country, energy demand by sector and fuel, power generation mix, energy efficiency improvements.

Sources for main data inputs:

- Eurostat, GTAP and Exiobase: Input Output tables, National Accounts, Employment, Institutional Transactions, Labour force, Bilateral Trade, Capital stock, Taxes and tariffs, Household consumption by purpose
- Ageing Report and ILO: Employment, Unemployment rate
- PRIMES and POLES-JRC: Energy and emission projections

*Adjustments to the JRC-GEM-E3 model*

In order to capture the effect on some important sectors for which CBAM might be applied, the sectoral granularity of the JRC-GEM-E3 model was improved for the purposes of the modelling analysis. This exercise allowed for the model's underlying database to explicitly feature:

- aluminium
- fertilisers
- cement (and lime)
- iron and steel.

The main difficulty in splitting aluminium, fertilisers, cement (and lime) out of the more aggregate non-ferrous metals, chemicals, non-metallic minerals sectors was to obtain

adequate data to inform cost and use shares of the sectors<sup>5</sup>. Important aspects included capturing the emission and trade intensities of the sub-sectors as these are determinants of how effective leakage protection measures will be<sup>6</sup>. The GTAP 10 database<sup>7</sup> which is used as the main economic data source of the JRC-GEM-E3 model does not break out these subsectors. EXIOBASE<sup>8</sup>, another global input output table, does include these subsectors, and is used to determine cost and trade shares, including the trade intensity of the subsectors. It is however not advisable to run JRC-GEM-E3 with only relying on Exiobase due to the richer representation of taxes, subsidies, trade costs, etc. in GTAP.

In view of the above, the analysis integrated the Exiobase information into the GTAP database. In particular the analysis used GTAP data for the sectors not affected and constrained the sums of the subsectors to match the overall GTAP data. For example in the present data set aluminium and other non-ferrous metals sum up to the value of the non-ferrous metals sector in GTAP. This exercise was further augmented by cross-checking against additional data provided by DG CLIMA on emissions intensity of EU ETS sectors by the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE) codes in the EU member states and adjusting where necessary. The final dataset was compared again to the emissions reported in the European Union Transaction Log database to confirm that key characteristics are captured.

### *Description of the baseline*

The starting point of the analysis is the PRIMES EU Reference Scenario 2020, which is the common baseline for the Fit for 55 impact assessments. It provides projections for energy demand and supply, as well as GHG emissions in all sectors of the European economy under the current EU and national policy framework. It embeds in particular the EU legislation in place to reach the 2030 climate target of at least 40 % compared to 1990, as well as national contributions captured in the National Energy and Climate Plans to reaching the EU 2030 energy targets on energy efficiency and renewables under the Governance of the Energy Union. Projections for GDP, population and fossil fuel prices take into account the impact of the COVID crisis and are aligned with the 2021 Ageing Report. A more detailed description can be found in the impact assessment covering the revision of the ETS Directive.

The implementation of the EU Reference scenario into JRC-GEM-E3 is using the Pyramid methodology<sup>9</sup>, reproducing the energy balances of the PRIMES model for the EU Reference scenario and being fully harmonized with the macro data used to drive PRIMES for the EU (and UK)<sup>10</sup>. For non-EU regions (except UK), energy balances were taken from POLES-JRC, in particular the model runs produced for the Global Energy

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<sup>5</sup> Cost shares refer to the relative importance of different inputs in the cost of a sector to produce a unit of output, while use shares refer to the share of which products are used by other sectors as intermediate goods or as final goods.

<sup>6</sup> <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2012.08.015>

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/>

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.exiobase.eu/>

<sup>9</sup> See <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/macroeconomic.baselines.for.policy.assessments>

<sup>10</sup> As PRIMES energy balances do not explicitly specify the sub-sectors split out, assumptions are made to project energy use and emissions in the subsectors. In general, it is assumed that sub-sectors experience the same growth rates as the overall sector represented in PRIMES and that relative emission reductions are equal in sub-sectors.

and Climate Outlook 2020<sup>11</sup>. These also take into account the macroeconomic consequences of COVID-19 and likely (persistent) changes in the transportation sector.

The CBAM has to be seen in the context of a policy environment achieving -55 % emission reductions. For the modelling underlying this impact assessment, this policy context is mainly represented by the use of the MIX scenario. The MIX scenario achieves a reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions of 55 % compared to 1990 levels and of around 53 % excluding LULUCF. The GHG target includes intra-EU maritime and intra-EU aviation emissions in its scope. The scenario relies on both carbon price signal extension to road transport and buildings and strong intensification of energy and transport policies to achieve the higher GHG target. In the JRC-GEM-E3 model, the EU ETS is assumed to be expanded to also cover buildings and road transport, with full auctioning in these sectors. Free allowances are assumed to cover 100 % of emissions of energy intensive industries at risk of leakage. The scenario is implemented with a ‘soft coupling’ to the PRIMES model. This means that the scenario is using certain input values from the PRIMES model results for housing, transport and electricity sector, as well as providing guidance to set emission targets for (expanded) EU ETS and emission reduction potential for industrial process emissions.

As indicated in the main report, this impact assessment is drafted in parallel with the impact assessment on the revision of the ETS directive that sets out a number of scenarios for the strengthening of the existing EU ETS on power and industry installations. Each of these options have an impact on the evolution of free allocation. In view of this and to complement the analysis on the carbon leakage prevention framework, a variant of the MIX is also modelled depicting the case of complete removal of free allowances in the CBAM sectors<sup>12</sup>, in the absence of a CBAM.

#### *Closure rules and key assumptions*

Various alternative modelling assumptions were explored with the JRC-GEM-E3 model. For the purposes of this analysis, the focus is on the results based on budget neutrality, where government budgets are held fixed to baseline values relative to GDP with additional revenue provided as reductions of labour taxation<sup>13</sup> and allowing for the imperfect labour market to adjust after the policy shock.

Moreover, firms are assumed to fully pass on the value of free allowances to consumers (‘market share maximisation’). This market share maximization behaviour implies a zero pass through rate, i.e. firms are assumed to not pass through the opportunity cost of selling permits that they have received for free. While the empirical literature provides evidence of some pass through of opportunity costs depending on sector characteristics such as

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<sup>11</sup> Keramidas, K., Fosse, F., Diaz-Vazquez, A., Schade, B., Tchung-Ming, S., Weitzel, M., Vandyck, T., Wojtowicz, K. Global Energy and Climate Outlook 2020: A New Normal Beyond Covid-19, doi: 10.2760/608429, JRC123203.

<sup>12</sup> CBAM sectors refer to sectors where CBAM is considered as a possible alternative to free allocation of allowances under the EU ETS.

<sup>13</sup> This modelling approach ensures budget neutrality, rather than defining how additional revenues from CBAM as an own resource could be used. The introduction of CBAM and the associated own resource hence lowers the need of Member States contributions to maintain the same budget, lowering the need to raise revenue through (e.g. labour) taxes

market concentration<sup>14</sup>, revisions to the EU ETS will couple free allowances tighter to output values. The economic literature suggests that this would reduce or even eliminate pass through. The modelling approach without pass through is conservative, as it indicates larger consequences when moving from free allowances to full auctioning. The effect of adding CBAM on top of full auctioning would however be very similar regardless of the assumption on cost pass through.

### 3. Euromod

The estimates of the distributional impacts of the CBAM scenarios use Euromod, the European Union tax-benefit microsimulation model<sup>15</sup>. The Euromod model combines country-specific coded policy rules with representative household microdata (mainly from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions database, EU-SILC). The model employs information on countries' tax and benefit policy rules and on household characteristics and economic circumstances to simulate tax liabilities and cash benefit entitlements. Taxes and transfers that are not possible to simulate because of lack of relevant information are used as recorded in the original surveys. The model simulations take into account the role played by each tax-benefit instrument, their possible interactions, and generate the disposable (i.e. after taxes and cash benefits) household income<sup>16</sup>. Therefore, the model results are particularly suitable for the analysis of the distributional, inequality and poverty impact of tax changes, by households or groups according to socio-economic variables of interest. Cross-country comparability is enabled by coding the policy systems of the EU Member States according to a common framework and from the harmonization of the underlying microdata. Euromod simulations also provide estimations of the budgetary effects and indicators which are commonly used to measure work incentive effects of the policy scenarios.

It should be kept in mind that Euromod simulations do not incorporate any behavioural effects that may also affect the (second-round) fiscal as well as the distributional outcomes of a policy change. Thus, the model is static and delivers the first-round effects ('the overnight effect').

The analysis of the CBAM scenarios is based on the recently developed Indirect Tax Tool version 3 (ITTv3) extension of the Euromod model<sup>17</sup>. The ITT allows the simulation of indirect taxes (VAT and excises) and their impact on household and government budgets. In order to simulate these indirect tax liabilities, the ITT uses the underlying microdata of Euromod (primarily based on EU-SILC) combined with imputed private household expenditure information for more than 200 commodity categories from the harmonised Eurostat Household Budget Surveys (EU HBS). The tool applies the indirect taxation rules in place in each country (including VAT, specific and ad-valorem excises) to compute households' indirect tax liabilities based on their imputed

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<sup>14</sup> Cludius, Johanna & de Bruyn, Sander & Schumacher, Katja & Vergeer, Robert, 2020. 'Ex-post investigation of cost pass-through in the EU ETS - an analysis for six industry sectors', Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).

<sup>15</sup> For more detail see <https://euromod-web.jrc.ec.europa.eu/about/what-is-euromod>

<sup>16</sup> The main income inequality and poverty indicators which are used to evaluate the impact of CBAM are generally based on *equivalised* household disposable income, considering economies of scale in consumption within the household: *equivalised* income refers to the fact that household members are made equivalent by weighting them according to their age, using the so-called modified OECD equivalence scale.

<sup>17</sup> For more detail see <https://euromod-web.jrc.ec.europa.eu/about/extended-functionalities>

consumption basket. Currently, the ITT rests on the assumption of full tax compliance and of full pass-through, and it is available for 18 countries (BE, CY, CZ, DK, FI, FR, DE, EL, ES, HU, IE, IT, LT, PL, PT, RO, SI and SK).

The simulations conducted in this analysis are based on Euromod version I2.0. The tax-benefit systems simulated in the baseline refer to those in place in each country as of June 2019, while the underlying input data mainly come from the 2010 EU-SILC<sup>18</sup> and the 2010 HBS. Incomes reported in the EU-SILC of 2010 refer to 2009-2010. Uprating factors are used to update income and prices from the date of the input data to the year of interest, in this case 2019.

The distributional impact of the CBAM scenarios is analysed by estimating the changes in household adjusted disposable income (the disposable income<sup>19</sup> after the payment of indirect taxes) across the income distribution. Changes in household adjusted disposable income in the CBAM scenario under consideration are compared against the counterfactual (tax-benefit systems in place in 2019).

For the simulations of the CBAM options, the Euromod-ITT has been linked to the JRC-GEM-E3 macroeconomic model to account for the economy-wide impact of the reforms. Two main steps are followed to link the two models. In the first step, the baseline scenarios of the two models are aligned<sup>20</sup>. For this end, the consumption of each household in the ITT is adjusted proportionally in order to ensure that the aggregate share of consumption expenditure by each group of goods and services (e.g. 'Education' or 'Food') matches the one in the JRC-GEM-E3 model. In the second step, Euromod is fed with the impact of the simulated carbon-adjustment mechanism over prices and incomes, as simulated by JRC-GEM-E3. In more detail, the consumption expenditure of each household is adjusted to account for the changes in prices, while keeping constant the quantities consumed in each category. Furthermore, household income is also adjusted to account for the changes in labour and capital income triggered by the introduction of CBAM, as simulated by the JRC-GEM-E3. It should be noted that the recycling of the revenues from the carbon-adjustment mechanism is done through a budget-neutral reduction of labour income taxation, which is performed within the JRC-GEM-E3 model. The changes in labour income that feed the micro simulations from the macro model include the effect of this compensatory measure (alongside with the direct impact of the CBAM on prices and incomes mentioned above).

This procedure rests on two key assumptions affecting the estimation of the change in the indirect tax burden for households. First, in the CBAM scenarios, households are assumed to continue consuming the same quantities of all goods and services as before. This can be interpreted as consumers' demand being inelastic or the 'overnight effect' (households do not adapt their consumption basket after the change in price

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<sup>18</sup> While there are more up to date EU-SILC data, the 2010 version was chosen to match the latest EU-HBS dataset available for the imputation of consumption data.

<sup>19</sup> Household market income net of direct taxes and cash benefits.

<sup>20</sup> There are a number of reasons for the baselines of Euromod and JRC-GEM-E3 not to be necessarily aligned in a given year. One of them is that Euromod and JRC-GEM-E3 variables are constructed in accordance to different sets of statistics: for example, while in JRC-GEM-E3 household consumption is aligned with National Account data, consumption is recorded from survey data in Euromod.

immediately). That effectively rules out any offsetting effects via reduced demand.<sup>21</sup> Second, estimations of the changes in consumer prices resulting from the CBAM are calculated with the JRC-GEM-E3 model. This means impacts on producer prices are captured in the general equilibrium solution of the CGE model, but are exogenous to Euromod.

#### 4. PRIMES

The PRIMES model, was employed to assess CBAM for the electricity sector. PRIMES model (Price-Induced Market Equilibrium System<sup>22</sup>) is a large-scale applied energy system model that provides detailed projections of energy demand, supply, prices and investment to the future, covering the entire energy system including emissions. The distinctive feature of PRIMES is the combination of behavioural modelling (following a micro-economic foundation) with engineering aspects, covering all energy sectors and markets. The model has a detailed representation of instruments policy impact assessment related to energy markets and climate, including market drivers, standards, and targets by sector or overall. It simulates the EU Emissions Trading System in its current form. It handles multiple policy objectives, such as GHG emissions reductions, energy efficiency, and renewable energy targets, and provides pan-European simulation of internal markets for electricity and gas.

PRIMES offer the possibility of handling market distortions, barriers to rational decisions, behaviours and market coordination issues and it has full accounting of costs (CAPEX and OPEX) and investment on infrastructure needs. The model covers the horizon up to 2070 in 5-year interval periods and includes all Member States of the EU individually, as well as neighbouring and candidate countries. PRIMES is designed to analyse complex interactions within the energy system in a multiple agent – multiple markets framework. Decisions by agents are formulated based on microeconomic foundation (utility maximization, cost minimization and market equilibrium) embedding engineering constraints and explicit representation of technologies and vintages; optionally perfect or imperfect foresight for the modelling of investment in all sectors.

PRIMES allows simulating long-term transformations/transitions and includes non-linear formulation of potentials by type (resources, sites, acceptability, etc.) and technology learning. It is a private model maintained by E3Modelling<sup>23</sup>, originally developed in the context of a series of research programmes co-financed by the European Commission. The model has been successfully peer-reviewed and team members regularly participate in international conferences and publish in scientific peer-reviewed journals.

For the simulation of the effects of the CBAM in the electricity sector, the PRIMES electricity sector model is employed to project scenarios with and without the CBAM to assess the impacts on the power generation mix, investment, costs, prices and carbon emissions.

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<sup>21</sup> It is generally the case that when the price of a good rises (e.g. because an increase in taxation) the demanded quantity decreases. Empirically, price elasticity of demand are typically found to be in the range of (-1, 0).

<sup>22</sup> More information and model documentation: <https://e3modelling.com/modelling-tools/primes/>

<sup>23</sup> E3Modelling (<https://e3modelling.com/>) is a private consulting, established as a spin-off inheriting staff, knowledge and software-modelling innovation of the laboratory E3MLab from the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA).

The basic projection for the EU countries reflects the assumptions of the MIX scenario, based on the PRIMES model, as available in end January 2021. The alternative scenarios assume that the CBAM mechanism increases the unit cost of imports of electricity from third countries not applying carbon pricing, which induces a restructuring of electricity trade and readjustment in the fuel and capacity mix in the EU countries.

The analysis considered the period of 2025–2030. The model simulates optimal expansion and operation of the power system and handles power exchanges over the interconnection system simultaneously. The simulation fully includes all the EU countries, the UK, Norway, Switzerland and the Energy Community contracting parties (with the exception of Georgia). Exports from Russia are part of the simulation and are price elastic with respect to the CBAM obligation.

The PRIMES model of the power sector performs optimal (least-cost) capacity expansion and system operation of the interconnected system inter-temporally in the period 2025–2030. The unknown variables are investment in power generation plants and storage facilities, the hourly operation of plants, storage facilities and the cross-border flows, which respect a DC-linear power flow model. Demand for electricity is given, as projected for the MIX scenario; similarly heat and steam produced by cogeneration units is fixed, as projected in the MIX. Fuel costs, technical efficiencies and other parameters, the EU ETS carbon prices and the non-linear cost-potential curves for resources and plant siting are exogenous data. The model handles power plants individually, considers various types of investment decisions (e.g. greenfield, brownfield or refurbishment investment) and includes technical restrictions on their operation.

After projecting capacity expansion, operation and flows, the PRIMES power sector model calculates costs and revenues following a simulation of stylised wholesale markets and determines electricity tariffs per sector. The calculation of tariffs per sector of consumption takes care to recover all generation and grid costs and considers differentiation of prices by sector based on a simulation of retail supply that reflect a matching of load profiles and generation portfolios profiles as in bilateral contracts. Import and export prices reflect wholesale market prices.

## ANNEX 5: DEFINITIONS

- **Raw materials:** Materials which are at the beginning of any value chain and are result of mining or quarrying, or materials such as agricultural and forestry products (i.e. biomass). Raw materials can be physically modified (e.g. in aggregate size) compared to their natural form, but usually not chemically modified before used in a production process. Zero carbon content is assigned to raw materials.
- **(Basic) materials:** A material is either a (technically pure) substance or a mixture of substances in a physical form that can be sold, which has been derived from raw materials in an industrial process, during which their chemical composition is modified.
- **Basic material products:** Formed products which consist overwhelmingly of one single basic material, and which are usually produced in a (sometimes energy-intensive) process closely coupled and performed in the same installation as the basic material.
- **Components** (also referred to as semi-finished products): This term refers to products made of more than one basic material or basic material product, which require more complex manufacturing steps. A component by itself is usually not intended for end consumers but may replace parts of a final product.
- **Final products:** Every product that is made out of components and/or further basic materials/products and is ready for sales to end consumers. In contrast to the other products in the value chain, final products are not part of other final products.
- **Production process/production step:** a single operation which adds value to one of the material or product categories listed above, resulting in another material or product.
- **Value chain:** This is the sum of subsequent production steps. The value chains discussed regarding embedded emissions are always understood to include the processes from the raw material to the product discussed (i.e. relating to the specific partial product carbon footprint which relates to EU ETS processes to result in the product discussed). Longer value chains reach further downstream.
- **Upstream processes:** All the processes required to end up with the product or material discussed.
- **Downstream processes:** All processes in which the discussed product or material can be used. Downstream processes can reach as far as to include manufactured products intended for the final consumer.
- **Being covered by the EU ETS:** Production processes or specific GHG emissions from processes would be considered ‘covered by the EU ETS’, if those processes and GHG emissions are listed as an activity in Annex I of the EU ETS Directive<sup>24</sup>. Hence, this term should be understood to apply to installations both inside and outside the EU. This is because the term ‘embedded emissions’ relevant for CBAM design is intended to be aligned with EU ETS emissions, no matter in which country they take place.

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<sup>24</sup> Directive (EU) 2018/410 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018 amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments, and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 (OJ L 76/3).



- **Embedded emissions:** Emissions relating to a specific partial product carbon footprint of a material or product subject to the CBAM. The definition is intended such that the CBAM obligation for a material or product can be calculated as:  $\text{Obligation} = \text{Embedded emissions} \times \text{Tonnes product} [\times \text{Carbon price}]$ .
- **CBAM registry:** secure electronic registry system of CBAM importers at EU level. It would have to link to the relevant customs databases, manage the data of the ‘CBAM importers’, allow access for the relevant competent authorities and verifiers, and should store all emission data of installations in third countries which report emissions for the purpose of the CBAM. For the CBAM designs involving the surrender of CBAM certificates, the data stored in the CBAM registry will be used by the Central Administrative CBAM Body to recognize CBAM importers eligible to buy CBAM certificates and to fulfil the necessary monitoring and verification of surrendering sufficient CBAM certificates and accounting for any carbon price paid abroad by the importers.
- **CBAM Authority/National authorities tasked with CBAM:** Body(ies) assigned the task of selling CBAM certificates and conducting monitoring and verification of importers surrendering sufficient CBAM certificates to cover for embedded emissions in imported materials. In a centralised model, the body would be a central CBAM authority, while in a decentralised model these tasks would be carried out by national authorities.
- **CBAM certificate:** One certificate covers one tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent emissions embedded in imported materials and is part of CBAM designs involving the surrender of certificates to a Central Administrative CBAM Body as part of a reconciliation process.
- **Carbon pricing:** A price on GHG emissions can take the form of an emissions trading scheme or a carbon tax. Pricing of GHG emissions in the EU ETS is an important instrument of the EU’s policy package to support the transformation of industries towards climate neutrality. This is because it varies only slightly between Member States and it also results in direct price differences between production at different origins, creating the need to prevent the risk of carbon leakage. As a result of the measures to mitigate the risk of carbon leakage, the impact of the carbon price to foster innovation in low-carbon technology and resource efficiency is weakened and not consistent across products. This is because the effective share of priced emissions differs, as free allocation distorts the GHG price signal of EU ETS. The EU’s carbon pricing policies need to provide fully effective incentives for efficient and climate neutral production processes, efficient use and choice of materials as well as for recycling to effectively achieve climate neutrality in the EU in the context of a need for global emissions reductions as agreed in the Paris Agreement.

## **ANNEX 6: COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR BUSINESSES**

Compliance and enforcement costs refer to the costs that are incurred by businesses for complying with rules and obligations, and for authorities to administer the mechanism and ensure the rules are respected. This section assesses the costs of the different CBAM options following a standard cost model approach.

### ***Structure***

The assessment of compliance and enforcement costs considers the different design elements of setting up the various options of CBAM. On the one hand, these can be largely similar across options, but on the other, these also vary depending on the choice of implementation. For all options, existing processes and their costs for businesses and authorities have been considered to only quantify new costs additional to the business as usual scenario.

This section assesses the following parameters to cover possible combinations of option design and implementation set-up:

1. Whether the choice of instrument is an import tax, uses import certificates (CBAM certificates) or an excise duty system;
2. Whether the mechanism relies fully on default values or is one in which importers to claim individual treatment based on actual emission.

For each of these parameters, cost elements have been identified based on the necessary process. Cost elements can be based on information obligations that define data that economic operators need to be able to provide to authorities or transaction costs related to the payment itself. These cost elements have been standardised to unit costs to reflect single elements that can be multiplied by the number of yearly occurrences. The single unit varies between the cost elements. Some occur on an installation level (e.g. monitoring costs), while costs per declaration or per economic operator are the single unit for other elements such as the surrender of the payment or certificates.

For enforcement costs of authorities, the same method is followed to the extent that data is available. Wherever possible, similar sources of data to the costs for businesses have been used to ensure comparable estimates. However, in particular for the implementation as an excise duty, this data was not available in a similar way to the options using CBAM certificates or an import tax.

### ***Data***

In order to estimate the compliance costs for economic operators and determine the drivers behind enforcement costs for authorities, data from cost assessments of existing mechanisms is used. Cost elements are estimated based on similar elements in instruments such as the EU ETS, national emissions trading systems, existing excise duties or import taxes as well as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM<sup>25</sup>) as an international instrument that monitors emissions from international installations and projects. Therefore, it is a central assumption of this assessment that CBAM cost

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<sup>25</sup> <https://cdm.unfccc.int/index.html>

elements are mainly comparable to the similar elements of existing mechanisms. Important deviations from this assumption, notably in the case of emissions monitoring, will be mentioned and discussed below.

For cost elements of EU instruments as well as excise duties, data on national implementation in the Member States is the main source of information. In the assessment activities, the most recent, comprehensive data is used to reflect process simplifications from digitalization of customs and tax procedures in the EU. The estimations on the number of imports, businesses or installations is based on data from industry associations, reports prepared for the EU Commission as well as EU and national databases on tax and customs.

Some data sources are academic papers, while many have been collected in public databases or form part of impact assessments and evaluations at the national level. Academic research, however, also provides important comparative assessments between economic policy instruments that help to understand the context and validate the results for an option in relation to the others. As such, research articles find that compliance costs for customs and excise duty instruments are the lowest of all tax instruments<sup>2627</sup>. However, this relates to weight, volume or value-based instruments and does not consider the monitoring of emissions in third countries. Moreover, the literature provides evidence that important cost drivers for all types of instruments are the number of taxpayers, the frequency of reporting and the number of exemptions and differing rates<sup>28</sup>.

Overall, the estimations provided in this report are based on instruments that have been in place for multiple years, which has led to reductions of problems in efficiency. A newly established CBAM as the first of its kind would likely result in higher costs initially. Thus, the estimations made in the sections below are approximations. While the absolute costs of a CBAM could be higher, the assessment enables an evidence-based comparison of the options and their implementations.

### ***Assumptions***

For the estimation of the costs for businesses and authorities, the assessment is based on a set of assumptions. First, general assumptions underlying the assessment are:

- Compliance costs are assumed to arise for importers located in the EU that would have to pay the CBAM obligation. This could be done either based on a default value or by providing verified information about actual emissions, if voluntarily chosen by the importer. While the monitoring of these actual emissions would take place outside the EU, the responsibility – and thus costs – of providing the information to authorities lies with the importers.

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<sup>26</sup> Eichfelder, S., & Vaillancourt, F. (2014). Tax compliance costs: A review of cost burdens and cost structures. arqus Discussion Paper No. 178.

<sup>27</sup> Smulders, S., Stiglingh, M., Franzsen, R., & Fletcher, L. (2012). Tax compliance costs for the small business sector in South Africa—Establishing a baseline. *EJournal of Tax Research*, 10(2), 44.

<sup>28</sup> Barbone, L., Bird, R. M., & Vazquez-Caro, J. (2012). The Costs of VAT: A Review of the Literature. CASE Network Reports.

- For CBAM options which use default values, it is assumed that all importers report such monitored actual emissions. For the initial phase, this is realistic in the case that actual emission values are made mandatory by the legislator.
- As already mentioned above, the CBAM is assumed to result in comparable costs as existing, similar mechanisms. However, the CBAM will target imports of products and their embedded emissions. Therefore, costs from existing mechanisms of monitoring installations' emissions are generally doubled to create an estimation for the production of multiple products in one installation. This is estimated based on own expertise and reflects the additional burden for monitoring emissions related to the production process of the different products.
- The number of occurrences for installations, imports and economic operators are based on the sectors steel, cement, aluminium, polymers, fertilisers and petrochemicals. A narrower or broader scope would therefore reduce or increase the respective numbers. From these sectors, basic material imports are considered. The inclusion of basic material products would increase the number of cases and subsequently the costs, notably for the border mechanisms import tax and import EU ETS.
- For the assessment of the cost of individual treatment based on actual embedded emissions, the number of relevant global installations is estimated based on the number of EU installation and the relation between EU production and imports<sup>29</sup>. The total number could in reality be lower due to importers deciding to import from fewer installations to increase efficiency of MRV obligations.
- The number of import actions per year is estimated based on imported quantities in relation to the average share of import modes for sea road and rail<sup>30</sup>. Because of the nature of basic materials, a high share of bulk shipments is assumed, which results in a low number of import events in relation to the weight of imports. The average capacities of bulk shipments for the modes of transport are based on information from logistics service providers.
- The number of importers is estimated based on the number of Authorised Economic Operators<sup>31</sup>. The share of affected importers is assumed to reflect the share of import value of the mentioned basic materials out of the value of all EU imports<sup>32</sup>.
- Importers are assumed to have existing relations and exchange with customs authorities due to customs declarations, and also involving payments, because of existing obligations such as import sales tax. Therefore, basic data on quantity and origin is available, with the main information missing being the embedded emission from the production process.

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<sup>29</sup> Data sources: publicly available industry data from European Aluminium, CEFIC, PetrochemistryEU, Ecorys et al. 2019, and the US International Trade Administration.

<sup>30</sup> Eurostat, 2020: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International\\_trade\\_in\\_goods\\_by\\_mode\\_of\\_transport#Trade\\_by\\_mode\\_of\\_transport\\_in\\_value\\_and\\_quantity](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International_trade_in_goods_by_mode_of_transport#Trade_by_mode_of_transport_in_value_and_quantity)

<sup>31</sup> See: [https://ec.europa.eu/taxation\\_customs/general-information-customs/customs-security/authorised-economic-operator-aeo/authorised-economic-operator-aeo\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/general-information-customs/customs-security/authorised-economic-operator-aeo/authorised-economic-operator-aeo_en)

<sup>32</sup> Data sources: industry data, Eurostat, 2020: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International\\_trade\\_in\\_goods](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International_trade_in_goods)

- The creation of an excise duty would oblige domestic producers and businesses in the value chain. Therefore, the introduction of an excise duty is assumed to create comparable cost elements as the existing excise duties (e.g. on tobacco or alcohol). In contrast to other existing excise duties on goods like alcohol or tobacco, it is assumed that real-time tracking through the Excise Movement Control System<sup>33</sup> is not necessary, because of the low excise duty value in relation to the weight of the product.

Expressed in numbers, these assumptions translate into a number of estimated cases for non-EU installations, importing operators and import actions. These numbers form the basis for the multiplication of standardised unit costs to estimate the total costs of the options.

**Table 6-1: Number of estimated cases for third-country installations, importers and import transactions.**

Number of third-country installations	510
Number of importers	1 000
Number of import transactions per year	239 000

Source: estimations based on industry and statistical data<sup>34</sup>

For an excise duty option the number of cases expresses the number of businesses and installations producing, importing, processing and storing goods containing the basic materials covered by the CBAM. Because of the nature of basic materials as input in different value chains, a number ten times the number of EU installations in the steel, cement, aluminium and petrochemicals sectors plus the third-country installations is

<sup>33</sup> See: [https://ec.europa.eu/taxation\\_customs/business/excise-duties-alcohol-tobacco-energy/excise-movement-control-system\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/excise-duties-alcohol-tobacco-energy/excise-movement-control-system_en)

<sup>34</sup> Data on industries: <https://legacy.trade.gov/steel/countries/pdfs/imports-eu.pdf>; Ecorys et al. 2017: [http://publications.europa.eu/resource/ellar/07d18924-07ce-11e8-b8f5-01aa75ed71a1.0001.01/DOC\\_1](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/ellar/07d18924-07ce-11e8-b8f5-01aa75ed71a1.0001.01/DOC_1); European Aluminium: <https://www.european-aluminium.eu/activity-report-2019-2020/market-overview/>; VCI 2020: <https://www.vci.de/vci/downloads-vci/publikation/chemiewirtschaft-in-zahlen-print.pdf>; CEFIC: <https://cefic.org/app/uploads/2019/01/The-European-Chemical-Industry-Facts-And-Figures-2020.pdf>

**Importers:** Based on number of overall AEOs in the EU: [https://ec.europa.eu/taxation\\_customs/dds2/eos/aeo\\_consultation.jsp?Lang=en](https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/eos/aeo_consultation.jsp?Lang=en); and the share of imports in each sector (in terms of value) of the overall value of imports: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International\\_trade\\_in\\_goods#:~:text=EU%2D27%20international%20trade%20in,ex-ports%20\(EUR%2073%20billion\)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International_trade_in_goods#:~:text=EU%2D27%20international%20trade%20in,ex-ports%20(EUR%2073%20billion))

**Import transactions:** Imported quantities taken for each industry from the sources above; Modal split of imports: Eurostat, 2020: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International\\_trade\\_in\\_goods\\_by\\_mode\\_of\\_transport#Trade\\_by\\_mode\\_of\\_transport\\_in\\_value\\_and\\_quantity](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International_trade_in_goods_by_mode_of_transport#Trade_by_mode_of_transport_in_value_and_quantity); Cargo industry data, mainly: <https://www.dsv.com/en/our-solutions/modes-of-transport/sea-freight/shipping-container-dimensions/dry-container>; <https://www.marineinsight.com/types-of-ships/different-types-of-bulk-carriers/>; <https://www.csx.com/index.cfm/customers/resources/equipment/railroad-equipment/>

assumed for this. This is again based on expertise in the project team and the common use of the materials. The result is 10 000 cases for the excise duty system.

It should be noted that the numbers provided here and below as well as the corresponding results are estimates with potentially significant margins of errors.

## **1. Assessment of compliance costs for businesses**

Following the general remarks and assumptions laid out above, this section will assess and estimate the compliance costs for businesses that arise from the different options and their implementation.

When outlining the cost elements, it is important to note that they differ between the border instruments and the excise duty option. The former comprises the implementation through the surrender of import certificates (CBAM certificates) and the payment of an import tax.

On the one hand, design **options 1 to 5** rely on an adjustment of carbon price at the border using the payment options of an import tax or import certificates. For those border instruments, the cost elements are the following:

- First and most importantly, the quantification of the emissions value that forms the basis of the calculation of the carbon price for design options in which importers claim of actual emissions. This includes:
  - Monitoring the quantity of imported goods.
  - Tracking the place of origin.
  - Monitoring the embedded carbon emissions of goods stemming from the production process.
  - Verification of the monitored emissions.
- Cost related to the documentation of the process, including the submission of information to the CBAM registry.
- Costs related to making the payment.
- Costs related to the preparation for controls by the authorities.

Based on these cost elements, the options for implementation are assessed in the following sections.

### ***Import tax***

For the first set of cost elements related to the quantification of emissions, based on the outlined assumptions, monitoring the quantity of imported goods and their origin does not cause substantial added burden to businesses. In a CBAM option that purely relies on default values, monitoring of the emissions from the production process is not necessary and therefore also cause no substantial costs. However, in an option that sees importers to claim the actual emissions from the production process, the monitoring creates substantial costs for the business. Based on estimates of the transaction costs of the CDM, monitoring emissions of an installation are quantified at EUR 10 200 per year<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> Krey, M. (2004). Transaction Costs of CDM Projects in India – An Empirical Survey. Hamburg Institute of International Economics.

Assuming the doubled costs for monitoring production processes instead of entire installations, this results in EUR 20 400 per year and non-EU installation.

The verification of claimed emissions adds further costs in the case of a possibility to deviate from default values. A report on the national implementation of the EU ETS in the United Kingdom estimates yearly verification costs for an installation at EUR 4 000. Estimations for the CDM, however, indicate a span for verification costs<sup>36</sup> between EUR 4 000 and EUR 15 300 per installation and verification cycle (Krey, 2004). It should be noted that these figures relate to the monitoring and verification at the installation level. As pointed out above, the differentiation between products from one plant would require more granular tracking of emissions and is expected to increase the costs for both monitoring and verification substantially. Therefore, the cost estimate presented here is not a definite amount.

As second cost element, the documentation and reporting of the quantities and emissions is assessed based on the reporting costs estimated under the EU ETS for UK businesses. Based on this, the estimation is of EUR 900 per year and business (Talbot, 2016). As a higher frequency of documentation is assumed for an import tax, this number is estimated to be up to six times higher. This is based on fewer information needed to be documented more often during a year.

The payment of the CBAM in the form of an import tax is considered to be a negligible additional burden because an existing relation of the importer with authorities involving tax and customs payments is assumed.

Finally, the costs of preparation for controls are included, for options of claimable actual emissions, in the costs for MRV described before. For options relying on default values, checks and audits do not involve substantially more information than existing mechanisms and therefore the additional costs are negligible.

Table 6-2 summarises the above. In total, the sum of yearly standardised cost estimations amounts to EUR 5 400 per importer for options entirely based on default values.

In contrast, options where claiming actual emissions is possible result in total yearly costs between EUR 30 800 and EUR 43 800 for quantifying actual emission values. Data on yearly MRV costs of the EU ETS implementation in Germany (on installation level, not product specific) estimates EUR 23 700 per installation<sup>37</sup>. This validates the estimations for cost elements and indicates an amount closer to the higher end of the range. In addition, the low costs for the default value option is in line with academic findings on the low level of compliance costs with border tax measures, as outlined above.

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<sup>36</sup> Talbot, A. (2016). ASSESSMENT OF COSTS TO UK PARTICIPANTS OF COMPLIANCE WITH PHASE III OF THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM. Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy.  
[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/799575/Cost\\_of\\_Compliance\\_Report.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/799575/Cost_of_Compliance_Report.pdf)

<sup>37</sup> Destatis OnDEA database, calculation for 1 900 EU ETS participants:  
[https://www.ondea.de/SiteGlobals/Functions/Datenbank/Vorgaben/Einzelansicht/Vorgabe\\_Einzelansicht.html?cms\\_idVorgabe=12746](https://www.ondea.de/SiteGlobals/Functions/Datenbank/Vorgaben/Einzelansicht/Vorgabe_Einzelansicht.html?cms_idVorgabe=12746)

**Table 6-2: Annual compliance costs estimates per importer (in 1 000 EUR) for a CBAM implemented as an import tax.**

<b>Determination of emission intensity</b>	<b>Default values only</b>	<b>Possibility to present actual emissions</b>
<b>Cost elements</b>		
<b>Monitoring of basic material quantities</b>	negligible extra burden	negligible extra burden
<b>Tracking of origin of goods</b>	negligible extra burden	negligible extra burden
<b>Monitoring of embedded emissions from production process</b>	negligible extra burden	20.4 (for plant emissions)
<b>Verification of monitored emissions</b>	negligible extra burden	4-18 (for plant emissions)
<b>Submission of documentation of imports</b>	5.4	5.4
<b>Tax return and tax payment</b>	negligible extra burden	negligible extra burden
<b>Inspection and audit costs to be prepared for verification by authorities</b>	negligible extra burden	1–2
<b>Total (standardised costs<sup>38</sup>)</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>30.8–43.8</b>

Sources: Krey 2004, Talbot 2016, Destatis OnDEA database

The result for overall yearly costs for EU businesses is calculated based on the estimates and the number of cases. For an import tax relying entirely on default values, the compliance costs amount to EUR 5.4 million per year.

For an import tax using actual emission values, it is assumed that all importers are claiming actual emissions. The total cost for such a CBAM amount to EUR 18.84 million to EUR 26.98 million. If only 50 % of importers are submitting actual emission values while the other 50 % uses default values, the total compliance costs drop to between EUR 11.8 million and EUR 15.7 million.

<sup>38</sup> Unit differs between third-country installations for MRV and inspection costs, and importers for documentation.



### *Import certificates*

As the cost assessment for an implementation using import certificates (CBAM certificates) follows very similar requirements and thus also cost elements, the considerations largely overlap with the one made above.

Therefore, the estimated standardised costs for the quantification of emissions, and as a result certificates to be surrendered, documentation and control are assumed to be similar to costs arising from an implementation based on an import tax, to ensure equal levels of accuracy and control. However, regarding the payment, an additional mechanism – the buying and surrendering of CBAM certificates – creates new costs to businesses. Additionally, the costs of having a registry account contributes between EUR 0 and EUR 800<sup>39</sup>. Thus, based on this and assessments of national EU ETS implementation these costs are quantified between EUR 40 and EUR 1 500 per year and participant<sup>40</sup>.

Table 6-3 summarises the costs for the import certificates design. Basing the CBAM entirely on default emission values results in yearly estimated costs of EUR 5 440 to EUR 6 900. If the CBAM allows the claiming of actual emission values, the estimated costs range from EUR 30 840 to 45 300 per year.

**Table 6-3: Compliance costs estimates per importer (in 1 000 EUR) for a CBAM implemented through CBAM certificates.**

Cost elements	Determination of emission intensity	Default values only	Possibility to present actual emissions
	<b>Monitoring of basic material quantities</b>		negligible extra burden
<b>Tracking of origin of goods</b>		negligible extra burden	negligible extra burden
<b>Monitoring of embedded emissions from production process</b>		negligible extra burden	20.4 (for plant emissions)
<b>Verification of monitored emissions</b>		negligible extra burden	4-18 (for plant emissions)
<b>Submission of documentation on imports</b>		5.4	5.4
<b>Purchase and surrender of import certificates (CBAM certificates)</b>		0.04–1.5	0.04–1.5

<sup>39</sup> Umweltbundesamt, 2015. Evaluation of the EU ETS Directive

<sup>40</sup> Destatis OnDEA database: [https://www.ondea.de/DE/Home/home\\_node.html](https://www.ondea.de/DE/Home/home_node.html); Talbot, 2016

<b>Inspection and audit costs to be prepared for verification by authorities</b>	negligible extra burden	12
<b>Total (standardised costs<sup>41</sup>)</b>	<b>5.44–6.9</b>	<b>30.84–45.3</b>

Sources: Krey 2004, Talbot 2016, Destatis OnDEA database

Again, the result for overall yearly costs for EU businesses is calculated based on the estimates and the number of cases. For CBAM implemented as the surrender of CBAM certificates relying entirely on default values, the compliance costs amount to EUR 3.96 million to EUR 5.03 million per year.

For an implementation as CBAM certificates using actual emission values, it is assumed that all importers are claiming actual emissions. The total cost for such a CBAM amount to EUR 18.88 million to EUR 28.48 million. If only 50 % of importers are submitting actual emission values while the other 50 %, the total compliance costs drop to between EUR 11.9 million and EUR 17.2 million.

### ***Excise duty***

The cost elements for the excise duty are composed differently than the previous two options, which both complete the adjustment at the point of import. In addition to the difference in instrument that also includes transactions within the borders of the EU, the proposed excise duty option considers as design elements (1) only the reliance on default values for the quantification of the excise duty, and (2) always includes the downstream value chain of basic materials. Therefore, only one design needs to be considered in this assessment.

As described above, the estimation of compliance costs for an excise duty assumes cost elements similar to existing excise duties. Detailed data on the compliance costs for excise duty obligations is available for German excise duties on tobacco, different types of alcohol and coffee. Cost elements below are taken from the Destatis' OnDEA database and standardised using case numbers available on the platform<sup>42</sup>.

## **2. Assessment of the impacts on SMEs**

The assumptions and data available do not allow for a quantitative assessment of impacts of a CBAM specifically on small and medium sized companies (SMEs). However, the evidence body in the literature is well developed both for the difference between large and smaller companies in administrative burden of tax or customs measures as well as for different cost structures for MRV of carbon emissions.

Research and reports on the burden of taxation largely align in their findings that small businesses face higher relative compliance costs for the main types of tax instruments. Eichfelder and Vaillancourt (2014) present such results linked to the higher costs for collecting the relevant information to report. More specifically on the case of valued

<sup>41</sup> Unit differs between third-country installations for MRV and inspection costs, and importers for documentation and surrender of CBAM certificates.

<sup>42</sup> Destatis OnDEA database: [https://www.ondea.de/DE/Home/home\\_node.html](https://www.ondea.de/DE/Home/home_node.html).

added tax (VAT), Barbone et al. (2012) present a similar finding in the context of a review of research papers. These finding is also confirmed by a study conducted by KPMG and GfK on behalf of the European Commission<sup>43</sup>. Data collection for tax reporting is identified as the main cost driver. Total costs are found to be relatively higher for smaller companies. However, the core focus of all these studies relates to VAT and Corporate Income Tax (CIT). Customs and excise duties are less systematically assessed. In the EU study, they are found to be one of the most burdensome taxation types beyond VAT or CIT in a high-level analysis. In a South African study, Smulders et al. (2012) still finds substantially lower compliance costs for customs and excise duties than for VAT or CIT. Recording of information is also found to be a main factor in this study, behind the familiarization with the tax instrument.

Literature sources on the compliance costs with carbon quantification instruments point in a similar direction. Academic work finds substantially higher administrative costs per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> for small emitters in emission quantification systems like the EU ETS<sup>44</sup> or the Clean Development Mechanism (c.f. Krey, 2004). The national compliance costs study of EU ETS implementation in the UK confirms these results (Talbot, 2016). Small emitters (< 25 000 tonnes per year) in the EU ETS face more than 8 times higher compliance costs than emitters of 50 000–500 000 tonnes.

Overall, this indicates that a CBAM would result in relatively higher compliance costs for SMEs compared to large enterprises. As mentioned above, the exact degree of difference between the two groups could not be quantified based on the currently available data.

Information on the structure of the sectors under consideration is not comprehensively available for the entire EU because it is classified as confidential in many Member States. Calculations based on Eurostat data<sup>45</sup> for the sectors' NACE codes (three digits) result in a total number of 31 000 SMEs in the sectors considered for a CBAM in this study. However, this number needs to be considered in context. First, the production value of SMEs in the sectors of the dataset – based on the available data – amounts to 19 % of the overall production value. Second, the data includes wider sector definitions than the proposed product scope of this study. For instance, ceramics are included in the cement sector. This can be expected to change the structure significantly, as some subsectors (like ceramics) have a much higher share of SMEs than the considered raw materials<sup>46</sup>. The fact that a CBAM applies to imports of a few basic materials and basic material products results in large businesses being the main mainly impacted ones. Therefore, the practical impact of import related measures would have little practical impact on SMEs, even though this impact would be relatively higher than for large businesses if compared on the amount imported.

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<sup>43</sup> KPMG & GfK. (2018). Study on tax compliance costs for SMEs. EASME/COSME/2015/004. Brussels. European Commission. <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0ed32649-fe8e-11e8-a96d-01aa75ed71a1>

<sup>44</sup> Coria, J. & Jaraite, J. (2019). Transaction Costs of Upstream Versus Downstream Pricing of CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions. *Environmental and Resource Economics*, 72(4), pp. 965-1001.

<sup>45</sup> See

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/SBS\\_SC\\_IND\\_R2\\_custom\\_553424/default/table?lang=en](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/SBS_SC_IND_R2_custom_553424/default/table?lang=en)

<sup>46</sup> EU-MERCI. Analysis of the industrial sectors in the European Union. <http://www.eumerci-portal.eu/documents/20182/38527/0+-+EU.pdf>

An option that includes goods further along the value chain, or also EU internal transactions like the proposed excise duty option, would result in a higher a substantially larger share of SMEs targeted by the CBAM measures and therefore also in higher compliance costs for SMEs overall. A study on the compliance costs of the REACH Regulation<sup>47</sup> which applies to EU manufacturers and importers highlights the higher burden for SMEs, compared to large companies<sup>48</sup>. The quantification of this effect for the CBAM is however not possible at this point as available data is lacking.

### **3. Assessment of enforcement costs for the administration**

The assessment of enforcement costs focuses on identifying the drivers of costs for authorities in the enforcement of the CBAM options.

Essentially, the authorities face comparable cost elements as the businesses, with the difference that costs arise from assessing information and controlling the reports from economic operators. Literature describes the same cost drivers for administration and enforcement costs as for compliance for taxation measures (Barbone et al., 2012). This is most importantly the complexity of the system, including the number of different rates, exemptions or documents required. Therefore, the options that have been found as more costly for businesses above, in general also create higher costs for authorities.

As authorities are already assessing customs declarations for imported goods in the volume and scope of this study, an existing infrastructure and processes are in place. This assessment of enforcement costs will again provide estimations on the additional costs compared to this business as usual scenario. This applies mostly to data processing and exchange, but also to controls and payments. The following sections will provide details on the specific options.

The sections provide estimations for the assessed administration and compliance costs. In line with the compliance cost assessment, the estimations are based on studies published by the European Commission<sup>49</sup> as well as impact assessments at EU and national levels<sup>50</sup>. In cases where the enforcement effort was indicated in a time duration, the average hourly wage costs of the EU<sup>51</sup> were used to estimate the resulting costs.

#### ***IT infrastructure***

An overarching cost element is to have the necessary IT technology in place. Collected data at the time of import by customs authorities needs to be shared with the authorities in charge of assessing declared actual emissions (if applicable) and connect the imported goods to CBAM certificates either already surrendered at that point or to be surrendered

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<sup>47</sup> Regulation on the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals. EC Regulation No 1907/2006.

<sup>48</sup> See also SWD (2018) 58 final.

<sup>49</sup> Amec Foster Wheeler Environment, 2016. Evaluation of EU ETS Monitoring, Reporting and Verification Administration Costs. [http://publications.europa.eu/resource/ellar/f6a49ec5-c35c-11e6-a6db-01aa75ed71a1.0001.01/DOC\\_1](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/ellar/f6a49ec5-c35c-11e6-a6db-01aa75ed71a1.0001.01/DOC_1).

<sup>50</sup> Impact assessment of EU customs and tax instruments, the implementation of EU legislation in Germany, and of taxation initiatives in the UK.

<sup>51</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Wages\\_and\\_labour\\_costs](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Wages_and_labour_costs)

(also if applicable<sup>52</sup>). In any case, data on the imported quantities and related pricing of the CBAM certificates has to be shared with a central European system to collect the CBAM revenue as an EU-own resource. The same also applies to the option of implementing the CBAM as an excise duty as this would also require an interface between Member States and the EU Commission, including the customs organisations.

This can represent a major share of the costs. The implementation of the EU VAT rules for e-commerce support this indication with estimated costs of EUR 2.2 million per Member State for the introduction of a one-stop shop system<sup>53</sup>. Across the options assessed below, the need for additional IT systems varies slightly depending on their complexity and need for collaboration but additional infrastructure would in all cases be necessary to process the data and share it between customs and CBAM authorities.

Similarly to some existing requirements on imported goods such as ozone-depleting substances or F-gases, the CBAM could also be part of the recently launched Single Window Environment for Customs<sup>54</sup> that facilitates automatic assessment and sharing of import-related data. Including the CBAM obligation in this environment would reduce costs for IT systems and also for the processing of the documents. However, the process of setting this up would require time and result in some limitations in the implementation. For example, a centralised assessment of monitoring data would be necessary. A decentralised approach involving Member States' existing structures would not be supported by this environment.

Depending on the inclusion in the Single Window or not, the costs will differ substantially. Compared to the estimated EUR 2.2 million per year and Member State for a decentralised IT system, the currently launching Single Window Environment can be adapted to include the CBAM in its centralised data sharing. Individual Member States would face lower costs, while the Commission bears a large part of the costs for maintenance and support. The impact assessment for the Single Window Environment EUR 9.2 million per year for the Commission during the gradual implementation (first seven years) and between EUR 350 000 and EUR 680 000 per year and Member State<sup>55</sup>. As the central system will be in place by the time the CBAM enters into force, the yearly costs for the IT infrastructure, in particular for the Commission, are expected to be lower than this number.

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<sup>52</sup> See subsequent sections for the costs of the different set-ups

<sup>53</sup> Deloitte (2016). VAT Aspects of cross-border ecommerce - Options for modernization. Final report – Lot 3: Assessment of the implementation of the 2015 place of supply rules and the Mini-One Stop Shop. Brussels. European Commission.  
[https://ec.europa.eu/taxation\\_customs/sites/taxation/files/vat\\_aspects\\_cross-border\\_e-commerce\\_final\\_report\\_lot3.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/vat_aspects_cross-border_e-commerce_final_report_lot3.pdf).

<sup>54</sup> See: [https://ec.europa.eu/taxation\\_customs/general-information-customs/electronic-customs/eu-single-window-environment-for-customs\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/general-information-customs/electronic-customs/eu-single-window-environment-for-customs_en).

<sup>55</sup> SWD(2020) 239 final,  
[https://ec.europa.eu/taxation\\_customs/sites/taxation/files/201028\\_single\\_window\\_impact\\_summary.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/201028_single_window_impact_summary.pdf);  
and SWD(2020) 238 final,  
[https://ec.europa.eu/taxation\\_customs/sites/taxation/files/201028\\_single\\_window\\_impact.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/201028_single_window_impact.pdf)

## *Import tax*

For CBAM options using an import tax, efforts are necessary for processing documents, administering payments and controlling the correct declaration of goods. In the case of actual emissions that are reported, these reports and validations would need to be assessed as well. Except for the last cost element, customs authorities are already performing these tasks. A CBAM that fully relies on default values would be based for very large parts of its administrative needs on existing processes. The carbon price applicable to an import transaction would be based on the product category and the weight, both of which data points are already collected. This would be the only additional requirement, which adds a small marginal amount of cost. The collection of the import tax directly at the time of import would already be included in this figure. As a second point, additional controls by customs authorities would be necessary to ensure the right product categories are declared. The carbon price increases the risk of fraud by declaring goods that are not covered by CBAM. Therefore, the controls at entry points to the EU on a sample of imports are necessary and result in additional enforcement costs. These costs are estimated based on the standardised estimations of costs for additional controls to enforce the import elements of the VAT obligations of e-commerce<sup>56</sup>.

In comparison, an import tax with the option or even expectation to present actual emission values has a higher complexity and creates higher costs for enforcement. The processing of customs declaration would require more time, as the existence of an emissions report supporting the declared carbon content would need to be checked. The CBAM obligation would need to be paid based on the declared emissions at the time of import. Together with the necessary controls, this would complete the task of the customs authority. However, the declared actual emissions would have to be assessed by a competent climate authority. The monitoring report provided by the importer and its verification need to be assessed. As the reporting needs to be performed at product level and in non-EU countries, the costs are again assumed to be twice the amount of assessing EU ETS reports. Based on cost estimations for the EU ETS<sup>57</sup>, this results in costs of EUR 6 750 per installation from which goods are imported. A reconciliation of payments needs to be made at the end of a compliance cycle. The administration of these additional payments by the importers or the refunding in case the actual emissions were lower creates costs that do not arise when using default values. Using the administration of EU ETS accounts as a proxy<sup>58</sup>, this element is estimated at EUR 400 per importer per year. In addition to this, it is assumed that a small amount of site inspections at production sites would be carried out to verify compliance also at the level of production process. As

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<sup>56</sup> German Parliament, 2020a. Entwurf eines Jahressteuergesetzes 2020. <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/228/1922850.pdf>

See also: [https://ec.europa.eu/taxation\\_customs/business/vat/modernising-vat-cross-border-ecommerce\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/vat/modernising-vat-cross-border-ecommerce_en).

<sup>57</sup> Amec Foster Wheeler Environment, 2016. Evaluation of EU ETS Monitoring, Reporting and Verification Administration Costs. [http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/f6a49ec5-c35c-11e6-a6db-01aa75ed71a1.0001.01/DOC\\_1](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/f6a49ec5-c35c-11e6-a6db-01aa75ed71a1.0001.01/DOC_1)

<sup>58</sup> Amec Foster Wheeler Environment, 2016.

this is assumed to target only a sample every year, the costs are estimated at EUR 351 per installation per year<sup>59</sup>.

Table 6-4 summarises the ongoing administration and enforcement costs for CBAM options based on an import tax. To these, the costs for setting up and maintaining the IT infrastructure need to be added.

**Table 6-4: Yearly administration and enforcement costs for an import tax-based CBAM in EUR**

Costs Cost element	Unit costs <sup>60</sup>		Overall costs	
	default factors	actual emissions	default factors	actual emissions
Processing of customs declarations	3	6	690 000	1 380 000
Assessment of monitored actual emissions	0	6 750	0	3 442 500
Administration of accounts/payments	included above	400	0	400 000
Customs controls	75	75	8 625 000	8 625 000
Site inspections	0	351	0	179 010
<b>Total (yearly)</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>7 582</b>	<b>9 315 000</b>	<b>14 026 510</b>

Sources: Amec Foster Wheeler Environment, 2016; German Parliament, 2020.

### *Import certificates*

The administration and enforcement costs for the implementation of the CBAM using import certificates are structured very similarly to the import tax option described just above. The main difference is the greater involvement of an authority responsible for issuing and administering the surrender of the certificates. As the CBAM is designed as an EU-own resource, the following considerations are based on the assumption that a central authority would be tasked with this. In contrast to this, a set-up similar to the EU ETS with national competent authorities is also conceivable. This is expected to result in substantially higher costs due to the stronger need for collaboration and coordination relating to the assessment of monitoring and verification.

<sup>59</sup> Based on costs for EU ETS inspections (Amec Foster Wheeler Environment, 2016), tripled to reflect the additional complexity of non-EU installations and emission monitoring at product level.

<sup>60</sup> Units: Processing of documents: per import transaction; assessment of monitored emissions: per third-country installation; administration of accounts: per importer; customs controls: per import transaction; site inspections: per third-country installation.



As the CBAM based on import certificates would also be calculated at the point of import, customs authorities will need to collect and, depending on the roles given to either customs authorities and the CBAM Authority/national authorities, process the information related to the imported product. Data necessary to calculate the amount of CBAM certificates to be surrendered would have to be included in the customs declaration and either certificates will be directly surrendered or added up for a final balance for a full calendar year. While customs will always have an important role, the option of requiring a surrender or proof of surrender of the certificates at the time of import will have a significantly higher impact on customs costs. If customs authorities only collect this information on behalf of the CBAM authority/national authorities, which would perform the yearly balance, reconciliation and ensure submission, the costs for customs authorities are lower, as those costs would be shifted to the CBAM authority/national authorities. The costs would arise in both cases, either for customs authorities or for the CBAM authority/national authorities, and are for this assessment assumed to be similar.

In the scenario where default values are used to calculate the certificates to be surrendered, the administration of the importers' accounts would be the main cost difference to the costs of an import tax based on default values. The costs here are estimated based on the assessment of such costs for the national implementation of the EU ETS in Germany<sup>61</sup>. Because of higher complexity that results from international accounts that also need to be administered, the reported costs are again doubled. As a result, EUR 400 per year and importer account are assumed for the administration of accounts and payments such as the supervision of the surrender of certificates. Additional customs controls are estimated similarly to the costs for the import tax.

As mentioned above for both compliance costs for industry and for enforcement costs of the import tax, the possibility to provide actual emissions as basis for the calculation of the CBAM creates higher costs compared to the use of default values. The need for emission monitoring reports to support the claimed actual emissions on which the self-declared CBAM obligation is calculated creates further complexity for the processing of customs declaration before the customs authorities. Similar to the import tax, the monitoring reports and verifications need to be assessed by a responsible authority, for example the CBAM authority or in case of a decentralised system the national authorities. The costs for this are – just as for the import tax above – estimated at EUR 6 750 per report. This cost element would increase in the case of decentralised assessment of the MRV documents. In this case, authorities of multiple Member States would have to assess the documents of an installation unless a system of information, exchange and eventually acceptance of a decision taken in one Member States is put in place. In addition, the same costs for site visits are as for the import tax are assumed, adding on average EUR 351 per installation.

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<sup>61</sup> German Parliament, 2020: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Anpassung der Rechtsgrundlagen für die Fortentwicklung des Europäischen Emissionshandels. [https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten\\_BMU/Download\\_PDF/Glaeserne\\_Gesetze/19\\_Lp/tehg\\_novelle/entwurf/tehg-novelle\\_180801\\_rege\\_bf.pdf](https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/19_Lp/tehg_novelle/entwurf/tehg-novelle_180801_rege_bf.pdf)



Table 6-5 summarises the administration and enforcement costs for CBAM options based on import certificates. To these, the costs for setting up and maintaining the IT infrastructure need to be added.

**Table 6-5: Yearly administration and enforcement costs for an import certificates - based CBAM in EUR.**

Costs Cost element	Unit costs <sup>62</sup>		Overall costs	
	default factors	actual emissions	default factors	actual emissions
Processing of customs declarations	6	9	1 380 000	2 070 000
Assessment of monitoring and reporting action	0	6 750	0	3 442 500
Administration of accounts/payments	400	800	400 000	800 000
Customs controls	75	75	8 500 000	8 500 000
Site inspections	0	351	0	179010
<b>Total (yearly)</b>	<b>481</b>	<b>7 985</b>	<b>10 280 000</b>	<b>14 991 510</b>

Sources: Amec Foster Wheeler Environment, 2016; German Parliament, 2020.

### *Excise duty*

As in the previous sections on practical implementation and the assessment of compliance costs, the option of implementing CBAM as an excise duty (Option 6) requires a different set-up of administration and enforcement. The implementation of an excise duty on carbon intensive material would be similar to existing excise duties. However, there are different configurations of excise duties that result in substantially differing enforcement requirements and costs for authorities.

Data sources for existing excise duties are scarce and not comprehensive in their assessment of different cost elements. The central element influencing the costs for enforcement of an excise duty is the requirement for movement control within a duty suspension arrangement and obtaining data from the producers and traders participating in this system. This is the case for excise duties on highly taxed products like tobacco. The high costs – not only for authorities but also for economic operators – are mentioned

<sup>62</sup> Units: Processing of documents: per import transaction; assessment of monitored emissions: per third-country installation; administration of accounts: per importer; customs controls: per import transaction; site inspections: per third-country installation.

by the experts. As the excise duty systems to implement a CBAM is assumed not to require such real-time tracking, the costs of enforcement can be limited in this respect.

Still, the excise duty requires processing data reported by businesses, maintain the data infrastructure, and monitor compliance through controls<sup>63</sup>. Important factors influencing the administration and enforcement costs are the complexity of products and the number of producers obliged to pay the excise duty. A higher number of producers increases costs for the authorities<sup>64</sup>. As discussed in the assessment of compliance costs for businesses, the number of producers will be high compared to other excisable goods, because of the nature of the covered products as basic materials for many value chains.

Because of the nature of product and the similarity in set-up, excise duties or consumption charges for plastic provide a good reference point for the administration and enforcement of an excise duty on carbon intensive basic materials. Currently, plastic levies are in preparation in Italy and Spain as well as in the United Kingdom. In the cases of Italy and Spain, impact assessments for the charge are still to be performed. The case of the UK provides an estimation of the overall ongoing costs. The impact assessment performed by the UK government foresees EUR 12.9 million per year for ongoing costs<sup>65</sup>. This includes implementing continuous changes in the collection systems, compliance monitoring and support to customers. An EU CBAM system could thus be expected to result in higher yearly costs than that. With the available evidence base, a more precise quantification is difficult to achieve.

### ***Comparison with EU ETS***

Under **options 2, 3, 4 and 5**, and while the import certificates options would differ in comparison to the EU ETS (as the system for import certificates would cover goods and not stationary installations, would involve third party verification, foresees an assessment based on declared emissions, covers less goods, etc.), the administrative costs of the current EU ETS may provide an interesting point of comparison. Indeed, under these options, the setting up of a CBAM would need to consider selling the CBAM certificates (using EU ETS auctioning prices as a proxy), a CBAM registry (as mentioned above although simpler than the EU ETS registry) and Monitoring, Reporting and Verification systems for taking into account actual emissions. In the case of EU ETS:

- The auctioning platform costs around EUR 1.6 million per year, of which EUR 1.5 million is covered by fees for auctioning participants, and EUR 150 000 paid by the Commission (for reporting, etc.).
- About 2 full-time equivalent for auctioning in DG CLIMA.
- 24 full-time equivalent for handling the EU ETS Union Registry.

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<sup>63</sup> Ramboll et al. 2014: Study on the measuring and reducing of administrative costs for economic operators and tax authorities and obtaining in parallel a higher level of compliance and security in imposing excise duties on tobacco products. <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/a5d22256-3d16-4c7f-bb9e-3209447e517e/language-en>.

<sup>64</sup> ECOTEC et al., 2001: Economic and Environmental Implications of the Use of Environmental Taxes and Charges in the European Union and its Member States

<sup>65</sup> Converted from GBP, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/introduction-of-plastic-packaging-tax/plastic-packaging-tax>.

- Around EUR 3–4 million for external contracts for the EU ETS Union Registry (IT development and maintenance, service desk, infrastructure/costs). IT development, procurement choices and potential inclusion of infrastructure costs in the H7 infrastructure budget via co-financing baselines will be subject to pre-approval by the European Commission Information Technology and Cybersecurity Board
- For Member States (not taking into account the costs related to free allocation as there will be no equivalent in CBAM): managing accounts, permitting, validation of data from operators: 1 – 100 full-time equivalent per Member State, with an average 15 full-time equivalent per Member State (in total around 400 full-time equivalent for EU-27). In case a CBAM centralises these functions, the amount of full-time equivalent needed strongly depends on the number of importers; Verifiers are paid by operators, around EUR 1 000 – 10 000 per year and per operator; National Accreditation Bodies (supervising verifiers): around 2 full-time equivalent per Member State. For a CBAM, there might be a limited need for additional staff.

#### 4. Summary of the results of the costs assessment

The estimations made in the previous sections are approximations. While the absolute costs of a CBAM could be higher, the assessment enables an evidence-based comparison of the options and their implementations. The options 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 could be implemented by obliging importers to either pay an import tax or to surrender import certificates (CBAM certificates). It should however be noted that the assessed options differ in key underlying features such as the covered value chain, which impacts the direct comparability of the options.

An import tax relying on default values would be an option resulting in comparatively low costs. Under the assumptions applied in this compliance cost assessment, the total yearly costs amount to EUR 3.95 million for an import tax or between EUR 3.96 million and EUR 5.03 million for an import certificates option.

A CBAM with the possibility to demonstrate actual emissions would result in higher costs. This is because the option to claim the CBAM obligation based on actual emission values creates monitoring, verification and reporting costs for businesses in the EU. The estimated total yearly costs for this option amount to between EUR 9.8 million and EUR 13.2 million for an import tax or between EUR 9.8 million and EUR 14.3 million for import certificates.

Moreover, the further depth of the value chain adds more relevant installations, importers, and import transactions. This increases the compliance costs compared to similar designs only targeting basic materials (and basic material products). The introduction of an excise duty, is estimated to result in relatively low unit costs but higher total costs because of the larger number of businesses obliged. The total for this option is estimated between EUR 14.7 million and EUR 28.7 million.

**Table 6-6: Estimated total compliance costs for businesses in EUR.**

Specifications	Import tax	Import certificates	Excise duty
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<b>Default values</b>	5.4 million	5.44–6.9 million	N/A
<b>Actual emissions</b>	18.84–26.98 million	18.88–28.48 million	N/A
<b>Excise duty</b>	N/A	N/A	23.1–45.1 million

Source: Previous calculations

Considering the volumes of imports of all sectors considered in this study, the compliance cost per tonne of import or per tonne covered by the excise duty system would be very low for import mechanisms using default values or an excise duty-based system. For an import mechanism using actual emission values, the costs per tonne would be slightly higher but still at a very low level of between 10 and 38 Eurocents per tonne. Table 6-7: summarises these results.

**Table 6-7: Compliance cost of CBAM per tonne of import (in EUR).**

Specifications	Import tax in EUR	Import certificates in EUR	Excise duty in EUR
	per tonne imported	per tonne imported	per tonne covered by the excise duty system <sup>66</sup>
<b>Default values</b>	0.071	0.071–0.090	N/A
<b>Actual emissions</b>	0.110–0.353	0.111–0.373	N/A
<b>Excise duty</b>	N/A	N/A	0.043–0.085

Sources: previous calculations, industry data, Eurostat<sup>67</sup>

Overall, it becomes clear that using default values for the quantification of embedded emissions results in significantly lower compliance costs than basing the calculations (partly) on actual, monitored and verified emissions. In comparison between the option of an import tax and a system of surrendering import certificates (CBAM certificates), the import charge creates marginally lower compliance costs. This is because of the easier integration in existing obligations.

Enforcement costs for authorities are driven by similar factors as are compliance costs for businesses. The higher the complexity of the system the higher the costs of enforcement. For this reason, a CBAM using only default values creates lower costs as options using more accurate emission as reported by importers based on the monitoring in the production sites. For all options, compliance controls by customs make up a major share of the costs. In addition, the set-up of an IT system to collect and exchange data between

<sup>66</sup> Including both EU production and imports of the covered sectors.

<sup>67</sup> See: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International\\_trade\\_in\\_goods](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International_trade_in_goods); [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International\\_trade\\_in\\_goods\\_by\\_mode\\_of\\_transport#Trade\\_by\\_mode\\_of\\_transport\\_in\\_value\\_and\\_quantity](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International_trade_in_goods_by_mode_of_transport#Trade_by_mode_of_transport_in_value_and_quantity)

the responsible authorities adds another important share of the costs. These depend on the implementation in a centralized (with possibility to be included in the Single Window Environment for Customs), or in a decentralized way. The latter is expected to create substantially higher costs than the former.

The options of import tax and import certificates share many cost elements and have overall comparable costs. The main difference is the administration of payments. For an import tax, this would be collected by customs authorities together with existing import obligations. A system based on import certificates requires an authority to sell CBAM certificates and monitor the surrender.

In the case of actual emission values to be used for the calculation of the CBAM obligation, the assessment of the declared emissions adds another important cost element. Depending on the selection of a compliance cycle, the distribution of the costs between authorities differs. As the preferred implementation options for this suggest a reconciliation over a longer period (e.g. one year), the costs would incur in the CBAM authority/national authorities rather than in customs authorities.

The implementation in co-existence with free allowance allocation under the EU ETS would result in similar costs for authorities as an import tax or import certificates with full auctioning, depending on the choice between default values or actual emission values. For all these cases, the expansion of the scope to products of downstream processes or providing rebates to exports would increase the number of importers (or also exporters) and therefore result in substantially higher costs. The importers of products of downstream processes but also exporters of basic materials from the EU are in large shares different businesses than those importing the basic materials and basic material products under the narrower CBAM. The broader scope would increase the number of cases and in consequence the enforcement costs.

An excise duty differs from the border instruments mentioned in the previous paragraphs. Because of less data available, the costs are more difficult to quantify. Based on recent cost estimates for a consumption charge on plastic in the UK, the overall enforcement costs for an excise duty are expected to be high, even without real-time movement control. This is because of the relatively high number of businesses importing or producing goods containing the basic materials and basic material products in the scope suggested in this study.

Table 6-8: summarises the estimations for enforcement costs for the different options.

**Table 6-8: Estimated total enforcement costs for authorities in EUR**

Specifications	Import tax	Import certificates	Excise duty
Default values	9.3 million	10.3 million	N/A
Actual emissions	14 million	15 million	N/A

<b>Excise duty</b>	N/A	N/A	>12.9 million
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Source: Previous calculations, industry data, Eurostat<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>68</sup>See: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International\\_trade\\_in\\_goods](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International_trade_in_goods);  
[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International\\_trade\\_in\\_goods\\_by\\_mode\\_of\\_transport#Trade\\_by\\_mode\\_of\\_transport\\_in\\_value\\_and\\_quantity](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International_trade_in_goods_by_mode_of_transport#Trade_by_mode_of_transport_in_value_and_quantity)

## ANNEX 7: SELECTION OF SECTORS

This Annex describes the issue of scope and builds on the options defined for detailed implementation approaches of the CBAM, such as the definition of ‘embedded emissions’ and the related MRV provisions, which are crucial for defining the scope of the CBAM, as will be explained in this chapter.

### 1. Overview

Several principle dimensions have to be discussed regarding a feasible scope of a carbon border adjustment mechanism:

- (A) The industry sectors affected, using a suitable classification such as NACE.
- (B) How far down the value chain the CBAM should be applied (whether only basic materials or more complex goods should be covered, see section 4, and which elements to take into account to define their relevant embedded emissions). Such a discussion should lead to a list of materials and goods which are identifiable in terms of product codes used in international trade, such as the CN (Combined Nomenclature) system.

All of these aspects are discussed in the report, although the focus is on points (A) and (B). Aspect (B) has strong links to the necessary carbon content definition (more appropriately termed ‘embedded emissions’) which needs to be aligned with emissions also covered by the EU ETS (or would be covered, if those emissions happened in the EU). They may take the form of a ‘specific partial product carbon footprint’. Options to define embedded emissions have an inevitable link to the necessary MRV system, which in turn have strong impacts on the technical and administrative feasibility of the CBAM. Aspect (B) therefore has to be assessed in strong connection with those design elements. Section 4 will specifically discuss the impact of practical feasibility aspects on the selection of sectors/products.

### 2. Assessment criteria for the sectoral scope of a CBAM

The purpose of a CBAM is to provide similar conditions between producers within the EU and abroad specifically in respect of any costs for GHG emissions caused by their production. These costs are generated in the EU by its emission trading system (the EU ETS). This assumption requires that the further discussion in this chapter focusses on those emissions affected by the EU ETS. Therefore, other emissions, such as e.g. from upstream operations (mining, transport, etc.) are considered not relevant. For the same reason, other aspects contributing to different competitive (dis-)advantages, such as possible carbon or energy taxes, subsidies for diverse energy carriers etc. are not within the scope of this study.

For defining if an industry sector should be covered by the CBAM, the following criteria are used:

- **Relevance in terms of emissions** (i.e. whether the sector is a significant emitter of GHG, and whether there is an emission reduction potential), which for the

purpose of this study and in line with the EU ETS' design<sup>69</sup> can mean the following sub-cases:

- Relevance regarding *direct emissions*: We translate this into 'are there installations in the sector covered by the EU ETS?' This means that if a sector's structure is such that installations are typically too small for being covered by the EU ETS, the sector does not face emission costs and is per definition not exposed to carbon leakage. Hence, we exclude sectors without EU ETS installations from the analysis with the exception mentioned under the next point.
  - Relevance regarding *indirect emissions*<sup>70</sup>: This sub-criterion would identify sectors in which carbon leakage risk is induced by the increase of electricity prices due to the carbon costs borne by the producers of electricity from fossil sources. No EU-wide list of installations falling within this category is available, as only few<sup>71</sup> Member States apply the indirect cost compensation. Therefore, we use as an indicator whether a sector should be covered by this criterion, whether the EU State Aid Guidelines for indirect EU ETS cost compensation<sup>72</sup> have identified the sector as eligible based on the 'indirect carbon leakage indicator'. For practical reasons it is also of interest whether those guidelines contain a benchmark for goods of this sector.
- **Exposure to a significant risk of carbon leakage** (as defined pursuant to the EU ETS Directive).
  - Applying these first two criteria gives a list of sectors which produce energy intensive and trade exposed materials and products. These range from (mixtures of) chemical substances such as ammonia, ethylene glycol, cement clinker over commodities of certain specifications (e.g. PRODCOM 24.20.21.10 '*Line pipe, of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, longitudinally welded, of an external diameter > 406,4 mm, of steel*', or PRODCOM 23.13.11.50 '*Bottles of coloured glass of a nominal capacity < 2,5 litres, for beverages and foodstuffs (excluding bottles covered with leather or composition leather, infant's feeding bottles)*') to final products which may be immediately sold to consumers (e.g. gasoline and diesel, certain fertilisers, ceramics products (tiles, tableware), some (table) glass ware, etc.). Some of these 'consumer products' would have to be classified 'basic

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<sup>69</sup> Note that other classification of emissions exist, such as the scope 1, 2 and 3 of the 'GHG protocol' by the WBCSD (<https://ghgprotocol.org/>), but due to the necessity to compare to the EU ETS, these classifications aren't suitable.

<sup>70</sup> In this report we use the term 'indirect emissions' for emissions from electricity production, unless otherwise stated. Emissions from e.g. heat and steam production – even if carried out in a separate installation – are considered as direct (EU ETS) emissions, because the free allocation rules (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/3319 ensure that consumers of the heat receive free allocation, and the CL risk is therefore mitigated in the same way as for other direct emissions.

<sup>71</sup> According to the Commission's recent evaluation (SWD(2020) 194), 12 MS and Norway provide compensation pursuant to Article 10a(6) of the EU ETS Directive.

<sup>72</sup> These guidelines have been recently amended for the purpose of the 4<sup>th</sup> EU ETS trading period, see [https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state\\_aid/what\\_is\\_new/news.html](https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/news.html) However, Commission Communication C(2020) 6400 final does not yet contain any new benchmarks. Therefore, we use the relevant 3<sup>rd</sup> phase benchmarks given by Commission Communication 2012/C 387/06.



material products'. Therefore, it is difficult to define a uniform criterion regarding the **depth of the value chain** that can or should be covered by a CBAM. Nevertheless, sections 4.b to 4.d approach this topic. The value chain issue is also firmly linked to the options chosen for defining embedded emissions and impact the administrative burden via the MRV system required.

- **Practical arguments** need to be taken into consideration:
  - **Whether a material or product class can be clearly defined**, and whether materials or products can be **unambiguously identified in practice** when the level of CBAM obligation needs to be determined.
  - Ultimately, the conclusions on a proposed CBAM scope in section 6 are drawn on our judgment **that it will be feasible to define reference values for the embedded emissions** as the decisive argument for a product or material's inclusion in the CBAM. Without such reference values it is impossible to calculate the CBAM obligation to be paid upon import.
  - Furthermore, the choice of the scope will require certain design choices on other elements (it is e.g. useless to demand the inclusion of more downstream products in the scope, if MRV rules and the definition of embedded emissions do not take into account more upstream emissions). However, availability of data for defining reference values on embedded emissions need to be balanced against the desire to limit administrative burden, which may impact on the scope that can be covered by the CBAM.
- The width of the CBAM scope has an impact on the **revenues raised** by the CBAM itself (as the EU's own resources) as well as on Member States' EU ETS auctioning revenues, when free allocation is ended (or phased out) as consequence of the CBAM's introduction. However, for selecting sectors we consider the revenues not as a primary criterion in this report. They would be a secondary and ancillary positive effect of the design. We will therefore not use it as criterion in the analysis here. Furthermore, revenues are also very strongly influenced by whether indirect emissions and elements of the value chain are taken into account for embedded emissions. It would therefore not be appropriate to assess this topic in isolation based on only the materials and goods in the CBAM scope.

### 3. Starting point: Industry sectors

#### *a. Industrial sectors at risk of carbon leakage*

The starting point is that the CBAM is intended as an instrument to establish a comparable carbon price on goods produced in or imported to the EU with the objectives of creating consistent incentives for emissions reduction, to limit the risk of Carbon Leakage (CL) from the EU ETS, and to incentivise the use of carbon pricing as policy measure to mitigate GHG emissions in other parts of the world. Consequently, the CBAM should focus on those sectors that have already been identified as being at risk of carbon leakage. The applicable criteria for defining the CL risk are laid down in Article 10b of the EU ETS Directive. The list of sectors adopted by the Commission based on

these criteria is given in Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2019/708 (referred to as 'the CL List' or 'CLL' hereinafter). The CLL contains 50 sectors at 4-digit NACE level and further 13 sectors at more disaggregated level (6 or 8 digit PRODCOM).


For successfully implementing a CBAM, those 63 sectors and the multitude of products and materials produced by them might be too difficult to regulate. It is proposed to focus on fewer sectors, at least for a pilot phase. This would make the CBAM simpler and more manageable.

Figure 7-1 shows NACE sectors against these CL criteria. It is evident that only few sectors contribute with *significant emissions* and are therefore at CL risk due to their emission costs, while many sectors are on the list merely due to their *trade intensity*. The CBAM should focus on those few sectors with significant emissions and where a CBAM can provide the highest environmental impact at relatively low administrative effort. In particular, this would allow to focus on the carbon intensive basic materials at the core of each of these sectors' activities (like cement clinker, steel, organic chemicals, etc.). This approach is often found in literature.

Moreover, the discussion of MRV systems and the possibilities to define the 'embedded emissions' of goods demonstrates that implementation of the CBAM becomes the more difficult the more significant manufacturing steps are included after those which are directly included in the EU ETS. This is another argument that justifies to focus on industry sectors and products under the EU ETS.

However, for the purpose of this report it is important not to jump to conclusions too quickly. On the contrary, the wide set of design considers that theoretically all goods placed on the European market might be subject to a carbon price based on their partial carbon footprint. Therefore, the analysis here starts from the assumption that all kinds of goods could be theoretically included in a CBAM.

**Figure 7-1: Position of NACE sectors regarding the CL criteria for the 4<sup>th</sup> EU ETS phase. Sectors in the coloured area are considered to be exposed to a risk of carbon leakage in line with the EU ETS Directive (Article 10b). The sectors with the highest emissions in this picture are: (1) Iron and steel, (2) Refining of mineral oil, (3) Cement; (4) Organic basic chemicals.**



Source: Commission Analysis

*b. Proposed aggregated sectors for further discussion*

The CLL contains 50 sectors at 4-digit NACE level and further 13 sectors at more disaggregated level (6 or 8 digit PRODCOM). For making the discussion about sectors easier to handle, we have aggregated several NACE codes into fewer, more aggregated ‘sectors’ and assigned shorter sector names. For this purpose, we have considered only NACE codes which are found on the Carbon Leakage List<sup>73</sup> (CLL) for the 4<sup>th</sup> phase of the EU ETS and for which installations are currently found in the EU ETS<sup>74</sup>. This aggregation is given in Table 7-1: at the end of this Annex, sorted by direct emissions of the aggregated sector. The table furthermore presents the number of installations in these sectors in the EU ETS, their emissions, and the number of affected PRODCOM codes as an indicator for the potential complexity of the sector.

Furthermore,

<sup>73</sup> Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2019/708 of 15 February 2019 supplementing Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the determination of sectors and subsectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage for the period 2021 to 2030.

<sup>74</sup> Note that numbers in this section include installations from the EU-27, the UK as well as the EFTA countries Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.

Table 7-3, shows which EU ETS product benchmarks can be found in each of the proposed aggregated sectors as an indicator for the possible complexity of the sector (note that in some cases product benchmarks apply separately for separate products of the sector (e.g. either grey or white cement clinker), while in other cases a (sometimes complex) value chain is found (e.g. for a Polymer: refinery → steam cracker + chlorine → Vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) → S-PVC; or in the fertiliser sector: Ammonia → nitric acid or urea → various Nitrogen-Phosphorus-Potassium (NPK) fertilisers). Furthermore, we take into account the electricity consumption benchmarks from the state aid guidelines on EU ETS indirect cost compensation in order to identify the necessity to include indirect emissions for the sector when including it in the CBAM.

In a next step we exclude sectors which do not have product benchmarks in the EU ETS, which is a clear sign that the products and/or production processes in those sectors are too diverse for defining benchmarks. Another reason can be that the attributing of emission data to products in the MRV system would be too complex to determine benchmarks. Those are aggregated in the category ‘other sectors’<sup>75</sup>, which together account for about 10 % of the CL exposed EU ETS emissions. The result of this exercise is presented in Figure 7-2 in a shorter and more graphical description of the situation than the table in the Annex. It can be seen that by including only 7 sectors, 80 % of EU ETS direct emissions at risk of carbon leakage could be tackled (this is approximately 33 % of the EU ETS’s total emissions). Coverage in practice will be smaller, as not all the products of these sectors will be suitable for inclusion in the CBAM (see sections 4 and 5). The percentage mentioned does not, however, include the indirect emissions of some sectors with significant carbon emission reduction potential and which are highly CL exposed due to their indirect emissions (in particular aluminium production), which are included in the CBAM analysis. Such aggregation results in 12 aggregated ‘sectors’ (without the ‘other sectors’), which are still a considerable number where separate assessment is needed, but reasonable for further discussion.

**Figure 7-2: Proposed aggregated sectors sorted by emissions.**

Short sector name	Number of installations	Emissions [kt CO <sub>2</sub> /yr]	Number of PRODCOM codes	Cumulated emissions
Iron & Steel	485	159 861	144	22.8%
Refineries	130	132 164	10	41.7%
Cement	214	118 164	3	58.6%
Organic basic chemicals	331	64 877	168	67.8%
Fertilizers	99	36 995	30	73.1%
Pulp & Paper	672	27 233	57	77.0%
Lime & Plaster	193	26 151	6	80.7%
Inorganic chemicals	149	22 483	116	84.0%
Glass	326	18 226	47	86.6%
Aluminium	89	13 755	14	88.5%
Ceramics	350	7 810	13	89.6%
Polymers	121	5 655	50	90.4%
Other sectors	1 200	66 902	281	100.0%

Source: Commission analysis

<sup>75</sup> We have aggregated here some sectors with product benchmarks but low emissions: Coke and ‘other mineral products’ (including mineral wool benchmark), and all sectors which have no product benchmarks: Crude petroleum extraction, Food and drink, non-ferrous metals (except Aluminium), other chemicals, mining, Wood-based panels, nuclear fuel processing, Textiles.

If using these 12 aggregated sectors, there would be 658 product categories out of the 3 919 categories listed at 8-digit level in PRODCOM 2019. The PRODCOM system is used here because the reporting rules for free allocation in the EU ETS are required operators of installations to report their production in this system, and due to its compatibility with the NACE classification of industry sectors used for determining the CLL. However, in the administration of EU customs and taxes, CN<sup>76</sup> numbers are used for identifying product categories of imported or exported goods. Furthermore, the 8-digit CN codes are an extension of the internationally used (6-digit) Harmonized System (HS) classification developed under the UN. CN codes cover more commodities than PRODCOM<sup>77</sup>. In the following we will sometimes refer to CN codes, or where they are easier to handle because of their higher aggregation level. Mapping tables for correlating HS, CN and PRODCOM codes are available on Eurostat's website<sup>78</sup>. A final choice of the most useful classification system will only have to be made when a CBAM will be finally defined in a legal instrument.

The identified aggregated sectors build the starting point for further discussion in the next sections. Whether an industry sector can or should be included in a CBAM depends on many factors, and trade-offs between them must be carefully balanced. In particular, a very comprehensive CBAM scope which could make the largest contribution towards enhancing the effectiveness of the EU ETS carbon price signal in support of climate neutrality while avoiding carbon leakage risks has to be balanced against the administrative burden, the technical feasibility and the actual enforceability of such a system. Therefore, the criteria listed in section 2 state that practical issues need to be considered, linked in particular to MRV issues. For this purpose, it is necessary to look at specific products, not the sectors, as at the custom offices decisions and calculation of the CBAM obligation needs to be made based on the type of product. Therefore section c first outlines some consideration on how products can be defined. Thereafter the central question is discussed, namely for which products the embedded emissions can be determined. For this purpose, a discussion of the most important value chains in the EU ETS sectors is given in section 4.c.

### *c. Defining and identifying products*

For the practical feasibility of a CBAM two aspects are relevant: Firstly, the **products and materials must be defined** to a sufficient degree that the appropriate amount of the obligation<sup>79</sup> under the CBAM can be determined by the designated authority. For this purpose it is not enough to clarify only the (carbon leakage exposed) sector using a NACE or PRODCOM code like in the Carbon Leakage List, but to list specifically all the products from within those sectors which are to be included in the CBAM. This has to take into account that within the NACE sectors value chains can be found, with

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<sup>76</sup> Combined Nomenclature, which is the European statistical classification system compatible with the United Nation's HS (Harmonized System) used in international trade.

<sup>77</sup> E.g., since 2005 PRODCOM does not contain codes for refinery products such as gasoline, diesel and kerosene.

<sup>78</sup> E.g. for CN 2019 and PRODCOM 2019:

[http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/documents/prodcom\\_2019/PRODCOM\\_2019\\_CN\\_2019\\_mapping.zip](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/documents/prodcom_2019/PRODCOM_2019_CN_2019_mapping.zip)

<sup>79</sup> I.e. the amount of tax to be paid, the emission data to be declared or the number of CBAM certificates to be surrendered.

subsequent production steps leading to different amounts of emissions. Focus on the steps with highest emissions and including those products along the value chain that satisfy the criterion of identifiable products will help to find the right balance between administrative burden and effectiveness against carbon leakage. For applying the CBAM in practice, all product categories which satisfy all criteria for including them in the CBAM should be defined by specifying their PRODCOM codes or better: CN codes, together with the applicable default reference values for the embedded emissions required for defining the amount of obligation under the CBAM, if not the actual emissions option is at hand.

Secondly, it must be considered **whether materials and products can be sufficiently identified** in practice for making the CBAM enforceable. This means that it must be possible that a product or material is unambiguously linkable to its definition and its reference value for embedded emissions. Such distinction would be for example difficult when the same basic material products can be made of primary or secondary (i.e. recycled) materials, if differentiated treatment were allowed or required. Such differentiation can create incentives for resource shuffling, and where distinction is difficult to monitor, it may invite for fraud. The most prominent case here are metals in general, which can be easily recycled, and in particular the different production routes blast furnace (primary) and electric arc furnace (almost exclusively secondary) steel. While it would be justifiable based on the EU ETS benchmark methodology to assign different levels of embedded emissions to primary and secondary materials even in the absence of verified emissions data, it might be quite appealing for importers to claim their product to be recycled and therefore subject to the lower CBAM obligation. The proposed approaches for avoiding incorrect claims in this regard are either to require independently verified emissions data following strict MRV rules, or to rely fully on default values for embedded emissions.

If those MRV rules are applied appropriately, only in rare cases of suspected fraud actual (chemical) analyses would be required to **distinguish primary and secondary materials**. Analytical methods would have to be made available to the designated authorities together with reference data for selected tracer elements which would allow identifying non-primary materials to a sufficient assurance level. For the moment it seems an excessive effort to develop such methods. Instead, the MRV rules in the CBAM applicable to emissions from foreign countries will require the importer to provide credible evidence (confirmation with reasonable assurance by an accredited verifier applying international standards and in line with relevant EU legislation), which would also have to confirm what production process at which installation of provenance has been applied. For other cases of doubt, e.g. whether a certain CN code has to be applied, already now sufficient instruments exist, since all kinds of custom tariffs need to be confirmed in practice, too.

If both criteria are satisfied, i.e. products are defined and it is ensured they can be identified, the remaining issue is **whether the embedded emissions of a material or product can be determined**. This question is intertwined with the design of the MRV system and the approach chosen for determining default values. However, as will be discussed there, a solution will almost always be possible if the system boundaries of MRV are chosen reasonably. In order to understand what kind of 'reasonable' would be

meant here, we will discuss in the next section what kind of value chains have to be considered in context of the EU ETS and CBAM.

#### 4. Practical feasibility aspects

Most literature on CBAMs concentrates on only a handful of ‘Energy Intensive and Trade Exposed’ (EITE) sectors, which are often not defined in detail<sup>80</sup>. Furthermore, most literature rightfully assumes that focus on basic materials may make the system more realistically feasible than if taking into account more downstream products. This goes hand in hand with the expectation that for basic materials the administrative burden may remain limited. In this chapter we examine if these assumptions are correct. This is in particular important, as in case only imports are included in a CBAM (options 1 and 2), a strong incentive will be generated for producing more semi-finished or finished products outside the EU and thereafter importing them into the EU without being covered by the CBAM. This would mean that bigger parts of value chains would become subject to carbon leakage. If, however, it was possible to cover more complex products by the CBAM, the carbon price would be more effective and carbon leakage risks better addressed.

Value chains are very different in the sectors covered by the EU ETS and exposed to a risk of carbon leakage. The differences concern both the typical depth as well as the horizontal width of value chains. Therefore, it can be assumed that not all options of CBAM designs will be equally suitable for the different sectors.

##### a. Overview

One difficulty of discussing complex topics such as a CBAM comes from the fact that that many terms are difficult to define, used for different meanings in different contexts, etc. For example, the term ‘value chain’, ‘upstream’ or ‘downstream’ processes are used in different ways in literature and by stakeholders from different industry sectors. In order to provide as unambiguous information as possible in this report, there is reference to the definitions found in Annex 5. We use a very pragmatic approach instead of an

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<sup>80</sup> Böhringer, C., Rosendahl, K. E., & Storrosten, H. B., ‘Robust policies to mitigate carbon leakage’, *Journal of Public Economics* 149, 2017, 35-46 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.03.006>; Cosby, A., Droege, S., Fischer, C., & Munnings, C., ‘Developing Guidance for Implementing Border Carbon Adjustments: Lessons, Cautions, and Research Needs from the Literature’, *Review of Environmental Economics and Policy*, 13(1), 2019, 3–22. <https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rey020>; Flannery, B., Hillman, J., Mares, J. W., & Porterfield, M., ‘Framework Proposal for a US Upstream Greenhouse Gas Tax with WTO-Compliant Border Adjustments’, *Resources for the Future*, 2018; Kortum, S., & Weisbach, D. J., ‘The Design of Border Adjustments for Carbon Prices’, *National Tax Journal*, 70(2), 2017, 421–446. <https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2017.2.07>; Das, K., ‘Can Border Adjustments Be WTO-Legal?’, *Manchester Journal of International Economic Law*, 8(3), 2011, 65–97; Mehling, M. A., van Asselt, H., Das, K., Droege, S., & Verkuil, C., ‘Designing Border Carbon Adjustments for Enhanced Climate Action’, *American Journal of International Law*, 113(3), 2019, pp.433–481. <https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2019.22>; Sandbag, ‘The A-B-C Of BCAs’, 2019. [https://ember-climate.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/2019-SB-Border-Adjustments\\_DIGI-1.pdf](https://ember-climate.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/2019-SB-Border-Adjustments_DIGI-1.pdf); Branger, F., & Quirion, P., ‘Would border carbon adjustments prevent carbon leakage and heavy industry competitiveness losses? Insights from a meta-analysis of recent economic studies’, *Ecological Economics*, Vol 99, 2014, pp.29–39. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.12.010>; Böhringer, C., Balistreri, E. J., & Rutherford, T. F., ‘The role of border carbon adjustment in unilateral climate policy: Overview of an Energy Modeling Forum study (EMF 29)’, *Energy Economic*, 34, 2012, S97–S110. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2012.10.003>.



exact definition that would be universally applicable: We explain the terms in exactly the way they are needed to discuss the scope and the related practicalities of MRV which are closely connected to the scope definition.

From the definitions above it becomes clear that boundaries between the material and product categories are often flexible and subjective. In some sectors the basic material product can be identical to the final product sold to the end consumer (e.g. a bag of Portland cement for the do-it-yourself market; a bag of NPK fertiliser, etc.), while other sectors require to bring together a multitude of basic materials and semi-finished products from various other sectors. Literature about CBAM often uses terms like the above without further definition. It is therefore often not clear on the real scope implied for the CBAM. In particular the boundaries between basic materials and semi-finished products, and between the latter and manufactured products can be unclear. It is therefore important that any legislation for implementing a CBAM provides clear definitions of the products to be included, or at least clear criteria based on which some implementing acts can later define the precise definitions. Due to the mentioned complexities the preferred approach for defining materials and products is to provide a list of the CN codes which would fall under the respective definition, instead of actually defining the product in a descriptive way.

*b. Impact of the value chains on CBAM product choice*

The first and most obvious argument in favour of concentrating on basic materials/products may be that the number of products to be administered by a CBAM will strongly increase with every production step, while the energy intensive basic materials (and their carbon costs) are ‘diluted’ in each manufacturing step. For example, in the steel sectors found on the CL List (see Section 3) there are 144 PRODCOM categories (including alloyed steels and ferroalloys which will differ from ‘normal’ steel in terms of embedded emissions). These categories refer mostly to steel materials like ingots, bars, coils, sheets, pipes etc. of various dimensions and steel qualities. They mostly fit into the above definition of ‘basic material products’, where the larger part of the material’s value actually is based on the production costs of the chemical steel making process, while the effort for bringing the steel into the form and dimension sold

is some order of magnitude smaller. Therefore, several authors<sup>81</sup> consider the additional energy and thus carbon requirement for the additional refinement of basic materials to be small compared to the carbon intensity of the conventional primary production process. Furthermore, typically the increased value added of the subsequent refinement stages is significantly higher. Hence the initial focus resides on enhancing the effectiveness of the carbon price while avoiding carbon leakage risks for the basic material production stage.

Secondly, for practical reasons, only products should be included in a CBAM for which the embedded emissions can be determined with reasonable robustness and credibility as basis for the definition of reference values. For basic materials coming directly out of an installation which monitors its emissions under a mandatory and publicly regulated carbon pricing scheme such as the EU ETS or the Korean ETS, this will be the case in principle, although it can be difficult in practice. Experience with the new allocation rules for the 4th phase of the EU ETS shows that it is often very demanding to split the emissions correctly along the boundaries of the so-called sub-installations which serve for attributing emissions to the various products leaving the installation. The situation gets the more complicated, the more manufacturing steps are subsequently carried out. It is the nature of manufacturing of more complex products, that the content of the basic materials in the final product will not always be 100 %. For example, a product may consist e.g. of 60 % steel and 40 % other materials. Assuming that those other materials would not lead to significant emissions during their production (they might be recycled materials or biomass), the embedded emissions of that product would be only 60 % of those found for a pure steel<sup>82</sup>. On the other hand, for complex structures, extensive machining may be required, such that e.g. only 25 % of the original steel material end up in the product, while 75 % are wasted in the form of (recyclable) scrap. In this case, the embedded emissions of the product would be 4 times higher based on the mass of the product than for the original steel material<sup>83</sup>. Furthermore, most manufactured products

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<sup>81</sup> Cosbey, A., Droege, S., Fischer, C., & Munnings, C., ‘Developing Guidance for Implementing Border Carbon Adjustments: Lessons, Cautions, and Research Needs from the Literature’, *Review of Environmental Economics and Policy*, 13(1), 2019, 3–22. <https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rey020>; Mehling, M. A., van Asselt, H., Das, K., Droege, S., & Verkuil, C., ‘Designing Border Carbon Adjustments for Enhanced Climate Action’, *American Journal of International Law*, 113(3), 2019, pp.433–481. <https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2019.22>; Monjon, S., & Quirion, P., ‘How to design a border adjustment for the European Union Emissions Trading System?’, *Energy Policy*, 38(9), 2010, 5199–5207; Droege, S., *Tackling Leakage in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices*, 2019, [http://www2.centre-cired.fr/IMG/pdf/cs\\_tackling\\_leakage\\_report\\_final.pdf](http://www2.centre-cired.fr/IMG/pdf/cs_tackling_leakage_report_final.pdf); Sakai, M., & Barrett, J., ‘Border carbon adjustments: Addressing emissions embodied in trade’, *Energy Policy*, 92, 2016 102–110. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.01.038>; Gisselman, F., & Eriksson, E., ‘Border Carbon Adjustments. An analysis of trade related aspects and the way forward’, *National Board of Trade Sweden*, 2020 [https://www.kommerskollegium.se/contentassets/7a09d4cdb83a46feaf0c6ae6e5b02fff/border-carbon-adjustments\\_final.pdf](https://www.kommerskollegium.se/contentassets/7a09d4cdb83a46feaf0c6ae6e5b02fff/border-carbon-adjustments_final.pdf); Böhringer, C., Carbone, J. C., & Rutherford, T. F., ‘Embodied Carbon Tariffs’, *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 120(1), 2018, pp.183–210. <https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12211>; Pauliuk, S., Neuhoff, K., Owen, A., & Wood, R., ‘Quantifying Impacts of Consumption Based Charge for Carbon Intensive Materials on Products’, *DIW Discussion Papers No. 1570*, 2016. <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2779451>

<sup>82</sup> These are rough estimates which assume that the emissions of manufacturing steps for the compound products are negligible, which is indeed often the case compared to the emissions of the base material production.

<sup>83</sup> One might argue that the 75% material cut off would be recyclable (through the EAF route) and would then lead to significantly lower emissions than a virgin steel produced by the blast furnace route. However, if the MRV effort should be kept reasonable, it would be easier to fully assign all 100% steel emissions to

(for end consumers) consist of far more than two basic materials and require many production steps<sup>84</sup>, which are often carried out by a multitude of different companies across the globe, making the tracing of the associated emissions very onerous. It is therefore desirable to find a reasonable limit regarding the number of production steps which can still be taken into account when determining the embedded emissions of a product. The term ‘semi-finished products’ is often found in the discussion of CBAMs as the boundary of its scope, but it is rarely defined in detail. In our approach there is no need for such ambiguity, since we propose to explicitly list which goods should be included in the CBAM.

Thirdly, as has already been mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, it has to be kept in mind that different industry sectors function very differently. In some cases, the ‘EITE<sup>85</sup> product’ itself is a good for purchase by an end consumer. This is the case e.g. for electricity production, refinery products (gasoline, diesel), most fertilisers, some tissue or office papers, etc. In other cases, there are so many production steps before a product is placed on the market that the final customer cannot reasonably know which basic materials it consists of. Many simple and homogeneous appearing materials are in fact complex mixtures (e.g. PVC contains significant mass fractions of stabilizers, plasticizers and other additives such as pigments). Furthermore, there are products (e.g. electronic equipment) of which the value stems more from the know-how in the production process than from the materials used. The value of a microprocessor’s silicon content, its gold wires etc. is several orders of magnitude lower than the final product’s. These are cases where the embedded emissions are extremely ‘diluted’ throughout the production process, so that any remaining potential carbon costs of the production process would not merit any consideration for a CBAM.

From the above it becomes clear that basic materials, and in some sectors, basic material products seem most appropriate for inclusion in the CBAM due to the relatively limited administrative burden which it would entail regarding:

- the number of products for which product definitions, MRV rules and reference values need to be developed;
- the number of transactions (imports) that need to be subject to the CBAM.

However, at least for those options which are import-oriented, the focus on basic materials and products will provide an incentive to produce semi-finished and final manufactured products outside the EU, as their import would then not fall under the scope of the CBAM. In other words, value chains would be partly pushed outside the EU, which would not only increase carbon leakage, but would lead to a further loss of value generation within the EU. In order to mitigate this effect, a purely import-oriented CBAM would benefit from inclusion of semi-finished products in its scope. This study

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the product under consideration, while the emissions of recycling would be fully attributed to the EAF steel which used the scrap as input.

<sup>84</sup> More in general, the embodied emissions could be expressed as the sum of the products of the content and the specific embodied emissions of all materials found in the product. However, often there are also materials used in the manufacturing which do not end up in the product, such as cutting tools, solvents for cleaning etc., the consumption of which would also have to be taken into account.

<sup>85</sup> Energy Intensive and Trade Exposed.

therefore needs to discuss if that would be possible at reasonable administrative effort. This is done by discussing the most important value chains in the EU ETS in the next section.

*c. Selected issues of value chains for basic materials*

A crucial criterion which can impact the overall feasibility of a CBAM is the availability of data for defining reference levels for the embedded emissions of a product or material. If such data is unavailable, it would remain unknown how big the obligation for an imported product in the CBAM would be.

At this point it is to be examined how embedded emissions of simple materials stemming from EU ETS installations can be determined for the purpose of a CBAM. It might turn out more complex than it appears at first sight. For defining a product's embedded emissions, literature<sup>86</sup> often refers to the options (a) actual emissions or (b) reference values such as the EU ETS benchmarks or the EU's average emissions in a sector. This appears convincing for materials which can be produced in one single step covered by the EU ETS. However, if goods produced in the EU should be put on equal footing with imported goods regarding embedded carbon costs, it is necessary to look whether reasonably robust data in the EU could be obtained for the relevant value chains. In some cases such value chains can be well-defined, which means that it is possible to combine EU ETS benchmarks or average emission values for products which are usually produced via relatively uniform routes, and where material consumption in the different production steps can be well estimated. This approach is however not straightforward in the case that materials can be obtained by different (chemical) routes, where a choice for one of the possible routes will have to be made and may turn out controversial. Such considerations may be of high importance in sectors where high emissions are caused by basic materials or products which can be traded across borders. Some examples are given below:

- For the **steel industry**, the typical production route for basic material products (blast furnace route) can be described simplified as follows:
  - Coke (product benchmark) is produced from coal.
  - Some iron ores are treated in a sinter (product benchmark) or pelletisation plant.
  - Iron ore (or purchased pellets), coke and sinter are used in the blast furnace for producing pig iron, from which residual carbon is removed in

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<sup>86</sup> Cosby, A., Droege, S., Fischer, C., Reinaud, J., Stephenson, J., Weischer, L. and Wooders, P., 'A Guide For The Concerned: Guidance On The Elaboration And Implementation Of Border Carbon Adjustment', *Entwined*, 2012, [https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/bca\\_guidance.pdf](https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/bca_guidance.pdf); Mehling, M. A., van Asselt, H., Das, K., Droege, S., & Verkuil, C., 'Designing Border Carbon Adjustments for Enhanced Climate Action', *American Journal of International Law*, 113(3), 2019, pp.433–481. <https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2019.22>; Pauliuk, S., Neuhoff, K., Owen, A., & Wood, R., 'Quantifying Impacts of Consumption Based Charge for Carbon Intensive Materials on Products', *DIW Discussion Papers No. 1570*, 2016. <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2779451>; Böhringer, C., Carbone, J. C., & Rutherford, T. F., 'Embodied Carbon Tariffs', *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 120(1), 2018, pp.183–210. <https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12211>; Moran, D., Hasanbeigi, A., & Springer, C., 'The carbon loophole in climate policy. Quantifying the Embodied Carbon in Traded Products' *KGM & Associates, Global Efficiency Intelligence, Climate Work Foundations*, 2018.

the converter for producing steel (the ‘hot metal’ benchmark applies to the whole process, although the calculation basis is the hot iron leaving the blast furnace).

- For a more precise treatment, various additives (in particular lime) and the often-significant amounts of scrap added to the process have to be considered.
- Some more energy input is required (fall-back approach ‘fuel benchmark’) for hot rolling, cold rolling, plating, etc., i.e. for arriving at the basic material product.

From (confidential) EU ETS data, or by using information from the BAT reference document, and with the support of the industry association, it could be possible to come up with a reference value for typical steel products taking into account all the above production steps.

However, an issue of high importance in the steel sector is the fact that there is another production route (electric arc furnace) which leads to considerably lower GHG emissions than the blast furnace route. This is a consequence of the use of already metallic iron instead of iron ore in the process (either steel scrap or ‘Direct Reduced Iron’, DRI). For EU ETS purposes it has been argued that blast furnace and EAF routes usually lead to different products and different benchmarks for both production routes have been introduced. The reason is due to the lower purity of scrap-based steels<sup>87</sup>. They could therefore be distinguishable based on chemical analyses. However, when using DRI, it is doubtful if this distinction is possible. Therefore, the criterion of the possibility to distinguish materials needs to be considered in the design and evaluation of CBAM options (see section 3.c).

- In the **fertiliser industry**, a few pure and emission-intensive substances are traded (ammonia, nitric acid, ammonium nitrate and urea), and other typical products are granulated NPK fertilisers of various nutrient mixtures. This is because plant growth can be improved by providing three nutrients to soils which might otherwise be insufficiently available: Nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium (in chemical symbols: N-P-K). The only component which is produced with significant GHG emissions is the nitrogen component (which can be either ammonium or nitrate ions, urea, or mixtures thereof), and nitrogen components are also traded as pure chemicals which can also be used by other industries. The production chain is as follows:
  - As a first step, ammonia is produced where natural gas is almost the exclusive raw material<sup>88</sup>. A dedicated EU ETS benchmark exists.

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<sup>87</sup> Ecofys et al., 2009, [https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/ets/allowances/docs/bm\\_study-iron\\_and\\_steel\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/ets/allowances/docs/bm_study-iron_and_steel_en.pdf)

<sup>88</sup> In fact, the first production step is hydrogen production, for which a dedicated product benchmark exists in the EU ETS. However, this benchmark is only applicable where other substances than ammonia are produced. It is worth to mention that the vast majority of hydrogen is currently produced from natural gas, and only in few cases from heavy fractions in refineries. At this point in time ‘green’ hydrogen from water electrolysis using electricity from renewable sources is not yet an economically feasible option. However, as soon as a ‘green hydrogen economy’ becomes reality, it would also feed the ammonia production.

- From ammonia, nitric acid (benchmark) or urea can be produced.
- The downstream process steps are less energy intensive and (if carried out in standalone installations) not under the EU ETS: Urea can act as a solid fertiliser on its own or be used for NPK production. Ammonia and nitric acid can be reacted to form ammonium nitrate, which is a fertiliser on its own, or a component in NPK fertilisers.

For a CBAM this means that for all the fertilisers mentioned, the nitrogen content and the chemical form of the nitrogen component need to be known to determine the emissions. For nitric acid and nitrates, it should be possible to determine combined reference values based on the ammonia and nitric acid benchmarks. For urea production, a reference value based on the necessary ammonia quantity would be logical<sup>89</sup>.

- For **polymers**, which are highly tradable commodities, the actual emissions of the polymerisation of monomers are relatively low, while the production of the precursors (the monomers) is highly energy intensive. Hence, an approximation to reality may be required by taking into account the upstream processes. For example, the CBAM reference values for PE (Polyethylene) and PP (Polypropylene), the two polymers most produced globally, may be reasonably focused on the carbon emissions from refining and high value chemical production (steam cracker). However, for PVC (the third-most produced polymer), one of the most complex value chains in the EU ETS can be construed:
  - The starting point are light fractions of the refinery products. Hence, some emissions based on the refinery benchmark<sup>90</sup> should be taken into account.
  - Production of simple olefins (ethylene, propylene, etc.) is usually using steam cracking. The EU ETS benchmark for HVC ('High Value Chemicals'<sup>91</sup>) applies. For the next step, only ethylene is relevant.
  - For vinyl chloride (monomer) production there is again an EU ETS benchmark. Input materials are ethylene (which 'carries' emissions from refineries and HVC) and Chlorine<sup>92</sup>.
  - Chlorine production is an electrolytic process which is eligible for indirect EU ETS compensation. A benchmark is found in the state aid guidelines on power price compensation for the third phase, and its production is

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<sup>89</sup> Furthermore, the absorption of CO<sub>2</sub> in the urea production process could be considered. However, at the current stage the EU ETS monitoring regulation considers this CO<sub>2</sub> quantity as emitted.

<sup>90</sup> Note that the refinery benchmark based on the CWT (Complexity Weighted Tonnes) approach is rather atypical, as it does not directly relate to the quantity of certain products such as gasoline, diesel or kerosene, but on the complexity and throughput of the whole refinery and its actual configuration. Hence, at this point in time there is not yet any agreed approach to assign CO<sub>2</sub> quantities to each of the refinery products.

<sup>91</sup> This takes into account acetylene, ethylene, propylene, butadiene, benzene and hydrogen. Note that like for refineries, no agreed methodology is available at this time for assigning specific emissions to each of the individual products.

<sup>92</sup> Alternative production routes use hydrochloric acid. However, although the latter may be by-product from other reactions, at some point chlorine production is also required.

eligible for compensation in several Member States. Chlorine production has no direct emissions and is therefore not covered by the EU ETS itself.

- For two of the existing three polymerisation processes (E-PVC and S-PVC), EU ETS benchmarks exist.

In this case the determination of an encompassing reference value may be difficult. Not only are the refinery and HVC benchmarks not directly useable, but the final production step can be subject to different benchmarks. It is to be expected that based on customs papers, no distinction between E and S-PVC can be made. The latter may, however, be a less important issue, as the significantly higher emissions stem from the other processes listed, in particular the steam cracker.

*d. Feasibility to determine embedded emissions of basic materials*

As said before, the embedded emissions of a material or product are required to calculate the CBAM obligation, and if the embedded emissions cannot be determined at least as a reasonable default value, the material or product cannot be included in the CBAM scope. This feasibility to determine embedded emissions is discussed here.

A generic formula for determining embedded emissions  $EE_p$  of a material or product in a value chain can be expressed as follows (without taking into account any carbon price already paid or free allocation received<sup>93</sup>):

$$\text{Equation (1)} \quad EE_p = EM_p + IE_p + \sum_{i=1}^n MC_i \cdot (EM_i + IE_i)$$

Where  $EM_p$  are the direct emissions of the production process of the material or product under consideration,  $IE_p$  the indirect emissions of the production process. The formula takes into account the emissions of upstream production processes, where the index  $i$  indicates the upstream materials 1 to  $n$ , and  $MC_i$  the amount of material  $i$  consumed for one unit of the material or product for which the embedded emissions are to be calculated.  $EM_i$  are the direct emissions during the production of material  $i$ , and  $IE_i$  the respective indirect emissions. This formula is relatively simple to apply to a single production step. If it is the first step of a value chain, i.e. if all raw materials used in the process have embedded emissions of zero, it is simply  $EE_p = EM_p + IE_p$ , and if the CBAM design were such that indirect emissions were not included it would be reduced to only  $EE_p = EM_p$ . For applying it to a longer value chain, the formula can be used either subsequently for one production step after the other, or by applying it in one go by applying  $MC_i$  values which take into account how much of the upstream produced materials pass through the value chain to give the product or material under consideration.

From that equation it becomes apparent what data are required to determine embedded emissions, and what is required to decide if the product can be included in the CBAM:

- In case of a basic material produced in one single step covered by the EU ETS from raw materials:

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<sup>93</sup> As this here is only about the purely technical arguments and description of the important value chains, there is no need to take carbon costs into account.

- A reference value for the direct emissions per tonne of the production process ( $EM_P$ );
- Where relevant, a reference value for indirect emissions per tonne related to that production process ( $EM_P$ ).
- In order to determine those two values, the CBAM design needs to define a set of rules to determine them. This will apply without prejudice whether the reference values would be set at the EU ETS benchmark or at a higher level such as the average emissions intensity in the EU, or even specific to certain countries.

The key issue here is that for all types of production processes which lead to more than one product, rules need to be defined for how to split ('attribute') emissions to those goods. For those basic materials which are covered by EU ETS product benchmarks, the FAR<sup>94</sup> provide relatively clear rules for defining system boundaries (so-called sub-installations), and for attributing Combined Heat and Power (CHP) emissions into a part for heat and a part for electricity. However, there are no rules for going into more detail (e.g. splitting fall-back sub-installations into more disaggregated product-specific values), and even some of the defined product benchmarks do not provide sufficient detail to assign them to the single products covered by the benchmark. For example, the refinery benchmark applies to a whole 'typical product mix' of a refinery, consisting of various fractions such as naphtha, gasoline, diesel, kerosene, fuel oils etc. The same applies to the 'HVC'<sup>95</sup> benchmark and some other chemicals benchmarks. This is no obstacle in principle to include such materials/products in the CBAM, but a considerable practical stumbling block to making it happen in practice, as the definition of the required rules may be quite controversial. Proposals for solving this specific issue include to attribute the emissions to specific materials/products according to:

- the ratio of free reaction enthalpies of the chemical reactions involved;
  - the molecular weights of the materials obtained;
  - the relative economic value of the materials/products produced;
  - a flat-rate approach (all materials/products are rated equal, e.g. a tonne of gasoline would have the same embedded emissions as a tonne of heavy fuel oil).
- In case of basic materials or products which require more than one production step covered by the EU ETS, Equation (1) can either be applied for combining all the steps of the value chain in one calculation, or each step can be assessed

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<sup>94</sup> Free Allocation Rules, i.e. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/331 of 19 December 2018 determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.

<sup>95</sup> High value chemicals, defined as a typical output of the steam cracking process, which yields several organic bulk chemicals which are input to polymer production and other organic syntheses.



separately. As in most of the cases each of the production steps itself leads to a tradable material or product, it is most useful to carry out the calculation for each step separately. An overview can be helpful to determine all relevant value chains. The data and information needs for determining reference values of embedded emissions for implementing a CBAM include:

- The reference value of the embedded emissions of each of the precursor materials, as discussed under the previous main bullet point for ‘one-step’ basic materials.
- The typical quantity of the precursor required to produce one tonne of the material or product under consideration (material consumption  $MC_i$ ). This can be a stoichiometric factor, but more often this will have to be based on a ‘typical consumption level’ that will require additional data collection or expert judgement, e.g. based on BAT reference documents, other literature or industry guidelines. Again, this is no obstacle in principle, but a possible source of controversy.
- The definition of the reference production route in case of products or materials that can be obtained by quite different production routes. For example:
  - Aromatics (benzene, toluene, xylols) are basic chemicals typically produced in refineries or subsequent chemical plants. However, they are also side products of coke ovens.
  - Ethanol is best known in public as a product of a biological process (fermentation). However, it can also be produced from fossil feedstock.
  - Hydrogen and ammonia are currently produced almost exclusively from fossil feedstock (natural gas or heavy refinery fractions) but are expected to be produced via electrolyses at large scale in the future. Already now hydrogen is a by-product of the Chloralkali electrolysis<sup>96</sup>.
  - In the steel sector, blast furnace and electric arc furnace routes are important and can overlap regarding their product mix.
  - For several non-ferrous metals both primary and secondary production routes are of importance.

Again, this issue is no obstacle for including products in the CBAM in principle, but its solution will be difficult from a political perspective and may draw considerable international attention.

- It goes without saying that the above data demand becomes more complex with every step down the value chain.

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<sup>96</sup> However, there is also a technology called ‘oxygen depolarised cathode’ which reduces significantly the energy consumption of the electrolysis, which avoids the hydrogen production. This is useful only at chemical sites where no use can be made of the produced hydrogen.

The application of the methodology to determine embedded emissions will need to inform the implied next process steps. In the case where the reference value will be applied to imports, a higher level of precision and robustness against potential legal challenges will be required. The preferred approach for solving such issues would be that a working group under the Commission's lead consisting of Member State experts and possible consultants and industry stakeholders would develop solutions. Ultimately, this group would provide the technical basis for the decision on inclusions of materials or products in the CBAM, and on default values for embedded emissions and their input factors.

## **5. Candidates for materials and products to be included in the CBAM**

The final step for defining the scope of the CBAM is to move from the 'sector' concept used in the CLL for the EU ETS to the more tangible concept of 'materials and products'. For the EU ETS, it is important to use a concept that fits to the installations covered, which often produce a multitude of different products. However, when an imported good is to be subject of a CBAM, it is necessary that the authority in charge – a Member State's customs office or port authority, etc. – can identify the product imported, check whether it is to be covered, and then determine the relevant amount of emissions which are to be covered by certificates or a tax.

As has been raised in section 3.c, a clear definition of the CBAM will ultimately require a list of materials and products (or product classes) which should be covered by the CBAM. This list must ensure that products can be clearly identified, and emission reference values will be required to be attached to each of these products.

In that respect, adopting implementing acts could be used. Implementing acts could be further be used for defining other technical details such as specific monitoring procedures and actual default values for the embedded emissions of various products. Thus, technological progress and the development of new product groups, or the gradual introducing of products along the value chain when more data becomes available can be also envisaged.

Table 7-2 presents the candidate materials/products from which the scope of the CBAM can be defined. The table follows the logic of starting with simple ('single-process') basic materials and going along the value chain to basic material products and in rare cases semi-finished products. The table provides an insight to what data is required and whether is already available. In the column 'Include in CBAM?' the table gives a recommendation on whether the material or product should be included in the CBAM. The indicators 'possible' or 'tbd' (to be decided) show that the inclusion should in principle be technically possible, but that at this stage the data is not sufficiently available, i.e. it would be up to the data collection approach for embedded emission default values to provide the basis for the decision if the material or product can be included in the CBAM.

Larger groups of CN/HS codes have been gathered into material and product groups for the purpose of Table 7-2. The materials/products are named in the first column of that table.

Materials and products are considered to be within the same group where production processes suggest that the level of embedded emissions ( $EE_P$ ) as similar. Separate materials/products are listed where the embedded emissions are considered significantly different. However, more work (involving industry experts) in the future would be required for determining the relevant values. Where  $EE_P$  turn out to be sufficiently on a similar level, product groups might be combined into one material group, or extended by adding further CN codes. Such design choices are also dependent on the main CBAM option chosen. For an excise duty (option 6),  $EE_P$  levels don't have to be perfectly exact, as they would not have to fully relate to true emissions. It would be sufficient if they provide a reasonable differentiation between materials for incentivising the use of materials with lower embedded emissions on average.

**Table 7-2: Material and product categories, data requirements and considerations for inclusion in the CBAM, for selected aggregated sectors.**

Under 'Include in CBAM?' The meaning of the entries are as follows: 'Yes': Product can be included in the CBAM based on practical feasibility considerations; 'No': Product does not appear suitable. 'Tbd' (to be discussed): at the current stage it is unclear if practical obstacles can be solved; 'possible' means inclusion should be possible in practice, but either data is not sufficient or the merits of inclusion are not clear yet. Where 'tbd' is given in combination with yes or no, it means that 'yes' or 'no' are not as clear cut as without 'tbd'. The decision on inclusion of such products requires that more information is to be collected.

CBAM Product name	Precursors	Data needs	Include in CBAM?	Other comments
<b>Iron and Steel (HS 72)</b>				
Pig iron	Coke, sintered ore	$MC_i$ of Coke, sintered ore, $EE_P$ of coke and Sintered ore; $EE_P$ of 'hot metal', correction factor for not making steel	No	Reference $EE_P$ required for other steel products; Don't include product in CBAM, as imports are negligible
Ferro-Alloys			No (tbd)	Too diverse products, no EU ETS product benchmark (BM) data. Inclusion can be re-evaluated in a few years
DRI (Direct Reduced Iron)		Process route and precursors, $EE_P$	No (tbd)	More efficient than conventional iron making. May become increasingly important as low carbon technology. Inclusion can be re-evaluated in a few years
Iron and steel Scrap			No	Too diverse, and no emissions attached
Iron and steel primary forms	Coke, sintered ore	$MC_i$ of Coke, sintered ore, $EE_P$ of coke and Sintered ore; $EE_P$ of 'hot metal' - Alternatively EAF steel different $EE_P$ ?	possible	Includes largest import category (720712 - Semi-finished bars, iron or non-alloy steel <0.25%C, rectangular, nes), which might be EAF steel? Needs further information from the sector; Reference $EE_P$ required for calculating hot rolled steel, i.e. is precondition for 'hot rolled steel'
Hot rolled and further	'Hot metal' (EU ETS	$MC_i$ of hot metal (or estimate as 100%),	possible	Promising candidate (often mentioned in literature). Proposal here to include also

CBAM Product name	Precursors	Data needs	Include in CBAM?	Other comments
steps	BM) / iron and steel in primary forms	$EE_p$ for 'hot metal'; correction factor for hot rolling (based on fuel input, not available from EU ETS data)		cold-rolled products (which includes a step after hot rolling)
Coated hot rolled and further steps	Hot rolled steel	Use $EE_p$ of hot rolled steel as proxy?	tbd.	Coatings are very diverse, may have significant impact on $EE_p$ . However, if not enough data available, propose to use $EE_p$ of hot rolled steel as a proxy. Would require additional expertise on coating processes. Inclusion might be interesting due to including a step on the value chain. If not included, re-evaluate in a few years
Forged, extruded, wire etc.	Hot rolled steel or hot metal	$EE_p$ of hot rolled steel might serve as proxy	No (tbd.)	Processes covered quite diverse. Imported volume not too big.
Stainless steel	scrap and ferro-alloys	$MCI$ levels of precursors, $EE_p$ thereof (unknown), $EE_p$ of EAF high alloy steel (EU ETS BM)	No (tbd.)	Danger of too diverse products and lack of reference data. Inclusion can be re-evaluated in a few years
Other alloyed steel	scrap and ferro-alloys	$MCI$ levels of precursors, $EE_p$ thereof (unknown), $EE_p$ of EAF high alloy steel (EU ETS BM)	No (tbd.)	Danger of too diverse products and lack of reference data. Inclusion can be re-evaluated in a few years
<b>Iron and steel articles (HS 73)</b>				
Note: These products seem to consist to a very high percentage of cast iron or steel. The reference value of the corresponding basic material could serve as a proxy for embedded emissions of the (manufactured) product. These products can be considered for inclusion if the goal is to include more steps down the value chain.				
Article of iron or steel		Composition data in most cases not specified, hence no $EE_p$ data know. Perhaps use 'hot rolled steel' as proxy.	No (tbd)	General problem here: Many products (the most traded ones) are 'n.e.s.', hence too diverse. Furthermore most product groups cover both 'iron or steel', i.e. $EE_p$ quite uncertain
Article of cast iron	Pig iron (hot metal with correction factor)	Correction factor for converting 'hot metal' into 'cast iron'; $MCI$ assumed as 100%; $EE_p$ for iron casting (EU ETS BM)	No (tbd)	Not very high imports
Article of stainless or alloy	Stainless steel	use stainless steel $EE_p$ as proxy	No (tbd)	Not very high imports
Article of Steel	(hot rolled) steel	use hot rolled steel $EE_p$ as proxy	No (tbd)	Not very high imports

CBAM Product name	Precursors	Data needs	Include in CBAM?	Other comments
<b>Refineries (HS 271)</b>				
Standard Refinery products		Derive a proxy $EE_p$ as average of refinery outputs (will require Eurostat data combined with EU ETS data), since CWT benchmark is not directly linked to products	tbd	Product definition: Naphtha (required for chemicals $EE_p$ ); motor spirits, jet fuels, gas oils, fuel oils; Tbd if sector structure is suitable for CBAM (Global equilibrium of refining capacities); The definition of embedded emissions may be difficult, which has an impact on basic organic chemicals and polymers, which require reference values of refinery products.
Special refinery products			no	Define these products as ‘everything not covered by Standard Refinery products’; Products are very diverse, probably insufficient data available
<b>Cement (HS 25)</b>				
Clinker		EU ETS data for developing $EE_p$	yes	good data availability due to simplicity of product
Portland cement	clinker	$MCi$ for clinker, $EE_p$ of Clinker	yes	good data availability due to simplicity of product; simple value chain
White and coloured cement			no	Various niche products (EU ETS BM for white clinker not generally applicable), propose to omit for reducing admin burden
<b>Aluminium (HS 76)</b>				
Aluminium unwrought		EU ETS data and data on indirect emissions (State aid Guidelines)	yes (tbd)	Discussion regarding electricity mix and resource shuffling likely. However, product is reasonably homogeneous. Problem to distinguish primary and secondary aluminium.
Aluminium unwrought alloyed		Use same reference data as for non-alloyed aluminium as proxy	yes (tbd)	Big diversity of alloys possible. However, pure Al reference value should be a reasonable proxy
Other Al products (HS 76)		Use same reference data as for non-alloyed aluminium as proxy	yes (tbd)	For including at least limited value chains, this should be included, too.
<b>Pulp and Paper (HS 47 and 48)</b>				
Pulp			no	HS/CN codes seem to be not aligned with EU ETS benchmark classification. Data situation complex. Specific emission costs relatively low due to biomass use. Propose not to include in CBAM, since admin burden might exceed the benefit (CL impact will be limited)
Paper	pulp		no	Identification of products seems possible. However, Limited CL impact (see pulp), determination of $EE_p$ difficult.

CBAM Product name	Precursors	Data needs	Include in CBAM?	Other comments
<b>Fertilisers (HS 31)</b>				
Ammonia		EU ETS data and data on indirect emissions (State aid Guidelines)	yes	Product simple to identify; However, for aqueous solutions concentration would have to be known (apply $EE_p$ to 100% Ammonia)
Urea	Ammonia	$MC_i$ and $EE_p$ of Ammonia. Under current EU ETS legislation (M and R Regulation), there is no subtraction of CO <sub>2</sub> bound in the urea production process.	yes	Product simple to identify; However, for aqueous solutions concentration would have to be known (apply $EE_p$ to 100% Urea)
Nitric acid	Ammonia	$MC_i$ and $EE_p$ of Ammonia plus EU ETS data for nitric acid production.	yes (tbd)	Nitric acid imports don't seem to be very big. However, even if not included in the CBAM, the calculation of $EE_p$ would be required as a precursor to other nitrogen or NPK fertilisers
Mixed N fertilisers	Ammonia, nitric acid and/or urea	$EE_p$ and $MC_i$ of the three N components NH <sub>4</sub> , NO <sub>3</sub> and Urea. Fertiliser grade must be known, as this can be converted into $MC_i$ values.	yes (tbd)	All combinations of Urea, NH <sub>4</sub> and NO <sub>3</sub> content can be taken into account. Covers also NP, NK and NPK fertilisers.  Challenge for CBAM implementation: The concentration of the three N components have to be known (must be declared by the producer anyway for demonstrating compliance with fertiliser regulations), and their concentration must be converted to one single number which defines the CBAM obligation.  For some substances (CN codes), default values can be defined based on stoichiometry (e.g. ammonium sulphate or ammonium phosphates).  Despite this complexity, inclusion of this product class would ensure that the complete value chain of fertilisers is included.
<b>Inorganic chemicals (HS 28)</b>				
Hydrogen		EU ETS data for hydrogen production.	Possible	Needed for defining $EE_p$ of other chemicals. However, currently not much traded. In the future, when 'green' or 'blue' hydrogen become more important, it might be necessary to introduce a 'guarantee of origin' system (depends on general CBAM design: If only default values for $EE_p$ were used instead of actual MRV data of the producer, such distinction would be irrelevant).
Soda ash		EU ETS data for Soda	Possible	Relatively simple product definition (basic

CBAM Product name	Precursors	Data needs	Include in CBAM?	Other comments
		ash production.		material product)
Carbon black		EU ETS data for Carbon black production.	Possible	Relatively simple product definition (basic material product, although many grades available)
Other inorganic chemicals			No	Too diverse products, many of them not associated with significant embedded emissions
<b>Organic basic chemicals (HS 29)</b>				
HVC (high value chemicals / lower olefins)	Naphtha (refinery fraction)	Derive a proxy $EE_p$ as average of HVC (steam cracker) outputs (will require EU ETS data), since HVC benchmark is not directly linked to products. Precondition is that an $EE_p$ value for naphtha production can be determined.	possible	According to free allocation rules, the covered substances are acetylene, ethylene, propylene, butadiene, benzene and hydrogen. Therefore, need to derive a proxy $EE_p$ as average of HVC outputs (will require additional data, or involvement of further experts, as EU ETS data is not sufficient), since HVC benchmark is not directly linked to individual products. Defining an $EE_p$ value is pre-condition for including plastics in the CBAM.
Aromatics	Refinery products	Derive a proxy $EE_p$ as average of aromatics outputs (will require EU ETS data), since aromatics benchmark is not directly linked to products. Precondition is that an $EE_p$ value for refinery products can be determined.	Possible	May cover: benzene, toluene, o-xylene, p-xylene, m-xylene and mixed xylene isomers, ethylbenzene, cumene, cyclohexane, naphthalene, anthracene. FAR don't contain exact list of substances. Problem may be that the precursors can be several refinery intermediate fractions. Defining an $EE_p$ value is pre-condition for including Some other products (styrene, phenol, polystyrene) in the CBAM.
Styrene	Benzene (see aromatics), Ethylene (see HVC)	Derive a proxy $EE_p$ based on $MC_i$ and $EE_p$ of benzene and ethylene (both not simple to determine)	Possible (tbd)	Defining $EE_p$ onerous as aromatics data not simple to determine. Not proposed at this stage, although it would be a precondition for inclusion of PS (Polystyrene).
Phenol	Cumene (see aromatics or via benzene and propylene)	$MC_i$ and $EE_p$ of Cumene required; resulting $EE_p$ must be split into parts for phenol and acetone.	Possible (tbd)	Defining $EE_p$ too onerous to propose at this stage
Ethylene oxide/ ethylene glycols	Ethylene (see HVC)	$MC_i$ and $EE_p$ of Ethylene required; EU ETS data on Ethylene oxide benchmark.	Possible (tbd)	Resulting $EE_p$ may apply to all glycols, but stoichiometric factors would apply

CBAM Product name	Precursors	Data needs	Include in CBAM?	Other comments
Vinyl chloride monomer (VCM)	Ethylene (see HVC), Chlorine (only indirect emissions)	$MC_i$ and $EE_p$ of Ethylene required; EU ETS data on VCM benchmark. Tbd if indirect emissions of Chlorine production should be included, and how.	Possible (tbd)	$EE_p$ value needed, if PVC is to be included in CBAM.
Methanol	Syngas	EU ETS benchmark data needed for syngas, $MC_i$ and emissions from Methanol synthesis to be determined from other sources	Possible (tbd)	Syngas as energy intensive product is not traded but used on-site. Methanol and Formaldehyde are the most common products of syngas. Determination of $EE_p$ not straightforward.
Formaldehyde	Syngas	EU ETS benchmark data needed for syngas, $MC_i$ and emissions from Formaldehyde synthesis to be determined from other sources	Possible (tbd)	Syngas as energy intensive product is not traded but used on-site. Methanol and Formaldehyde are the most common products of syngas. Determination of $EE_p$ not straightforward.
Ethanol	Ethylene (see HVC)	$MC_i$ and $EE_p$ of Ethylene required	Possible (tbd)	Ethanol can alternatively be produced by fermentation of biomass. Treatment in CBAM like distinction blast furnace/EAF steel: If differentiation is desirable, a kind of guarantee of origin system could be envisaged.
Acetone	Propylene (see HVC) or as by-product from Phenol	$MC_i$ and $EE_p$ of Propylene required, or alternatively a stoichiometric factor for converting the $EE_p$ value of Phenol.	Possible (tbd)	Determination of appropriate $EE_p$ value may be controversial.
Other organic basic chemicals			no	There are about 260 HS product categories of this type. For some of them it might be possible on the long run to define proxy values for $EE_p$ . However, based on experience from the EU ETS benchmarking exercise, it is would be very onerous.
<b>Polymers ('plastics')</b>				
PE (Poly-ethylene)	Ethylene (see HVC)	$MC_i$ and $EE_p$ of Ethylene required	possible	Inclusion in CBAM depends on data availability, but makes sense due to the big amounts produced and traded. For a better $EE_p$ value, additional emission data (covering the polymerisation process) would be required.



CBAM Product name	Precursors	Data needs	Include in CBAM?	Other comments
PP (Polypropylene)	Propylene (see HVC)	$MC_i$ and $EE_p$ of Propylene required	possible	Inclusion in CBAM depends on data availability, but makes sense due to the big amounts produced and traded. For a better $EE_p$ value, additional emission data (covering the polymerisation process) would be required.
PVC (Polyvinylchloride)	VCM (see above)	$MC_i$ and $EE_p$ of VCM required; depending on production process, S-PVC or E-PVC benchmark data from EU ETS used.	tbd	Inclusion in CBAM depends on data availability, but makes sense due to the big amounts produced and traded. Two out of three polymerisation processes have EU ETS data. Not clear if CN codes can distinguish between the polymerisation processes. Potentially one $EE_p$ value for all PVC would be required.
PET (Polyethylene terephthalate)	Terephthalic acid (from p-Xylene, see aromatics), and ethylene glycol (see above)		No	Determination of appropriate $EE_p$ value onerous. Same $EE_p$ could apply to several products (Polyesters) in HS groups 54 and 55 (man-made fibres).
PS	Styrene (see above)		No	Determination of appropriate $EE_p$ value onerous.
Other polymers and copolymers			no	Too many, too different products

## 6. Conclusion: Identification of options of scope

The final conclusions on selecting specific sectors and/or products for a CBAM depend to some extent on the main design option chosen. In all cases the carbon intensity of sectors and their trade intensity are an important selection factor. Moreover, for all the options it is important that the administrative burden of the CBAM must be balanced against the achievable results. For reasons of avoiding carbon leakage risks in value chains in the EU, some options warrant to consider also basic materials as part of semi-finished or even manufactured products, while for practical reasons the focus on basic materials is usually to be preferred. Furthermore, it is important from a practical perspective that products covered can be clearly identified and distinguished. For options which require or allow the use of actual emission intensity levels, robust and feasible rules for monitoring, reporting and verification are required. Finally, it is essential that an appropriate default value for the emission intensity level of the materials or products included can be defined. The level of precision required differs: For an excise duty a rough estimate may be sufficient, while a design option imposing a default value only on imported goods, while maintaining actual values on emissions intensity within the EU

ETS will require default values which are established in a way that is compliant with international rules.

**Table 7-3: Supplementing Tables for Annex 7 on sectoral scope of CBAM**

Short sector name	NACE	Sector description	# of inst.	Emissions [kt CO <sub>2</sub> /yr]	# of PROD-COM	Applicable Benchmarks	Indirect cost compensation benchmarks <sup>97</sup>	Remarks
<b>Iron and Steel</b>	24.10	Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys	396	156 358	97	Hot metal EAF carbon steel	Basic oxygen steel EAF carbon steel	Benchmarks in brackets may need to be considered for value chain purposes Fall-back approaches for hot rolling and several other processes etc.
	24.20	Manufacture of tubes, pipes, hollow profiles and related fittings, of steel	32	1 304	31	EAF high alloy steel Iron casting (sintered ore)	EAF high alloy steel FeSi FeMn	
	24.51	Casting of iron	28	1 705	15	(Coke)	SiMn	
	25.50	Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; powder metallurgy	29	495	1*	Fall-backs		
<b>Refineries</b>	19.20	Manufacture of refined petroleum products	130	132 164	10**	Refinery products (Hydrogen, synthesis gas, aromatics, high value chemicals) Fall-backs		Benchmarks mentioned in brackets are derived from the refinery BM Fall-back approaches relevant e.g. for heat imports and exports.
<b>Cement</b>	23.51	Manufacture of cement	214	118 164	3	Grey cement clinker White cement clinker Fall-backs		Fall-back approaches relevant e.g. for heat imports and exports.

<sup>97</sup> Indirect cost compensation benchmarks are taken from the 3<sup>rd</sup> EU ETS phase, as new ones not available yet.

Short sector name	NACE	Sector description	# of inst.	Emissions [kt CO <sub>2</sub> /yr]	# of PROD-COM	Applicable Benchmarks	Indirect cost compensation benchmarks <sup>97</sup>	Remarks
<b>Organic basic chemicals</b>	20.14	Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals	331	64 877	168	Adipic acid Steam cracking Aromatics Styrene Phenol/acetone Ethylene oxide/ethylene glycols Synthesis gas Vinyl chloride monomer (Refinery Products) Fall-backs	Sector not eligible in 4 <sup>th</sup> phase anymore. However, the following BM were applied in the third phase: Steam cracking (HVC) Aromatics Styrene Ethylene oxide/glycols	Sector can be simplified by including only products directly covered by benchmarks (i.e. by putting the other products into the sector 'other chemicals'). Otherwise very high number of very different processes and products, high number of application of fall-back approaches. Refinery products benchmark mentioned, because there is often high integration of processes into refineries, and some benchmarks are derived from the refineries BM.
<b>Fertilisers</b>	20.15	Manufacture of fertilisers and nitrogen compounds	99	36 995	30	Ammonia Nitric acid Fall-backs	Ammonia (not eligible in 4 <sup>th</sup> phase anymore)	
<b>Pulp and Paper</b>	17.11	Manufacture of pulp	56	1 722	4	Short fibre kraft pulp		Several products outside the BM

Short sector name	NACE	Sector description	# of inst.	Emissions [kt CO <sub>2</sub> /yr]	# of PROD-COM	Applicable Benchmarks	Indirect cost compensation benchmarks <sup>97</sup>	Remarks
	17.12	Manufacture of paper and paperboard	616	25 510	53	Long fibre kraft pulp Sulphite pulp Thermo-mechanical and mechanical pulp Recovered paper pulp Newsprint Uncoated fine paper Coated fine paper Tissue Testliner and fluting Uncoated carton board Coated carton board Fall-backs		definition, hence fall-back approaches relevant.
<b>Lime and Plaster</b>	23.52	Manufacture of lime and plaster	193	26 151	6	Lime Dolime Sintered Dolime (Plaster, Dried secondary gypsum, Plasterboard) Fall-backs		BM products in brackets have significantly lower specific emissions and could therefore be treated separately. Several products outside the BM definition, hence fall-back approaches relevant.
<b>Crude petroleum</b>	06.10	Extraction of crude petroleum	132	23 492	2 <sup>†</sup>	Fall-backs		
<b>Inorganic chemicals</b>	20.11	Manufacture of industrial gases	36	6 438	11	Carbon black Hydrogen	Carbon black Chlorine (not in EU ETS)	Very high number of very different processes and products, high number of application of fall-back approaches Refinery products benchmark mentioned, because the hydrogen benchmark is derived from it. Indirect emissions in some cases more important for CL than direct emissions (Chlor-Alkali).
	20.13	Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals	113	16 045	105	Soda ash (Refinery Products) Fall-backs	Si metal hyperpure polysilicon SiC (Silicon Carbide)	

Short sector name	NACE	Sector description	# of inst.	Emissions [kt CO <sub>2</sub> /yr]	# of PROD-COM	Applicable Benchmarks	Indirect cost compensation benchmarks <sup>97</sup>	Remarks
<b>Food and drink</b>	10.31	Processing and preserving of potatoes	38	1 162	2*	Fall-backs		
	10.39	Other processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables	100	855	1*			
	10.41	Manufacture of oils and fats	95	2 622	30			
	10.51	Operation of dairies and cheese making	133	3 372	5*			
	10.62	Manufacture of starches and starch products	53	4 052	15			
	10.81	Manufacture of sugar	135	8 503	7			
	10.89	Manufacture of other food products n.e.c.	16	618	1*			
	11.06	Manufacture of malt	19	328	2			
<b>Glass</b>	23.11	Manufacture of flat glass	53	5 847	8	Float glass		Many products outside the BM definition, hence fall-back approaches relevant. Proposal: Include 'mineral wool' here instead of under 'other mineral products'
	23.13	Manufacture of hollow glass	197	10 684	18	Bottles and jars of colourless glass		
	23.14	Manufacture of glass fibres	45	1 149	8	Bottles and jars of coloured glass		
	23.19	Manufacture and processing of other glass, including technical glassware	31	547	13	Continuous filament glass fibre products Mineral wool Fall-backs		
<b>Aluminium</b>	24.42	Aluminium production	89	13 755	14	Pre-bake anode Primary Aluminium Fall-backs	Primary Aluminium Alumina (Aluminium Oxide)	Fall-back approaches for forming processes, alloying, ... Indirect emissions more important for CL than direct emissions.
<b>Ceramics</b>	23.20	Manufacture of refractory products	47	981	12	Facing bricks		Many products outside the BM definition (in particular 'normal

Short sector name	NACE	Sector description	# of inst.	Emissions [kt CO <sub>2</sub> /yr]	# of PROD-COM	Applicable Benchmarks	Indirect cost compensation benchmarks <sup>97</sup>	Remarks
	23.31	Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags	303	6 829	1	Pavers Roof tiles Spray dried powder Fall-backs		building bricks <sup>7</sup> , tiles, table and sanitary ware, etc., hence fall-back approaches relevant.
<b>Coke</b>	19.10	Manufacture of coke oven products	16	5 833	1	Coke Fall-backs		Coke by-products (aromatics) <i>not</i> covered by aromatics benchmark (see organic chemicals)
<b>Polymers</b>	20.16	Manufacture of plastics in primary forms	112	4 789	48	S-PVC E-PVC	(Chlorine, Steam cracking)	Potentially very high number of very different processes and products, high number of application of fall-back approaches.
	20.17	Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms	9	866	2	(Steam cracking, Vinyl chloride monomer, Adipic acid, Synthesis gas, Refinery Products) Fall-backs		Benchmarks in brackets added for the production of the monomers (i.e. pre-cursors of the polymers), as those are the emission-intensive processes, while the polymers are the trade-intensive ones.  Refinery products benchmark mentioned, because there is often high integration of processes into refineries.
<b>Non-ferrous metals (except Al)</b>	24.43	Lead, zinc and tin production	20	1 903	11	Fall-backs	Zinc electrolysis	Indirect emissions often more important for CL than direct emissions.
	24.44	Copper production	21	2 040	13			
	24.45	Other non-ferrous metal production	-††	190	42			
<b>Other mineral products</b>	23.99	Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.	212	3 691	15	Fall-backs		
<b>Other chemicals</b>	20.12	Manufacture of dyes and pigments	22	1 779	31	Fall-backs		

Short sector name	NACE	Sector description	# of inst.	Emissions [kt CO <sub>2</sub> /yr]	# of PRODCOM	Applicable Benchmarks	Indirect cost compensation benchmarks <sup>97</sup>	Remarks
	20.30	Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics	18	377	2			
	20.60	Manufacture of man-made fibres	19	1 101	24			
<b>Mining</b>	07.10	Mining of iron ores	–††	682	2	Sintered ore		
	08.12	Operation of gravel and sand pits; mining of clays and kaolin	7	156	1*	Fall-backs		
	08.91	Mining of chemical and fertiliser minerals	–††	52	4			
	08.99	Other mining and quarrying n.e.c.	16	1 703	7			
<b>Wood-based panels</b>	16.21	Manufacture of veneer sheets and wood-based panels	108	1,919	18	Fall-backs		
<b>Textiles</b>	13.10	Preparation and spinning of textile fibres	–††	28	42			
	13.95	Manufacture of non-wovens and articles made from non-wovens, except apparel	–††	68	5			
Other installations			18	1 020				

† Number of CN codes given, as there is no PRODCOM code

†† For reasons of confidentiality, these installations have been grouped under ‘other installations’.

\* In case of sectors indicated by an asterisk, only a limited number of PRODCOM sectors are on the CLL.

\*\* Number of PRODCOM 2004 codes (no codes in current PRODCOM system); There are 46 corresponding CN codes.



## **ANNEX 8: CASE OF ELECTRICITY – IMPACTS**

The PRIMES model, used for the purpose of simulating the application of the CBAM on electricity imports, shows that the impacts of the considered options on total carbon emissions reductions (in the EU and its neighbours) differ greatly.

### **Option A vs Option B**

Under option A, there is no effect on total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions until 2025 and very little until 2030 (see figure 8.1). The environmental impact of this option is therefore very limited and significantly smaller than the impact of option B.


The large difference between the environmental impact of option B with regard to option A stems largely from the fact that option A results in a relatively low estimated CBAM obligation (5 €/MWh in 2030 compared to 20–30 €/MWh under option B in the same year) which is insufficient to meaningfully affect cross-border electricity trade and prevent carbon leakage.

Additionally, by exerting greater influence on trade patterns and by offering a degree of protection against carbon leakage, option B incentivises more efficient investment in new renewable capacities in certain Member States bordering third countries, which results in higher renewable generation within the EU replacing part of the discouraged imports. This represents another important channel through which CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are avoided, although its effect is much weaker under option A. Overall, option B displays superior effectiveness in preventing carbon leakage due to a greater amount of carbon-intensive imports, and hence generation, avoided.

The electricity mix within the EU does not change significantly due to the application of the CBAM in the sector. Given its very limited effects on cross-border trade, option A leaves the structure of power generation almost unchanged.

Option B therefore introduces a higher barrier for emission-intensive imports which requires increased generation in the EU as replacement. Since the additional generation is less emission-intensive, the overall effect on carbon emissions is positive. Consequently, option B is considered to be preferable to option A.

**Figure 8-1: Scale of CBAM obligation by option and impact of CO<sub>2</sub> emission reduction (Options A and B)**



Source: PRIMES

### Analysis of the impact of the variants of option B

Variant B.1 and variant B.2 set the range of the CBAM obligation and therefore of the impacts of the variants under option B. From a situation where all exporting countries use EU CO<sub>2</sub> factor, to the most favourable situation for all exporting countries, to a situation in which exporting countries can choose the country CO<sub>2</sub> factor when lower than the EU CO<sub>2</sub> factor.

Option B reduces cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 0.80 % (54–58 Mt CO<sub>2</sub><sup>98</sup>) by 2030, as can be observed in figure 8.3. Variant B.3's reduction of cumulative emissions is expected to be around the higher end of the latter interval<sup>99</sup>. Likewise, the environmental results for variant B.3 would be expected to fall close to the results for variant B.1.

<sup>98</sup> At the high end of the range (58 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>) the EU benchmark is applied to the imports. At the low end of the range (54 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>), importers optimise. Thus, the EU benchmark is not applied for imports from the countries where the CO<sub>2</sub> factor is lower than the EU CO<sub>2</sub> factor. The CBAM obligation is based on this mix of country CO<sub>2</sub> factors and the EU benchmark. For option A, little or no optimisation is assumed as the CBAM obligation is so low that it discourages importers to present evidence about the concrete carbon footprint of their product, which in the majority of cases is assumed to be higher than the benchmark.

<sup>99</sup> Under the assumption of a proportional distribution of electricity trade in 2030 as in 2019.

## 8-2: Scale of CBAM obligation by option and impact of CO<sub>2</sub> emission reduction (option B variants)




Source: PRIMES

In the range of variants under option B, which results in measurably lower imports, EU-based net generation rises by 0.50–0.60 % cumulatively until 2030, with the variant assuming no optimisation showing a larger increase. The additional power output is achieved thanks to higher renewable generation (mostly wind-based), which increases by 30–39 TWh in cumulatively by 2030, and by higher fossil-based generation, which increases by 110–123 TWh cumulatively until 2030. The overwhelming majority of the increase in the fossil fuel use in the EU comes from additional gas-fired generation, as coal-fired power plants lose competitiveness due to rising carbon prices. Thus, electricity imports from third countries, a significant part of which is sourced from coal-fired power plants, are predominantly replaced by gas-fired and renewable generation within the EU. CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the EU increase due to higher fossil-based generation (by 1.00–1.10 % cumulatively until 2030, with the variant assuming no optimisation showing a larger increase), but this is more than compensated by lower CO<sub>2</sub> emissions outside the EU where the output of more carbon-intensive power plants is reduced. This ultimately results in lower CO<sub>2</sub> emissions globally and in reduced carbon leakage.

At EU level, the application of the CBAM causes cumulative net imports of electricity until 2030 to shift from 22 TWh in the baseline scenario to between -116 TWh and -138 TWh under option B (with the variant assuming no optimisation showing a larger difference<sup>100</sup>).

<sup>100</sup> Under option A, cumulative net imports of electricity until 2030 shifted to -10 TWh (meaning net exports). The CBAM has no noticeable effect on retail electricity prices at EU level in all options under consideration.

**Figure 8-3: Impact on imports of electricity**




Source: PRIMES

From the system perspective, higher EU generation brings about greater generation costs which are, however, almost fully compensated by lower payments for electricity imports. The net result is a slight increase in EU system costs by 0.10 % under option B compared to the baseline scenario<sup>101</sup>.

Under option B, the cumulative CBAM revenues reach between EUR 1.0–1.1 billion depending on the prevalence of optimisation. Within option B, the slightly lower revenue in the variant assuming no optimisation stems from the fact that the effect of higher CBAM obligation per MWh of electricity imported is overpowered by a rising volume of discouraged inflows from third countries, which ultimately reduces revenue. This variant thus represents the far end of the Laffer Curve<sup>102</sup>.

In view of the relatively limited number of undertakings engaged in the business of importing electricity, the total administrative costs associated with compliance are expected to be low.

#### 8-4: Impact on potential revenues



Source: PRIMES

<sup>101</sup> Option A leaves system costs unchanged due to its lower effect on electricity trade. Revenues collected from CBAM obligations are not included in this calculation since they are expected to be recycled back into the economy (and they are too small to influence the system result anyway).

<sup>102</sup> It should be noted that the cumulative CBAM revenues are similar between option A and option B. Under option A, they reach EUR 1.0 billion until 2030. A much smaller base for calculating the CBAM obligation in option A is compensated by higher import volumes which are subject to the measure and which have not been discouraged to the extent expected under option B.

### **Most preferred option**

The modelling results point towards option B as the better option than option A since it delivers a better outcome in overall terms of environmental benefits, which are the overriding priority of the measure in question. While displaying superior qualities as far as preventing carbon leakage is concerned, option B and its variants also do not introduce sizeable additional system costs compared to option A. Variant B.3 appears the most preferred because it reflects better the specific country's carbon intensity of the exported electricity and introduces an incentive for countries to invest in a cleaner power mix.

## **ANNEX 9: ENERGY SYSTEM IMPACT OF AN IMPORT CBAM ON MATERIALS (IN THE FORM OF A NOTIONAL ETS BASED ON EXPORTING COUNTRIES' AVERAGE<sup>103</sup>)**

The current scope of CBAM focuses on energy intensive goods and its application has an impact on their production and price. This may have repercussions in the energy system. Current demand centres may change, the fuels required to satisfy the demand may be different and energy prices and costs may be impacted, too. In a longer-term perspective, products used for the energy transition (e.g. wind turbines, solar panel) could be affected due to the imposed adjustments on the primary materials required.

The analysis shows that these effects are rather limited at the EU level. Gross Inland Consumption in 2030 is virtually the same (-0.02 %) in a scenario with import CBAM compared to the MIX55 scenario<sup>104</sup>. Final energy consumption shows a similar result (+0.01 % in 2030). The fuel mix changes as some energy intensive goods are now produced within the Member States that would otherwise have been produced outside the EU. In final energy consumption, the most notable change is a slightly stronger shift from coal (-0.47 % in 2030) and towards distributed heat (+0.47 % in 2030) and hydrogen (after 2030). This shows that CBAM would have a positive impact in the uptake of fuels that facilitate a more decarbonised and flexible energy system, particularly for industry (also the sector strongest affected in energy terms by the measure). However, given the increase in overall consumption, the shares of the fuels in the energy mix stay the same. Because of the limited impacts on EU level, system costs are expected to remain largely the same (average 2021-2030), also in relation to GDP. Likewise, energy investments and energy related expenditures remain largely the same. On a Member State level, these effects naturally depend on the relative importance of particular industrial sectors in the overall energy consumption.

There is a limited impact on the products enabling the energy transition. The EU's production of batteries, electric vehicle transport equipment, equipment for wind power technology, equipment for photovoltaics and equipment for Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) power technology decrease slightly compared to MIX55. The changes are in the range of -0.27 % to -0.79 % in 2030. However, CBAM is beneficial for the less mature clean technologies (hydrogen +0.33 %, and clean gas +0.31 % in 2030). Positive effects come mainly from increased domestic demand while negative effects originate mostly in a decrease in exports of these products.

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<sup>103</sup> The results presented in this section are based on an energy system modelling exercise with FIMM, GEM-E3 and PRIMES models. While based on similar assumptions, the results are not identical due to differences in the models.

<sup>104</sup> The MIX55 scenario includes free allocation while the CBAM scenario assumes the removal of free allocation. The CBAM scenario modelled in this exercise is closest to option 3 of this impact assessment.

## ANNEX 10: STATISTICAL ANNEX (TABLES AND REFERENCES TO THE MAIN TEXT)

### 1. Descriptive statistics on CBAM sectors

Overall CBAM sectors account for a relatively small share of the EU industry. Collectively they generate 0.790 % of total GVA (gross value added) and 2.610 % of total EU exports, while they are responsible for 2.324 % of EU imports.

**Table 10-1: GVA, imports and exports of CBAM sectors in EU in 2020 (% of total)**

	<b>Iron and Steel</b>	<b>Cement</b>	<b>Fertiliser</b>	<b>Aluminium</b>	<b>CBAM sectors</b>
<b>GVA</b>	0.45 %	0.12 %	0.11 %	0.11 %	0.79 %
<b>Imports</b>	1.23 %	0.06 %	0.34 %	0.68 %	2.32 %
<b>Exports</b>	1.56 %	0.08 %	0.43 %	0.54 %	2.61 %

*Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model*

As regards Member States, the picture is fairly homogenous with the EU average. Imports of CBAM sectors account for the largest shares of total imports from non-EU countries in Bulgaria and Italy followed by Slovenia and Romania, driven mostly by imports in iron and steel. While exports of CBAM sectors account for the largest shares in Romania, Lithuania and Estonia.

**Table 10-2: GVA, imports and exports of CBAM sectors in EU Member States in 2020 (as % of total)**

	Share of CBAM sectors in imports from non-EU countries	Share of CBAM sectors in exports to non-EU countries	Share of CBAM sectors' GVA in total GVA
AUT	3.2 %	3.6 %	1.4 %
BEL	3.5 %	4.1 %	0.7 %
BGR	12.1 %	3.8 %	1.4 %
CYP	1.0 %	1.8 %	0.7 %
CZE	2.4 %	2.4 %	0.6 %
DEU	2.3 %	2.4 %	0.8 %
DNK	2.3 %	1.4 %	0.9 %
ESP	2.7 %	3.8 %	0.6 %
EST	4.9 %	4.8 %	0.8 %
FIN	3.5 %	4.0 %	1.3 %
FRA	1.5 %	2.2 %	1.1 %
GRC	2.6 %	4.0 %	0.6 %
HUN	2.5 %	1.4 %	0.8 %
IRL	1.3 %	1.2 %	0.7 %
ITA	6.5 %	4.4 %	0.5 %
LTU	4.4 %	5.1 %	1.0 %
LUX	0.3 %	3.3 %	0.6 %
LVA	3.0 %	2.3 %	0.7 %
MLT	0.6 %	0.5 %	0.5 %
NLD	2.0 %	2.2 %	0.5 %
POL	3.9 %	3.0 %	0.9 %
PRT	4.3 %	3.8 %	0.8 %
SVK	4.4 %	3.8 %	0.8 %
SVN	5.3 %	2.8 %	1.2 %
SWE	2.5 %	3.5 %	1.5 %
ROU	6.3 %	6.3 %	1.2 %
CRO	6.7 %	4.6 %	0.9 %
EU27	2.3 %	2.6 %	0.8 %

Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

When it comes to distribution of imports and exports by Member State, data for 2020 indicate that Italy, Germany, Belgium are leading importers of iron and steel, Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands are the leading importers of cement, Germany, Belgium, France and Italy are the leading importers of fertilisers, and Germany, Italy, France and the Netherlands are the leading importers of aluminium.

On the export side Germany, France, Italy and Belgium are the biggest exporters of iron and steel, Germany, Spain, Italy, Denmark and Ireland are the biggest exporters of cement, Belgium, Germany and Ireland are the biggest exporters of fertilisers and Germany, Italy, and Poland are the biggest exporters of aluminium.



**Table 10-3: Share of imports of Member States to EU27 total by CBAM sector (in 2020)**

	<b>Iron and steel</b>	<b>Cement</b>	<b>Fertilisers</b>	<b>Aluminium</b>
<b>AUT</b>	1.3 %	2.1 %	1.0 %	5.9 %
<b>BEL</b>	12.9 %	2.5 %	11.9 %	5.0 %
<b>BGR</b>	4.3%	1.3 %	2.0 %	0.7 %
<b>CYP</b>	0.1%	0.2 %	0.1 %	0.0 %
<b>CZE</b>	1.6 %	1.2 %	1.4 %	1.5 %
<b>DEU</b>	13.8 %	10.7 %	15.8 %	32.9 %
<b>DNK</b>	2.5 %	1.1 %	1.1 %	1.1 %
<b>ESP</b>	9.3 %	2.7 %	6.0 %	3.5 %
<b>EST</b>	0.6 %	0.6 %	1.1 %	0.2 %
<b>FIN</b>	1.9 %	1.0 %	4.3 %	1.0 %
<b>FRA</b>	5.7 %	8.9 %	7.2 %	8.2 %
<b>GRC</b>	1.7 %	1.1 %	0.8 %	2.4 %
<b>HUN</b>	1.3 %	0.8 %	1.3 %	0.8 %
<b>IRL</b>	3.0 %	0.7 %	6.9 %	0.6 %
<b>ITA</b>	26.6 %	3.7 %	7.3 %	19.0 %
<b>LTU</b>	1.1 %	1.4 %	1.6 %	0.1 %
<b>LUX</b>	0.1 %	0.4 %	0.1 %	0.5 %
<b>LVA</b>	0.1 %	0.3 %	1.3 %	0.0 %
<b>MLT</b>	0.1 %	0.2 %	0.1 %	0.0 %
<b>NLD</b>	5.2 %	2.5 %	3.4 %	6.0 %
<b>POL</b>	5.3 %	2.7 %	4.6 %	4.0 %
<b>PRT</b>	2.7 %	0.2 %	0.9 %	0.2 %
<b>SVK</b>	1.6 %	0.4 %	1.6 %	0.5 %
<b>SVN</b>	0.5 %	0.4 %	0.1 %	1.6 %
<b>SWE</b>	3.3 %	3.4 %	2.0 %	1.5 %
<b>ROU</b>	3.3 %	1.4 %	1.2 %	0.3 %
<b>CRO</b>	0.3 %	0.9 %	1.6 %	0.5 %
<b>EU27</b>	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %

Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

**Table 10-4: Share of exports of Member States to EU27 total by CBAM sector (in 2020)**


	<b>Iron and steel</b>	<b>Cement</b>	<b>Fertilisers</b>	<b>Aluminium</b>
<b>AUT</b>	3.6 %	1.0 %	0.8 %	4.0 %
<b>BEL</b>	6.0 %	1.3 %	27.2 %	1.3 %
<b>BGR</b>	0.8 %	0.6 %	0.5 %	0.4 %
<b>CYP</b>	0.0 %	2.3 %	0.0 %	0.3 %
<b>CZE</b>	1.5 %	1.4 %	0.4 %	0.7 %
<b>DEU</b>	17.5 %	8.8 %	12.2 %	38.2 %
<b>DNK</b>	1.1 %	5.8 %	0.2 %	1.7 %
<b>ESP</b>	8.2 %	9.9 %	3.0 %	6.5 %
<b>EST</b>	0.4 %	1.0 %	0.5 %	0.2 %
<b>FIN</b>	2.8 %	0.4 %	2.2 %	0.6 %
<b>FRA</b>	8.5 %	3.3 %	5.9 %	8.8 %
<b>GRC</b>	1.2 %	5.8 %	0.6 %	3.1 %
<b>HUN</b>	0.3 %	0.4 %	0.8 %	1.0 %
<b>IRL</b>	0.6 %	6.0 %	10.2 %	1.6 %
<b>ITA</b>	15.2 %	6.3 %	3.1 %	13.6 %
<b>LTU</b>	0.5 %	1.8 %	3.4 %	0.1 %
<b>LUX</b>	1.9 %	0.1 %	0.0 %	1.6 %
<b>LVA</b>	0.0 %	0.9 %	0.7 %	0.0 %
<b>MLT</b>	0.1 %	0.0 %	0.0 %	0.0 %
<b>NLD</b>	4.9 %	5.6 %	3.7 %	1.5 %
<b>POL</b>	1.2 %	3.1 %	4.5 %	5.1 %
<b>PRT</b>	1.8 %	5.6 %	0.3 %	0.6 %
<b>SVK</b>	1.2 %	0.4 %	0.0 %	0.3 %
<b>SVN</b>	0.4 %	0.2 %	0.0 %	0.5 %
<b>SWE</b>	6.1 %	1.2 %	1.2 %	1.4 %
<b>ROU</b>	2.7 %	0.2 %	1.3 %	0.9 %
<b>CRO</b>	0.1 %	6.4 %	0.9 %	0.2 %
<b>EU27</b>	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %

Source: JRC-GEM-E3 model

## 2. Trade by partner


This section contains shows the main exporters of basic materials under the CBAM shortlist sectors (to be linked with section 6.4.3: Trade impacts)

**Figure 10-1: Main exporters of Iron and steel to EU27 - 2019**




Source: Commission analysis based on data from Eurostat COMEXT

**Figure 10-2: Main exporters of aluminium to EU27 - 2019**




Source: Commission analysis based on data from Eurostat COMEXT

**Figure 10-3: Main exporters of fertilisers to EU27 - 2019**



Source: Commission analysis based on data from Eurostat COMEXT

**Figure 10-4: Main exporters of cement to EU27 - 2019**



Source: Commission analysis based on data from Eurostat COMEX

### 3. Distributional impacts

#### 3.1 Methodological issues

##### Input microdata

This analysis uses Euromod's ITT extension and microdata from two household surveys:

- The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions database, EU-SILC, which contains information on household income and other household- and individual-level characteristics
- and the EU Household Budget Surveys, from where information on household consumption expenditures at the 4 digits-COICOP categories of goods/services is extracted.

The Euromod's ITT extension uses as input a database obtained from matching these two surveys, in order to compute indirect tax liabilities (VAT and specific excise duties) for each household. These are calculated on top of the direct taxes, social contributions and cash benefits simulated by the core Euromod model.

##### Link between GEM-E3 and Euromod

First, the macroeconomic impacts of the CBAM scenarios are simulated in the JRC-GEM-E3 macro model. Then, in order to study the distributional impacts of the CBAM on households at the micro level, key variables from the macro simulation are used to feed the micro model. By linking the two models in this way, the distributional analysis at the micro level is able to account for the economy-wide impact of the CBAM under consideration, capturing the effects of the policy option not only through its direct impact on the tax burden, but also through its broader implications on consumer prices and household incomes.

It is important in this sense to mention the variables that are passed on from the macro model JRC-GEM-E3 to the micro model Euromod, as this can help interpret the microsimulation results. Firstly, on the expenditure side, Euromod is fed with the consumer price changes relative to the MIX-full auctioning scenario induced by the relevant CBAM option, as simulated by JRC-GEM-E3. This concerns 14 aggregate consumption categories based on COICOP groups, which are generated using consumption matrices embedded in the JRC-GEM-E3 model<sup>105</sup>. Since expenditures are imputed for each household at the commodity level, the mapping into these 14 categories only requires aggregation in Euromod. These price changes include both direct effects of carbon pricing and indirect price changes through inputs along the supply chain. Secondly, on the household income side, the relative changes to the baseline for both labour and capital income also feed the microsimulation. In this way, the economic environment of Euromod is approximated to the one foreseen by the JRC-GEM-E3 model.

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<sup>105</sup> The 14 categories are: food beverages and tobacco, clothing and footwear, housing and water charges, fuels and power, household equipment and operation excluding heating and cooking appliances, heating and cooking appliances, medical care and health, purchase of vehicles, operation of personal transport equipment, transport services, communication, recreational services, miscellaneous goods and services and education.

All policy options simulated in the macro model assume the recycling of revenues from the CBAM based on a reduction of labour taxes to ensure budget neutrality within the JRC-GEM-E3 environment<sup>106</sup>. This is also reflected in the micro modelling through both the direct effect of the CBAM on (labour and capital) incomes as mentioned above, and the indirect effect from the recycling of CBAM revenues.

Drawing on this input from the JRC-GEM-E3 model, the distributional analysis is performed in Euromod by comparing for each considered CBAM option the adjusted disposable income (i.e. the disposable income net of indirect taxes) of households, by deciles, against the baseline. The baseline scenario in Euromod refers to the tax-benefit policy system in place as in 2019 in the Member State under consideration.

Furthermore, the impact of each CBAM scenario on household budgets, across the income distribution, is disentangled across two effects:

- The ‘price effect’, which captures the distributional effect of the CBAM scenario under analysis arising only from the predicted changes in consumer prices.
- The ‘price and income effect’, which adds to the price effect, the predicted changes in market income, which includes the recycling of CBAM revenue

### 3.2 Overall results

Microsimulations show that the CBAM options under analysis are regressive albeit the impacts are very small. The macro-simulated impact on labour/capital income and consumer prices are such that richer households would experience the largest increase (or lowest declines) of adjusted disposable income (disposable income after indirect taxes), while the poorest are often the most adversely affected. The distributive impact depends on the policy option and largely differs across countries.

In general, the three CBAM options considered show the following impacts on household incomes across the income distribution, for each of the two drivers (price and income, in both cases including the compensation mechanism):

- i) ***A negative and regressive ‘price effect’.*** All the scenarios considered drive a price rise in a number of consumption categories, mainly in transport, fuels and power, as well as heating. Although prices of other categories are expected to decrease (mostly in services related with housing and water, communication, recreational services and education), overall, household adjusted disposable incomes are expected to fall across the whole income distribution through the price effect. In most countries, CBAM is regressive, as this affects more heavily households at the bottom of the income distribution, for their income share of consumption is notably larger.
- ii) ***A positive and regressive ‘income effect’.*** All the options generally lead to an increase of labour and capital income, which benefits more the households in the second half of the income distribution.<sup>107</sup> Differently from the ‘price

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<sup>106</sup> As emphasized earlier this approach ensures budget neutrality for modelling purposes, rather than defining how additional revenues from CBAM as an own resource could be used.

<sup>107</sup> It is worth noting that surveys data, such as EU-SILC, measure labour income much more accurately than capital income. Therefore, changes in labour-earning are the main driver of the overall income effects in our analysis.

effect', the 'income effect' produces a positive impact on household adjusted disposable incomes across the board. However, it is regressive: poorer households benefit relatively less, since they rely more on replacement income (such as pensions or unemployment benefits) or non-contributory cash benefits (such as social assistance). The revenue recycling possibly reinforces this regressivity, since many households at the bottom do not pay labour taxes, so they cannot benefit from this compensatory measure. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the overall distributional impacts remains very small.

The overall impact of all the CBAM options under consideration (cum the compensation mechanism) is however very small. That is because the expected changes in prices and incomes coming from the JRC-GEM-E3 model are very small and so is their impact on household adjusted disposable income. For example, for the first decile the impact on disposable income ranges from -0.11 % (Lithuania, option 6) to 0.07 % (Lithuania, options 1 and 2). Beyond the first decile, the largest negative impact across all countries and scenarios is observed in Greece and Romania, in their second decile, in option 6 (of about -0.06 %), while the largest positive impact is observed in Belgium (options 1 and 2, 9th decile: 0.24 %).

Options 1 and 2 have the lowest estimated impact on poorer household incomes, while options 4 and 6 display a larger impact. In these latter scenarios, the worst affected households are those in the first decile who experience a decrease in adjusted disposable income between -0.15-2.1 % (option 4, in Lithuania, Slovakia and Romania) and of 0.1 % (option 6, in Lithuania, Romania, Germany and Greece). On the other hand, in option 1/2 the largest fall in adjusted disposable income for households in the first decile is about a fifth of it (i.e. about -0.015 % in Denmark, Finland, France and Slovenia).

Within each CBAM scenario, results substantially vary across countries. This is due to the different impact that the CBAM produces on prices of each good category and on incomes in each country. Country disparities are also explained by the different consumption patterns across the income distribution and the income structure of households.

### *3.3 Distributional impacts of each policy option*

#### *Impacts of options 1 and 2*

Figure 10-5 presents the change in equivalized household adjusted disposable income, relative to disposable income, resulting from CBAM options 1 and 2.


Each figure groups six countries, which are classified according to the magnitude of the impact of the CBAM option over the first decile of the income distribution (household disposable income in the baseline). Figure 10-6(a) shows the group of countries with mildest impact on the first decile; 10-6(c) the countries with the strongest impact and 10-5(b) those in between.

Results for the 18 Member States suggest:


- In general, the impact of this CBAM option (combined with the compensation mechanism) over household incomes is positive for all households from the second decile onwards. That is because this policy option implies a larger effect in earnings than in prices. The overall impact however is of a very small magnitude, ranging from -0.015 % (Slovenia and Finland, 1<sup>st</sup> decile) to 0.24 % (Belgium, 9<sup>th</sup> decile).
- In more detail, the impact over the first decile ranges from 0.05–0.07 % for the cases of Slovakia and Lithuania, to -0.10 % for France and Slovenia. At the other extreme, Belgium is the country where the richest are relatively more benefited, with adjusted disposable income increasing by more than 0.23 % in the ninth and in the tenth decile.

**Figure 10-5. % change in adjusted disposable income resulting from Options 1 and 2**


a. Mildest effect on the first decile



b. Moderate (intermediate) effect on the first decile



c. Strongest negative effect on the first decile




Note: Plots show the total effect of the CBAM (including the compensatory measure) expressed as the % change in adjusted disposable income in relation to household disposable income in the baseline. Deciles of equivalent household disposable income in the baseline. Adjusted disposable income is the residual of household disposable income after the subtraction of indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties). The scaling of y-axis differs across the three groupings. Equivalence scales used are the standard ‘OECD-modified’ ones.

Source: European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, based on the Euromod model.



**Figure 10-6: % change in adjusted disposable income resulting from CBAM option 1/2: price and income effects country by country**



Note: Plots show the total effect of the CBAM (including the compensatory measure) expressed as the % change in adjusted disposable income in relation to household disposable income in the baseline. Deciles of equivalent household disposable income in the baseline. Adjusted disposable income is the residual of household disposable income after the subtraction of indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties). Equivalence scales used are the standard 'OECD-modified' ones.

Source: European Commission's Joint Research Centre, based on the Euromod model.

### Impacts of option 4

Figures 10-7 present the change in equivalised household adjusted disposable income, relative to disposable income, resulting from CBAM option 4.


Each figure groups a number of countries, classifying them according to the magnitude of the impact of the CBAM over the first decile of the income distribution. Figure 10-8(a) shows the group of countries with mildest impact on the first decile, 10-8(c) the countries with the strongest impact and 10-8(b) those in between.

Results for the 18 Member States suggest:


- In most countries, the impact of this CBAM option (combined with the compensatory measure) is negative for households in the first half of the distribution, whereas it is positive for households of the second half. Romania seems to be the only country where the richest are more severely affected than the poorest (although they all lose across the board), while Denmark and Cyprus show the more neutral/flat patterns (households are all similarly affected across the income distribution). The impact on household incomes is small in magnitude with the worst affected in Lithuania, suffering a loss worth about -0.21 % of their disposable income. At the other extreme, the richest households in Belgium experience a gain of about the same amount (i.e. around 0.14 %).

**Figure 10-7: % change in adjusted disposable income resulting from CBAM option 4**


a. Mildest effect on the first decile



b. Moderate (intermediate) effect on the first decile



c. Strongest negative effect on the first decile



Note: Plots show the total effect of the CBAM (including the compensatory measure) expressed as the % change in adjusted disposable income in relation to household disposable income in the baseline. Deciles of equivalent household disposable income in the baseline. Adjusted disposable income is the residual of household disposable income after the subtraction of indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties). The scaling of y-axis differs across the three groupings. Equivalence scales used are the standard 'OECD-modified' ones.

Source: European Commission's Joint Research Centre, based on the Euromod model.

**Figure 10-8: % change in adjusted disposable income resulting from CBAM option 4: price and income effects country by country**



Note: Plots show the total effect of the CBAM (including the compensatory measure) expressed as the % change in adjusted disposable income in relation to household disposable income in the baseline. Deciles of equivalent household disposable income in the baseline. Adjusted disposable income is the residual of household disposable income after the subtraction of indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties). Equivalence scales used are the standard 'OECD-modified' ones.

Source: European Commission's Joint Research Centre, based on the Euromod model.

Impacts of option 6

Figure 10-9 presents the change in equivalised household adjusted disposable income, relative to disposable income, resulting from option 6.


Each figure groups a number of countries, classifying them according to the magnitude of the impact of the CBAM over the first decile of the income distribution. Figure 10-9(a) shows the group of countries with mildest impact on the first decile, 10-9(c) the countries with the strongest impact and 10-9(b) those in between.

Results for the 18 Member States suggest:


- In most countries, the impact of this CBAM option (combined with the compensatory measure) is positive for all households situated on the third decile of the distribution onwards. It is, instead, often negative for households sitting in the first two deciles (with the main exception of Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Slovenia and Denmark).
- The impact on household incomes is small in magnitude, with the worst affected being Lithuania, Romania, Germany and Greece first decile households who are suffering a loss worth about -0.10 % of their disposable income. At the other extreme, the richest households in Belgium and Cyprus experience a gain in excess of 0.15 %.

**Figure 10-9: % change in adjusted disposable income resulting from Option 6**


a. Mildest effect on the first decile



b. Moderate (intermediate) effect on the first decile




c. Strongest negative effect on the first decile



Note: Plots show the total effect of the CBAM (including the compensatory measure) expressed as the % change in adjusted disposable income in relation to household disposable income in the baseline. Deciles of equivalent household disposable income in the baseline. Adjusted disposable income is the residual of household disposable income after the subtraction of indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties). The scaling of y-axis differs across the three groupings. Equivalence scales used are the standard 'OECD-modified' ones.

Source: European Commission's Joint Research Centre, based on the Euromod model.

**Figure 10-10: % change in adjusted disposable income resulting from CBAM option 6: price and income effects country by country**



Note: Plots show the total effect of the CBAM (including the compensatory measure) expressed as the % change in adjusted disposable income in relation to household disposable income in the baseline. Deciles of equivalent household disposable income in the baseline. Adjusted disposable income is the residual of household disposable income after the subtraction of indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties). Equivalence scales used are the standard 'OECD-modified' ones.

Source: European Commission's Joint Research Centre, based on the Euromod model.

#### 4. Results for option 4 including impacts of resource shuffling

Resource shuffling may occur in all options where imports may be subject to a CBAM based on actual emissions, in practice options 1 to 5.

To assess the potential impacts of resource shuffling, a variant of option 4 was also modelled introducing the assumption that exporters to the EU would be able to claim lower emission intensities. Based on available estimates in the literature –as discussed in the main report- these were assumed to be 50 % lower for cement and iron and steel, and 80 % lower for aluminium. No resource shuffling was assumed for fertilisers as no reliable estimates could be sourced from available studies. The results as compared to the main findings are presented in Table 10-5 below.

**Table 10-5: Impacts on carbon leakage, emissions, imports and revenues with and without resource shuffling (in 2030)**

	MIX	MIX full auctioning	Option 4	Option 4 with resource shuffling
Carbon Leakage (%)				
Iron and Steel	8	37	-24	0
Cement and Lime	4	31	7	13
Aluminium	24	36	-89	8
Change in Emissions in the EU (% change from baseline)				
Iron and Steel	-14.5	-17.4	-14.6	-15.4
Cement and Lime	-11.9	-16.0	-14.0	-14.2
Aluminium	-10.0	-16.9	-12.6	-13.9
Change in Emissions in the non-EU (% change from baseline)				
Iron and Steel	0.14	0.72	-0.44	-0.02
Cement and Lime	0.03	0.27	0.05	0.10
Aluminium	0.13	0.25	-0.03	0.17
Imports of CBAM sectors (% change from baseline)				
Iron and Steel	1.45	11.01	-11.98	-2.38
Cement and Lime	3.39	45.88	-15.12	6.97
Aluminium	2.07	3.64	-4.41	1.75
Revenue <sup>108</sup> (bn Euro)				
Revenue from auctioning			7.0	6.9
Revenue collected at the border			2.1	1.3
Total revenue			9.1	8.2

Source: JRC-GEM-E3

<sup>108</sup> Includes fertilisers



## 5. Implied CBAM tariff equivalent

Tariff equivalents were estimated on the basis of model results. They are based on the ratio of revenue generated from the carbon price applied to implied emissions of imports in the CBAM sectors over the corresponding import flow (CIF).

**Table 10-6: Implied tariff equivalent by different CBAM sectors - 2030**

	<b>Iron and Steel</b>	<b>Cement and Lime</b>	<b>Fertiliser</b>	<b>Aluminium</b>	<b>CBAM sectors</b>
<b>Options 1 and 2</b>	2.8%	9.9%	3.0%	0.6%	2.3%
<b>Option 3</b>	5.1%	13.5%	8.3%	1.1%	4.4%
<b>Option 4</b>	4.2%	9.8%	7.5%	0.9%	3.6%
<b>Option 5</b>	5.1%	13.5%	8.3%	1.1%	4.4%

Source: JRC-GEM-E3

**Table 10-7: Implied tariff equivalent by different downstream sectors - 2030**

	<b>Other non-ferrous metals</b>	<b>Chemical Products</b>	<b>Electric Goods</b>	<b>Transport Equipment</b>	<b>Other Equipment</b>	<b>Consumer Goods</b>
<b>Option 5</b>	0.03%	0.08%	0.02%	0.03%	0.14%	0.02%

Source: JRC-GEM-E3

## ANNEX 11: EVIDENCE OF CARBON LEAKAGE

The existence of carbon leakage is assessed in different ways. A number of studies are carried out as *ex-ante* analyses using simulation models. These often find a substantial risk of carbon leakage in the absence of carbon leakage protection mechanisms such as free allocation of carbon allowances. Böhringer et al. present the estimation of economy wide carbon leakage models<sup>109</sup> at an average of 10 % to 30 %. The percentage indicates the share of saved domestic emissions that are offset by increased emissions in other parts of the world. In a similar way, Branger and Quirion find a typical range of carbon leakage estimates between 5 % and 25 % with a mean at 14 % without any adjusting policy<sup>110</sup>. In these models, prices are a central factor in the quantification of carbon leakage as the simulations focus on the determination of price- elastic market supply and demand<sup>111</sup>. In other studies, partial equilibrium models are applied to specific industries. These studies tend to focus on emission-intensive and trade-exposed sectors and find higher leakage rates for these sectors in particular<sup>112</sup>.

*Ex-post* studies quantify the existence of carbon leakage based on trade flows and embodied GHG emissions. Many of these types of studies do not find substantial levels of carbon leakage from existing mechanisms like the EU ETS. Branger et al. did not find evidence for effects on trade in emission-intensive and trade-exposed sectors caused by the EU ETS<sup>113</sup>. Similarly, Naegele and Zaklan conclude that carbon leakage has not occurred, based on input-output data and administrative data of the EU ETS<sup>114</sup>. In a review study, Dechezlepretre and Sato conclude the same but also explain that in existing mechanisms, the cost of the environmental legislation has been relatively low in comparison to overall trade volume and value<sup>115</sup>. If other costs like tariffs and transportation outweigh the carbon price, relocation of production is not attractive<sup>116</sup>.

The differences in results between the types of studies indicate that carbon leakage protection measures have been successful to date, while higher carbon prices and

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<sup>109</sup> Böhringer, C., Carbone, J. C., & Rutherford, T. F., 'Embodied Carbon Tariffs', *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 120(1), 2018, pp.183–210. <https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12211>

<sup>110</sup> Branger, F., & Quirion, P., 'Would border carbon adjustments prevent carbon leakage and heavy industry competitiveness losses? Insights from a meta-analysis of recent economic studies', *Ecological Economics*, Vol 99, 2014, pp.29–39. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.12.010>

<sup>111</sup> Böhringer, C., Carbone, J. C., & Rutherford, T. F., 'Embodied Carbon Tariffs', *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 120(1), 2018, pp.183–210. <https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12211>

<sup>112</sup> Demailly, D., & Quirion, P., 'European Emission Trading Scheme and competitiveness: A case study on the iron and steel industry', *Energy Economics*, 30(4), 2008, pp. 2009–2027. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2007.01.020>

<sup>113</sup> Branger F., Quirion, P., & Chevallier, J., 'Carbon Leakage and Competitiveness of Cement and Steel Industries Under the EU ETS: Much Ado About Nothing', *The Energy Journal*, 37(3), 2016, pp. 109–135. <https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.37.3.fbra>

<sup>114</sup> Naegele, H., & Zaklan, A., 'Does the EU ETS cause carbon leakage in European manufacturing?' *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 93, 2019, pp. 125–147. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.11.004>

<sup>115</sup> Dechezleprêtre, A., & Sato, M., 'The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Competitiveness', *Review of Environmental and Economics and Policy*, vol. 11(2), 2017, pp. 183–206.

<sup>116</sup> Naegele, H., & Zaklan, A., 'Does the EU ETS cause carbon leakage in European manufacturing?' *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 93, 2019, pp. 125–147. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.11.004>

declining free allocation can result in an increased leakage risk and thus alter the results. These considerations align the results of *ex-ante* and *ex-post* studies by explaining the differences. *Ex-ante* studies often assume the absence of carbon-leakage protection mechanisms. However, policy makers have always accompanied carbon pricing mechanisms with special provisions, such as, free allowance allocation or carbon tax exemptions, to avoid the risk of carbon leakage. In *ex-post* studies of existing carbon pricing mechanisms, these leakage protection measures are therefore included. Additionally, analytic and empirical evidence shows that as a result of the existing leakage protection mechanisms, the carbon price signal has been significantly reduced<sup>117</sup>.

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<sup>117</sup> Neuhoff, K., & Ritz, R., ‘Carbon cost pass-through in industrial sectors’, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.46544>